# RAM DAYAL v. BRURAJ SINGH AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1970] 1 S.C.R. 530
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-04-30
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1526 of 1968
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-dayal-v-bruraj-singh-and-ors-4655
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Representatio11 of the People Act, 1951, ss. 31(1), 77(1) 81(1)-/f
8
111attrial an1tndml!nl of tltction petition can ht allowed after .txptry oj
ptrlod In S. 81(1) within which pttitlon Itself must be filed-Signature
end authentication of ptlition urrdtr S. 31(1)-J/ authentication can bt
done .tubsequtnt to prt.ftntation of petition-Voluntary expenses to help
canclidate's election-If liablt to bt included H:ithin limits ur1tr S. 77( 1).
C
The ftm responoent was elected to the Madhya Pradesh Legislative
Assembly in February 1967. The appellant, o voter in the constituency.
challenged his election by an election petition claiming that the nomination
paper of one D was ill<gally rejected by the Returning Officer and that
1hc respondent had committed several corrupt practices; it was aha allege.ct
that the Mahasaja and Rajmata of Gwalior had helped the first mpondent's
election in a number of ways and had in effect acted as his agents and had
D
incurred considerable expenditure which exceeded the limils prescribed
hy the statute. The High Court dismissed the pe1i1ion and also dismissed
an application ri1adc by the petilioner for an1enJment of 1he petition to
include a new allegation on the ground that it \\"'15 made after the expiry
of the period prescribed for filing an eltction petition.
On appeal to this Cl)Urt,
HELD : Dismissing the appeal : (i) The High Court bad rightly held
that it coul<l nol exercise ii' power to p.!rmil amendment of a pelition so
as 10 allow ncy.· grounds or charges to he raio;~d or the charact~r of the
petilion to he so alrcre<l a.;, to make it in suhstancc a new petition, if a
fresh petition on those allegations '"·ould be barred on the d;1tc of the
proposed amendment.
llarish Clumrf,.a Bajpai v. Trilok; Sin<I• [ 1957[ S.C.R. 370; followed.
(ii) The mark made by the proposer on IYs nomination paper was
not authenricatcd er attestcJ by one of the dco;ignaled officers as requir~<l
under"'· 31(1) read "'ith tn~ definition of the C"'(prcssion "sign·· ins. !(il
of the Representation of the People Act. 1951. and the provisions of r. 2(~)
oi the Conduct of EJection Rule". 1961.
It \\·:ts rhcrcforc ri~htly rejected
by the Returning Officer.
The requirement or s. 33(1) of the Act th:-.t thr nomination shall be
siancd by the candidate and by the prop~r is
mandatory.
Signing,
\Vbencver signature is necessary, must be in strict accordance v.·irh lhe
requirements of the Act and where the signature cunn0t be made ii "n1ust
be authorised in the manner prescribed by the Rl!lcs."
Attestation is not
a mere technical or umuhstantial requtrement wi1hin the meaning o{
s. 36(4) of the Act and cannot be dispensed with. The attestation and
the satisfaction must exist at the stage of prcsenlation and nmis.sion ot
such an essential feature may not be subsequently va1idatcd ~t !he !ltagc
of scrutiny any more lhan the omission of a candidate to sign at alt could
have heen. [532 F. 533 D-F]
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RAM DAYAL v. BRIJRAJ SINGH (Shah, J.)
531
Rattan Anmol Singh and Another v. Atma Ram & Others [1955]
I S.C.R. 481; referred 10.
(iii) The High Court had rigHtly held on the evidence that none of
the corrupt practices alleged was proved.
Unless it is established that expenditure was incurred in. connection
with the election by the candidate or by his election agent or was autho·
rised by him it is not liable to be included under s. 77 of the Representation
of the People Act.
Expenses incurred by any other agent or person
without anything more need not be included in t.he account or return,
as such incurring of expenditure would be purely voluntary.
Assuming
in the present case . that expenditure· was incurred by the Maharaj a an.d the
Rajmata of Gwalior for the purpose of canvassing votes against the principal
candidate opposina the first respondent, in the absence of any evidence
to show that 1.be Mabaraja and the Rajmata of Gwalior acted as election
agents of the first respondent or the ~xpenditure was authorised by

## Text

530
RAM DAYAL
A
v.
BRURAJ SINGH AND ORS.
April 30, 1969
[J. C. SHAH AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)
Representatio11 of the People Act, 1951, ss. 31(1), 77(1) 81(1)-/f
8
111attrial an1tndml!nl of tltction petition can ht allowed after .txptry oj
ptrlod In S. 81(1) within which pttitlon Itself must be filed-Signature
end authentication of ptlition urrdtr S. 31(1)-J/ authentication can bt
done .tubsequtnt to prt.ftntation of petition-Voluntary expenses to help
canclidate's election-If liablt to bt included H:ithin limits ur1tr S. 77( 1).
C
The ftm responoent was elected to the Madhya Pradesh Legislative
Assembly in February 1967. The appellant, o voter in the constituency.
challenged his election by an election petition claiming that the nomination
paper of one D was ill<gally rejected by the Returning Officer and that
1hc respondent had committed several corrupt practices; it was aha allege.ct
that the Mahasaja and Rajmata of Gwalior had helped the first mpondent's
election in a number of ways and had in effect acted as his agents and had
D
incurred considerable expenditure which exceeded the limils prescribed
hy the statute. The High Court dismissed the pe1i1ion and also dismissed
an application ri1adc by the petilioner for an1enJment of 1he petition to
include a new allegation on the ground that it \\"'15 made after the expiry
of the period prescribed for filing an eltction petition.
On appeal to this Cl)Urt,
HELD : Dismissing the appeal : (i) The High Court bad rightly held
that it coul<l nol exercise ii' power to p.!rmil amendment of a pelition so
as 10 allow ncy.· grounds or charges to he raio;~d or the charact~r of the
petilion to he so alrcre<l a.;, to make it in suhstancc a new petition, if a
fresh petition on those allegations '"·ould be barred on the d;1tc of the
proposed amendment.
llarish Clumrf,.a Bajpai v. Trilok; Sin<I• [ 1957[ S.C.R. 370; followed.
(ii) The mark made by the proposer on IYs nomination paper was
not authenricatcd er attestcJ by one of the dco;ignaled officers as requir~<l
under"'· 31(1) read "'ith tn~ definition of the C"'(prcssion "sign·· ins. !(il
of the Representation of the People Act. 1951. and the provisions of r. 2(~)
oi the Conduct of EJection Rule". 1961.
It \\·:ts rhcrcforc ri~htly rejected
by the Returning Officer.
The requirement or s. 33(1) of the Act th:-.t thr nomination shall be
siancd by the candidate and by the prop~r is
mandatory.
Signing,
\Vbencver signature is necessary, must be in strict accordance v.·irh lhe
requirements of the Act and where the signature cunn0t be made ii "n1ust
be authorised in the manner prescribed by the Rl!lcs."
Attestation is not
a mere technical or umuhstantial requtrement wi1hin the meaning o{
s. 36(4) of the Act and cannot be dispensed with. The attestation and
the satisfaction must exist at the stage of prcsenlation and nmis.sion ot
such an essential feature may not be subsequently va1idatcd ~t !he !ltagc
of scrutiny any more lhan the omission of a candidate to sign at alt could
have heen. [532 F. 533 D-F]
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RAM DAYAL v. BRIJRAJ SINGH (Shah, J.)
531
Rattan Anmol Singh and Another v. Atma Ram & Others [1955]
I S.C.R. 481; referred 10.
(iii) The High Court had rigHtly held on the evidence that none of
the corrupt practices alleged was proved.
Unless it is established that expenditure was incurred in. connection
with the election by the candidate or by his election agent or was autho·
rised by him it is not liable to be included under s. 77 of the Representation
of the People Act.
Expenses incurred by any other agent or person
without anything more need not be included in t.he account or return,
as such incurring of expenditure would be purely voluntary.
Assuming
in the present case . that expenditure· was incurred by the Maharaj a an.d the
Rajmata of Gwalior for the purpose of canvassing votes against the principal
candidate opposina the first respondent, in the absence of any evidence
to show that 1.be Mabaraja and the Rajmata of Gwalior acted as election
agents of the first respondent or the ~xpenditure was authorised by him
ii was not liable to be included in the account of the election expenses.
[541 D-Fl
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1526 of
1968,
Appeitl under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated May 4, 1968 of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. 39 of 1967.
G. L. Sanghi, So/Jhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the
appellant.
H. R. Gokhale, P. L. Dubey, Rameshwar Nuth and Mahinder
Narain, for respondent No. 1.
V. C. Parashar, for respondent No. 4.
'J;he Judgment o~ the Court was delivered by
Shah, J.
At the general elections held in February
i 967,
Brijraj Singh (first ~pondent in this appeal) was declared elected
to a seat in the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Qom the
Sabalgarh Constituency defeating his rival candidate Raja
Pancham Singh by 1706 votes.
The appellant Ram Dayal who
is a voter in the cqnstituency moved an election petition in the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh for an order setting aside the
election on two gro~nds :
( 1) that tbC nomination paper of one Dhani Rarr;
was
illegally rejected by the Returning Officer; and
(2) that Brijraj Singh and his agents committed several
com1pt practices in relation to the electio11.
A third ground tha~ Dataram (third respondent in this appeal)
when his nomination was accepted was below the age of 25 and
was on that account incompetent to stand for election, was souaht
to set up a new ~nd made after the expiry of the period p!estion. The application was disallowed by the High Court. The
High Court held that an application for amendment which sought
to be set up by an application for amendment of the election peticribed for filling an; election petition cannot 1:-e entertained.
On
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] l S.C.R
a consideration of the evidence the High Court rejected the other
grounds, and dismissed the petition.
The appellant bas appealed
to this Court.
An election petition has, under s. 81 ( 1) of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951, to be filed within 45 days of the date of
the publication of the result of the election.
An application for
setting aside the election, that Dataram was below the age of 25
and on that account the election was liable to be set aside under
s. 100( l)(d)(i) of the Act made on August 15, 1967, would
plainly have been barred, and by amendment the ground could
not be permitted to be added.
This Court in Harish Chandra
Bajpai v. Trilo[ci Singh(') held that the Election Tribunal bas
power to allow an amendment in respect of particulars of illegal
and corrupt practices, or to permit new instances to be included,
provided -the grounds or charges are specifically stated
in
the
petition, but its power to permit amendment of a petition under
0. VI r. 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not be exercised
so as to allow new grounds or charges to be raised or the character
of the petition to be 'o altered as to .nake it in substance a new
petition, if a flesh petition on those allegations would on the date
of the proposed amendment be barred.
By the amendment a
new ground for setting aside the election was sought to be introduced, and the High Court was right in rejecting the application
for amendment.
The plea that the rejection of the nomination paper of Dhani
Ram by the Returning officer was illegal has no substance.
On
January 19, 1967 Dhani Ram delivered to the Returning Officer
two nomination papers signed by him.
Each nomination paper
bore a thumb impression of one Gokla as the proposer.
But the
thumb impressions were not authenticated or attested in the presence of the Returning officer or any other officer specified in the
Rules.
The Returning Officer rejected the nomination papers.
Sec. 33 ( 1) of the Representation of the People Act,
1951.
requires that each candidate shall deliver to the returning officer
a nomination paper completed in the prescribed form and signed
by the candidate and by an elector of the comtituency as proposer.
The expression "sign" is defined in s. 2(i) of the Act as
amended by Act 27 of 1956 as meaning "in relation to a person
who is U4lable to write his name authenticate in such manner as
may be prescribed".
Rule 2(2) of the
Conduct of Election
Rules. 1961 provides :
"For the purposes of the Act or these rules, a person
who is unable to write his name shall, unless otherwise
expressly provided in these rules, be deemed to have
signed an instrument .or other paper if111 (1957) S.C.R. 370.
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RAM DAYAL v. BRIJRAJ SINGH (Shah, i.)
533<
la)
(b)
he has placed a mark on such instrument or
other paper in the presence of the Returning
officer or· the Presiding officer or such other
officer as may be specified in this behalf by the
Election Commission.
such officer on being satisfied as to his identity
has attested the mark as being the mark of that
person."
Where a person is unab~ to write his name, he may place his
mark on the instrument or other paper and the requirements of
law are complied with, provided he puts the mark in the presence
of the Returning officer o' the Presiding officer or such other
officer as may be specified in that behalf by the Election Commission and such officer on being satisfied as to his identity attests.
the mark as being the mark of that person.
Gok!a was illiterate.
He impressed his thumb mark on the nomination paper : but it
was not placed in the presence of any of the designated officers,
nor was there any authentication or attestation of the thu..'llb-mark.
The requirement under s. 33 ( 1) of the Act that the nomination
shall be signed by the candidate and by the proposer is mandatory.
Signing, whenever signature is necessary, must be in strict
accordance with the requirements of the Act and where the signature cannot be written it must be authorised in the manner prescribed by the Rules.
Attestation is not a mere technical or un3ubstantia! requirement within the meaning of s. 36 ( 4) of the
Act. and cannot be dispensed with.
The attestation and the satisfaction must exist at the stage· of presentation and omission of
such an essential feature may not be subsequently validated at the
stage of scrutiny any more than the omission of a candidate to
sign. at all could have been : Rattan Anmol Singh and Another v.
4tma Ram & Others.('). The nomination papers of Dhani Ram
were filed on the last day fixed for receiving the nomination
papers.
Not being attested as required by law on the date of
filing, the defect could not be rectijied at the .time of scrutiny.
Evidence of witnesses for the appellant who deposed that that at
the date of scrutiny, Gokla was present outside the office of the
Returning Officer and that Dhani Ram brought to the notice of .the
Returning Officer that· Gokla was present and that his sipture·
may be attested, and that the Returning officer declined to accede I
to the request need JJOt be considered.
The Returning officer
could not allow' Dhani Ram or his proposer to rectify the defect ·
in the nomination papers after the last date of nomination .
.• Several corrupt practices were set up in the petition.
The
~\!fl! practices relied upon by the appellant in this appeal may
be bi-Qadly classifi~ under three heads :
----'~-------------
<lf'(l.955] I S.C.R. 4ft1.
534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] I S.C.R.
(I) that on January 19, 1967, Brijraj Singh paid
Rs. 250 to Sone Ram respondent No. 5 at
Morena and successfully persuaded him not to
file his nomination paper.
(2) that Brijraj Singh and his agents
toured
the
constituency in a jeep fitted with a microphone
and visited many villages and delivered speeches
reflecting upon the character and conduct of
Raja Pancham Singh a candidate sponsored by
the Congress Party.
A
One Chhotey Lal respondent No. 4 was
made to
contest the election by Brijraj Singh to "devide the votes
of Raja Pancham Singh" and that
Chhotey Lal who
C
supported the candidature of Brijraj Singh made statemQDts between January 20, 1967
and February 19,
1967 and distributed leaflets containing statements of
fact relating to the personal character and conduct of
Raja Pancham Singh which were false to the knowledge o( Chhotey Lal or who did not believe them to
D
be true, and that the leaflets were issued and circulated
with the CO!!ISent of Brijraj Singh, :\Dd
(3) that the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior accompanied by Brijraj Singh visited several villages
in a helicopter and addressed election meetings
in support of the candidature of Brijraj Singh
E
and the Maharaja acted as his agent and
incurred expenditure for carrying on election propaganda : if the expenditure incurred for the
purpose of obtaining the use of the
helicopter
and a fleet of motor cars used by him were
taken into acc.,unt, such expenses being incurred
or authorised by Brijraj Sfngh would considera·
F
bly exceed the limit prescribed by the statute.
In the view of the High Court Chhotey Lal did commit a cor·
rupt practice in that he distributed on January 29, 1967 at Kelaras
village leaflets containing statement' of fact relating to the personal conduct of Raja Pancham Singh. but it was not proved that
Chhotey Lal contested the election at the instance of Bri jra j Singh
G
"to divide the votes of Raja Pancham Singh" or that he was the
agent at any time of Brijraj Singh
nor was
it proved
that
Chhotey Lal had ever supported the candidature of Brijraj Singh
or that any pamphlet of the nature circulated by Chhotey Lal was
issued or circulated by Brijraj Singh.
In that view the
Hi!!h
Court held that the election of Brijraj Singh was not materially
H
affected by the candidature of Chhotey Lal.
The High Court
rejected the contention of the appellant that Brijraj Singh committed other corrupt practices alleged.
The High Court accordll
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RAM DAYAL v. BlUJRAJ SINGH (Shah, J.)
535
ingly passed an order declaring that the appellant had failed to
establish that Brijraj Singh had committed any corrupt practice
with which he was charged.
The High Court dismissed the election petition tiled by the appellant with costs, but declared that
the 4tl\_ reipondent Chhotey Lal was guilty of the corrupt practice
within the meaning of s. 123(4) of the Act and
was ·on that
account disqualified for a period of six years from the date of the
order under s. BA of the Act.
Against that order this appea; has
been preferred by the appellant.
Chhotey Lal has not appealed against the order
r~corded
against him. He is impleaded as a party-respondent and he has
appeared before this Court through counsel.
At the hearing
counsel appearing for Chhotey Lal urged that the finding of the
High Court that Chhotey Lal was guilty of the corrupt practice
charged against him is contrary to evidence.
But in the absence
of an appeal filed by Chhotey Lal the ground cannot be permitted
to be agitated by hun.
The appeal was filed by the appellant·
challenging the order of the High Court refusing to set aside the
election of Brijraj Singh on the three grounds set out hereinbefore.
The scope of the am>eal cannot be expanded by permitting
Chhofoy Lal who could have, but has not chosen to app.eal, to
plead that he has not committed any acts amounting to a corrupt
practice.
The case that Brijraj Singh gave Rs. 250 to Sone Ram and
induced him to withdraw his candidature is
unreliable. One
Shanker Lal deposed that on January 19, 1967, he met Brijraj
Singh and Sane RaJI1c in the compound of the office of the Colicctor,
Morena, and the fotmer induced Sane Ram not to contest the
election and offered to pay a bribe of Rs. 250, and paid Rs. 250 to
Sone Ram.
According to the witness there were several persons
pre.sent at the time when the bribe was offered and paid, but none
of those persons was called as a witness on behalf of the appelant.
One Tikaram who was alleged to be present was examined on
behalf of Brijraj Singh and he denied that any such offer was made
or bribe paid.
Some Ram also denied that he had received any
bribe from Brijraj Singh.
He stated that he had borrowed
Rs. 200 from his' maternal uncle to deposit the amount for his
candidature but since his maternal uncle declined to incur any
further expenditure and dissuaded him from contesting the election he had to abuldon his candidature.
In the opinion of the
Trial Judge the witness Shanker Lal was an untruthful witness
and we sec no reason to disagree with that view.
8
We may now tum to the plea that Brijraj Singh made false
allegations against the personal conduct and character of Raja
Pancham Singh orally and by circulating pamphlets, on which a
great deal of argument was advanced before us. It was the case
Ll4 Sup, C.I./69-S
536
SUPREME COUil! REPORTS
[1970] I S.C.R.
of tho appellimt that Brijraj Singh and his two workers Laxml
A
chand and Shankarlal VJSited several villag~ bet~een F ebmary
2, 1967 and February 26, 1967, m connection with the election
campaign and made false statements against the character and
conduct of Pancham Singh in the meetings held in those villages
and "in door to door canvassing in" those villages.
Those allega'. ,
tions are denied by Brijraj Singh and by Laxmichand and Shankar • B
Jal.
The case of the appellant was that these allegations
w~re
made in the course of the election propaganda in ten villages. but
evidence was led in respect of statements made in six villages. It
is said th3t Drijraj Singh and his supporters visited the village
Narhela and held a meeting in
that village.
One Dhan;ram
<tated that a meeting was held at the village Narhela,
but the
witness did not say that either Brijraj Singh or his workers made
C
any allegations against the personal character of Pancham Singh.
According to this witness Brijraj Singh merely
requested
the
persons assembled therein the meeting to vote for him.
Witness
Ghansu stated•that a meeting was held at the village Narhela and
the same was addressed by Brijraj Singh and Laxmichand
and
that these
two
persons
stated
that
Pancham
Singh
was
D
·•associating with dacoits" and had misappropriated money belonging to a school and had got the school closed and that whenever
any member of the legislative assembly sought to visit him he set
hi< dogs at him.
In the election petition there was no refertnce
to any meeting held at Narhela or of any offending statements mad~
at any such meeting. It was stated in paragraph IIl(a) of the
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election petition, in setting out the details of the cormpt practices.
that the first respondent
accompanied
by Laxmichand
and
Shankerlal toured in a jeep fitted with a microphone and visited
the village Narhela on Febmary 2, 1967 and canvassed
votes
going from door to door.
The witness Ghansu did not belong
to Narhela, and no witness from village Narhela was examined.
i Laxmichand, Shankerlal and Brijlal Singh denied that any stateF
ment against the personal conduct and character of Panch1m
Singh was made by them at Narhela either in any meeting or in
"door to door canvassing".
Phoolsingh-the only witness examined on behalf of the appellant-<lid not. support his ca<e
tliat
Singh at Budhreta.
About the village Khirla. witness Kesharsingh
stated that Brijraj Singh and ·Laxmichand had held meetines and
G
had 'nade statements against the personal conduct and character
of Pancham Singh.
But the witness did not belong to the villn?-c
Khirla : he is a resident of Pahadgarh village which is at a distance
of fifteen miles from Khirla.
No witness from Khirla was
~~
amined.
Witness Dataram said that at a meeting held at SujamJ.
Brijraj Sin2h had made any statements derogatory of Pancham
H
Pancham Singh." But the testimonv of the witne<s who is salcl
to be constantlv under "police surveillance" is unreliable.
About
the meeting held at Village Kelaras the appellant examined three
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RAM DAYAL v. BIUJRAJ SINGH (Shah, l.)
537
witnesses
Narayan, Kanhaiyalal and Sardarsingh.
The first two
witnesses said nothing about any statement made about the personal character of Raja Pancham Singh at the meeting.
Sardarsingh supported the case of the appellant, but the testimooy of the
witness was inconsistent with the case of the appellant.
About
the meeting held at village Kuloul\ the appellant examined wit·
ness Badri who stated that both Brijraj Singh and Laxmichand
had made statements derogatory of Pancham Singh.
His explanation about his presence at the village Kulouli was apparently
untrue and his testimony was otherwise unreliable.
The learned Judge summarised the evidence of the witnesse~
on behalf of the appellant and concl)lded that the appellant had
"miserably failed" to establish that Brijraj Singh and his agents
Laxmichand and Shankar Lal had made any statements derogatory
to the personal character of Pancham Singh.
In the view of the
learned Judge it was not proved that Brijraj Singh and his two
agents had made statements that Pancham Singh was an associate
of dacoits, nor was the ·statement that Pancham Singh had misappropriated the funds of the school proved.
The learned Judge
also held that the statem~nt alleged to have been made by Brijraj
Singh and his agents •that Pancham Singh was responsible
for
getting the school at Pahadgarh closed and that "he lets loose
ferocious dogs towards the persons who go to see him" were trivial
and did not involve apy moral turpitude, and even assuming that
those statements were made, no corrupt practice could we said to
have been committed on that account under s. 123 ( 4) of the
Act.
The learned Trial Judge found that Chhotey Lal committed a
corrupt practice by distributing pamphlets casting reflections upon
the personal character of Pancham Singh.
But in the view of the
learned Trial Judge there was no reliable evid®ce to prove that
ChhOtey Lal acted o.n behalf of Brijraj Singh or that the latter
defrayed the expenses of the pamphlet or that the agents of Brijraj
Singh distributed the offending pamphlets.
The leaned Judge
has carefully considered the evidence and no serious argument has
been advanced before us otn that part of the case which may justify
us in taking a different view.
Not a word was said that the exp~nses incurred by Chhotey Lal for getting the pamphlets printed
were reimbursed, nor was the evidence Qf the witnesses Sanwaldas
Gupta, Kalyansingh Tyagi examined on behalf of the appella,n1
that Brijraj Singh and his agents circulated !lie oamphlets true.
The learned Judge observed that the story that out of the 2,500
copies of the pamphlets printed, 2,000 copies of the pamphlet had
been handed over by Chhotey Lal to Brijraj Singh on the night
on· January 19, 1967, was "a clumsy and crud~ invention of these
two witnesses", and 'was utterly false and unrehable".
After con-
538
SUPREME COURT llEPORTS
[1970] 1 S.c.R.
sidering the various improbabilities and the discrepancies relating
to the testimony of the witnesses Sanwaldas Gupta and Kalyansi.ngh Tyagi, the learned Judge observed that these witnesses "invented lies" and did "their best to introduce clumsy and crude
improvements at the stage of evidence" with the "object of bolstering up" the appellant's case and through him that of Raja
Pancham Singh.
In his view the story that the pamphlet Annexure 'A' was issued or circulated with the consent of Brijraj Singh
was false.
The learned Judge also found on a consideration of
the e' idence that at no stage did Chhotey Lal support the candidature of Brijraj Singh and that it was not proved that the pamphlet Annexure 'A' was ever issued or circulated with the consent
of Brijraj S;'lgh.
In his view Brijraj Singh had no connection
with the printing and publication of the pamphlet and on that
account the plea of corrupt practice set out and founded on the
circulation of the pamphlet was not proved.
We 5CC no reason
to disagree with the view expressed by the learned Judge.
It was then urged that the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior in-
~urred considerable expenditure as agent of Brijraj Singh in CJUJ.-
vassing votes and the expenditure so incurred was liable to
be
included in the election expenses of Brijraj Singh. It was claimed
that the Maharaja and the Rajmata of Gwalior as a~nts of Brijraj
Singh took a leading part in canvassing votes in different villages
and in doing so used a helicopter and a fleet of motor cars and
spent large sums of money which were not disclosed in the account
<>f eleetion expenses filed by the first respondent Brijraj Singh.
Brijraj Singh had cQDtcsted the election as an independent
candidate.
But the appellant says that the Maharaja and the
Rajmata of Gwalior addressed election meetings and in those
meetings they declared that Brijraj Singh was sponsored as a candidate by them, and that the voters should support Brijraj Singh.
Brijraj Singh in his evidence stated that the Maharaja had the
"Central Election office of Maharaja Gwalior" representing the
alliance of various political parties and individuals opposed to the
Congress candidate and in propagating its views and policy during
the election this organisation also supported the candidates who
opposed Pancham Singh.
There was no reliable evideince that the canilidature of Brijraj
Singh was sponsored by the Maharaja and the Rajmata of Gwalior.
The opinion expressed by the witness Dataram cannot do duty for
evidence in support of the case of the appellant Sanwaldas
Gupta and Kalyansingh Tyagi stated that they had requested the
Maharaja to adopt Chhotey Lal as his canilidate for electiQD, but
they were told by the Maharaja that he had already decided to set
up Brijraj Singh as his candidate and that they also should actively
support him.
1be evidence of these witnesses 'tfllll found to be
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RAM DAYAL V. BRIJ:RAJ SINGH (Shah,!.)
539
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unreliable by the High Court. In our judgment the High Cou:t
has rightly rejected their testimony.
It was said that in certain
villages speeches were made by Brijraj Singh that he was set up
as a candidate by the Rajmata of Gwalior.
But there is no reliable evidence iin support of that case.
Reliance was strongly placed upon visits made by the Rajmata
B of Gwalior at villaiies Kelaras and Sabalgarh on Feb. 4 or Feb. 5,
1967, with a ll.eet of motor cars and about the speeches delivered
in those villages declaring that Brijraj Singh wa~ set up by her
and that the voters should vote for him and strengthen her hands.
It is also said that the Maharaja visited Kelaras, Pahadgarh,
Sujarma, Budhreta, Kulhouli, Sabalgarh, Jhunpura and Narhela
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~Feb. 11 or 12, 1967 in a helicopter and addressed meetings in
those villages and in his speeches declared that Brijraj Singh was
sponsored as a candidate by him and his mother and the voters
should vote for him.
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A large number of witnesses Keshrisingh, Narayaa Sardarsingh, Dhaniram, Phoolsingh, Kanhaiyalal, Mata Prasad, Dwarka
Prasad, Sanwaldas Gupta, Kalyansingh Tyagi, beliides the appellant, were examined in support of that case. Brijraj Singh admitted that on Feb. 4 or 5, 1967, the Rajmata had visited the villages
Kelaras andi Sabalgarh and had addressed meetings in those villages.
But he denied 'that she declared in those meetings that he
was set up as a CSJ!!didate by her. He further stated that the
Maharaja had visited on Feb. 11 or 12, 1967, fin villages,
Kelaras, Pahadgarh,,' Budhreta, Jhundpura and Sabalgarh in a
helicopter and addressed meetings in those villages. But in none
of those meetings dld he declare that Brijraj Singh was a candidate set up by the Maharaja. The witnesses examined on behalf
of the appellant were. in view of their general tenor, found unreliable.
The learned Judge therefore stated his conclusion that
on Feb. 4 or 5, 1967 the Rajmata of Gwalior visited two villages,
Kelaras and Sabalguh and addressed meetings there; and her son
the Maharaja visittid five villages, namely, Kelaras, Pahadgarh,
Budhreta, Jhundpura and Sabalgarh in a helicopter on or about
Feb. 11 or 12, 1967 and addressed meetings there, but there was
no reliable evidence to prove that Brijraj Singh was sponsored as
a candidate by the Rajmata or the Maharaja of Gwalior. In the
view of the learned Judge the testimony of the witnesses on behalf
of the appellant was "so thoroughly unreliable" that no reliance
could be placed upon it.
He concluded, after considering the evidence of Budharairi, lhat Brijraj Singh was an independent candidate and ci>ntested the election as an independent candidate, and
even though llleetings were addressed by the Maharaja and his
mother-the Rajmata--they did not say that Brijraj Singh was
set up as their candidate." We have carefully gone through tbe
evidence of the witness and heard the arguments advanced at the
540
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1970) l S.CR
Bar and see no reason to disagree with the view taken by the
learned Judge.
The evidence of the witnesses that Brijraj Singh travelled with
the :vJaharaja of Gwalior in his helicopter and visited several vii·
]ages for his election campaign was also unreliable and was, in
our judgment, rightly disbelieved. The evidence shows that when
the :.taharaja visited the village Kelaras the only occupants in the
helicopter were the Maharaja and lhe pilot and that Brijraj Singh
.va1 not in the helicopter when
the
Maharaja visited Kelaras.
Similarly about the village Jhundpura there is evidence that Brijraj Singh was noc with the Maharaja in the helicopter. About the
village
Budhreta
the witness Phoolsingh deposed that Brijraj
Singh was in the helicopter travelling with the Maharaja. But from
the cross-examination of the witness it appears that his testimony
was "worthless."
The testimony of Phoolsingh
was
inconsistent with the testimony of Ramcharanlal--Sarpanch of the village.
Similarly about the visit to Sabalgarh village two of the witnesses
ex:•mined "ere Budhram and Sanwaldas Gupta.
Budhram said
nothing about Ilrijraj Singh accompanying the Maharaja in th~
helicopter. Sanwaldas Gupta supported the case of the appellant.
but having rc~ard to hi' interest in the appellant and the general_
unreliability of his testimony. he could not be believed.
About
the village J>ahadgarh. according to Mata Prasad examined on
behalf of the appellant. Ilrijraj Singh was in the helicopter anJ
the witness claimed that he had taken photographs of Brijraj Singh
while he was in the helicopter. We have seen the original photo·
graph' Exts. p.J !A. P-1 IB. P-12A. P-12B. P-13A and P-14A
which arc in respect of the journeys by th6 helicopter, the helicopter getting ready for take off. of the meetings addressed by the
\1aharaja and of the occupants in the helicopter. Some of the
photographs are so
hazy and indistinct that it is impossible to
identify any one in the group. For instance the photograph Ext.
P-13A in which it is claimed that Brijraj Singh was in the helicopter shows merely a. smudge and it is impossible to say that any
one was sitting in the helicopter. In the view of the learned Judge
the witness Mata Prasad and Dwarka Prasad had been tutored to
give false testimony
that
Brijraj
Singh had accompanied the
Maharaja at the time when the helicopter landed and also when
it took off and on the consideration of the evidence it was established that Brijraj Singh was not with the Maharaja of Gwalior
either at the time when the helicopter landed at the five vil!agesKelaras. Jhundpura, Budhreta. Sabalgarh and Pahadgarh or when
the heliropter took off. The learned Trial Judge disbelieved the
witness Mata Prasad. We have scrutinized the evidence of Mata
Prasad and have seen the original photographs and have no doubt
that the learned Judge was right in holding that the testimony of
the witness Mata Prasad was unreliable.
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RAM DAYAL v. BRIJRAJ SINGH (Shah, J.)
541
In the absence of any connection between the canvassing activities carried on by the Maharaja and the Rajmata with the candidature of Brijraj Singh, it is impossible to hold that any expenditure was incurred for Brijraj Singh which was liable to be
included in the election expenses of the first respondent. Under
s. 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the incurring or authorizing of expenditure in contravention of s. 77 is
a corrnpt practice and s. 77 provides, insofar as it is material :
" ( 1) Every candidate at an election shall, either
by himself or by his election agent, keep a separate and
correct account of all expenditure in connection with
the election incurred or authorised by h;m or by his
election agent between the date of publication of the
notification calling the election and the date of declaration of the result thereof, both dates inclusive.
(2)
( 3) The total of the said expenditure shall not exceed such amount as may be prescribed."
Unless it is established that the expenditure was incurred in connection with the election by the candidate or by his election agent
or was authorised by him it is not liable to be included under s. 77
of the Representation of the People Act. We agree with the High
Court that under s. 77 ( 1) only the expenditure incurred or authorised by the candidate himself or by his election agent is required
to be included in the account or return of election expenses and
thus expenses incurred by any other agent or person without anything more need net be included iu the account or return, as such
incurring of expenditure would be purely voluntarv. Assuming.
that expenditure was incurred by the Maharaja and the Rajmatl
for the purpose of canvassing votes against Raja Pancham Singh.
in the absence of any evidence to show that the Maharaja and the
Rajmata of Gwalior acted as election agents of Brijraj Singh or
the expenditure was authorised by Brijraj Singh it was not liable
to be included in the account of the election expenses.
We agree with the High Court that there is no evidence on
the record to prove that Brijraj Singh actually spent any money
on the helicopter used by the Maharaja in visiting the five villages
and the two cars used by the Rajmata in visiting the two villages.
There is no evidence on the record direct or circumstantial to
prove that Brijraj Singh had authorised the Maharaja and his
mother to incur the expenditure on the helicopter and the two
cars. It is not necessary then to consider whether the expenditure
incurred by the Maharaja and the Rajmata of Gwalior in respect
of the helioopter and the motor cars can be said to be expenditure incurred by a political party for carrying on propaganda to
542
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[lgJ0] 1 S.C.R.
promote their views and their party interest and their policies and
to educate the electoral constituency, and on that account is not
liable to be included in the election expenses of the candidate.
Having carefully considered the evidence and having heard
the arguments advanced at the Bar at considerable length, we are
of the view that the appellant has failed to establish that Brijraj
Singh was set up as a candidate by the Maharaja or the Rajmata
of Gwalior as their nominee or that the Maharaja and the Rajmata
had incurred any expenditure as an agent of Brijraj Singh or the
expenditure incurred by the Maharaja and the Rajmata of Gwalior
was authorized by Brijraj Singh and was liable to be included in
his account of election expenses under s. 77 of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs in favour of the
first respondent. The order of costs in favour of the 4th respondent passed by the High Court is set aside.
RK.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
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