# RAM GOPAL v. AN ANT PRASAD AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 692
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-04-21
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 284 of 1958
- **Bench:** S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar, K. SuBBA RAO
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-gopal-v-an-ant-prasad-and-another-1728
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Appeal-Maintainability-Permit to run stage carriage-Application for renewal-New applicant's application for permit-Order
by State Transport Authority renewing permit but no order passed on
new applicant's application-Appeal to Appellate Tribunal against
order granting renewal-Whether appeal competent-Motor Vehicles
Act, r939 (4 of r939), ss. 47, 57,. 58, 64.
The appellant who was the holder of a permit to run a stage
carriage, which was about to expire, rna<le an application to the
State Transport Authority for its renewal for a further period.
The respondent made a representation against the renewal of the
appellant's permit and also applied for the grant of the permit
to himself. The State Transport Authority made an order in
the terms "Renewed for three years" in respect of the appellant's permit but no express order was made on the respondent's
application for the grant of the permit to him. On appeal by
the respondent, the Appellate Tribunal cancelled the appellant's
permit and granted the permit to the respondent. The appellant
then moved the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, for a
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Appellate Tribunal
r959
on the ground that it disclosed.an error on the face of it because
under the Act no appeal lay from the order that was passed -by
Ram Gopal
the subordinate authority. The learned Judicial Commissioner
v.
held that the appeal was competent and dismissed the applicaAnant P•asad
cation for the writ. It was contended for the appellant that the
respondent's appeal to the Appellate Tribunal was not maintainable on the grounds (r) that no express order was made against
the respondent by the State Transport Authority, and so s. 64(a)
of the Act did not give him a right of appeal and (2) that in view
of ss. 47, 57 and 58 of the Act, the State Transport Authority
had no jurisdiction to consider the respondent's application or to
make an order in respect of it after the appellant's permit was
renewed, and therefore could not make an order rejecting it. It
was also contended thats. 64 of the Act did not provide for an
appeal by a person aggrieved by the renewal of a permit unless
he was one of those mentioned in cl. (f) of that section which the
respondent was not, and therefore even if an appeal by the respondent was competent under s. 64(a) in such an appeal, the
Appellate Authority could not set aside the order of renewal.
Held: (r) that the order made by the State Transport
Authority in the present case did amount, in fact, to a refusal
to grant the permit to the respondent. The respondent's appeal
to the Appellate Authority was therefore maintainable under
s. 64(a) of the Act.
S. Gopala Reddi v. Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot•
[1955] 2 M.L.J. 130, approved.
V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority,
Coimbatore, [1957] S.C.R. 663, distinguished.
(2) thats. 58(2) of the Act shows that an application for the
renewal of a permit and a fresh application for the same permit
have to be heard together, and that there was nothing in ss. 47
and 57, indicating a contrary course.
(3) that cl. (f) of s. 64 of the Act does not in any way
restrict the power of the Appellate Tribunal to grant all reliefs
in an appeal under cl. (a) of the section. Consequently, the
order of the Appellate Tribunal setting aside the order of renewal
' was valid.
Dholpur Co-operative Transport Etc. Union Ltd. v. The Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, A.LR. 1955 Rajasthan 19, in so far as it
decided to the contrary, disapproved.

## Text

692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
r959
shows that the legislature was defining the term
' business ' as and when necessary, as it laid down the
Co1nmissioncr of rules for calculation of profits of a business. It was
Inconie-ta~;
•West Bengal
including different kinds of businesses within the Act
v.
and indicating how in those cases the profits had to
Calcutta National be calculated. I do not think that the definition
<Ba~~ Limit'.d
given in the Act can be said to control everything in
In
quidation) the Schedule, in spite of the definition of ' profits ' and
Hidayatullah J. the heading given to the Schedule. As I have said
I959
April 2I.
'
above, the second of the two alternatives is really
applicable to the present case.
For these reasons and those given by my brother,
Sinha, J., I hold that this appeal should be allowed
with costs here and below.
BY THE CoURT.-In accordance with the judgment
of the majority, the decision under appeal is set aside
and the appeal is allowed with costs here and below.
RAM GOPAL
v.
AN ANT PRASAD AND ANOTHER
(S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and K. SuBBA RAO, JJ.)
Appeal-Maintainability-Permit to run stage carriage-Application for renewal-New applicant's application for permit-Order
by State Transport Authority renewing permit but no order passed on
new applicant's application-Appeal to Appellate Tribunal against
order granting renewal-Whether appeal competent-Motor Vehicles
Act, r939 (4 of r939), ss. 47, 57,. 58, 64.
The appellant who was the holder of a permit to run a stage
carriage, which was about to expire, rna<le an application to the
State Transport Authority for its renewal for a further period.
The respondent made a representation against the renewal of the
appellant's permit and also applied for the grant of the permit
to himself. The State Transport Authority made an order in
the terms "Renewed for three years" in respect of the appellant's permit but no express order was made on the respondent's
application for the grant of the permit to him. On appeal by
the respondent, the Appellate Tribunal cancelled the appellant's
permit and granted the permit to the respondent. The appellant
then moved the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, for a
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Appellate Tribunal
r959
on the ground that it disclosed.an error on the face of it because
under the Act no appeal lay from the order that was passed -by
Ram Gopal
the subordinate authority. The learned Judicial Commissioner
v.
held that the appeal was competent and dismissed the applicaAnant P•asad
cation for the writ. It was contended for the appellant that the
respondent's appeal to the Appellate Tribunal was not maintainable on the grounds (r) that no express order was made against
the respondent by the State Transport Authority, and so s. 64(a)
of the Act did not give him a right of appeal and (2) that in view
of ss. 47, 57 and 58 of the Act, the State Transport Authority
had no jurisdiction to consider the respondent's application or to
make an order in respect of it after the appellant's permit was
renewed, and therefore could not make an order rejecting it. It
was also contended thats. 64 of the Act did not provide for an
appeal by a person aggrieved by the renewal of a permit unless
he was one of those mentioned in cl. (f) of that section which the
respondent was not, and therefore even if an appeal by the respondent was competent under s. 64(a) in such an appeal, the
Appellate Authority could not set aside the order of renewal.
Held: (r) that the order made by the State Transport
Authority in the present case did amount, in fact, to a refusal
to grant the permit to the respondent. The respondent's appeal
to the Appellate Authority was therefore maintainable under
s. 64(a) of the Act.
S. Gopala Reddi v. Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot•
[1955] 2 M.L.J. 130, approved.
V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority,
Coimbatore, [1957] S.C.R. 663, distinguished.
(2) thats. 58(2) of the Act shows that an application for the
renewal of a permit and a fresh application for the same permit
have to be heard together, and that there was nothing in ss. 47
and 57, indicating a contrary course.
(3) that cl. (f) of s. 64 of the Act does not in any way
restrict the power of the Appellate Tribunal to grant all reliefs
in an appeal under cl. (a) of the section. Consequently, the
order of the Appellate Tribunal setting aside the order of renewal
' was valid.
Dholpur Co-operative Transport Etc. Union Ltd. v. The Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, A.LR. 1955 Rajasthan 19, in so far as it
decided to the contrary, disapproved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
284 of 1958.'
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 21,
1956, of the former Judicial Commissioner's Court,
Rewit, in Misc. Civil Writ No. 27 of 1956.
Na.unit Lal, for .the appellant.
1959
Ram Gopal
v.
Anant Prasad
Sarkar ].
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
Bhagwan Das Jain, for respondent No. 1.
1959.
April 21.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SARKAR, J.-This appeal arises out of an application for a writ of certiorari and involves questions of
interpretation of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of
1939), by which grants of permits to run stage carriages and all matters connected therewith are governed.
The appellant was the holder of a permit to run a
stage carriage on a stretch of the public highway
called the Rewa-Singrauli route, in the State of Vindhya Pradesh which is now merged in the State of
Madhya Pradesh. That permit was due to expire on
December 11, 1955, and so on September 12, 1955, he
made an application for its renewal for a further
period. The respondent Anant Prasad who will be
referred to as the respondent, made a representation
against the renewal of the appellant's permit. He also
applied for the grant of the permit to himself. On
December 9, 1955, the State Transport Authority,
Vindhya Pradesh, made· an order in the following
terms: "Renewed for three years". It is not in
dispute that the order meant that the appellant's permit was renewed for three years.
No express order
was made on the respondent's application for the
grant of the permit to him.
The respondent preferred an appeal against this
order to the Vindhya Pradesh Transport Appellate
Tribunal, the appellate authority under the Act. It
was contended by the appellant before the Appellate
Tribunal that the appeal was not competent. The
Appellate Tribunal rejected this contention and passed
an order cancelling the permit granted to the a ppellant by the State Transport Authority and issuing the
permit to the respondent.
The appellant then moved the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, for a writ of certiorari
quashing the order of the Appellate Tribunal Ol! the
ground that it disclosed an error on the face of it
because under the Act no appeal lay from the order
that was passed by the subordinate authority~ The
learned Judicial Commissioner held that the appeal
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
was competent and dismissed the application for the
writ. Hence the present appeal.
The question is, Did an appeal lie to the Appellate
Tribunal from the order made by the State Transport
Authority in the present case? Section 64 of the Act
contains the provisions for appeals. Whether the
appeal lay or not will have to be decided by reference
to these provisions. The portion of the section w-hich
will have to be considered is in these terms:
"Section 64.
Any person-
( a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a
Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, ......
or
(e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit, ......... or
(f) being a local authority or police authority or
an association which, or a person providing transport
facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit is
aggrieved by £he grant thereof.. ........................... .
may, ......... appeal to the prescribed authority ...... ".
The prescribed authority was as we have earlier
stated, the Appellate Tribunal. Clearly the respondent
was not a person contemplated by cl. (e) of the section. It is also not in dispute that he was not one of
those mentioned in cl. (f). The respondent does not
claim that any of these clauses gave him the right of
appeal.
He however claims a right of a&IJeal under cl. (a).
In our view that claim is justified~ He had applied
for a permit and had not got it. He was therefore a
person aggrieved by the refusal to grant a permit and
clearly came within cl. (a). It is true that the order
of the State Transport Authority did not expressly
refuse him the permit. But that no doubt was the
effect of the order that was made. He had made an
application for the grant of the permit to him and the
application was disposed of without granting him the
permit but granting it to a competing applicant.
There was only one permit which could be granted
r959
Ram Gopal
v.
Ananl Prasad
sa .. har 1.
I959
Ram Gopal
v.
A nant Prasad
Sarkar ].
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
and the result of the order was to give it to the appellant. The permit was thereby necessarily refused to
the respondent. The fact that an express order was
not made cannot operate to his prejudice. In S. Gopala
Reddi v. Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot (1),
in circumstances identical to those in the present case
an order was made by the Transport Authority in the
same terms as we have here and it was said, "The
grant of a permit to one, would automatically mean
the refusal of the permit to the other". We are in
entire agreement with the view expressed there.
Therefore it seems to us that the respondent was a
person who had been aggrieved by the refusal to grant
him a permit and the appeal by him was fully competent.
But it was said on behalf of the appellant that in
the present case it would be wrong to imply an order
refusing the permit to the respondent for none such
could be made under the Act and therefore here there
was no scope for applying s. 64(a) .• The contention
was put in this way : When there are a number of
applications in respect of the same permit, one of
which is by way of renewal to which objections have
been filed and the others, fresh applications, the latter
could not be taken up for consideration till the former
and the objections made to it had been considered. If
the objections to the renewal failed, the application
for renewal had to be granted and the fresh applications for permit could not then be cousidered at all. If
on the other hand, the objections to the renewal succeeded, the ren~wal could not be granted and the
choice had then to be made from the new applicants
for the permit. In the present case the objection to
the renewal of the applicant's permit raised by the
respondent failed and the appellant's permit was in
consequence renewed. Therefore the respondent's
application for_ a permit, which was an application
for a new permit, never fell to be considered and that
is why no order on it was made at all.
We think this contention completely lacks substance. It was said that that was t4e result of ss. 47,
(1) [1955] 2 M.L.J. 130.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
57 and 58 of the Act but we find nothing in any of
them to support it. Section 47 does not deal with the
order in which applications for the renewal or grant of
a new permit are to be heard and does not help at all.
Section 57 (3) provides that after an application for a
permit had bee!}. made others can make representations against it. These are the objections to an application for the grant or renewal of a permit earlier referred
to. Sub-section (5) of s. 57 provides that the application for a permit which includes an application for the
renewal of a permit and the representations against it
shall be disposed of at a public hearing at which the
person making the application and the persons making
the representations shall be given an opportunity of
being heard. But this does not show that all other
applications for the same permit and all other representations in connection therewith, cannot be disposed
of at the same hearing. Indeed, s. 58 (2) puts it beyond
doubt that an application for renewal of a permit and
the fresh applications for the same permit have to be
heard together. That section so far as is relevant is
in these terms :
" Section 58.-.............................................. .
(2) A permit may be renewed on an application
made and disposed of as if it were an application for a
permit:
(a) .•....•.........................................•...•..........
(b ) .............................................................. .
Provided further that, other conditions being
equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permits".
The section therefore requires an application for the
renewal of a permit to be dealt with in the same way
as a new application for a· permit. Such an application lias therefore to be heard along with new applications for the permit. Again, no question of giving an
application for renewal preference over new applications for permits which the section requires to be given,
can arise unless they are considered together. We are
therefore unable to hold that in the present case the
88
r959
Ra1n Gopal
v.
Anant Prasaa
Sarkar J.
•
I959
Rant Gopal
v.
Anant Prasad
Sarkar ].
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
State Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to con·
sider the respondent's application or to make any order
in respect of it as it granted the appellant's application
for renewal. It follows that the order that was made
amounted in fact to a refusal to grant the permit to
the respondent.
It was then said that a renewed permit was a continuation of the old permit and hence once the old
permit was renewed, no question of considering the applications for new permit arose.
We find nothing to
support this view. It is true that in V. 0. K. Bus
Service Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore (1 ), this Court held that a renewed permit was a
continuation of the old permit but it did not hold that
the appropriate authority could not consider the applications for a fresh permit along with the application
for renewal of the permit. This case does not assist
the appellant at all.
It was then contended that s. 64 did not provide for
an appeal by a person aggrieved by the renewal of a
permit unless he was one of those mentioned in s. 64 (f),
which the respondent was not, and therefore even if
an appeal by the respondent was competent under
s. 64 (a), in such an appeal the Appellate Tribunal could
not set aside the order of renewal made by the State
· Transport Authority. It was said that if in such an
appeal the order granting a renewal could be set aside,
in effect an appeal against an order renewing a permit
would become competent though the law did not permit this. We were referred to Dholpur Co-operative
Transport Etc. Union Ltd. v. The Appellate Authority,
Rajasthan ('), in support of this contention. It was
there said:
"Where an appeal has been made under cl. (a)
against the refusal of a permit, the Appellate Authority will generally have the right to give relief to the
appellant by the grant of a permit, but will not have
any jurisdiction to cancel the permit granted to another
person, unless a foundation has been laid before the
Regional Transport Authority for an appeal provided
(r) [1957) S.C.R. 663.
(2) A.I.R. 1955 Rajasthan 19, 26.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
by cl. (f) by an objection of somebody entitled to appeal under that clause. If such an objection has been
made then it does not matter whether that particular
person appeals or not. In such a case, on an appeal
under s. 64 (a), the Appellate Authority may consider
the objection of the nature specified in cl. (f) before the
Regional Transport Authority and give its own decision in the matter."
It- was said that the respondent though he had filed
objections was not a person who can claim a right of
appeal under cl. (f) of s. 64. It was therefore contended on the authority of the observations referred to
above that no foundation had been laid for an appeal
provided by cl. (f) and so the Appellate Tribunal could
not cancel the permit granted to the appellant by the
subordinate authority.
We are unable to agree that in an appeal which is
competent under cl. (a) of the section, the order renewing or granting a permit cannot be set aside unless the
case was such that an appeal under cl. (f) would have
also been competent. So to hold would result in making
the right of appeal given by cl. (a) wholly infructuous in
those cases where no relief can be given in the appeal
except by setting aside the order granting or renewing a
permit, for example, where there was'only one permit
to grant as in the present case. Such an interpretation
has to be rejected. It is based on cl. (f). But this clause
cannot be construed in a manner so as to render infructuous another clause in the same section. Nor do
we find anything in cl. (f) to justify such a construction.
The different clauses in the section deal with
different situations. Each is independent of the others.
Clause (f) deals with a case where an objection had
been filed against the fresh grant or the renewal of a
permit but the permit has none the less been granted
or renewed.
The clause gives the objector a right of
appeal against the result of the rejection of his objection if he is one of the persons mentioned in it. The
clause gives him that right irrespective of the fact
whether he has a right of appeal under any of the
other clauses or not. It does not say that a permit
granted or renewed cannot be questioned except at the
r959
Ram Gopal
v.
Anant Prasad
Sarkar j.
I959
Rani Gopal
v.
Anant Prasad
Sarkar J.
'
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
instance of the persons mentioned in cl. (f) ; it does not
affect the right of appeal under the other clauses. If
an appeal lies under any of the other clauses, that of
course must be an effective appeal and the appellate
authority must therefore have all powers to give the
relief to which the appellant is found entitled.
Again s. 64 is not concerned with defining the
powers of the appellate authority and does not purport
to do so.
Nor is there anything in the Aet to lead to
the conclusion that an applicant for a permit is bound
to put in objections against the applications of competing applicants for the grant or the renewal of the permit. The relief that can be granted in an appeal by
any person which is competent would not depend on
whether he had put in objections against the applications of the competing applicants or not.
W.e do not therefore think that cl. (f) of s. 64 in any
way' restricts the power of the Appellate Tribunal to
grant all proper reliefs in an appeal competent under
cl. (a) of the section. If cl. (f) does not so restrict the
power of the Appellate Tribunal, nothing else has been
pointed out to us as having that effect.
In our view,
there is nothing in the Act to prevent the Appellate
Tribunal from setting aside the order of the State
Transport Authority renewing the appellant's permit.
We think the matter was correctly put in S. Gopala
Reddi's case(') when it was said at p. 132:
"The appeal was, in our opinion, perfectly competent as an appeal against the order of the Regional
Transport Authority, refusing to grant a permit. The
fact that such an appeal involved an attack on the
order granting a renewal of a permit to the 4th respondent would not prevent the appeal being what it
was, viz., an appeal against a refusal to grant a permit,
· to the appellant. The Central Road Traffic Board
erred in presuming that it was not open to them in the
appeal to consider the merits of the order granting
renewal of the 4th respondent's permit. Indeed, the
first question which had to be determined in the appeal
'filed by the appellant would be the propriety of the
action of the Regional Transport Authority in granting
(1) [1955] 2 M.L.J. 130,
(2) S.C.H. SUPREME COUHT REPOHTS
701
renewal to the 4th respondent. The filing of the appeal
by the appellant set at large the order of the Regional
Transport Authority granting the renewal."
In the Dholpur Co-operative Transport etc. Union
Ltd. case (1) on which the appellant relies, no objection
had been filed against any of the competing applications for the grant of a permit and it was held that the
appellate authority had no power in such circumstances on appeal by a person whose application for
the grant of the permit had been refused, to give relief
by cancelling a permit granted by the subordinate
authority to one of the applicants. It was there
thought that Nadar Transport, Tiruchirapalli v. State
of Madras (2) led to this conclusion. For the reasons
earlier mentioned we are unable to agree with this
part of the decision in the Dholpur Co-operative Transport etc. Union Ltd. case (1).
With the rest of the decision there we are not concerned and as to that we
do not say anything. We also find nothing in the
Nadar Transport case (2), to support the conclusion
arrived at in Dholpur Co-operative Transport etc. Union
Ltd. case (1 ).
In the N adar Transport case e), on the
contrary, it was observed that" sec. 64, sub-secs. (a)
and (f) are intended in our opinion to apply to different situations" and that " the power of the appellate
authority is not restricted in any manner either by the
provisions of s. 64 or by any of the rules made under
the powers conferred by the Act". It was there held
that in an appeal under s. 64 (a) no grounds other than
those taken before the lower authority could be canvassed. That does not lead to the conclusion that on
proper grounds all reliefs necessary to make the appeal
effective cannot be granted. We think that the Nadar
'Pransport case (2) was misunderstood.
The result is that this appeal fails and it is dismisse\i
"ith costs.
(1) A. I. R. 1955 Rajasthan 19, 26.
(2) A. I. R. 1953 Mad. I, 3·
Appeal dismissed.
I959
Rani Gopal
v.
A nant Prasad
Sarkar ].