# RAM JAG AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF U.P

- **Citation:** [1974] 3 S.C.R. 9
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-12-21
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1970
- **Bench:** M. H. Beg, Y. V. Chandrachud
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-jag-and-others-v-the-state-of-u-p-6297
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

9
Penal Code-Ss. 302, 32S, 323-i::o11stitt1tioll of India-Art. 136-High Co11rt
set1ti11,~ aside acquittal-Appeal b)' special leave-If Supre1ne Court could reappreciate
e1•ide11ce.
Tbe appellants who were charged with the offence of murder were acquitted
by the Additional Sessions Judge but the order of acquittal was set aside in appeal
by the High Court. The High Court convicted them under various sections of the
Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment for the offence of murder and
to shorter tcnns for the other offences. The prosecution case was that when
the deceased, along with three other persons, was returning from temple, he was
attacked at about 4 P. M. on the day of the occurrence by the appellants. The
deceased, who was mortally injured, was carried in a bullock cart to a nearby police
station. On the way he succumbed. to his injuries. The
first
information
report was lodged in the police station at 12 ·30 that night.
Allowjng the appeal to this Court,
HELD : This Court in an appeal under Art. 136 will examine lhe cvid1:nce only
if the High Court while setting aside the order of acquittal by the trial court has
failed to apply correctly the principles governing appeals against acquittals.
In S/teo Swarup & Ors v. The King Emperor, 61 I.A. 398, Surajpal Sb1gh r. The
State (19521 S.C.R.193 and Samvat Singh v. State ~f Rajasthan [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120,
the principles governing appeals against· acquittal are firmly established. The Cede
of Criminal Proc!dure m1de no di~tinction b~tween the powers of the appellate
court in regard to the two categoties of appeals and, therefore, the High Court
has powers as full and wide in appeals against acquittal as in appeals against con~
viction. Whether the High Court is dealing with one class of appeals of criminal
jurisprudence that unless th~ statute provides to the contrary there is a presumption
of innocence in favour of the accused and secondly that the accused is entitled to the
benefit of reasonable doubt. Due regard to the views of the trial court as to the
credibility of wit~s in matters resting on pure appreciation of evidence
:.ind the studied slowness of the appeUate court in disturbing a finding of fact
arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses,
where such seeing and hearing can be useful aids to the assessment or
evidence are well known principles which generally inform the administration
of justice and govern the
exercise of all appellate jurisdiction. They are
sclf~imposed limitations on a power otherwise plenary cmd 1ike all voluntary
restrainls, they constitute valuable guidelines.
Such regard and slowness
must find their reflection in the appellate judgment, "1hich can only be if the
appellate court deals \vith the principal reasons that inftuenced the order of acquittal
and after examining the evidence with care gives its own
reasons justifying a
contrary view of the evidence. It is implicit
in this judicial process that
if two views of the evidence arc reasonably possible, the finding of acquittal
ought not to be disturbed.
If after applying these principles, not by their n1echanic.:1.l recitation in the
judgment, the Hiah Court has reached the conclusion that the order of acquit~
tal ought to be reversed, this court will not reappraise Cvidence in appeals
bro~t before it under art. -136 of the Constitution. In such appeals, only such
examination of the evictence would ordinarily be necessary as is required to see
whether the High Court has applied the principles correctly. The High Court is the
final court of facts and the reserve jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136, though
couched in wide terms, is by long practice exercised in exceptional cases where the
Hi&h O>\lfl has disreg~ed the guidelines set by this Court for deciding appeals
against acquittal or ''by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation or
the principles of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been
do

## Text

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RAM JAG AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF U.P.
December 21, 1973
[M. H. BEG AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
9
Penal Code-Ss. 302, 32S, 323-i::o11stitt1tioll of India-Art. 136-High Co11rt
set1ti11,~ aside acquittal-Appeal b)' special leave-If Supre1ne Court could reappreciate
e1•ide11ce.
Tbe appellants who were charged with the offence of murder were acquitted
by the Additional Sessions Judge but the order of acquittal was set aside in appeal
by the High Court. The High Court convicted them under various sections of the
Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment for the offence of murder and
to shorter tcnns for the other offences. The prosecution case was that when
the deceased, along with three other persons, was returning from temple, he was
attacked at about 4 P. M. on the day of the occurrence by the appellants. The
deceased, who was mortally injured, was carried in a bullock cart to a nearby police
station. On the way he succumbed. to his injuries. The
first
information
report was lodged in the police station at 12 ·30 that night.
Allowjng the appeal to this Court,
HELD : This Court in an appeal under Art. 136 will examine lhe cvid1:nce only
if the High Court while setting aside the order of acquittal by the trial court has
failed to apply correctly the principles governing appeals against acquittals.
In S/teo Swarup & Ors v. The King Emperor, 61 I.A. 398, Surajpal Sb1gh r. The
State (19521 S.C.R.193 and Samvat Singh v. State ~f Rajasthan [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120,
the principles governing appeals against· acquittal are firmly established. The Cede
of Criminal Proc!dure m1de no di~tinction b~tween the powers of the appellate
court in regard to the two categoties of appeals and, therefore, the High Court
has powers as full and wide in appeals against acquittal as in appeals against con~
viction. Whether the High Court is dealing with one class of appeals of criminal
jurisprudence that unless th~ statute provides to the contrary there is a presumption
of innocence in favour of the accused and secondly that the accused is entitled to the
benefit of reasonable doubt. Due regard to the views of the trial court as to the
credibility of wit~s in matters resting on pure appreciation of evidence
:.ind the studied slowness of the appeUate court in disturbing a finding of fact
arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses,
where such seeing and hearing can be useful aids to the assessment or
evidence are well known principles which generally inform the administration
of justice and govern the
exercise of all appellate jurisdiction. They are
sclf~imposed limitations on a power otherwise plenary cmd 1ike all voluntary
restrainls, they constitute valuable guidelines.
Such regard and slowness
must find their reflection in the appellate judgment, "1hich can only be if the
appellate court deals \vith the principal reasons that inftuenced the order of acquittal
and after examining the evidence with care gives its own
reasons justifying a
contrary view of the evidence. It is implicit
in this judicial process that
if two views of the evidence arc reasonably possible, the finding of acquittal
ought not to be disturbed.
If after applying these principles, not by their n1echanic.:1.l recitation in the
judgment, the Hiah Court has reached the conclusion that the order of acquit~
tal ought to be reversed, this court will not reappraise Cvidence in appeals
bro~t before it under art. -136 of the Constitution. In such appeals, only such
examination of the evictence would ordinarily be necessary as is required to see
whether the High Court has applied the principles correctly. The High Court is the
final court of facts and the reserve jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136, though
couched in wide terms, is by long practice exercised in exceptional cases where the
Hi&h O>\lfl has disreg~ed the guidelines set by this Court for deciding appeals
against acquittal or ''by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation or
the principles of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been
done", or where the finding is such that it shakes the conscicm;c of the court. (lSB~G]
10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1974) 3 S.C.R.
The lligh Court in the instant case was evidently aware of these principles but
it failed to apply the1n to the case on hand. The High Court was not corre<:t in
characterising of the findings recorded by the tri:ll court as "perverse".
(1) The High C<Jurt was not right in rejecting the vii.!W of the Sessions Judg..:
that there was undue dday in lodging the report and that the delay was not satisfactorily explained, \Vhether the delay was so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion
on the case of the prosc..:ution must depend upon a variety of factors which would
vary from case to case.
(ii) In the insttnl caSI! the defence of the appdlants that the occurrcnv: inust
·11:1vc taken place under cover of darkness, tllat is. long after the ti1n;! at which it
Wa'i alleged to have taken place is well founded and the High Court·w•1s clearly in
error in discarding it.
(iii) lf the prini;ip:.1! witness ha<l no compunction in creating an cye~witncss
his .evidence had to be llpproached with grc;1t caution. The High Court was not
justified in holding th:1t the only impact of the false discovery of an eye witness on
the prosecution case was that the evidence of the principal witness had to 1x rejected
fn part.
(iv) Yet another witness had made conn.lcting statcn1cnts on o:Hh before two
courts on an important aspect and the question which the High Court should have
asked itself was whether the view taken by the Sessions Court in regard to
this witness was a reasonable one. The H.igh CoUrt was not right in saying th<it
there was no reason to discard the testi1nony of the other eye witnesses even if his
evidence was left ()U1.
(v) The inoti\:c was said to be illicit intimacy between the deceased and d::iught
of one of the assailants. But one of the witnesses deposed that the assailants were
dacoits and that they searched his pocket as well as the pockets of his companions.
The first infonnation report made no meiltion of any one of the accused referring to
the illicit intimacy before, during or afler the attack. The endeavour at the trial
was to show that the incident was connected with the jllicit affair. Tf that be the true
1notive, it is.hardly likelv that the assailants would search tl:io. pockets of the deceased
and his 1;ompanions. The Sessions Judge was justified in attaching due in1portancc
to this aspect of the matter and the High Court w::is not right in saying that unnecc·
ssary cn1phasis \Vas laid on a 1ninor n1:1ttcr.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 110
of 1970.
Appeal by Special Leave (ram the Judgment
and Order dated
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the 8th January 1970 of the Allahabad High. Court (Lucknow Bencl1)
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at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 634 of 1967.
A. N. Mui/a and R. L. Kohli. for the appellants.
0. P. Rana, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD J.-The appellants, eleven in al!, were acquitted hy
the Additional Sessions Judge, Gonda, but the order of acquittal was
set aside in app~al by the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench).
The High Court has convicted the appellants under sections 302, 325
and 323 read with section 149 and under section 147 of the Penal Code.
They have been s~ntcnced to life i1nprisonment 'or the offence of n1urder
and to shorter terms for the other offences. This appeal by special leave
is directed against that judgment. The charge against the appollants
is that on the e\·cning of September 17, 1966 they formed an unlawful
:issembly and in prosecution of the common object of that assembly
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RAM JAG I'. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, /.)
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they caused the death of Hausla Prasad and injuries to Rampher,
Dwarika and Lakhu.
On September 17, 1966 which was a Kajri Tij day Rampher .and
the deceased Hausla Prasad had gone to a temple which is at a
distance about 8 miles from the village of Jhampur where they lived.
· They left the temple late in the afternoon along with Dwarika and
Lakhu whom they met at the temple.
Soon al'ter they crossed a river
near the village of Singha Chanda they are alleged to have been ..
attacked by the appellants.
Dwarika brought a buliock cart from
a village called Gauhani and thereafter the four injured persons
proceeded to theTarabganj police station. On theway Rampher dictated the First Information Report to a boy called Gorakhnath and soon
thereafter the report was lodged at the police station at about 12·30
at night.
Hausla Prasad succumbed to his injuries just before the party
reached the police station.
He had 12 injuries on his person,
Lakhu and a swelling Rampher had received 6 injuries while Dwarika
had received 9 injuries. The injuries received.by these persons includmg
llausla Prasad were mostly contused lacerated wounds and abrasions.
-The prosecution exa1nined Ra1npher, Dwarika, Lakhu, Ran1
Shanker and Ram Kripal (P. Ws 2 to 6) as eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that these w1tne,sses were not wort~y of credit and acquitted the appellants. The
High Court was not impressed by the e\·idence of Ram Shanker and
Ram Kripal but accepting the evidence of Rampher, Dwarika and
Lakhu it convicted the appellants of the offences of which they were
charged.
Learned counsel for the State, when called upon, raised a fundamental objection to our entertaining the various questions raised on
behalf of the appellants. He contends that the sole question in the appeal
is whether the High Court was right in accepting the evidence of the
three eye-\vitnesses and therefore this Court, in the exercise of its po\vers
under article 136 of the Constitution, ought not to re-appreciate that
evidence in order to detennine whether it can sus1ain the conviction of
the appellants.·
The question as regards the power of this Court in criminal appeals
by special leave from the judgments of High Courts setting aside acquittals has been discussed in numerous cases but the precise scope of that
power is still being debated as a live issue. In case after case, counsel
have contended that this Court does not under article 136 fcnction as
yet another court of appeal and therefore on matters of appreciation
of evidence, the final word must rest with the High Court. Considering
the staggering mass of work which is gradually accumulating in this
Court, such a rnle will bring welcome relief. But it is overstating the
rule to say that the verdic; of the High Court on questions of fact,
including assessm.ent of evidence, cannot ever be re-opened in this,
Court.
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 J 3 S.C.L
The true position is that if the High Court has set aside an order
of acquittal, this Court in an appeal under article 136 from the judgment of the High Court will examine the evidence only if the High
Court has failed to apply correctly the principles governing appeals
against acquittal. Jn a series of decisions, High Courts had taken the
view that upon an appeal from an acquittal the appellate court is .not
entitled to interfere with the decision of the trial court on facts unless
it has acted perversely or otherwise improperly or has been deceived
by fraud. (See Empress of India v. Gayadin(I); Queen-Empress r. Robins01~2); Deputy Legal Remembrancer of Bengal 1·. Amulya Dwan (3);
King-Emperor v. Deboo Singh (4); King-Emperor; 1·. U Sa11 Win lS).)
A contrary line of cases had, on the other hand, ruled tliat the Code of
Criminal Procedure drew no distinction between an appeal from an
acquittal and an appeal from a conviction, and no such distinction
could be imposed by judicial decision. (See Queen-Empress r. Prag
Dat(6); Queeu-Empress '" Bib/111/i Bhusan Bit('); Depllly Legal
Remembrancer, Behar and Orissa v. Mutukdhari Singh (8); Re Sinnu
Go1111da11 (9); Q11een-Empress. v. Karigoll'da(IO).
Jn Sheo Swarup and Ors. v. The King-Emperor,(11) these conflicting decisions were canvassed before the Privy Council· but it saw
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no useful purpose in examining the long list of decisions. Observing
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that the answ~r to the question in issue would depend upon the construction of the provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Prvy
Council noticed sections 404, 410, 417, 418 and 422, examined section
423 and concluded that the Code draw no distinction between an appeal
against an acquittal and an appeal against a conviction, as regards the
powers of the High Court. Speaking for the Judicial Committee, Lord
Russell observed :
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''There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view, apparently supported by the judgments of some Courts in Jridia,
that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction tn reverse an
order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in cases in which
the lower Court has "obstainately blundered," or has "through
incompetence, stupidity or perversity" reached such "distorted
conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice," or has
in some other way so conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by
the defence so as to produce a similar result.
"Sections 417, 418 and 423 oftlle Code give to the High Court
full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order
of acquittal was founded,. and to reach the conclusion that upon
that ·evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed No
limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found
1. (1881) I. L. R. 4 Allahabad 148.
6. (1898) I.LR. 20 Allahabad 459.
2. (1894) I.LR. 16 Allahabad 212.
7, (1890) l.L.R. 17 Calcutta 485.
3. (1913) J.L.R. 18 C.W.N. 666.
8. (1915) 20 C.W.N. 128,
4. (1927) I.LR. 6 Patna 496.
9. (1914) I.LR. 38 Madras 1028, 1034.
5. (1932) I.LR. 10 Rangoon 312.
10. (1894) I.LR. 19 Bombay 51.
11. 61 !. A. 398.
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RAM JAG v. U.P. STATE (Clzandrachud, I.)
13
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expressly stated in the Code, But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon
fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight
and consideration to such matters as(!) the views of the trial judge
as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of
____,.
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1nnocence 111 favour of the accused, a presumption certainly
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not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial:
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(3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and
(4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of
14
fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing
the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High
Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordaance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the
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adn1inistration of justice."
'
The amplitude of the power of the High Court in appeals against
acquittal was reiterated by the Privy Council in Nur Mahomet!
I'.
.,
Emperor.( I)
While holding that in appeals against acquittals the High Court
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has full power to review at large all the evidence and to reach the
., ...
conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be
re\"ersed, the Privy Council had pointed out that before reaching its
[
conclusions on facts the High Court tnust ahvays give proper weight
to certain n1atters like the presutnption of innocence, the benefit of
doubt etc. This qualification upon a power otherwise wide and unlin1ited \vas no 1norc than differently expressed by this Court ln Sura) pa/
Singh ''- The State(2). by saying that though it is well-established tJ1at
the High Court has full power to revie\.V' the evidence onwhich the order·
\
of acquittai was founded, "it is equally well settled that thepresumplion of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittnl:
by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had theadvantage- of seeing the \Vitnesses and hearing their evidence can be
reversed only for very substantial and con1pelling reasons". The phrase
r
'·substantial and con1pelling reasor1s" becan1e altnost a part, as it ,,·ere.
or codified law and was repeatedly used by this Court with emphasis
in cases like Ajmer Si111:'1 '" State ~f Punjab(3), P11ra11 v. State of
Punjab (4), Alier Raja Khima 1•. Tlie State of Saurashtra (S), Bhag11·a11,
Das v. State of Rajastha11 (6) and Balbir Singh v. State of P1111jab. Cr
Judgments of several High Courts in appeals against acquitt:ils would
bear evidence of the magic spell which the phrase had cast and how it
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had coloured their approach to the evidence before them. The apparently rigorous requirement of the rule of "substantial and compelling rea··
sons"' and to so1ne extent its tediu1n \Vas relieved by the use of \rords
~
"~.ood and sufficiently cogent reasons" in Tu/siram Ka1111 v. Tl1e .State,(B}
In A her Raja Khima's case(S), the formula of "substantiol \Ind comH
I. A.!,R. 1945 P.C. 151.
2. !l952j S.C.R. 193.
J. [195.l] S.C.R. 418.
4. AJ.R. 1953 S.C. 459.
5, [1955j 2 S,C.R. 1285.
6, A.LR. 1957 S. C. 589
7. AJ,R. 1957 S,C. 216.
8, A.LR. 1954 S.C. l.
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS
I 1974 l 3 s.c.R.
pelling reasons" though adopted, was treated as synonymous with
06strong reasons"'.
This. stalemate was resolved by this Court in Samrat Singh '"
Slate of Rajastlian]'>· Observing that "In recent years the words 'compelling reasons' have become words of magic incantation in every
.appeal against acquittal", the Court said: "The words were intended
to convey the idea that an appellate court not only shall bear in mind
the principles laid down by the Privy Council but also must give its
dear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal
was wrong." The principles laid down by the Privy Council in S!reo
S11•arup's case(2) were expressly approved and it was held that "the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, li)
•substantial and compelling reasons', (ii) 'good and sufficiently cogent
reasons', and (iii) 'strong reasons' are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to
review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion ; but in
doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a
bearing on the question of fact and the reasons given by the court
below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclu-
~ion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the a.cquittal was not justified."
.
The principles governing appeals against acquittal as explained in
Samvat Singlz"s case have been adopted and applied by this Court
in numerous cases over the past many years. No case has struck a discordant note though one or the other requirement of the well-established principles has been high-lighted more in some judgments than in
-0thers. These, however, are variations in style and do not reflect a varia1ion in approach.
'
.
In /Iarbans Singlz r. State of Pzmjab(!), a four-Judge Bench observed:
. "What may be called the golden thread running through all these
-Oecisions is the rule that in deciding appeals against acquittal the Court
-0f Appeal must examine the evidence with particular care, must examine
also the reasons on which the order of acquittal was based and should
interfere with the order only when satisfied thatthe \·iew taken by the
acquitting Judge is clearly unreasonable." In Ramabhupala Reddy
and Ors. v. The State of.A11dhra Pradesh(4), the same thought was expressed by saying : "If two reasonable conclusions can be reached on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
disturb the findings of the trial court." Very recently, in Shiraji Saflr-
.brao Bobade a11d Anr. v. State ofMaharashtra(S), this Court rejuvenated
the suspect formula of "substantial and compelling grounds" thus :
·"We are clearly in agreement. ..... that an acquitted accused should
not be put in peril of com·iction on appeal sav~ \\here substantial and
compelling grounds exist for such a course ....... Jn law there arc no
fetters on the plenary power of the Appellate Court to review the whole
c\idence on which the order of acquit!al is founded and, indeed, it
. I, [1961]3 s.C.R.120.
2. 61 I. A. 398.
3. [1962) I Supp. S.C.R. 104. •
4. A.1.R. 1971 S.C. 460.
'
5. A.l.R. 1973 S.C. 2622.
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.. RA~.1 JAG v. U.P, STATE -(Cha11drachud, J.)
J s.
has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de 1wi·o, informed,
howe,·er, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted int<> an acquittal the
homage our jurisprudence owes· to individual liberty constrains the
higher court not to upset the holding without \ery convincing reasons
and comprehensive_ consideration."
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The principles governing appeals against acquittal are thus firmly
established and the. issue cannot now be re-opened. The Code of
Criminal Proeedure by section 423,. has accorded parity to appeals
against conviction and appeals against acquittal; the Code makes no
distinction between the powers of the appellate court in regard to the
two categories of appeals and therefore the High Court has powers as
full and wide in appeals against acquittal as in appeals against conviction. Whether the High Court is dealing with one class of. appeals or
the other, it must equally have regard to the fundamental principles of
Criminal Jurisprudence that unless the statute provides to the contrary
there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused . and .
secondly, that the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.
Due ·regard to the views of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses. in matters resting on pure appreciation of evidence and the
studied slowness of the appellate court. in disturbing a finding of fact
arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the·
witnesses, where s1ich Sl!eing and healing can be useful aids to the assessment of evidence, are well-known principles which generally informs
the administration of justice and govern the exerdse ·of all appellate
jurisdiction. They are seJf:imposed limitations. on a power otherwise
plenary ·and like all voluntary restraints, they constitute valuable
guidelines. Such regard and slowness must find their reflection in the
appellate judgment, which can only be ifthe appellate court deals with
the principal reasons that become influenced the order of acquittal
and after examining the evidence with care giYes its own reasons justi- ·
fying a contrary view of the evidence. It is implicit in ibis judicial process that if two views of the evidence ate reasonably possible, tbc
finding of acquittal ought not to be disturbed ..
If after applying these principles, not by their mechanical reciiation
in the judgment, the High Court has reached the conclusion th·at the
order of acquittal ought to be reversed, this Court will not reappraise
evidence in appeals brought before it under article I 36 of the Constitution. In such appeals, only such examination of the evidence would
ordinarily be necessary as is required to see whether the High Court
has applied the principles correctly. The High Court is the final court
· of facts and the reserve jurisdiction of this Court under article !36,
though couched in.wide tenns, is by long practice exercised in exceptio_nal cases where the High Court has disregarded the guide-lines set
by this Court for deciding appeals against acquittal or "by disregard to
the forms of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural
justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done"
or.where the finding is such that it shocks the conscience of the Court
(See Sa11wat Singh & Ors. I'. State of Rajast/zan(I); _Harbam Singlz &
(I) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120, 134-135 • .'
·.
16 .
SUPl\EMI! COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 3 S.C.lt.
Anr. "·State of Punjab (I); Ramab/zupala Reddy and Ors., v. The State
of Andhra Pradesh(2); and Shivji Gem• Mohite v. Stale of M alzaraslttra)(l),
A finding reached by the application of correct principles cannot shock
judicial conscience and this Court does not permit its conscience
to be projected save where known and recognised tests of testimonial
U'«ssment are totally disregarded; otherwise, conscience can become
an unruly customer.
The High Court in the instant case was evidently awore of these
principles but it failed to apply them to the case on hand. In an effort
. to justify its interference with the order of acquittal it has characterised
one of the findings recorded by the trial court as 'perverse' but with
that we must express ourdisagreement. We will now proceed to show
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how the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge is clearly a reasonable
view to take of the evidence.
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According to the prosecution the occurrence took place .at about
4 p. m. and since the Firs.I Information Report was lodged at about
12-30 at night at the Tarabganj police station which is at a distance of
about 4 miles from the scene of occurrence, the learned Sessions Judge
held that there was undue delay in lodging the Report and that the delay
was not satisfactorily explained. It is true that witnesses cannot be
called upon to explain every hour's delay and a commonsense view has
to be taken in ascertaining whether the First Information Report was
lodged after an undue delay so as to afford enough scope for manipulating evidence. Whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of
suspicion on the seeds of the prosecution must depend upon a variety
of factors which would vary from case to case. Even a long delay in
filing report of an occurrence can be condoned if the witnesses on whose
evidence the prosecution relies have no motive for . implicating . the
accused. On .the other hand, prompt filing of the 'report is not an
unmistakeable guarantee of the truthfulness of the version of the
prosecution.
In the instant case the importance of the question whether there
. was delay in filing the First Information Report is of a different order.
The case of the appellants is that the occurrence must have taken place
under cover of darkness, that is, long after the time at which it is alleged
. to. have taken place and that is why the First Information Report
could not b~ !edged earlier than at 12-30 ·a.m.
This defence is wellfounded and the High Court was clearly in error in discarding it.
The village of Singha Chand~ is just. about a furlong away from the
scene of offence and yet Owanka claims to have gone to Gauhani,
which is about 3 or 4 ·miles away, to get a bullock-cart. The High Court·
observes:"It is not an unreasonable conduct on the part of the witnesses
not to take chance in the nearby village for arranging for a bullockcart when they felt sure that they would be able to procure one from
a village which .was somewhat farther away, the persons who owned
the bullock-cart being known to one of them." We find it difficult to
endorse this view. After the bullock-cart was· brought to the place
(1) [196!] I Supp. S.C. R.104, 111.
(2) A.l.R. 1971 S.C. 460, 464.
(3) A.l.R. 1973 S.C. 55, 6Z .
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RAM JAG v. u.P. STATE (Chandrachud, I.)
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where the incident took place Rampher and his tow companions
claimed to have taken a longer route to reach the police station for the
reason that taking the shorter route would have meant crossmg a
river twice. The river had but ankle-deep water and was only 12 paces
from one end to the other. Hausla Prasad was in a critical condition
and it is impossible to believe that a longer route was taken thoughtfully
in order to facilitate the journey. The High Court observes: "The
taking of a longer route also was justified in order to avoid the jolts
for the injured on the way for we find in the official map that
there is a route by the road of sufficiently good distance along which
the bullock-cart could go if it took the longer route." This reasoning
is wholly devoid of substance because in situations like the one in
which the injured persons were placed, there is neither time nor leisure
to consider calmly the pros and cons of the matter. The uppermost
thought would be to reach the hospital and the police station as early
as possible and it is in the least degree likely, as observed by the High
Court that the injured persons avoided going through the tiny river
because it "might have done damage to Hausla Prasad whose condition
was by no means good."
The truth of the matter is that the occurrence had taken place long
after 4 p.m. and witnesses were hard put to explaining why on their
own theory they took more than 8 hours to cover a distance of 4 miles.
They offered a fanciful explanation which was rightly rejected by the
Sessions Court and was wrongly accepted by the High Court. It is
, significant that Rampher had stated in the committing court tht di
of them were waiting at the spot of occurrence for about 2 hours
after "night-fall".
Ram Kripal, a brother of Rampher,. himself was examined by the
prosecution as an eye.witness. His name was not mentioned in the
First Information Report in spite of the fact that the name of other
witnesses and several other minute details were mentioned therein. lf
Ram Kripal was present at the time of the incident, he raiher than the
injured Dwarika would have gone to fetch the bullock-cart. The
Sessions Court therefore rejected the evidence of Ram Kripal and
indeed the High Court also came to the conclusion that Ram Kripal
was not a reliable witness, 'that he might nof have been present at all
and has been added as an after-thought in support of the prosecution
or in any case his statement is of doubtful value, but that does not mean
that Rarnpher's statement should be discarded for the principle of
falsus in uno,falsus in omnibus is a principle that does not apply in our
country.' If Rampher had no compunction in creating an eyewitness bis evidence had to be approached with great caution. The
High Court was not justified in holding that the only impact of the
false discovery of an eye-witness on the prosecution case was that
Rampher's evidence had to be rejected in part.
Ram Shanker is also alleged to have been present at the time of the
iacident but he had admitted before the committing magistrate that he
left his house for the temple at· about 2-30 p.m.
That would make it
impossible for him to be at the scene of offence at about 4 p.m. on his
3-852 Sup.C!J74
18
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.
way back from the temple. He therefore improved his version by statA
ing in the Sessions Court that he had left his house at about 6 a.m.
He had also stated in the committing court that he was waiting at the
scene of offence till about 8 p.m. but he denied in the Sessions Court
that he had made any such statement. The learned Sessions Judge
was therefore justi1ed in rejecting the evidence of Ram Shanker also
While dealing with the evidence of this witness the High Court obsenes
,that "the statement of a witness should be examined as a wliole and
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th! mere fact that the witness has denied certai1t statements made
by him earlier under the challenge thrown to him in the witness-box
during cross-examination should not detract from the value of his testimony m1de on oath before the trial Judge". One can be unconventional in the assessment of evidence but the approach of the High
Court is impossible to accept. Ram Shanker had made conflicting
statements on oath before the two courts on an important aspect and
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the question which the High Court had to ask itself in the appeal
· against the order of acquittal was whether the view taken by the Sesoions
Court in regard to the presence of Ram Shanker was not a reasonable
view to take. After indicating its disapproval of the conclusion recorded
by the Sessions Court that Ram Shanker was not a witness of truth,
the High Court proceeded to say that even if his evidence was
left out, there was no reason to ·discard the testimony of the other
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eye-witnesses.
The High Court also failed to appreciate the true implication of
Rampher's evidence in the Sessions Court that the assailants were dacoits
or 'Looteras' and that they had searched his pockets as well as the
pockets of his companions. Appellants are alleged to have assaulted ·
Hausla Prasad and his companions not with the motive ot thievi~g but
for the alleged motive that Hausla Prasad was in illicit intimacy with
Sheshkali, the daughter of Gaya Prasad who was the principal accused
but who died during the proceedings. If that be the true motive, it
is hardly likely that Gaya Prasad and his companions would search
the pockets of Rampher and his troupe. The Sessions Court was justified in attaching due importance to Rampher's evidence on this aspect
of the matter. We are unable to appreciate the criticism of the High
Court that "It is again the case of an unnecessary emphasis being laid
on a minor matter". Indeed witnesses themselves thought the matter
to be so important that in order to render the story of motive probable,
they Introduced in their evidence the embe:Hishment that before hitting'.
Hausla Prasad, Ga ya Prasad said "Is ko .... Aashnai ka Maza ChakhaJ
do 0 , -The endeavour at the trial was to. show that the incident \Vas
connected with the illicit affair between Hausla Prasad and Sheshkali.
Significantly, the First Information Report makes no mention of a11y
one of the accused referring to the 'Aashnai' (iiJicit intimacy) before,
during or after the attack.
In the concluding portion of.its judgment the High Court has observed· that the injured persons must have been present at the spot and as
the occ·urrence took place in "broad day·light", there was no reason
why their evidence should not be accepted, '.'even though they might
have one reason or the other to falsely 1mphcate one or the other
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RAM JAG V. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, /.)
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accused". It was wrong to conclude thatlhe incident had taken place
in broad day-light and it was even more wrong that the High Court did
not warn itSc:lf of the danger of accepting the evidence of witnesses who
had reason to implicate the appellants falsely.
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For these reasons we are of the >'iew that the Hight Court was not
justified in lnterfel-ing with the order of acquittal passed by the learned
Sessions Judge. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the
order of conviction and sentence and direct that the appellants shall
be set at liberty, if they are not already on ba;I.
P.B.R .
Appeal allowed.