# RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS - **Citation:** [2017] 4 S.C.R. 553 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2017-03-21 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 4288of2017 - **Bench:** Dipak Misra, A. M. Khanwilkar, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-kishan-fauji-v-state-of-haryana-and-ors-32045 - **Pages:** 38 ## Headnote Letters Patent: A ·B Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) - Writ petition C u/Art. 226 of the Constitution - Seeking quashing of recommendation of Lokayukta for registration of FIR and investigation - Single Judge of High Court allowed the writ petition quashing the recommendation - Letters Patent Appeal - Allowed - Appeal challenging maintainability of the LPA - Held: Till a D competent legislature takes away the power of the Letters Patent, the same can be exercised by the High Court under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent to the High Court - However, exercising such jurisdiction, it is imperative to see what is the nature of jurisdiction that has actually been provided in the Letters Patent· - If the proceedings, nature and relief sought pertain to anything connected E with criminal jurisdiction, LPA would not lie, as the same is not provided in Cl. I 0 of Letters Patent - Conception of 'criminal jurisdiction' as used in Cl. 10 encompasses in its gamut the inception and the consequence - In the present case, the nature of the proceedings was criminal and not civil - Therefore, the LPA was F not maintainable - Letters Patent (as applicable to erstwhile Punjab & Lahore High Courts) - Cl. 10. Court Proceedings : Nature/character of court proceedings - Determination of - Held: Character of the proceedings does not depend upon the nature G of the tribunal which is invested with the authority to grant relief. but upon the nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief which may be claimed. Civil proceedings and criminal proceedings - Distinction between - Discussed. 553 H 554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R. A Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Till a competent legislature takes away the power of the Letters Patent, the same can be exercised by the High Court. However, while exercising the power under the Letters Patent, it is imperative to see what is the nature of jurisdiction B that has actually been provided in the Letters Patent. The exercise of jurisdiction has to be within the ambit and scope of the authority enshrined in the provision meant for intra-court appeal. [Para 28) [511-B] Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra and others C (2005) 2 SCC 591 : [2005] 1 SCR 223 - followed. D Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay & another v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and others [1966) 1 SCR 190; Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat and others (2015) 9 SCC 1 : [2015] 6 SCR 504 - relied on. 4, An appeal shall lie from the judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Bench of the High Court if it is so permitted within the ambit and sweep of the Letters Patent. The power conferred . on the High Court by the Letters Pa_tent can be abolished or curtailed by the competent legislature by bringing appropriate E legislation. A writ petition which assails the order of a civil court in .. the High Court has to be understood, in all circumstances, to be a challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution and determination by the High Court under the said Article and, hence, no intra-court appeal is entertainable. The ~~nability of intra-court appeal will depend upon the Bench 3dju11icating the F /is as to how it understands and appreciates the ordl-r passed by the Single Judge. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for the sarite. [Para 46] (579-E-H) G Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others AIR 1955 SC 233 : [1955] SCR 1104 - held inapplicable. T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa: AIR 1954 SC 440: [1955] SCR 250 - referred to. 3. A civil proceeding is one in which a person seeks to H enforce by approprfate relief the alleged infringement of his civil RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 555 rights against another person or the State, and which, if the claim A is proved, would result in the declaration, express or implied, of the right claimed and relief such as payment of debt, damages, compensation, delivery of specific property, enforcement of personal rights, determination of status, etc. A criminal p ## Text _Characters 0–39,952 of 87,022. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39952 for what follows._ [2017] 4 S.C.R. 553 RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 4288of2017) MARCH 21, 2017 [DIPAK MISRA, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.] Letters Patent: A ·B Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) - Writ petition C u/Art. 226 of the Constitution - Seeking quashing of recommendation of Lokayukta for registration of FIR and investigation - Single Judge of High Court allowed the writ petition quashing the recommendation - Letters Patent Appeal - Allowed - Appeal challenging maintainability of the LPA - Held: Till a D competent legislature takes away the power of the Letters Patent, the same can be exercised by the High Court under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent to the High Court - However, exercising such jurisdiction, it is imperative to see what is the nature of jurisdiction that has actually been provided in the Letters Patent· - If the proceedings, nature and relief sought pertain to anything connected E with criminal jurisdiction, LPA would not lie, as the same is not provided in Cl. I 0 of Letters Patent - Conception of 'criminal jurisdiction' as used in Cl. 10 encompasses in its gamut the inception and the consequence - In the present case, the nature of the proceedings was criminal and not civil - Therefore, the LPA was F not maintainable - Letters Patent (as applicable to erstwhile Punjab & Lahore High Courts) - Cl. 10. Court Proceedings : Nature/character of court proceedings - Determination of - Held: Character of the proceedings does not depend upon the nature G of the tribunal which is invested with the authority to grant relief. but upon the nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief which may be claimed. Civil proceedings and criminal proceedings - Distinction between - Discussed. 553 H 554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R. A Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Till a competent legislature takes away the power of the Letters Patent, the same can be exercised by the High Court. However, while exercising the power under the Letters Patent, it is imperative to see what is the nature of jurisdiction B that has actually been provided in the Letters Patent. The exercise of jurisdiction has to be within the ambit and scope of the authority enshrined in the provision meant for intra-court appeal. [Para 28) [511-B] Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra and others C (2005) 2 SCC 591 : [2005] 1 SCR 223 - followed. D Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay & another v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and others [1966) 1 SCR 190; Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat and others (2015) 9 SCC 1 : [2015] 6 SCR 504 - relied on. 4, An appeal shall lie from the judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Bench of the High Court if it is so permitted within the ambit and sweep of the Letters Patent. The power conferred . on the High Court by the Letters Pa_tent can be abolished or curtailed by the competent legislature by bringing appropriate E legislation. A writ petition which assails the order of a civil court in .. the High Court has to be understood, in all circumstances, to be a challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution and determination by the High Court under the said Article and, hence, no intra-court appeal is entertainable. The ~~nability of intra-court appeal will depend upon the Bench 3dju11icating the F /is as to how it understands and appreciates the ordl-r passed by the Single Judge. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for the sarite. [Para 46] (579-E-H) G Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others AIR 1955 SC 233 : [1955] SCR 1104 - held inapplicable. T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa: AIR 1954 SC 440: [1955] SCR 250 - referred to. 3. A civil proceeding is one in which a person seeks to H enforce by approprfate relief the alleged infringement of his civil RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 555 rights against another person or the State, and which, if the claim A is proved, would result in the declaration, express or implied, of the right claimed and relief such as payment of debt, damages, compensation, delivery of specific property, enforcement of personal rights, determination of status, etc. A criminal proceeding is ordinarily one which, if carried to its conclusion, may result in B imposition of (i) sentence, and (ii) it can take within its ambit the larger interest of the State, orders to prevent apprehended breach of peace and orders to bind down persons who are a danger to the maintenance of peace and order. The character of the proceeding does not depend upon the nature of the tribunal which is invested with the authority to grant relief but upon the nature C of the right violated and the appropriate relief which may be claimed. [Paras 33 and 34] (572-E-H; 573-A] Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma AIR 1965 SC 1595 : (1965] SCR 366; Umaji Keshao Meshram & others v. Radhikabai & another 1986 (Supp.) SCC 401 : (1986] SCR 731; Kishorilal v. Sales Officer, District Land Development Bank (2006) 7 SCC 496 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 274; State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Visan Marduk Shiv Charan Lal (2008) 15 SCC 233 : (2008] 17 SCR 156; Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar and others v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha and others 1993 Supp (1) SCC 11; Ramesh Chandra Sank/a Etc. v. Vikram Cement Etc. (2008) 14 SCC 58: [2008] 10 SCR 243; Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others (2015) 5 SCC 423 : [2015] 3 SCR 197; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 : (2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 290; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1 : (1966] SCR 744; Lokmat Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Shankarprasad (1999) 6 SCC 275: (1999] 3 SCR 907 - referred to. 4. Where an appeal is not excluded against the judgment of the High Court of a Single Judge, an appeal would lie to the Division Bench and if the appropriate Legislature has expressly or by necessary implication not taken away a right of appeal, the appeal shall lie from the Single Judge under Clause 10 of the D E F G Letters Patent to the High Court. [Para 24] (569-C-D] H 556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R. A South Asia Industries Private Ltd v. S.B. Sarup Singh and others (1965) 2 SCR 756 - relied on. 5. If the proceeding, nature and relief sought pertain to anything connected with criminal jurisdiction, intra-court appeal would not lie, as the same is not provided in Clause 10 of the B Letters Patent. If an appeal in certain jurisdictions is not provided for, it cannot be conceived of. The conception of 'criminal jurisdiction' as used in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is not to be construed in the narrow sense. It encompasses in its gamut the inception and the consequence. It is the field in respect of which the jurisdiction is exercised, is relevant. The contention c that solely because a writ petition is filed to quash an investigation, it would have room for intra-court appeal and if a petition is filed under inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, there would be no space for an intra-court appeal, would create an anomalous, unacceptable and inconceivable situation. The provision D contained in the Letters Patent does not allow or permit such an interpretation. It confers jurisdiction as regards the subject of controversy or nature of proceeding and that subject is exercise of jurisdiction in criminal matters. It has nothing to do whether the order has been passed in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction E F under Article 226 of the Constitution or inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. [Paras 49 and 61] [580-H; 581-A; 587G-H; 588-A-C] Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 : [1994] 2 SCR 375; Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2009) 4 SCC 437 : [2009] 4 SCR 1027; Hema Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2014) 4 SCC 453 : [2014] 1 SCR 465 - referred to. 6. In the present case, the writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing of the G recommendation of the Lokayukta. The said recommendation would have led to launching of criminal prosecution, and, as the factual matrix reveals, FIR was registered and criminal investigation was initiated. The Single Judge analysed the report and the ultimate recommendation of the statutory authority and H thought it seemly to quash the same and after quashing the same, RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 557 as he found that FIR had been registered, he annulled it treating A the same as a natural consequence. Thus, the effort of the writ petitioner was to avoid a criminal investigation and the final order of the writ court is quashment of the registration of FIR and the subsequent investigation. In such a situation, to hold that the Single Judge, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the B Constitution, has passed an order in a civil proceeding as the order that was challenged was that of the quasi-judicial authority, that is, the Lokayukta, would be conceptually fallacious. It is because what matters is, the nature of the proceeding, and that is the litmus test. [Para 65) (589-F-H; 590-A-B] Adishwar Jain v. Union of India and another 2006 Cr.LJ 3193 - distinguished. Gangaram Kandaram v. Sunder Chikha Amin and others 2000 (2) ALT 448 (F.B.); State of Haryana and others v. B.rnjanlal and others AIR 1992 SC 604 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997) 2 SCC 397 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 347; Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi (1999) 3 SCC 259 : (1999] 1 SCR 1012; Sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt v. State of Gujarat & others (2000) 1 Gujarat Law Reports 206; Umaji Keshao Meshram & others v. Radhikabai & another 1986 Supp. SCC 401: [1986) SCR 73; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and another (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [~998) 2 SCR 795; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and another AIR 1988 SC 1531 : [1988) 1 Suppl. SCR 1; State of Gujarat v. Jayantilal Maganlal Patel 1995 (2) GLH 260; Patel Kashiram Lavjibhai v. Narottamdas Bechardas & others 1978 GLR 1047 (FB); CS. Agarwal v. State & others 2011 (125) DRJ 241 (FB); Commissioner of IncomeTax, Bombay & another v. Jshwarlal Bhagwandas and others [1966] 1 SCR 190; Vipul Gupta v. State & Ors 208 (2014) DLT 468 (DB) - referred to. 7. Therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable before the Division Bench of High Court and, consequently, the order passed therein is wholly unsustainable c D E F G H 558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R. A and, accordingly, it is set aside. However, as the State had been diligently agitating its grievance in a legal forum which it thought had jurisdiction, liberty is granted to the State to assail the order of the Single Judge in accordance with law. [Para 6tiJ [590-B-C) Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh and others B (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013) 14 SCR 713; Justice Chandrashekaraiah (Retd.) v. Janekere C. Krishna & others (2013) 3 SCC 117. : [2013) 3 SCR 987; Associated Cement Cvmpanies Ltd. v. P. N Sharma AIR 1965 SC 1595 : [1965) SCR 366 - referred to. c Case Law Reference [2013) 14 SCR 713 referred to Para 6 [2013) 3 SCR 987 referred to Para 11 [1965] SCR 366 referred to Para 14 D [196] 2 SCR 756 relied on Para 23 [200)5 1 SCR 223 followed Para 25 [1966) 1 SCR 190 relied on Para 29 E [1986) SCR 731 referred to Para 35 [2009) 13 SCR 886 relied on Para 37 [2006) 5 Suppl. SCR 274 referred to Para 37 F [2008] 17 SCR156 referred to Para 37 1993 Supp (1) sec 11 referred to Para 37 [2008] 10 SCR 243 referred to Para 38 G [2015) 3 SCR 197 referred to Para 39 [2003) 2 Suppl. SCR 290 referred to Para 39 [1966] SCR 744 referred to Para 39 [2015) 6 SCR 504 relied on Para 43 H RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 559 (1999] 3 SCR 907 referred to Para 44 A (1955] SCR 1104 held inapplicable Para 47 !1955) SCR 250 referred to Para 47 2000 (2) ALT 448 (F.B.) referred to Para 50 B [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 referred to Para 51 [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 347 referred to Para 51 [1999] 1 SCR 1012 referred to Para 51 (2000) 1 Gujarat Law Reports 206 referred to Para 53 c [1998] 2 SCR 795 referred to Para 54 [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 54 1995 (2) GLH 260 referred to Para 54 · D 1978 GLR 1047 (FB) referred to Para 55 2011 (125) DRJ 241 (FB) referred to Para 58 208 (2014) DLT 468 (DB) referred to Para 60 E [1994] 2 SCR 375 referred to Para 61 [2009) 4 SCR 1027 referred to Para 61 [2014] 1 SCR 465 referred to Para 61 2006 Cr.LJ 3193 distinguished Para 63 F CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4288 of2017. From the Judgment and Order dated 12.05.2016 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CM No. 3930-LPA of2015 in G LPANo. 1426 of2015 (O&M). Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Sr. Adv., Arunabh Chowdhury, Anupam Lal Das, Karma Dorjee, Vaibhav Tomar, Ms. Barnali Chowdhury, Kabir S. Ghosh, Advs. for the Appellant. H 560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R. A Arun Bhardwaj, Anil Grover, AA Gs., San jay Kumar Visen, Ronak B c D E F Karanpuria, Ashish Pandey, Sumit Sharma, Gauraan Bhardwaj, Dr. Monika Gusain, Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The Chief Secretary to the Government ofHaryana in exercise of power under Section 8(1) of the Haryana Lokayukta Act, 2002 (for brevity, "the Act") made a reference to the Lokayukta, Haryana to enquire into the allegations, namely, (i) whether the allegations of bribery levelled in the alleged Compact Disc (CD) are correct, (ii) whether Change of Land Use (CLU)/Licence was granted in pursuance of these allegations, and (iii) whether by such act, any illegality was committed. The said reference was registered as Complaint No. 773 of2013 in the office of the Lokayukta, Haryana. 3. Acting on the reference made by the Chief Secretary, the office of the Lokayukta issued a public notice requesting the public in general to send any such material including Video Compact Disc (VCD) connected with the subject in issue. Apart from the public notice, communications were sent to various departments of the Government, television channels and newspapers for furnishing all materials to find out the allegations of corruption against the persons who have been named in the complaint. 4. As the facts would unfold, the Lokayukta, Haryana, issued notice to the appellant in exercise of power under Section 14 of the Act to offer his explanation. In pursuance of the said communication, the appellant filed a reply and the Lokayukta granted him time to place on record his evidence in the form of an affidavit. When the matter stood thus, on 16.01.2014, two persons allegedly conducted a sting operation and filed their affidavits before the Lokayukta. The appellant, iri the meantime, got the CD examined from Mis Tmth Labs, Bangalore and also got the: forensic examination of the audio and a report was submitted on 20.01.2014 opining, as averred, thatthe audio and video recording in G the earlier CD was not continuous and the recording did not appear to be authentic. Be that as it may, on weighing the material brought on record, the Lokayukta thought it appropriate to recommend for registration of FIR for offences punishable under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, "the 1988 Act") and H investigation by a senior competent officer of impeccable integrity. RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 561 [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 5. At this stage, it is necessary to mention that the appellant had A preferred Civil Writ Petition No. 4554/2014 (O&M) praying for issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the impugned orders dated 20.01.2014 and 11.02.2014 passed by the respondent No. 2 whereby it had recommended registration of a case against the petitioner therein under the provisions of the 1988 Act and further for issue of a writ or B direction in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondent No. I from initiating any consequential proceeding on the basis of the impugned orders. The grounds asserted for the assail were that there was no verification of the genuinity of the alleged VCD and that the action taken was perverse, illegal, arbitrary and violative of the provisions of the Act. 6. The High Court, vide order dated 14.03.2014, directed the C respondent State to inquire into the authenticity of the CD in question and file a status report in the Court and further directed that the State shall be bound by the judgment of Lulita Kumari v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh and others1 with reference to the preliminary enquiry to be· conducted in respect of corruption cases. A reply was filed before the D High Court on 03.12.2014 and FIR No. 10/2014 was registered at P.S. State Vigilance Bureau, Panchkula on 04.12.2014 under Sections 7 and 8 of the 1988 Act. Certain other documents were brought on record before the learned Single Judge of the High Court and eventually. vide judgment dated 27.02.2015, the learned Single Judge referred to various aspects such as the facts that led to the complaint before the Lokayukta, the findings of the Lokayukta, the initial endeavour by the High Court to gather details of the authenticity of the CD, the contradictory report submitted by the writ petitioner from private laboratory, the fresh report from Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) to quell the contradiction, the law relating to the admissibility of evidence of electronic record and, thereafter, it recorded its conclusion on the issues pertaining to the authenticity of the CD, credible information for bribery, direction for filing of complaint by the Lokayukta, the report of the Lokayukta, the imputations made against the petitioner,primafacie proof, the jurisdiction of the Lokayukta to cause an inquiry and, ultimately, came to hold as follows:- "I have undertaken this examination only to conclude all the issues which were urged before me. The observations as regards the untenability invoking the provision of Section 9 does not obtain 1 (2014) 2 sec 1 E F G H 562 A B c D E SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R. relevance to us, for, we have already found the report to be seriously flawed in every respect both as regards the competence of the Lokayukta to order a registration of a complaint after he found the reference in the negative that there was no case made for allegations of corruption and that also the evidence of CD which was taken to be the basis for a further investigation itself could not be relied on, for, it lacks the basic element ofauthenticity." 7. Being of this view, it proceeded to deal with the registration of the complaint on the recommendation of the Lokayukta and, in that regard, opined that:- "Th e learned counsel for the State would submit that the investigation has proceeded subsequent to the impugned order passed. A FIR has been registered on 04.12.2014, that is, after the writ petition was filed, when the issue of the authenticity of . the CD was very much open for consideration. Indeed, I had stayed the further proceedings when I passed an order on 19.12.2014 directing the· CD to be sent along with the memory chip to the CFSL, Hyderabad. If the investigation is purported to · · be take.n by lodging a FIR, consequent on the directions given by the order which is now quashed, it shall also be quashed." 8. While so stating, the learned Single Judge ruled that ifthere is any other material or information of corrupt practice against the writ petitioner, the State shall be at liberty to carry out the investigation as ·p~r law. 9. The aforesaid order came to be assailed in LPA No. 1426 of 2015. The Division Bench, by order dated 15.12.2015, without issuing F notice to the present appellant, condoned the delay of 85 days in filing the appeal and stayedthe operation of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. The appellant filed CM No. 3930/LPA of2U l 5 for vacation of the said interim order and.die Division Bench declined to vacate the interim order and made it absolute on 12.05.2016 by the impugned order G and after admitting the LPA, passed the following order:- H "However, with a view to ensure absolute objectivity in the ongoing investigation and to rule out any possibility of alleged prejudice against respondent No. I, the Director Gener-al of Police, Haryana is directed to re-constitute a Special_ Investigation Team comprising RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 563 [DIPAK MISRA, J.] three senior !PS officers who originally do not belong to the State A of Haryana. Liberty is granted to the parties to seek out-of-turn hearing of the appeal after the investigation is over." I 0. Questioning the sustainability of the order passed by the Division Bench, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel, has raised B a singular contention that the LPA preferred before the Division Bench was not maintainable inasmuch as the learned Single Judge had exercised criminal jurisdiction. He has placed reliance on certain authorities to which we shall refer to at the relevant place in the course of our deliberations. C 11. Mr. Sanj ay Kumar Visen, learned counsel appearing for the respondent State, resisting the aforesaid submission, would contend that the writ petition was registered as a civil writ petition for the purpose of issuing a writ of certiorari and the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court is civil in nature and, therefore, the jurisdiction exercised is civil D jurisdiction that invites interference in intra-court appeal. That apart, contends Mr. Visen that the exercise of power of the learned Single Judge is strictly under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia and, hence, an intra-court appeal deserved to be entertained by the Division Bench. It is further submitted by him that the Lokayukta is a quasi-judicial body and when, at its instance, action is taken for inquiry, it has to come within E the ambit and scope of civil jurisdiction and not criminal jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the State has stressed on the status of Lokayukta and for that matter has commended us to the authority in Justice Chandrashekaraiah (Reid.) v. Janekere C. Krishna & others2• 12. First, we intend to advert to the position of the Lokayi.tkta or F Upa-Lokayukta as has been dealt with in Justice Chandrashekaraiah (supra). In the said case, Radhakrishnan, J. ruled that Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta act as quasi-judicial authorities, but their functions are investigative in nature. Scrutinising the provisions enshrined under Sections 9, I 0 and 11 of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, he opined G that the said authorities, while investigating the matters, are discharging quasi-judicial functions, but the nature offunctions is investigative. The learned Judge, while deliberating on the consequence of the report, ruled thus:- 2 (2013) 3 sec 117 H 564 A B c SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R. "The Governor of the State, acting in his discretion, if accepts the report of the Lokayukta against the Chief Minister, then he has to resign from the post. So also, ifthe Chief Minister accepts such a report against a Minister, then he has to resign from the post. The Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta, however, has no jurisdiction or power to direct the Governor or the Chief Minister to implement his report or direct resignation from the office they hold, which depends upon the question whether the Governor or the Chief Minister, as the case may be, accepts the report or not. But when the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta, if after the investigation, is satisfied that the public servant has committed any criminal offence, prosecution can be initiated, for which prior sanction of any authority required under any law for such prosecution, shall also be deemed to have been granted." 13. In the concurring opinion, Lokur, J. posed the question whether the Lokayukta is a quasi-judicial authority. The argument on behalf of D the State was that Upa-Lokayukta is essentially required to investigate complaints and enquire into the grievances brought before it and, therefore, he may be exercising some quasi-judicial functions, but that does not make him a quasi-judicial authority. The said submission was advanced to highlight the proposition that when the Upa-Lokayukta is not a quasi-judicial authority, the opinion of the Chief Justice of the High E Court of Karnataka would not have primacy in the appointment and consultation process. After adverting to the powers and functions of Upa-Lokayukta, it has been held that:- F "105. Section 14 of the Act enables the Upa-Lokayukta to prosecute a public servant and if such an action is taken, sanction to prosecute the public servant shall be deemed to have been granted by the appropriate authority." xxxxx xxxxx "107. The broad spectrum of functions, powers, duties and G responsibilities of the Upa-Lokayukta, as statutorily prescribed, clearly bring out that not only does he perform quasi-judicial functions, as contrasted with purely administrative or executive functions, but that the Upa-Lokayukta is more than an investigator or an enquiry officer. At the same time, notwithstanding his status, he is not placed on the pedestal ofajudicial authority rendering a H RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 565 [DIPAK MISRA, J.] binding decision. He is placed somewhere in between an A investigator and a judicial authority, having the elements of both. For want of a better expression, the office of an Upa-Lokayukta can only be described as a sui gen eris quasi-j_udicial authority." "108 ....... The final decis.ion rendered by the Upa-Lokayukta, called a report, may not bear the stamp of a judicial decision, as B would that of a court or, to a lesser extent, a tribunal, but in formulating the report, he is required to consider the point of view of the person complained against and ensure that the investigation reaches its logical conclusion, one way or the other, without any interference and without any fear. Notwithstanding this, the report of the Upa-Lokayukta does not determine the rights of the C complainant or the person complained against. Consequently, the Upa~Lokayukta is neither a court nor a tribunal. Therefore, in rny opinion, the Upa-Lokayukta can best be described as a sui generis quasi-judicial authority." 14. After so stating, the learned Judge referred to the opinions of D Kania, CJI and Das, J. in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma3 and arrived at the following conclusion:- "As mentioned above, an Upa-Lokayukta does function as an adjudicating authority but the Act places him short of a judicial authority. He is much more "judicial" than an investigator or an E inquisitorial authority largely exercising administrative or executive · functions and powers. Under the circumstances, taking an overall view of the provisions of the Act and the law laid down, my conclusion is that the Upa~Lokayukta is a quasi-judicial authority or in any event an authority exercising functions, powers, duties F and responsibilities conferred by the Act as a sui generis quasijudicial authority. . 15. The aforesaid pronouncement was rendered when the appointment ofUpa-Lokayukta was challenged on the ground that one of the constitutional functionaries was not consulted. Emphasis was on G the nature of the post held by Lokayukta or Upa~Lokayukta. 16. The aforesaid paragraphs would clearly show that neither the ' Lokayukta nor Upa-Lokayukta has any jurisdiction or authority to direct implementation of his report by the constitutional functionary but whert 3 AIR 1965 SC 1595 H 566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R. A after investigation, it is found that the public servant has committed any criminal offence, prosecution can be initiated for which prior sanction of any authority is required under any law for such prosecution and the same shall be deemed to have been granted. ·B 17. Relying on the aforesaid judgment, it is submitted by Mr. Visen that when the posts held by Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta are quasijudicial in nature, their functioning has to be given the same character and once they are clothed with such functioning and action taken by them is subject to challenge before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of certiorari for quashment of the same, in that event, the adjudication has to be regarded as civil in nature. C Elaborating further, he would submit that in the instanfoase, a civil writ was filed challenging the opinion and recommendation of the Lokayukta and, therefore, the jurisdiction sought to be exercised is under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia and resultantly, the order passed by the D E learned Single Judge is amenable to correction in intra-court appeal. 18. The maze needs to be immediately cleared. In the instant case, we are really not concerned with the nature of the post held by Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta. We are also not concerned how the recommendation of the said authorities is to be challenged and what will be the procedure therefor. As has been held by this Court, neither the Lokayukta nor Upa-Lokayukta can direct implementation of his report, but it investigates and after investigation, ifit is found that a public servant has committed a criminal offence, prosecution can be initiated. 19. Having discussed as aforesaid, at this juncture, reference to Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (as applicable to erstwhile Punjab & F Lahore High Courts) is absolutely apposite. It reads as follows:- "10. Appeals to the High Court from Judges of the Court - And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Lahore from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect G of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal H RAM KISHAN FAUJI v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 567 [DIPAK MISRA, J.] jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of A any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Governffient of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, made on B or after the first day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect ofa decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments C of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided." [emphasis added] 20. On a plain reading of the aforesaid clause of the Letters Patent, D it is manifest that no appeal lies against the order passed by the Single Judge in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Thus, the question that is required to be posed is whether the learned Single Judge, in the obtaining factual matrix has exercised criminal jurisdiction or not. 21. Presently, we may fruitfully refer to Clauses 15, 17 and 18 E that deal with criminal jurisdiction. Clause 15 that provides for ordinary criminal jurisdiction of the High Court reads as under:- "15. And We do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Lahore shall have ordinary original criminal jurisdiction in respect of all such persons within the Provinces of Punjab and Delhi as F the Chief Court of the Punjab had such criminal jurisdiction over immediately before the publication of these presents." 22. Clauses 17 and 18, being pertinent, are extracted below:- " 17. And We do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Lahore shall have extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction · G over all persons residing in places within the jurisdiction of any Court subject to its superintendence, and shall have authority to try at its discretion any such persons brought before it on charges preferred py any magistrate or other officer specially empowered by the Government in that behalf. H 568 A B SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 4 S.C.R. 18. And We do further ordaip that there shall be no appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Lahore from any sentence or order passed or made by the Courts of original criminal jurisdiction which may be constituted by one or more Judges of the said High Court. But it shall be at the discretion of any such court to reserve any point or points oflaw forthe opinion of the said High Court." [underlining is ours] 23. It is worthy to mention here that Clause 10 of the Letters Patent establishing the Lahore High Court (which is applicable to the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court) is in pari materia to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts. The four-Judge C Bench, in South Asia Industries Private Ltd v. S.B. Sarup Singh and others", speaking through Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) referred to Clauses 10 and 11 of the Letters Patent and, in that context, ruled:- D E 'f "A plain reading of the said clause indicates that except in the 3 cases excluded an appeal lay against the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court to the High Court in exercise of