# RAM KISHORE SEN AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS - **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 430 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1965-08-11 - **Case number:** Special Reference No. I of 1959 - **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayat· B Ullah, J. c. SHAii, s. M. Suau - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-kishore-sen-and-others-v-union-of-india-and-others-3599 - **Pages:** 20 ## Headnote Consrilution (Ninth Ammdment) A.ct, 19~Transftr of certain awu to Pakistan in fulfilment of India-Pakistan A.grumen:-Legulity of. As a result of the 'lndo-Pak..ista11 Agreements' entered into in 1956 between the Primo Mini,tcrs of India and Pakistan half of the area k.nowu as Barubari Union No. 12, and a ponion of Chilahati village arlmcasuring 512 acres were agreed to be uasferred by India to Pakistan. Cenaiu questions arising out of the implementation of the sand Agreements were referred by the President under An. 143( 1) of the Constitution, to this Court, and were answered by this Coun in Special Reference No. I of 1959. In accordance \\.ith the answers therein given. Parliament passed the Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Act, 1960. There was l?rovision in the Act for a date, to be appointed by notification in the Offictal Gazette, for the transler of the areas in question of Pakistan. In regard to Berubari Union No. 12 the Sec-Ond Schedule to the Amending Act, inter a/la, said : "Thia will be so divided as to give half the area to Pakistan. the other half adjacent lo India being retain<'d by India. The division of Berubari Union No. 12 will be horizontal. starting from the nonh-east corner o! Debiganj Tbana." The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the legality of the proposed transfer of the said areas of Berbubari Union No. 12 and Chilahati village to Pakistan. The language of the Amending Act in regard to Berubari Union No. 12 wa.., they urgeJ, so confused that it w.. incapable to implcmcntatioo. In rCllllfd to Chilabali village they uricd that il was outside tho Radclift'c Award. Reliance was placed by them on an unoC!icial map, Ext. A-1. The High C-Ourt found that Ext. A-1 was inadmis.Siblo and unrcliablt. Relying on the maps produced by tbe respondents it dismissed the writ petition filed by the oppcllants who. with certificate. appealed to this Court. It Wa! urged on behalf of the appellants : (I) If the division of Barubori Union No. 12 was made as directed by the said amendment no portion of Berubari Union No. 12 woold fall to the south of the horizontal line starting from the north-east corner of Dcbiganj Thana. so that no part of the \aid Union could be transferred to Pakistan. ( 2) The Hi~h Court erred in holding that map F.xt. A-1 was neither relevant nor accurate. (3) The location of ditTerent villages in the various Th:ina~ was a matter within the special lroowblge of the ri:,•pondcnts and under s. 106 of the Evidence Act the onus of proving the relevant facts was on the respon~ dents. ( 4) The ponion of Chilahati village in question was difforent from the village of Cbilahati which had gone 10 Pakistan under the Radcliffe Award, as y,·as shown not only hy maps but hy certain private document, which described Cbilahati as pan of Jalpaiguri Thana. (5) Entry 13 in the First Schedule to the Constitution provides, inter a/la, that West Bengal means the territories which immediately before the eommen~ment of the Cons.titution were either compri!ed in the Province of West Bengal or were hcing administered 'a< if they formed pan of that Pro' ince. The portion ('Of Qiilahoti in question was being admini-l belonged to Pakistan under the Radcliffe Award. (448 A-El (vii) The Plea o! adverse possession was not raised by the appcllan"s in their writ petition. Besides it was plain that nci:hcr the Vni"Jn of 1ncia/ Reference N? I of 1959. In re: The B?rubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves-{1960] 3 S.C.R. 250 at pp. 256, 295~. 434 SUPIUIKJI COU..T lll!PORTS J1966] i S.C.R. ( 3) Is a law of Parliament relatable to Article 3 of the Constitution sufficient for implementation of the Agreement relating ro Exchange of Enclaves or is an amendment of the Constitution in accordance with Article 368 of the Constitution necessary for the purpose, in addition or in the alternative ?" On the above Reference, this Court rendered the following 2nswers :- Q. ( 1) Yes. Q. (2) (a) A law of Parliament relatable to Art. 3 of the Constitution would be incompetent; (b) A law of Parliament relatable to Art. 168 of the Constitution is competent and necessary; ( c) A law of Parliament relatable to both Art. 368 and Art. 3 would be necessary only if Parliament chooses first to pass a law amending Art. 3 as indicated above; in that case, Parliament may have to pass " law on those lines under Art. 368 and then follow it up with a law relatable to the amended Art. 3 to implement the Agreement. Q. (3) Same as answers (a), (b) and (c) to Question 2. As a result of the opinion thus rendered, Parliament passed A B c D E the Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Act, 1960 which came into -operation on December 28, 1960. Under this amendment, "appointed day" means such date a~ the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as the date F for the transfer of territories to Pakistan in pursuance of the 'Inda-Pakistan Agreements' which means the Agreement' dated the 10th September, 1958, the 23rd October, 1959, and the 11th January, 1960 entered into between the Government of India and Pakistan. The relevant extracts from the said Agreements have been set out in the Second Schedule to the Ninth Amendment Act. G The material portion of the said Schedule reads as follows :- "(3) Berubari Union No. 12 This will be so divided as to give half the area to Pakistan. the other half adjacent to India being retained by India. The division of Berubari Union No. 12 wil1 be horizontal, starting from the north-east corner of Debiganj Thana. H t • ' l ' • - • A B ll. K. SEN v. UNION ( Gajendragadkor, C.J.) 43 5 The division should be made in such a manner that the Cooch Behar enclaves between Pachagar thana of East Pakistan and Berubari Union No. 12 of Jalpaiguri thana of West Bengal will remain connected at present with Indian terrirory and will remain with India. The Cooch Behar enclaves lower down between Boda thana of East Pakistan and Berubari Union No. 12 will be exchanged along with the general exchange of enclaves and will go to Pakistan." The appellants alleged that it had come to their knowledge that about a month before the date of their petition, officers of the C two Governments had gone to the locality to make demarcation by holding a survey and that the respondents intended to effect a partition of Berubari Union No. 12 with a view to transfer the southern part of the said Union to Pakistan. They had also come to know that a similar attempt to transfer village Chilahati was being made. The appellants also alleged that the language D of the Amendment Act in question in so far as it relates to Berubari Union No. 12 is involved and confused and is incapable of implementation. In the alternative, it is urged that if the division of Berubari Union No. 12 is made as directed by the said amendment, no portion of Berubari Union No. 12 would fall to the E south of the horizontal line starting from the north-east comer of Debiganj Thana, and so, no portion of the said Union can be transferred to Pakistan. In regard to the village of Chilahati, the appellants' case was that the said village was not covered either by the lndo-Pakistan Agreements or by the Ninth Amendment Act. According to them, this village was a part of West F Bengal and it was not competent to the respondents to transfer it to Pakistan without adopting the course indicated in that behalf by the opinion of this Court on the earlier Reference. That is how the appe1lants claimed the issue of a writ of in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from proceeding any further with the survey and demarcation of the area of G Berubari Union No. 12 and Chilahati and from giving effect to their intentions to transfer a part of Berubari Union No. 12 and Chilahati to Pakistan. That is the substance of the petition filed by the appellants before the Calcutta High Court on December 4. 1963 . The respondents disputed the appellants' right to obtain any H writ or direction in the nature of mandamus as claimed by them. They urged that the relevant provisions of the Ninth Amendment Act were neither vague nor confused, and were capable of imple- 436 SUPll.EME COURT REPORTS (1966] l S.C.R. ruootation. It was alleged that the assumption made by the A appellants that a strict horizontal line had to be drawn from the north-east comer of Debiganj Thana under the provisions of the said Amendment Act, was not valid; and they urged that the said Amendment Act had provided for the partition of Berubari Union No. 12 half and half in the manner indicated by it. The respondents were, therefore, justified in giving effect to the matoB rial provisions of the said Amendment Act. In regard to the village of Chilahati, the respondents contended that the said village formed part of Debiganj Thana and had been assigned to the share of Pakistan by the Radcliffe Award. All that the respondents intended to do was to transfer to Pakistan a sm:ill area of about c 512 acres of the said village which had not been delivered over to Pakistan on the earlier occasion when partition was made. That being so. the intended transfer of the said village was fully legal and valid and did not contravene any provisions of the Constitution. On these pleadings, the parties led evidence in the form of maps, and the case was argued elaborately before the D learned trial Judge. The trial Judge has found against the appellants on all the important issues. He has held that the map Ext. A-1 on which the appellants substantially bao;ed their case, was really not admissible under s. 36 of the Indian Evidence Act_ Alternatively, he found that the map was not reliable and could not be legitimately utilised for the purpose of determining the E merits of the appellant~' contention. The learned Judge examined the maps produced by the respondents and came to the conclusion that they were admissible and reliable. On examining these maps, the learned Judge held that Berubari Union No. 12 could be divided half and half as required by the material provisions of the Amendment Act and that the appellants were not justified in F contending that the said provision was not capable of implementation. In that behalf, the learned Judge placed considerable reliance on the congregated map Ext. 6. The learned Judge has rejected the contention of the appellants that if a fair partition of Ilerubari Union No. 12 is made as directed by the Amendment Act, no part of Berubari Union No. 12 would fall to the south and as such, no G part of the said Union could be transferred to Pakistan. He was not impressed by the appellants' argument that the division of Berubari Union No. 12 had to be made by a strict horirnntal line; in his opinion. the north-east comer of Debiganj Thana mentioned in the relevant provision was not a geometrical point. but it gives some scope for shifting the point of commencement to H suit the process of division, when the provision says that the division shall be made horizontal, it only means that it was not to , ' • • l • • 1 R. K. SEN v. UNION (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 437· A be vertical; it had to be according to the latitude and not according to the longitude. He observed that the problem presented by the relevant provisions of the Amendment Act was not intended to be solved as a mathematical problem, and that when the appellants contended that the division had to be made · by a strict mathematical line, they ignored the fact that the said provision: B made no reference to any tangential planes or geometrical lines. c D On these findings, the learned Judge rejected the appellants' prayer for the issue of a writ in respect of the proposed transfer of· Berubari Union No. 12. In regard to the appellants' case about the village of C:hila: hati, the learned Judge held that Chilahati was a part of Deb1ganr Thana and had been allotted to the share of Pakistan under the· Radcliffe Award. The theory set up by the appellants that the· village of Chilahati which was being transferred to Pakistan was different from Chilahati which was a part of the Debiganj Thana, was rejected by the learned Judge; and he found that a small area of 512 acres appertaining to the said village had not been delivered to Pakistan at the time of the partition; and so, when the· respondents were attempting to transfer that area to Pakistan, it was merely intended to give to Pakistan what. really belonged to her; the said area was not, in law, a part of West Bengal, and E no question in relation to the constitutional validity of the said proposed transfer can, therefore, arise. The plea of adverse· possession which was made by the appellants alternatively in respect of Chilahati was rejected by the learned Judge. In the result,. the appellants' prayer for the issue of a writ or order in the nature of mandamus in respect of the said proposed transfer of ChilaF hati was also disallowed. It appears to have been urged before the learned Judge that in order to make the transfer of a part of Berubari Union No. 12 to Pakistan, it was necessary to make a law relating to Art. 3 of the Constitution. The learned Judge held that this plea had G been rejected by this Court in the opinion rendered by it on the earlier Reference; and so, an attempt made by the respondents to implement the material provisions of the Ninth Amendment Act was fully valid and justified. That is how the writ petition filed by the appellants came to be dismissed . H The appellants then moved the learned Judge for a certificate· to prefer an appeal to this Court; and after the learned Jud.,.e was pleased to grant them the said certificate, they have come ~o this Court by their present appeal. · 438 SUPllEMB COUIT REPORTS [ 1966 I I S.C.R. Before proceeding to deal with the points which have been A raised before us by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the appellants, it is necessary to advert to the opinion expressed by this Court in Re : The Bmrbari Union and Exchangl' of Enc/arrs( 1) with a view to correct ;ui error which has crept into the opinion through inad\'ertencc. On that occasion, it was urged on hchalf of the Union of India that if any legislative action is held to be n~essary for the implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement, a law B >Of Parliament relating to Art. 3 of the Constituti1)n would be suflident for the purpose and that it would not be necc~'ary to take any action under Art. 368. This argument was rejected. In dealing "ith this contention, it was observed by this Court thai C the power to acquire new territory and the pm,cr to cede a part >Of the national territory were outside the scope of Art. '.1 ( c) of the Con~.;i1ution. This Court then took the view that both the powers were the essential attributes of sovereignty and vested in India as an independent Sovereign Republic. While discus.sing the significance of the several clauses of Art. '.1 in that behalf, it 0 seems to haw been assumed that the Union territori~ were outside the purview of the said pro,isions. In other words. the opinion proc·ccded on the basis that the word "State" used in all 1hc said clauses of Art. 3 did not include the Union territories specified in the First Schedule. Apparently. this as,umption wa' ba'ed on the distinction made between the two categories of territories hy Art. J ( 3). In doing so, however, the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act (Act X of 1897) were inadvertently not taken into account. Under s. 3 (58 )(b) of the said Act, "State" as respects any period after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956. shall mean a State as specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Union territory. This provision of the General Clauses Act has to be taken into account in interpreting the word "State" in the respective clauses of Art. 3, because Art. 367(1) specifically provides that unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Art. 3 72, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India. Therefore, the assumption made in the opinion that Art. 3 in its several clauses does not include the Union territory is misconceived and to that extent. the incidental reason given in support of the main conclusion is not justified. However. the conclusion itself was based primarily on the view that ----· ·-·----. (I) Jt960J 3 S.C.R. 250. f" G H • • • • J It. K. SEN v. UNION (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 439 A the power to cede a part of the national territory and the power to acquire additional territory were the inherent attributes of sovereignty; and if any part of the national territory was intended to be ceded, a law relating to Art. 3 alone would not be enough unless appropriate action was taken by the Indian Parliament under Art. 368. It is common ground that the Ninth ConstituB tion Amendment Act has been passed by Parliament in the manner indicated in the opinion rendered by this Court on the said t Reference. , Reverting then to the points urged before us by Mr. Mukerjee, the first question which falls to be considered is whether the C learned trial Judge was in error in holding that the map Ext. A-1 on which the appellants had rested their case was neither relevaat nor reliable. There is no doubt that the sole basis on which the appellants challenged the validity of the intended transfer of a part of Berubari Union No. 12 was that the division had to be made by a strict horizontal line beginning with the north-east D corner of the Debiganj Thana and drawn eiL,t-west, and that if such a division is made, no part of Berubari Union No. 12 could go to Pakistan. It is common ground that the intention of the relevant provision is that after Berubari Union No. 12 is divide.cl, its northern portion should remain with India and the southern portion should go to Pakistan. The appellants, urged that if a E horiwntal line is drawn from the north-east corner of Debiganj Thana from east to west, no part of Berubari Union No. 12 falls to the south of the horizontal line, and therefore, it is impossible to divide Berubari Union No. 12 into two halves by the process intended by the Amendment Act. F Now, the 'wall map' Ext. A-1 purports to have been prepared by Shashibhushan Chatterjee, F.R.G.S. & Sons, of the District of Jalpaiguri in the scale of 1"=3.8 miles. The learned Judge has pointed out that on the record, there is no material whate'Ver to vouch for the accuracy of the map. It was not stated who Shashibhushan Chatterjee was, and it is plain that the map is not an G official map. The sources on which Mr. Chatterjee relied in preparing the map are not indicated; on the other hand, there are intrinsic indications of its shortcomings. The learned Judge has referred to these shortcomings in the course of his judgment. When die questions about the admissibility of this map and its validity were argued before the learned Judge, an attempt was made by the H appellants to support their case by filing further affidavit made by Mr. Sunil Gupta, the 'tadbirkar' of the appellants. In this affidavit, it was alleged that the said map was one of the numerous 440 SUPllllMJ! COURT REPORTS (1966] I S.C.lt. maps published by Mr. Shashibhushan Chatterjee and generally A offerex! for public sale. This latter statement was made obviously to meet the requirements of s. 36 of the Evidence Act This statement has been verified by Mr. Gupta as "true to his knowledge", but no statement was made to show how the deponent <:ame !<> have personal knowledge in the matter. The map bears no date and no evid~nce is adduced to show when it was prepared. B The learned Judge, therefore, rejected the statement 01J1de by M~Gu~a. ~ The question about the admissibility of the map has to be conside~ed in the light of s. 36 of the Evidence Act. The said 'CCtion proviJes that :- c "Statements of facts in issue or relevant facts, made in published maps or charts generally offered for public sale, or in maps or places made under the authority of the Central Government or any State Government, as to matters usually represented or stated in such maps, D charts or places, arc themselves relevant facts." The map in question clearly does not fall under the latter category of maps; and so, before it is treated as relevant, it must be shown that it wa<; generally offered for public sale. Since the hirned Judge has rejected the statement of Mr. Gupta on this point, this re not satisfied. We see no reason why the view E taken by the learned Judge in regard to the credibility of Mr. Gupta's affidavit should be reversed. So, it follows that without proof of the fact that the maps of the kind produced by the appellants were generally offered for public sale. Ext. A-1 woold be irrelevant. It is true that s. 83 of the Evidence Act provides that the Court shall presume that mar>s or plans purporting to be made by the authority of the Central Government or any State Government were so made, and arc accurate; but maps or plam mftde F for the purpose<; of any cause must be proved to be accmatc. Tile presumption of accuracy can thus be drawn only in favour of G maps which satisfy the requirements prescribed by the first pan of s. 33. Ext. A-1 obviously does not fall under the category of the said maps, and so. there can be no question of drawing any presumption in favour nf the accuracy of the said man. In fact, as we have already indicated, the learned Judge has .eiven very good reasons for showing that the man does not apncar to H be accurate. Therefore. even if the map i' held to be relevant, its accuracy is not at all established; that is the conclusion of the ' .. • • t .. R. K. SEN v. UNION ( Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 4 41 A learned Judge and Mr. Mukerjee has given us no satisfactory reasons for differing from the said conclusion. Mr. Mukerjee then contended that in the present case, it should be held that on the allegations made by the appellants and on the evidence such as they have produced, the onus to prove B that t.'Je relevant portion of the Amendment Act was capable of implementation, had shifted to the respondents. He ::trgues that the location of different villages in different Thanas is a matter within the special knowledge of the respondents, and under s. 106 of the Evidence Act, they should be required to prove the relevant facts by leading adequate evidence. He also attempted to argue C that the respondents had deliberately suppressed material evidence from the Court. D The learned Judge was not impressed by these arguments and we think, rightly. It is true that the official maps in regard to the area with which we are concerned are not easy to secure. It is not, however, possible to accept the theory that they have been deliberately withdrawn from the market. In fact, during the course of the hearing of the writ petition, the appellants themselves produced two maps Exts. A-7 and A-8. Besides. as the leamed Judge points out, when the case "Ills first argued before him, the learned Attorney-General appearing for the respondents E produced most of the maps relied upon by him, and the learned Judge directed that they should be kept on the record to enable the appellants to take their inspection. Under these circumstances, we do not see how the appe!lants can complain that the respondents have suppressed evidence, or can ask the Court to hold that the onus was on the respondents to prove that the relevant F provisions of the Amendment Act can be implemented. The onus must primarily lie on the appellants to show that what is attempted to be done by the respondents in pursuance of the provisions of the Amendment Act is illegal or unconstitutional; and if they are not able to produce evidence in support of their pica, they cannot require the resoondents to show that the plea G made by the appellants is untenable. The location of the villages in the different Thanas cannot be regarded as a matter within the exclusive knowledge of the respondents and in any case, it has to be proved by the production of reliable maps. Both parties have produced maμs; and the learned trial Judge has refused to H accept the maps produced by the aμpellants as reliable and has treated the maps produced by the respondents as worthy of credence. Under these circumstances, uo question of onus really arises. H2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1966] I S.C.R. The respondents have produced eight maps in all. One of A them purports to be a congregated map of Police Station Jalpaiguri, Pochai:ar, Boda and Debiganj made and published under authority of Go,·emment dated September, 1930. With regard to the congregated map, the learned Judge has observed : "One has only to sec Ext. 2 map of Police Station Jalpaiguri and the congregated map Ext. 6 to find that the north eastern hump of Debiganj is not of the shape shown in the wall map of Sashi Bhushan Chatterjee Ext. A-1. It is wholly different." That is one of the reasons given by the learned Judge for disbelieving the appellants' map Ext. A-1. The learned Judge then proceeded B to compare the maps produced by the respondents and the COii· gregated map of the District of Jalpaiguri and found that they tally in all details. Having thus examined the relevant material produced before him, the learned Judge came to the definite conclusion that the congregated map had been reasonably and accurately drawn and should be relied upon. In fact, the learned Judge has given six different reasons for rejecting the map proD duced by the appellants, and he found no difficulty in accepcing the maps produced by the respondents. The learned Judge thougbt that the case made out by the appellants was entirely mhconceived since it was solely based on an incorrect map. H•tving regard to the finding made by the learaed Judge on these maps, we do not see how the appellants can contend that they have E establi,hed their plea that the relevant portion of the Constitution Amendment Act is incapable of implementation. It is true that the appellants contended before the learned Judge that the Agreement in question requires that a geometrical point be fixed at the north eastern extremity of Debiganj and then a geometrical line be drawn in a plane tangential to that geometric point. in the direction east to west, at an angle of 90' to the vertical, and this line should divide Berubari Union No. 12 into two exact equal halves. The learnerl Judge found n<' difficulty in rejecting this contention. and we are satisfierl that the conclusion of the learned Judge is absolutely right. It would be recalled that the relevant ponion of tbe Agreement which had been incl8ded in the Second Schedule to the Ninth Amendment Act, in substance, provides for the division of Berubari Union No. 12 half and half. This division has to be so made that the southern portion goes to Pakistan and the northern portion which is adjacent to India remains with India. When it L~ said that the division will be "horizontal". starting from the north-east corner of Dehiganj Thana, it i< not intended G H ...... . .. • - .... ) ' ' ; A B c R. K. SEN v. UNION (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) HS. that it should be made by a mathematical line in the manner suggested by the appellants. In fact, the provision does not refer to any line as such; it only indicates broadly the point from which: the division has to begin-east to west, and it emphasises that in making the said division, what has to be borne in mind is the· fact that the Union in question should be divided half and half. Even this division half and half cannot, in the very nature of things, be half and half in a mathematical way. The latter provision of the Agreement in relation to Cooch Behar also gives additional guidance which has to be taken into account in effecting the partition of Berubari Union No. 12. Therefore, the learned Judge was plainly right in rejecting the contention of the appellants that a straight horizontal line has to be drawn from the north-east corner of Debiganj Thana in order to effect the· division of Berubari Union No. 12. So, there is no substance· in the contention raised by Mr. Mukerjee before us that the learned Judge should have issued a writ or order in the nature of D mandamus prohibiting the division of Berubari Union No. 12. In the course of his arguments, Mr. Mukerjee no doubt faintly suggested that the Schedule annexed to the Amendment Act should itself have shown how the division had to be made. In other words, the argument was that more details should have· been given and specific directions issued by the Ninth AmendE ment Act itself as to the manner of making the division. This contention is clearly misconceived and must be rejected. All' that the relevant provision has done is to record the decision· reached by the Prime Ministers of the two countries and make it effective by including it in the Constitution Amendment Act F as suggested by this Court in its opinion on the Reference in· respect of tlris case. That takes us to the case of Chilahati. It was urged before· the learned trial Judge that Chilahati admeasuring about 512' acres which is proposed to be transferred to Pakistan is not a part of Debiganj Thana, but is a part of thana J alpaiguri and G as wch, is outside the Radcliffe Award. It is common ground that Chilahati which is a part of Debiganj Thana has been allotted' to Pakistan by the said Award. But the contention is that what is being transferred now is not a part of the said Chilahati. The learned Judge has rejected this contention broadly on two grounds. He has held that the plea that there are two Chilahatis. one H situated in Debiganj Thana. and the other in Thana Jalpaiguri, was not clearly made out in the writ petition as it was filed. This plea was introduced by Ram Kishore Sen and Dhaneswar Roy iDl -444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966] I S.C.R their affidavit filed on February 7, 1964. The learne.d Judge A ,bas found that this theory is plainly inconsistent with the maps produced in the case. The maps show only one Chilahati and that, according to the learned Judge, is a part of Debiganj Police .Station. This finding is substantially based on the affidavit made by Mr. C. S. Jha, Commonwealth Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, and the notification file.ct along with it. This B notification which has been issued on July 28, 1925, shows that Chilahati was to form part of Debiganj Police Station. It stated that its serial number in the General Jurisdiction List is 61. The Jurisdiction List relating to Thana Jalpaiguri was also produced. The relevant entry at p. 13 shows the Jurisdiction List No.