# RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [2019] 17 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-11-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 8597 of 2019
- **Bench:** Ranjan Gogoi Cji, Nageswara Rao, Sanjiv Khanna
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-krishan-grover-and-others-v-union-of-india-and-others-33650
- **Pages:** 45

## Headnote

Rent Control and Eviction:
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949:
s.13-B - Notification dated 09.10.2009 by Central
Government, extending Section 13-B and other related sections
(inserted in the Rent Act vide East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001) to the Union Territory of Chandigarh -
Provision of s. 13-B giving preferential right to claim eviction to
non-resident Indian - Constitutional validity of s. 13-B - Held:
Section 13-B is constitutional valid as also its extension and
applicability to the Union Territory of Chandigarh - East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 2001 - Punjab
Re-organisation Act, 1966 - s. 87.
s. 13-B - Issuance of Notification dated 09.10.2009, u/s. 87
of the Re-organisation Act, extending Section 13-B in the
Amendment Act to the Union Territory of Chandigarh by executive
action - Validity of - Held: Extension of the Amendment Act to the
Union Territory of Chandigarh falls within the ambit of conditional
delegation and is valid and permissible - Once a policy of
extension of laws has been laid down by the Parliament and is
clear and permissible, it would only seem as an inevitable fallout
that the executive should be permitted to extend future amendments
to the existing laws - Thus, the challenge predicated on the
doctrine of excessive delegation, separation of powers, doctrine
of the law of agency, cannot be accepted - Administrative law -
Conditional delegation - East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001 - Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 -
s. 87.
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s. 13-B - Amendments made vide the Amendment Act with
regard to the rights of Non-Resident Indians by the State Legislature
of Punjab - Legislative competence of the State - Held:
Amendment Act enacted by the State legislature was well within its
competence - Amendment Act on its true construction and by
reference to the doctrine of "pith and substance" is relatable to
the relationship of landlord and tenant for housing and
accommodation and falls under the Concurrent List - Dominant
intention or "pith and substance" of the legislation is to regulate
the relationship between Non-Resident Indian landlords and tenants
for housing and accommodation - Merely because the Amendment
Act to achieve its object touches upon the subject matter in respect
of Non-Resident Indian landlords in the Rent Act, does not make
the Amendment or the Rent Act ultra vires the Constitution - In the
context of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and as the subject
matter falls within the Concurrent List, it would be immaterial to
decide on the competence of the legislating body - Power to make
laws in respect of a Union Territory vests with the Parliament under
Art.246(4) - In terms of s. 87 of the Re-organisation Act, the power
to extend laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh vests with the
Central Government, that is the Parliament or the Central
Executive, as the case may be, and is permissible - Constitution
of India - Art. 246(4) - East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001 - Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 -
s. 87.
s. 13-B - Plea that s. 13-B creates a special class of NRI
landlords, however, does not afford any legal remedy to the tenants
- Reasonability of - Held: By providing for a simplified procedure
of eviction by the Non-Resident Indians, s. 13-B does not dilute
the rights of tenants - It gives a chance to the tenants on merits to
establish their case and when justified and necessary to take the
matter to trial - Thus, s. 13-B cannot be held to be arbitrary and
unreasonable.
s. 13-B - s. 13-B classifying non-Resident Indian landlords
as a separate category - Validity of Section 13-B - Held: Section
13-B cannot be treated as an arbitrary classification that infringes
and violates Article 14 - It cannot be held to be unconstitutional
because it grants a right to claim eviction for bona fide need by
summary procedure to a cer

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RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 8597 of 2019)
NOVEMBER 14, 2019
[RANJAN GOGOI CJI, NAGESWARA RAO AND
SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Rent Control and Eviction:
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949:
s.13-B - Notification dated 09.10.2009 by Central
Government, extending Section 13-B and other related sections
(inserted in the Rent Act vide East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001) to the Union Territory of Chandigarh -
Provision of s. 13-B giving preferential right to claim eviction to
non-resident Indian - Constitutional validity of s. 13-B - Held:
Section 13-B is constitutional valid as also its extension and
applicability to the Union Territory of Chandigarh - East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 2001 - Punjab
Re-organisation Act, 1966 - s. 87.
s. 13-B - Issuance of Notification dated 09.10.2009, u/s. 87
of the Re-organisation Act, extending Section 13-B in the
Amendment Act to the Union Territory of Chandigarh by executive
action - Validity of - Held: Extension of the Amendment Act to the
Union Territory of Chandigarh falls within the ambit of conditional
delegation and is valid and permissible - Once a policy of
extension of laws has been laid down by the Parliament and is
clear and permissible, it would only seem as an inevitable fallout
that the executive should be permitted to extend future amendments
to the existing laws - Thus, the challenge predicated on the
doctrine of excessive delegation, separation of powers, doctrine
of the law of agency, cannot be accepted - Administrative law -
Conditional delegation - East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001 - Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 -
s. 87.
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s. 13-B - Amendments made vide the Amendment Act with
regard to the rights of Non-Resident Indians by the State Legislature
of Punjab - Legislative competence of the State - Held:
Amendment Act enacted by the State legislature was well within its
competence - Amendment Act on its true construction and by
reference to the doctrine of "pith and substance" is relatable to
the relationship of landlord and tenant for housing and
accommodation and falls under the Concurrent List - Dominant
intention or "pith and substance" of the legislation is to regulate
the relationship between Non-Resident Indian landlords and tenants
for housing and accommodation - Merely because the Amendment
Act to achieve its object touches upon the subject matter in respect
of Non-Resident Indian landlords in the Rent Act, does not make
the Amendment or the Rent Act ultra vires the Constitution - In the
context of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and as the subject
matter falls within the Concurrent List, it would be immaterial to
decide on the competence of the legislating body - Power to make
laws in respect of a Union Territory vests with the Parliament under
Art.246(4) - In terms of s. 87 of the Re-organisation Act, the power
to extend laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh vests with the
Central Government, that is the Parliament or the Central
Executive, as the case may be, and is permissible - Constitution
of India - Art. 246(4) - East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 2001 - Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 -
s. 87.
s. 13-B - Plea that s. 13-B creates a special class of NRI
landlords, however, does not afford any legal remedy to the tenants
- Reasonability of - Held: By providing for a simplified procedure
of eviction by the Non-Resident Indians, s. 13-B does not dilute
the rights of tenants - It gives a chance to the tenants on merits to
establish their case and when justified and necessary to take the
matter to trial - Thus, s. 13-B cannot be held to be arbitrary and
unreasonable.
s. 13-B - s. 13-B classifying non-Resident Indian landlords
as a separate category - Validity of Section 13-B - Held: Section
13-B cannot be treated as an arbitrary classification that infringes
and violates Article 14 - It cannot be held to be unconstitutional
because it grants a right to claim eviction for bona fide need by
summary procedure to a certain group of landlords-Non-Resident
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Indians subject to and on the satisfaction of statutory conditions
which incorporate a check on frivolous evictions - It rests with
the legislature to make laws and extend it to other similarly situated
persons - Rent Act(s) invariably give similar rights by a controlled
mechanism and alluded riders to various other classes/groups of
landlords, namely, government servants, members of armed forces,
the retired or soon to retire employees of the Central and the State
Governments, widows, etc - Constitution of India - Art.14.
s. 13-B - Restrictions and conditions imposed on landlord
seeking eviction under - Purpose of - Held: In terms of Section
13-B, the condition imposed upon the landlord is that he should
have been the owner of the premises for five years before the
eviction petition is filed - Such landlord/owner is permitted to file
an eviction petition only once during the lifetime and in respect of
one building - Landlord cannot sell or give the premises on lease
for a period of five years from the date of taking possession from
the tenant - On breach of the same, the tenant has a right to seek
restoration of possession - In case the landlord does not occupy
the premises for a continuous period of three months after getting
an eviction order or lets out the whole or any part of the premises
to a third person other than the tenant in contravention of the
provisions of s. 13 B(3), punishment is imposed-- Thus, these
restrictions and conditions are strong in-built checks to ensure that
the need of the landlord should be genuine and bona fide and the
tenant should not be subjected to frivolous and dubious eviction
order by relying on false assertions.
s.18-A and s.13-B - Right of Non-Resident Indians to initiate
eviction under the summary procedure - Nature of - Held: Is not
an unfettered and absolute right - It is subject to satisfaction of
various pre-requisites and imperatives that ensure and check
potential abuse by resorting to a short-circuit procedure -
Requirement should arise from a genuine need of the Non-Resident
Indian landlord or his dependent - Furthermore, these
pre-conditions and post possession restrictions stated therein
suggest that s. 13-B serves a specific policy objective to ensure
the right of Non-Resident Indians to occupy their property in the
Union Territory of Chandigarh and the State of Punjab as the case
may be, after "returning" to their country - This right has to be
balanced with the right of the tenants to establish their case on
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merits by disproving the genuine requirement of the Non-Resident
Indians - Constitution of India - Art. 14.
Doctrines/Principles: Doctrine of Pith and substance -
Meaning of - Held: Pith and substance doctrine states that if the
legislation is covered by an entry, that is, it is within the permitted
jurisdiction of the legislature, any incidental encroachment in the
rival field has to be disregarded - Only when wide construction
of an entry leads to heads-on-clash with another entry in the same
or different List, the principle of harmonious construction is
applied to reconcile the conflict and to give effect to each of them.
Constitution of India: Art. 254 - Repugnancy - When
attracted - Held: Repugnancy arises between a Central and a State
Act when there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict between the
two enactments and in that case, the Central Legislation prevails
by virtue of Art. 254 - Such repugnancy or inconsistency is not to
be readily inferred as the entries in the three Lists permit incidental
encroachment - Thus, every attempt must be made to placate the
conflict and only when and in case of oppugnant clash, the court
should proceed to strike down the legislation as trespassing beyond
its legitimate and legal confines.
Legislature: Function of - Held: Primary function of the
legislature is to make laws for all or different groups or classes of
persons - Lawmakers as elected representatives are in a better
position to know the needs, requirements and expectations of
citizens - Thus, the legislature possesses the power to distinguish
and classify persons or things subjected to such laws - Such a
classification, however, must pass the muster of Art. 14 which
proscribe hostile and invidious discrimination - Art. 14 does not
entirely prohibit classification by grouping certain persons with
special peculiarities in a special category to meet certain specific
ends.
Legislation: Rent control legislation - Object of - Stated.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The constitutional validity of Section 13-B of the
Rent Act and its extension and applicability to the Union
Territory of Chandigarh is upheld. [Para 46] [45-B]
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Whether Notification dated 09.10.2009 issued under
Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 extending
Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949 to Chandigarh by executive action is invalid?
2.1 The extension of the Amendment Act to the Union
Territory of Chandigarh falls within the ambit of conditional
delegation and is valid and permissible. [Para 18] [26-A]
2.2 It cannot be accepted that the Notification dated
09.10.2009 which extends the Amendment Act to Chandigarh
by an executive action in exercise of powers under Section 87
of the Re-organisation Act amounts to and suffers from the vice
of excessive delegation as it amends the rent legislation in force
in Chandigarh, that is, the Extension Act were enacted by the
Parliament in exercise of powers under Article 246(4) of the
Constitution. Once a policy of extension of laws has been laid
down by the Parliament and is clear and permissible, it would
only seem as an inevitable fallout that the executive should be
permitted to extend future amendments to the existing laws.
Therefore, the challenge predicated on the doctrine of excessive
delegation, separation of powers, doctrine of the law of agency,
fails and must be rejected. Such challenge must also be rejected
in view of the large number of eviction suits filed by NonResident Indian landlords on the strength of Notification dated
09.10.2009 who would be left remediless if contentions to the
contrary are accepted. [Paras 15, 19] [20-A-B; 26-B-C]
Ramesh Birch v. Union of India (1989 Supp) 1 SCC
430 : [1989] 2 SCR 629 - relied on.
Re Delhi Laws Act 1912, Ajmer Merwara (Extension
of Laws) Act, 1947 and Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950
AIR 1951 SC 332 : [1951] SCR 747 ; R v Burah
(1878) 5 Ind App 178 (PC) ; Vasu Dev Singh v. Union
of India (2006) 12 SCC 753 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR
535 - referred to.
Whether amendments made vide the Amendment Act with
regard to the rights of Non-Resident Indians by the State
Legislature of Punjab were beyond its competence?
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3.1 The entries in the three Lists: List I - Entry 17 & 18,
List II - Entry 18, List III Entry 6, 7 & 13 are not mutually
exclusive. Further, the entries are fields of legislation that
demarcate the area and heads of legislation. Thus, they should
receive the widest construction unless their rigour and import
need to be castrated by competing entries and other parts of
the Constitution. Interpretation of each entry has to be fair and
liberal so as to cover all incidental and subsidiary matters which
can reasonably be said to have been comprehended in it. The
entries should not be interpreted in a narrow and pedantic sense.
"Pith and substance" doctrine states that if the legislation is
covered by an entry, that is, within the permitted jurisdiction of
the legislature, any incidental encroachment in the rival field has
to be disregarded. Only when wide construction of an entry leads
to heads-on-clash with another entry in the same or different
List, the principle of harmonious construction applies to
reconcile the conflict and to give effect to each of them. [Para
22] [27-D-F]
3.2 Repugnancy arises between a Central and a State Act
when there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict between the
two enactments. It is when there is an irreconcilable conflict
between the two legislations that the Central Legislation
prevails by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution. Such
repugnancy or inconsistency is not to be readily inferred as the
entries in the three Lists permit incidental encroachment.
Consequently, every attempt must be made to placate the
conflict and only when and in case of oppugnant clash, the Court
should proceed to strike down the legislation as trespassing
beyond its legitimate and legal confines. [Para 23] [27-F-H]
Vijay Kumar Sharma and Others v. State of Karnataka
and Others (1990) 2 SCC 562 : [1990] 1 SCR 614 ;
Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi and
Another (1969) 2 SCC 289 : [1970] 1 SCR 443 ;
Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi and Others v. Mamanchand
Ratilal Agarwal and Others (1980) 3 SCC 162 : [1980]
3 SCR 224 ; V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal
(1979) 4 SCC 214 : [1980] 1 SCR 334 ; Accountant
and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Union
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of India and Others (1988) 4 SCC 324 : [1988] 1
Suppl. SCR 493 - referred to.
3.3 The Amendment Act on its true construction and by
reference to the doctrine of "pith and substance" is relatable
to the relationship of landlord and tenant for housing and
accommodation and falls under the Concurrent List. The
dominant intention or "pith and substance" of the legislation is
to regulate the relationship between Non-Resident Indian
landlords and tenants for housing and accommodation. Merely
because the Amendment Act to achieve its object touches upon
the subject matter in respect of Non-Resident Indian landlords
in the Rent Act, does not make the Amendment or the Rent Act
ultra vires the Constitution. The Rent Act as amended by the
Amendment Act and the Central legislations relating to
citizenship, regulation of the right of non-residents to own and
acquire immovable property, cover different subject matters and
serve different objects and there is no repugnancy between the
Rent Act and any Central enactment like Citizenship Act,
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, etc. The view that the
legislative lists under the Seventh Schedule envisage and
mandate separate legislation by the Central Government for NonResident Indian landlords cannot be accepted. [Para 27] [29-GH; 30-A-B]
3.4 The Amendment Act enacted by the State legislature
was well within its competence. In the context of the Union
Territory of Chandigarh and as the subject matter falls within
the Concurrent List, it would be immaterial to decide on the
competence of the legislating body. The power to make laws in
respect of a Union Territory vests with the Parliament under
Article 246(4). In terms of Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act,
the power to extend laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh
vests with the Central Government, that is the Parliament or
the Central Executive, as the case may be, and is permissible.
[Para 28] [30-C-D]
Whether Section 13-B of the Rent Act is arbitrary and
unreasonable inasmuch as it does not afford any legal remedy
to the tenants?
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4.1 Section 19 (2-B) incorporates statutory safeguards to
check and penalise deceitful and two-faced landlords and gives
the right of restitution to the defrauded tenant. Section 18-A of
the Rent Act prescribes a summary procedure for recovery of
possession applicable to eviction petitions filed by Non-Resident
Indian landlords under Section 13-B of the Rent Act. Section 18A of the Rent Act requires the Controller to take up the matter
on a day-to-day basis until the hearing on an application for leave
to defend is concluded. No litigant can possibly object to a
provision stipulating day-to-day hearing which ensures speedy,
expeditious and effective decisions. Section 18-A also states that
the decision of the Controller is final as no appeal or second
appeal lies against the order of eviction except that the High
Court could, to satisfy itself of the correctness of the decision,
examine the matter by calling for the records of the case. [Paras
29, 30, 33] [30-H; 31-A; 33-E-F]
Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava (1984) 2 SCC
75 : [1984] 2 SCR 614 ; Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti
(1980) 1 SCC 290 : [1980] 1 SCR 854 - referred
to.
4.2 In terms of Section 13-B of the Rent Act, the landlord
should have been the owner of the premises for five years before
the eviction petition is filed. Such landlord/owner is permitted
to file an eviction petition only once during the lifetime and in
respect of one building. Sub-section (3) to Section 13-B of the
Rent Act imposes a restriction on sale or lease of the premises
for a period of five years from the date of taking possession from
the tenant. On breach of the conditions/ restrictions mentioned
in sub-section (3) to Section 13-B, the tenant has a right to seek
restoration of possession. Sub-section (2-B) to Section 19
imposes a maximum punishment of six months imprisonment or
a fine of one thousand rupees or both in case the landlord does
not occupy the premises for a continuous period of three months
after getting an eviction order or lets out the whole or any part
of the premises to a third person other than the tenant in
contravention of the provisions of sub-section (3) to Section 13B. These restrictions and conditions are strong in-built checks
to ensure that the need of the landlord should be genuine and
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bona fide and the tenant should not be subjected to frivolous
and dubious eviction order by relying on false assertions. [Para
35] [36-D-G]
Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC
778 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26 - relied on.
4.3 The presumption raised with regard to the genuine
need of the landlord as pleaded in the petition should not be read
as an axiom or self-evident truth, which entitles the landlord and
mandates the Court to pass a decree of eviction. The
requirement of a 'strong case' for obtaining leave to defend
means a good case that brings to fore reasonable and wellgrounded basis on which the tenant seeks leave to contest the
eviction proceedings. It does not mean setting up and
establishing at that stage a case beyond any scintilla of doubt
and debate. The grounds and pleas raised should reflect clear
and strong defence and relate to the grounds mentioned in
Baldev Singh Bajwa's case. Each case has to be decided on its
merits and not on the basis of any pre-conceived suppositions
and presumptions. By providing for a simplified procedure of
eviction by the Non-Resident Indians, Section 13-B does not
dilute the rights of tenants. It gives a chance to the tenants on
merits to establish their case and when justified and necessary
to take the matter to trial. By no means, therefore, Section 13B can be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. [Para 36] [36H; 37-E-G; 38-A]
Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC
778 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26 ; Inderjeet Kaur v.
Nirpal Singh (2001) 1 SCC 706 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR
707 - relied on.
Swami Nath v. Nirmal Singh (2010) 9 SCC 452 : [2010]
10 SCR 1002 - referred to.
Whether classifying Non-Resident Indian landlords as a
separate category renders Section 13-B invalid and ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution ?
5.1 Legislature's primary function is to make laws for all
or different groups or classes of persons. The lawmakers as
elected representatives are in a better position than any other
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body which is removed from local and other circumstances, to
know the needs, requirements and expectations of citizens. It,
therefore, seems only logical that the legislature possesses the
power to distinguish and classify persons or things subjected to
such laws. Such a classification, however, must pass the muster
of Article 14 which proscribes hostile and invidious
discrimination. Recognising that Article 14 does not entirely
prohibit classification by grouping certain persons with special
peculiarities in a special category to meet certain specific ends.
Two conditions which must be satisfied for a classification to
withstand a challenge under Article 14, the classification should
be founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons
or things that are grouped together from others left out of the
group; and the differentia must have a rational relation or nexus
to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
A classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically
complete and would be justified unless it is palpably arbitrary.
The test to judge the validity of any classification has to be
practical and pragmatic by looking beyond the classification to
the purpose of the law, that is, the purpose or object of the
legislation and the circumstances which had prevailed when the
law was passed and which had necessitated passing of that law.
Not only this, there is a presumption as to constitutional validity
of an enactment predicated on the belief that the legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people
and is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its
restriction to only those cases where the need is deemed to be
the clearest. The hardship that may result from the classification
cannot be the basis for determining the validity of any statute.
This requires distinguishing between under-inclusiveness and
over-inclusiveness. The former classification does not confer the
same benefit or place the same burden on others who are
similarly situated whereas over-inclusiveness includes not only
those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but
others who are not so situated as well. The latter is frowned upon
but the former may pass the judicial test for the courts do
exercise tolerance to under-inclusiveness unless it is clear that
there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with
equal force its extension to those whom it leaves untouched.
[Para 38] [39-B-G; 40-A-B]
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Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959]
SCR 279 ; State of A.P. and Others v. Nallamilli Rami
Reddi and Others (2001) 7 SCC 708 : [2001] 2 Suppl.
SCR 287 ; Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure
Limited and Another v. Union of India and Others
(2019) 8 SCC 416 - referred to.
5.2 Rent control legislation are quintessentially social
legislation that were enacted in the 1940's and 1950's to protect
and curb exploitation of tenants in view of the prevailing socioeconomic conditions due to large scale immigration to towns and
cities, increase in population, lack of housing facilities as landed
property was owned by a few well-off and wealthy persons. The
rent control legislation, thus, interfered with the general
freedom of contract and right of the landlord to seek eviction
under the Transfer of Property Act. However, all such legislations
invariably also provide for balancing the conflicting rights of the
landlords. There is a need for balancing the two rival interests.
[Para 40] [42-D-E]
Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others v. State of
Maharashtra and Another (1998) 2 SCC 1 : [1997] 6
Suppl. SCR 717 ; Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal
(2002) 5 SCC 397 : [2002] 3 SCR 1078 ; Satyawati
Sharma (Dead) By LRs v. Union of India and Another
(2008) 5 SCC 287 ; Vinod Kumar v. Ashok Kumar
Gandhi (2019) 10 SCALE 357 ; Kewal Singh v. Smt.
Lajwanti (1980) 1 SCC 290: [1980] 1 SCR 854 ; Ravi
Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava (1984) 2 SCC 75:
[1984] 2 SCR 614 - referred to.
5.3 Section 13-B of the Rent Act cannot be held to be
unconstitutional because it grants a right to claim eviction for
bona fide need by summary procedure to a certain group of
landlords, that is, Non-Resident Indians subject to and on the
satisfaction of statutory conditions which incorporate a check on
frivolous evictions. The plea that Section 13-B ought to be
struck down on the ground that similar rights can be extended
to other landlords is without substance and is rejected. It rests
with the legislature to make laws and extend it to other similarly
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situated persons. The Rent Act(s) invariably give similar rights
by a controlled mechanism and alluded riders to various other
classes/groups of landlords, namely, government servants,
members of armed forces, the retired or soon to retire
employees of the Central and the State Governments, widows,
etc. [Para 43] [44-B-C]
5.4 The right of Non-Resident Indians to initiate eviction
under the summary procedure provided in Section 18-A is not
an unfettered and absolute right. It is subject to satisfaction of
various pre-requisites and imperatives that ensure and check
potential abuse by resorting to a short-circuit procedure. The
requirement should arise from a genuine need of the NonResident Indian landlord or his dependent. Such landlord should
be an owner for five years preceding the date of filing of the
eviction petition. There is a cap on permitting the use of the
provision which is available only once in a lifetime and only in
respect of one building. There are restrictions and constraints
on the re-sale and re-letting and a further requirement to possess
the property for a continuous period of three months after the
possession is taken. These pre-conditions and post possession
restrictions suggest that Section 13-B serves a specific policy
objective to ensure the right of Non-Resident Indians to occupy
their property in the Union Territory of Chandigarh and the State
of Punjab as the case may be, after "returning" to their country.
This right has to be balanced with the right of the tenants to
establish their case on merits by disproving the genuine
requirement of the Non-Resident Indians. [Para 44] [44-D-G]
5.5 Section 13-B cannot be treated as an arbitrary
classification that infringes and violates Article 14 of the
Constitution. The challenge predicated on the basis of
unconstitutionality of the classification is rejected. [Para 45] [44H]
Harkishan Singh v. Union of India AIR 1975 Punj.
& Har 160 (FB) - referred to.
Case Law Reference
AIR 1975 P & H 160 (FB)
referred to
Para 7
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D
E
F
G
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13
[1951] SCR 747
referred to
Para 16
(1878) 5 Ind App 178 (PC)
referred to
Para 16
[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 535
referred to
Para 18
[1989] 2 SCR 629
relied on
Para 19
[1990] 1 SCR 614
referred to
Para 24
[1970] 1 SCR 443
referred to
Para 25
[1980] 3 SCR 224
referred to
Para 25
[1980] 1 SCR 334
referred to
Para 25
[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 493
referred to
Para 26
[1984] 2 SCR 614
referred to
Para 32
[1980] 1 SCR 854
referred to
Para 33
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26
relied on
Para 35, 36
[2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 707
referred to
Para 36
[2010] 10 SCR 1002
referred to
Para 37
[1959] SCR 279
referred to
Para 38
[2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 287
referred to
Para 38
(2019) 8 SCC 416
referred to
Para 38
[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 717
referred to
Para 40
[2002] 3 SCR 1078
referred to
Para 40
(2008) 5 SCC 287
referred to
Para 40
(2019) 10 SCALE 357
referred to
Para 40
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8597
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.08.2011 of the High
Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ
Petition No. 15378 of 2011.
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA
AND OTHERS
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With
Civil Appeal Nos. 8598, 8599, 8600, 8601, 8602, 8603, 8604, 8605
of 2019.
Sanjay Jain, ASG, Nidhesh Gupta, Narender Hooda, Rakesh
Kumar Khanna, Sr. Advs., Gopal Balwant Sathe, Siddharth Bhatnagar,
Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Nakul Gandhi, Navandeep Matta, Mrs. Manik
Karanjawala (for M/s Karanjawala & Co.), A. Venayagam Balan, Ankit
Swarup, Vipul Jindal, Rohit Kumar Singh, Shyamal Kumar, Tarun Gupta,
Rishi Malhotra, Alok K. Agarwal, Vikas Jain, Amit Kumar, Ms. Kaveeta
Wadia, Ms. Garima Prashad, Ms. Apoorv Rastogi, Ms. Vriti Gujral,
Ms. Pallavi Singh, Ms. Japneet Kaur, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Anand
Srivastava (for M/s. Lex Regis Law Offices), Subhasish Bhowmick,
Ms. Nida Doon, Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,
Yogesh Malhotra, P. S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Ms. Anne Mathew,
Ms. Shruti Jose, Udit Grover, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, P.S. Khurana,
Mohit Kumar Singh (for Ram Naresh Yadav), Ram Naresh Yadav,
Ms. Manju Jetley, Sanjai Kumar Pathak, Ms. Shashi Pathak, Arvind
Kumar Tripathi, Rajat Bhardwaj, Bhal Singh Malik, Mrs. Kamaldeep
Gulati, Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Vikas Mahajan, Vinod Sharma,
Aakash Varma, Anil Kumar, Ravinder Singh, Ms. Dimple Nagpal, (for
Ms. Astha Sharma), Ms. Astha Sharma, Shree Pal Singh, Ms. Upasana
Nath, Arvind Kumar Gupta, Tarunvir Singh Khehar, Sandeep Mishra,
Vishal Tripathi (for Ashok K. Mahajan), Ashok K. Mahajan,
Shubhranshu Padhi, Ajit Singh Pundir, Arijeet Singh, D. V. Singh,
Bhupendra Kumar Bhardwaj, Ritesh Khatri, Anil Kumar Mishra,
Anurag Singh, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, S. L. Aneja, Senthil Jagadeesan,
Sudhir Bisla, Kamal Mohan Gupta, Pawan K. Bahl, Rakesh K. Sharma,
Ashok Arora, Yadav Narender Singh, Anandan A., Jatinder Kumar
Bhatia, Naresh Bakshi, Yash Pal Dhingra, Dinesh Verma, Munish
Bhardwaj, S.K.S. Bedi (for Subhasish Bhowmick), Deepak Goel, P. N.
Puri, Satinder S. Gulati, Mrs. Kamaldeep Gulati, Anand Mishra,
Amrendra Kumar Singh, Anil Kumar Tandale, Shashank Tripathi,
Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Ms. Binu Tamta, B.V. Balram Das,
B. Krishna Prasad, Pankaj Pandey, Vishal Bhatnagar, Ashwani Kumar,
Ms. Iti Sharma, Ms. Kumud Lata Das, Jay Kumar, Arvind Gupta,
Himanshu Gupta, Ms. Uttara Babbar, Ashok Panigrahi, Anmol Tayal,
S. Vinay Ratnakar, Advs. for the appearing parties.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The afore-captioned appeals are by tenants of different
residential and non-residential buildings in the Union Territory of
Chandigarh and urban areas in the State of Punjab, who have challenged
the constitutional validity of Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 (for short, the 'Rent Act') and its extension to
the Union Territory of Chandigarh by the Central Government vide
Notification dated 09.10.2009 in exercise of powers under Section 87
of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (for short, the 'Reorganisation
Act').
3. Section 13-B of the Rent Act, reads as under:
"13-B. Right to recover immediate possession of
residential building or scheduled building and/or nonresidential building to accrue to Non-resident Indian.- (1)
Where an owner is a Non-Resident Indian and returns to India
and the residential building or scheduled building and/or nonresidential building, as the case may be, let out by him or her, is
required for his or her use, or for the use of any one ordinarily
living with and dependent on him or her, he or she, may apply to
the Controller for immediate possession of such building or
buildings, as the case may be:
Provided that a right to apply in respect of such a building under
this Section, shall be available only after a period of five years
from the date of becoming the owner of such a building and shall
be available only once during the life time of such an owner.
(2) Where the owner referred to in sub-section (1), has let out
more than one residential building or scheduled building and/or
non-residential building, it shall be open to him or her to make
an application under that sub-section in respect of only one
residential building or one scheduled building and/or one nonresidential building, each chosen by him or her.
(3) Where an owner recovers possession of a building under this
Section, he or she shall not transfer it through sale or any other
means or let it out before the expiry of a period of five years
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA
AND OTHERS
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 17 S.C.R.
from the date of taking possession of the said building, failing
which, the evicted tenant may apply to the Controller for an order
directing that he shall be restored the possession of the said
building and the Controller shall make an order accordingly."
The expression 'Non-Resident Indian' has been defined in clause
(dd) to Section 2 of the Rent Act and reads:
"(dd) "Non-resident Indian" means a person of Indian origin, who
is either permanently or temporarily settled outside India in either
case -
(a) for or on taking up employment outside India; or
(b) for carrying on a business or vocation outside India; or
(c) for any other purpose, in such circumstances, as would
indicate his intention to stay outside India for an
uncertain period;"
Section 13-B of the Rent Act gives a right to Non-Resident
Indians to recover immediate possession of residential/ scheduled/nonresidential buildings situated in the Union Territory of Chandigarh and
urban areas in the State of Punjab on the satisfaction of the conditions
stated. We shall elaborate the provisions subsequently and would first
refer to the legislative history and procedure adopted for enforcement
of the challenged provisions in the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
4. In 1956, the unified State of Punjab was created by merging
the erstwhile States of Pepsu and Punjab. In 1966, a new State of
Haryana was created and carved out of certain territories from the
State of Punjab. Certain hill areas of Punjab were merged in the Union
Territory of Himachal Pradesh. A new Union Territory of Chandigarh
was created and became the joint capital of Punjab and Haryana. The
Reorganisation Act, that is, the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 gave
effect to the proposals vide provisions relating to the delimitation of
territories. Another important aspect of the Reorganisation Act dealt
with the applicability of laws in territories that had undergone
reorganisation. This was effected by Part X of the Reorganisation Act
comprising of Sections 86 to 97. Sections 87, 88 and 89 of the
Reorganisation Act are relevant for the present decision and are
reproduced below:
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"87. Power to extend enactments to Chandigarh - The Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend
with such restrictions or modifications as it thinks fit, to the Union
territory of Chandigarh any enactment which is in force in a State
at the date of the notification.
88. Territorial extent of laws.-The provisions of Part II shall
not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to
which any law in force immediately before the appointed day
extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to
the State of Punjab shall, until otherwise provided by a competent
legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning
the territories within the State immediately before the appointed
day.
89. Power to adapt laws.-For the purpose of facilitating the
application in relation to the State of Punjab or Haryana or to
the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh or Chandigarh of any
law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government
may, before the expiration of two years from that day, by order,
make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by
way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient,
and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the
adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or
amended by a competent legislature or other competent
authority."
We shall subsequently elucidate on the sections, with specific
reference to Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act.
5. Territories originally comprised in the former province of East
Punjab and later designated as the State of Punjab were governed by
the Rent Act, which applied to all "urban areas" defined in Section 2(j)
as any area administered by a municipal committee, a cantonment
board, a town committee or an area notified by the State Government
as an "urban area" for the purposes of the Rent Act.
6. Central Government in exercise of power under Section 89
of the Reorganisation Act had issued the Punjab Reorganisation
(Chandigarh) (Adaptation of Laws on State and Concurrent Subjects)
Order, 1968 with effect from 1.11.1966 whereby in all the "existing laws"
in its application to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, any reference
to the State of Punjab should be read as a reference to the Union
RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA
AND OTHERS [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]
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Territory of Chandigarh. The expression "existing laws" was defined
in para 2(1)(b) of the Order. It is an accepted position that the Rent
Act was not a part of the "existing laws" as the area forming the Union
Territory of Chandigarh was not an "urban area" within the Rent Act.
7. The Central Government by Notification dated 13.10.1972 and
published in the Official Gazette on 04.11.1972 had declared the area
comprising of the Union Territory of Chandigarh to be an "urban area"
for the Rent Act. This Notification was struck down by the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Harkishan Singh v. Union of India1, on the
short ground that no notification extending the Rent Act to the Union
Territory of Chandigarh as an "urban area" under Section 2(j) of the
Rent Act could have been issued post reorganisation on 1.11.1966. The
Rent Act was not operative in Chandigarh in terms of Section 88 of
the Reorganisation Act nor any part would become operative by a
notification under Section 87 without necessary adaptation. Thus, neither
the Order nor the Notification dated 13.10.1972 could have the effect
of making the Rent Act applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
8. The Parliament had thereupon to rectify the defect exercised
its power under Article 246(4) of the Constitution by enacting the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974
(for short, the 'Extension Act') to extend the Rent Act, subject to
modification specified in the Schedule, to the Union Territory of
Chandigarh. This enactment had stipulated that the Rent Act would be
deemed to be in force from 04.11.1972, that is the day on which the
earlier Notification that was quashed in Harkishan Singh's case
(supra), was made effective. Thereby all proceedings for eviction
initiated in view of the Notification dated 04.11.1972 were regularised.
The Extension Act was in principle and substance a Parliamentary
enactment to incorporate by reference and to avoid repetition all the
provisions of the Rent Act to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
9. On 17.12.1976, when the Parliament was not in session, the
President had promulgated Ordinance 14 of 1976 by which the Rent
Act was amended by the introduction of an Explanation and addition
of sub-section (4A) to Section 13 and sub-section (2A) to Section 19.
New sections 13A, 18A and 18B were inserted and in Schedule II the
form of summons to be issued under Section 13A was added. This
Ordinance was allowed to lapse and was not enacted as law thereafter.
1 AIR 1975 Punj. & Har 160 (FB)
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10. In 1982, the Parliament passed the East Punjab Rent
Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act replacing the words "East
Punjab" with the word "Punjab" and by substituting the definition of
"non-residential building" in the Rent Act as applicable to Chandigarh.
Lapsed amendments to the Rent Act vide Ordinance 14 of 1976 were
not incorporated.
11.