# RAM LAL & ORS v. PIARA LAL GOBINDRAM & ORS

- **Citation:** [1974] 1 S.C.R. 198
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-05-03
- **Bench:** D. G. Palekar, A. Alagiriswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-lal-ors-v-piara-lal-gobindram-ors-6654
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Clause (ccc) to proviso to S. 60(1)-As
added by Pwijab Relief of Indebtedness Act 7 of 1934 as amended by Punjd/J
Acts 12 of 1940 and 6 of 1942-Exemption from
attachment-Scope of-
.Appellants using back portion of shop as residence-Portion of residential house
occupied by .. appellants for purposes of the shop does tlot cease to be part of
the residential house.
The appellants, two brothers and their sons, constituted a firm.
They were
declared insolvent and the Official Receiver took possession of all their pro·
perties including the building in dispute. The appellants filed an objection
petition
under
Sec.
60
of
the
Code of
Civil
Procedure read
with Sec. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act in respect of taking possession of the
building in dispute basing this upon clause (ccc) of the proviso sub-section (1).
The Trial Court held that the entire building consists of two distinct units, the
one being distinct business premises as a shop, while the other structure, on the
back thereof, exclusively used a residential premises, and, therefore, upheld the
objection petition of the appellants in respect of the residential portion and the
upper storey thereon and dismissed it in respect of the rest of the building.
On
appeal the Dist. Judge and the Single Judge of the High Court held in favour of
the appellants.
·On a further appeal under the Letters Patent. the Division Bench purporting
to follow the Fu11 Bench Decision of that Court in Ude Bhan and Ors. v. Kapoor
Chand and Ors. allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the learned
single Judge and restored the order of the Insolvency Judge.
On ·appeal by certificate, allowing the appeal,
HELD : (I) If a portion of the residential house is occupied by the Judgment debtor Limself for the purpoSe of a shop that portion does not cease to
be part of the residential house.
Jn the circumstances and social conditions in
this country it would be difficult to justify the conclusion that where a part
of a residential house is used in connection with the· business or profession of
the owner of that house that portion ceases to be part of the residential house.
The Punjab High Court has taken the same view at least from the year 1951.
The contrary view taken by the impugned judgment does not ftow from the full
beoch judgment or the language of the Section. [20 ID)
Ude Bhan & Ors. v. Kapoor Chand & Ors., I. L. R. 1966 (2) Punjab 400,
Agha !afar Ali Khan v. Rildha Kishore, A.l.R. 1951 Punjab 433, distinguished.
Firm Ganga Ram v. Firm lia Ram, A.l.R. 1957 Punjab 293 followed.
Punjab Mercantile Bank Limited (in liquidation) Jullundur City v. Messers
General Typewriter Co. Jullundur City, 1962 P.LR. 1081~ referred to.
(2) There is no doubt that the building in question was the main residential
house of .the appellants and it was occupied by them. The facts of the case
bring it squarely within the scope of the section and the whole building is,
therefore, exempt from attachment. [203A]
ClvlL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1248 of 1967.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated April 7,
1966 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Letters Patent No.
296 of 1963.
S. K. Mehta, K. R. Jagaraja and M. Qamaruddin, for . the appellants.
H. K. Puri, R. L. Roshan and S. K. Dhingra, for respondents
Nos. 3-5, 9 & 10.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
RAM LAL v. P!ARALAL GOBINDRAM (Alagiriswami, I.)
199
A

## Text

198
RAM LAL & ORS.
v.
PIARA LAL GOBINDRAM & ORS.
May 3, 1973.
[D. G. PALEKAR AND A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Clause (ccc) to proviso to S. 60(1)-As
added by Pwijab Relief of Indebtedness Act 7 of 1934 as amended by Punjd/J
Acts 12 of 1940 and 6 of 1942-Exemption from
attachment-Scope of-
.Appellants using back portion of shop as residence-Portion of residential house
occupied by .. appellants for purposes of the shop does tlot cease to be part of
the residential house.
The appellants, two brothers and their sons, constituted a firm.
They were
declared insolvent and the Official Receiver took possession of all their pro·
perties including the building in dispute. The appellants filed an objection
petition
under
Sec.
60
of
the
Code of
Civil
Procedure read
with Sec. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act in respect of taking possession of the
building in dispute basing this upon clause (ccc) of the proviso sub-section (1).
The Trial Court held that the entire building consists of two distinct units, the
one being distinct business premises as a shop, while the other structure, on the
back thereof, exclusively used a residential premises, and, therefore, upheld the
objection petition of the appellants in respect of the residential portion and the
upper storey thereon and dismissed it in respect of the rest of the building.
On
appeal the Dist. Judge and the Single Judge of the High Court held in favour of
the appellants.
·On a further appeal under the Letters Patent. the Division Bench purporting
to follow the Fu11 Bench Decision of that Court in Ude Bhan and Ors. v. Kapoor
Chand and Ors. allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the learned
single Judge and restored the order of the Insolvency Judge.
On ·appeal by certificate, allowing the appeal,
HELD : (I) If a portion of the residential house is occupied by the Judgment debtor Limself for the purpoSe of a shop that portion does not cease to
be part of the residential house.
Jn the circumstances and social conditions in
this country it would be difficult to justify the conclusion that where a part
of a residential house is used in connection with the· business or profession of
the owner of that house that portion ceases to be part of the residential house.
The Punjab High Court has taken the same view at least from the year 1951.
The contrary view taken by the impugned judgment does not ftow from the full
beoch judgment or the language of the Section. [20 ID)
Ude Bhan & Ors. v. Kapoor Chand & Ors., I. L. R. 1966 (2) Punjab 400,
Agha !afar Ali Khan v. Rildha Kishore, A.l.R. 1951 Punjab 433, distinguished.
Firm Ganga Ram v. Firm lia Ram, A.l.R. 1957 Punjab 293 followed.
Punjab Mercantile Bank Limited (in liquidation) Jullundur City v. Messers
General Typewriter Co. Jullundur City, 1962 P.LR. 1081~ referred to.
(2) There is no doubt that the building in question was the main residential
house of .the appellants and it was occupied by them. The facts of the case
bring it squarely within the scope of the section and the whole building is,
therefore, exempt from attachment. [203A]
ClvlL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1248 of 1967.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated April 7,
1966 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Letters Patent No.
296 of 1963.
S. K. Mehta, K. R. Jagaraja and M. Qamaruddin, for . the appellants.
H. K. Puri, R. L. Roshan and S. K. Dhingra, for respondents
Nos. 3-5, 9 & 10.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
RAM LAL v. P!ARALAL GOBINDRAM (Alagiriswami, I.)
199
A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
ALAGIRISWAMI, J.
This is an appeal by certificate against the
judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in a Letters
Patent Appeal.
The question for decision in this appeal depends upon the inter·
pretation of clause ( ccc) added to the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 60
of the Code .of Civil Procedure by Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act 7
of 1934 as amended by Punjab Acts 12 of 1940 and 6 of
1942
eJ11empting from attachment-
"One main residential-house and other buildings attached to it (with the material and the sites thereof and the land
immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their en·
joyment) belonging to a judgment debtor other
than
an
agriculturist and occupied by him : Provided that the pro·
· tection afforded by this clause shall not extend to any proper·
ty specifically charged with the debt sought to be recovered."
The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows.
The appellants
are two brothers and their sons. They constituted a firm
cillled
Jahangiri Mal Kalu Ram.
On 19-11-1956 they were declared inSol,.
venrs and the Official Receiver took possession of all their properties
including the building in dispute.
On 21-11-1956 the
appellants
filed an objection petition under s. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure
read with section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act in respect of
taking the possession of the building in dispute basing this upon
clause
(ccc)
above referred to. The Official Receiver contended
that the property in dispute is not a residential house but a shop and
that the back portion of the building which consists of a kitchen and
raised platform etc. for placing water was given in trust to -the
petitioners for residential purposes at the time of taking the possession of the shop. The creditors also contended that the property in
dispute is a shop and not a residential house, even though the appe1·
lants were admitted to be using the back portion of the shop as their
residence.
The Trial Court held that :
". . . the entire building consists of two distinct units,
the one opening in the chowk of the mandi being distinct
business premises as a shop while the other structure on the
back thereof is exclusively a residential
hou~"· The unit
which is a shop has the main hall which has two apartments
on account of the arched columns in the middle, and the
kotha immediately behind the said hall.
I consider this kotha
to be an integral part of the shop because there is no indica•
tion at the spot that it was an essential part of the residen•
tial house. To the contrary, the staircase leading from the
hall on to the roof of that kotha and the steps from
the
roof of that kotha leading to the roof of the hall and to the>
room on a portion thereof, show that the said kotha is an .
integral part of the shop itself. The two units being the
200
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1974] 1 s.c.R.
property of the same persons naturally we would expect connecting doors between tliese two units.
He, therefore, upheld the objection petition of the
appellants
in
respect of the portiou BCDE in the vlan and the upper storey thereon
and dismissed it in respect of the rest of the bmldmg.
On appeal
by the insolvents the learned District Judge _of Hissar he!d that the~e
was no manner of doubt that the
bmldmg Ill question 1s the
main
residential house of the insolvents and allowed
the
appeal.
On
appeal by the creditors a learned Single Judge observed :
"Accep_ting the finding of the Insolvency Judge that the
shop has a separate access of its own it cannot be denied
that the residential portion is connected with it.
The shop
is in the ground floor and there is an opening in the Mandi
but it is connected with the residential portion on the same
floor.
The other portion of the building is entirely devoted
to residential purposes."
In the result he held :
"It is only a portion of the ground floor which has been
used for shops.
In my opinion, the view adopted by the
lower appellate court is in conformity with the intent and
language of the Legislature and is also in accord with the
authorities of this Court."
On a further appeal under the Letters Patent the Division
Bench
purporting to follow the Full Bench decision of that Court in Ude
Bhan & Ors. v. Kapoor Chand & Ors.( 1), where it was held that if
out of the main residential house belonging to
a
non-agriculturist
judgment-debtor a portion is let out by him to a tenant, the whole
house could not be said to be in his occupation, allowed the appeal
and set aside the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as
the District Judge and restored the order of the Insolvency Judge.
We have carefully considered the facts of this case and are
in
agreement with the view of the learned District Judge as well as" the
learned Single Judge of the High Court that the building is a single one
with a portion of it iu the down stairs being used as a shop. That portion
opens on the chowk Mandi Dabwali and there is another opening
for regular ~ntrance from a public street.
There is no evidence that
any portion of the upstairs is being used for the purpose of the shop.
Therefore, there is no warrant for the finding of
the
Insolvency
Judge that the building is in two
distinct
portions. Indeed
the
learned Judges of the Division Bench did not differ from the finding
of the first appellate court and the second appellate c0urt on
this
point.
They seem to accent this finding and proceed on that basis.
Their reasoning was that if a portion of the main residential house
of a judgment-debtor ceases to eniov immunitv from attachment, in
case that portion is let out by the judgment debtor to a tenant, it
(1) I.LR. 1966 (2) Punjab 41JO.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
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D
E
F
G
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II.AM LAL v. PJARAL.\L GOBINDRAM (Alagiriswami, I.)
20 I
would necessarily follow that the shop portion of a
building,
the
other part of which is being used for residential purpose would not
be exempt from attachment. It appears to us that this conclusion
does not follow from the judgment of the Full Bench or from the
language of the statute. It is obvious that what clause (ccc) exempts
is the main residential house.
There is no doubt that the building
is the main residential house of the insolvents.
The judgment of the
Full Bench proceeds on the basis that when a portion of even a main
residential house is let out to a tenant by the judgment-debtor that
portion is not occupied by him and as occupation of the residential
house by the judgment-d~btor is one of the requirements of the
statute is order to qualify for exemption from attachment the portion
let out cannot be said to be occupied by the judgment-debtor and
therefore docs not qualify for exemption.
Therefore,
the
decision
of the Full Bench gives no guidance in interpreting the question that
has to ~e considered in this case.
The question for decision in this case is whether if a portion of
the residential house is occupied by the judgment-debtor himself for
the purposes of a shop that portion ceases to be part of the residential house. It appears to us clear that it
does
not.
In
the
circumstances and social conditions of this country it would be difficult to justify the conclusion that where a part of a residential house
is used in connection with the business or profession of the owner
of that house that portion ceases to be part of the residential house.
As is well-known, very often a lawyer might have his office room in
his house, a doctor might have a consulting room in his house, an advocat~'s library might occupy one of the rooms of his house. The room
where the lawyer works or his library is located cannot be said to
cease to be part of his residential house.
The Punjab Court has
taken the same view at least from the year 1951.' In Agha !afar Ali
Khan v. Radha Kishan(') it was held that
"where the whole building is being used for the purposes
of residence, the mere fact that there is a shop on the ground
floor will not convert the building into something different
from a residential house".
The judgment of the Full Bench mentions that it is not clear in that
case whether the shop portion of the building was in the possession
of the judgment-debtor or was rented out by him.
A careful reading
of the judgment shows that there was no question
in
th~t
c~>e
of the shop portion of the building being in the possession of anybody except the owner. In Firm Ganga Ram v. Firm Jai
Ram( 2 )
where the ground floor of a building with three floors was being
used for commercial purposes anc,l the first and the second floors for
residential purposes it was held that the judgment-debtor can
claim
immunity from attachment or sale, with respect to the entire house
under the provisions of section 60(1) clause ( ccc), where it is the
(I) A.l.R. 1'151 Purtjab 433.
(2) A.T.R. 1957 Punjab 293.
202
SUFREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 1 s.c.a.
only residential house belonging to them and .occupied
by them
It is insli uctive to refer to a portion of the discussion :
"The conditiors in our country are such which admit of
a composite user of the same building. A part of the s·ame
house is used for dwelling, and the other part is meant for
commercial ~r business purpose and
sometimes even the
later portion, particularly after the business hours, is used
for dwelling.
" .... Having regard to the mode of living of the people
in this country, their habits and customs, it is not possible
generally to designate a particular building as one, which is
used exclusively for a residential purpose in co.ntradiction
to a commercial purpose.
". . . On this basis, residential building of a medical practitioner, will not be exempt from liability to attachment or
sale, if in a portion he receives or treats his patient._
"Similarly, where in his house, an iron-smith works on
his forge, a shoes-maker makes shoes on his last, a potter
turns his wheel, or any other artisan spreads his tools, to
make a Jiving, or a petty trader keeps his wares for sale,
according to the interpretation, which the learned counsel
for the respondent, asks Illj) to put on the words occurring in
the Code, the provisions will be powerless in extending any
effective protection. This construction will result in defeating the very purpose of the Jaw."
We completely agree with the learned Judge's observations.
It is
interesting to note that in Punjab Mercantile Bank Limited (in
liquidation) lullundur City v.
Messrs
General
Typewriter
Co.,
Jullundur City( 1) Tak Chand, J. who gav~ the above judgment held
that where the judgment-debtor was residing in the greater part of
the house two chabaras on' the first floor Jet out to tenants were not
exempt from attachment and sale.
To the same effect is the judgment of the Full Bench relied on by the Division Bench in this .case.
Tek Chand, J. has kept clear in his mind the distinction between
a case where a portio11 of the residential house is let out and a
portion used by the owner himse)f, though for a purpose other than
residential.
Such use does not make the residential house cease to
be a residential house or the portion so used as not part of the
residential hoμse.
(I) 1962 P. L. R. JO 81.
R
c
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G
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llAM LAL v. P!AllALAL GOB!NDRAM (Alagiriswami, J.)
203
A
There is no doubt that this was the main residential house of the
insolvents and it was occupied by them. The facts of the case bring
it squarely within the scope of the section and the whole building
is, therefore, exempt from attachment.
The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment of the Division
B
Bench set aside and the judgments of the learned Single Judge and
the learned District Judge are restored. The respondents will pay the
appellants' costs.
S.B.W.
Appeal allowed.