# RAM LAL v. STATE OF U.P

- **Citation:** [1979] 3 S.C.R. 448
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1979-03-05
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 154 -G of 1972
- **Bench:** S. l\1URTAZA FAZAL ALI, 0. Chinnappa Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-lal-v-state-of-u-p-7631
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

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S. 499(1) Cr.P.C.-No personal bond taken front accused-Nor was the
signature of the accupsed taken on the reserve of surety bond-Accused jumptd
bail-Sureties if liable-Bond executed by surety if independent of the bond ex~
cuted by accused.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: Section 499(1) of the Cr. P.C., \Vhich contemplated the
e.xecution
of a bond by the accused and by the sureties, did not imply that a single bond
was to be executed by both the accused and the sureties, signed by the accused
and counter-signed by the sureties. An undertaking of the surety in Form 42,
Schedule V to secure the attendance of the accused \Vas quite independent of the
undertaking given by the accused to appear before the court whenever called
upon, even if both the undertakings of the surety and the accused happened ·~o
be executed in the same document for the sake of convenience. Each undertaking being distinct can be separately enforced. [ 450 C, 451 B·DJ
The fact that an accused 'vould not be released on bail without his executing a personal bond does not mean that if a person is released by n1h .. takc
without his executing a personal bond, the sureties are absolved from securing
the attendance of the accused and his appearance before the court. The sureties' responsibility arises from the execution of the surety bond and is not
contingent upon execution of a personal bond by the accused. Nor is the liability to forfeiture of the bond executed by the surety
contingent upon
the
execution and the Iio1bility to forfeiture of the personal bond executed by
the
accused. The forfeiture of the personal bond of the accused is not a condition
precedet:it to the forfeiture of the bonds executed by the sureties.
[451 E-F]
Abdul Aziz & Anr. v. Emperor, AIR 1946 All. 116; Mewa Ram & Anr. v.
State, AIR 1953 All. 481; approved.
Bakaru Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 430; distinguished.
•
Brahma Nand Misra v. Emperor, AIR 1939 All. 682;
Sailesh Clumdra
'f
Chakraborty v. The State, AIR 1963 Cal. 309; over-ruled.
•

## Text

448
A
RAM LAL
v.
STATE OF U.P.
March 5, 1979
•
B
(S. l\1URTAZA FAZAL ALI AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]
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F
S. 499(1) Cr.P.C.-No personal bond taken front accused-Nor was the
signature of the accupsed taken on the reserve of surety bond-Accused jumptd
bail-Sureties if liable-Bond executed by surety if independent of the bond ex~
cuted by accused.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: Section 499(1) of the Cr. P.C., \Vhich contemplated the
e.xecution
of a bond by the accused and by the sureties, did not imply that a single bond
was to be executed by both the accused and the sureties, signed by the accused
and counter-signed by the sureties. An undertaking of the surety in Form 42,
Schedule V to secure the attendance of the accused \Vas quite independent of the
undertaking given by the accused to appear before the court whenever called
upon, even if both the undertakings of the surety and the accused happened ·~o
be executed in the same document for the sake of convenience. Each undertaking being distinct can be separately enforced. [ 450 C, 451 B·DJ
The fact that an accused 'vould not be released on bail without his executing a personal bond does not mean that if a person is released by n1h .. takc
without his executing a personal bond, the sureties are absolved from securing
the attendance of the accused and his appearance before the court. The sureties' responsibility arises from the execution of the surety bond and is not
contingent upon execution of a personal bond by the accused. Nor is the liability to forfeiture of the bond executed by the surety
contingent upon
the
execution and the Iio1bility to forfeiture of the personal bond executed by
the
accused. The forfeiture of the personal bond of the accused is not a condition
precedet:it to the forfeiture of the bonds executed by the sureties.
[451 E-F]
Abdul Aziz & Anr. v. Emperor, AIR 1946 All. 116; Mewa Ram & Anr. v.
State, AIR 1953 All. 481; approved.
Bakaru Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 430; distinguished.
•
Brahma Nand Misra v. Emperor, AIR 1939 All. 682;
Sailesh Clumdra
'f
Chakraborty v. The State, AIR 1963 Cal. 309; over-ruled.
•
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 154
-G
of 1972.
•
From the Judgment and Order dated 12-11-1971 of the Allahabad
High Court in Criminal Revision No. 865 of 1970.
Shiv Pujan Singh for the Appellant.
D .P. Uniyal and M. V. Goswami for the Respondent.
lff
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CmNNAPPA REDDY J.-Jorma who was convicted by the learned
-<
Sessions Judge, Dehradun under Section ~02 Indian Penal Code and
..
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RAM LAL v. u. P. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, !.)
449
~entenced to suffer• imprisonment for life, was directed by the High
Court of Allahabad to be released on bail on furnishing bail to the
'Satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Dehradun. The District Magistrate (Judicial) Dehradun ordered Jorma to execute a personal bond
in a sum of Rs. 5,000/- and to furnish two sureties in a sum of Rs .
10,000/- each.
Ram Lal the present appellant was one of the persons
who executed a surety bond. Another, Abdul Jabbar, also executed
a surety bond. By some oversight no personal bond was taken from
Jorma nor was his signature taken on the reverse of the bonds executed
by the two sureties as appeared to have been usually done.
Jorma
jumped bail and the sureties were unable to produce him when required
to do so.
The Distrjct Magistrate, Dehradun, therefore, forfeited the
surety bonds and issued' a warrant of attachment against the sureties
under Section 514 of the Olde of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
The
"llppellant preferred an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad against
the order of forfeiture. Before the High Court it was submitted that
the surety bond executed by the appellant could not be forfeited when
no personal bond had been taken from the accused who had been
released on bail.
The High Court over-ruled the submission of the
appellant and confirmed the order af forfeiture.
The appellant has
'
'filed this appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court under Artide 134(1) (c) of the Constitution.
Shri Shiv Pujan Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted
that the question of forfeiting the surety bond for the failure of the
accused to appear would arise only if the accused himself had executed
a personal boud for his appearance. He submitted that someone must
be primarily bound before the surety could be bound and his bond
forfeited.
He invited our attention to Section 499 of the Code of
'Criminal Procedure, 1898, and form No. 42 of the forms in Schedule
V. He relied on the decisions in Brahma Nand Misra v. Emperor,('),
and Sailash Chandra Chakraborty v. The State('). A reference was
·also to BIJJ.'llru Singh v. State of U.P. (3) On the other hand the learned
Counsel for the State urged that the bond to be executed by the
surety was independent of the bond to be executed by the accused
and there was no impediment in the way of the forfeiture of the surety
bond even in the absence of a personal bond executed by the accused.
He relied upon the decisions iu Abdul Aziz & Anr. v. Emperor('),
oand Mewa Ram &: Anr. v. State(•),
(1) AIR 1939 All. 682
· (2) AIR 1963 Cal. 309
·(3) AIR 1963 SC 430
'(4) AIR 1946 All. 116
'(5) AIR 1953 All. 481
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450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979) 3 s.r R.
A
Section 499(1) of the Code of Criminal'Procedure Code 1898 wa;-.
in the following terms :
"Before any person is released on bail or released on his
own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer
or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be execuB
ted by such person, and, when he is relea'sed on bail, by one
or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such persons shall
attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall
continue so to attend nntil otherwise directed by the policeoflicer or Court, as the case may b.e".
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Now, this provision contemplated the execution of a bond by t)le
accused, and by the sureties. The provision did not imply that a singfo
bond was to be executed by the accused and the sureties, as it were,
to be signed by the accused and counter signed by the sureties. Form
No. 42 of Schedule V, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, was asfollows :
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"XLII-bond and bail-bond on a preliminary
Inquiry
before a Magistrate.
(See Sections 496 and 499)
I, (name), of (place), being brought before the Magistrate of (as the case may be charged with the offence of
and required to give security for my attendance, in his Court
and at the Court of Session, if required, do bind myself to
attend at the Court of the said Magistrate on every day of the
preliminary inquiry into the said charge, and, should the case
be sent for trial by the Court of Session, to be, and appear,
before the said Court when called upon to answer the charge
against me; and, in case of my making default, herein, I bind
myself to forfeit to Government the sum of rupees
Dated this
day of
19
c
(Signature}
I hereby declare myself (or we jointly and severally declare ourselves and each of us) surety (or sureties) for the
said (name) that he shall attend at the Court of
on every day of the preliminary inquiry into the offence charged against him, and, should the case be sent for trial by the
Court of Session, that he shall be, and appear, before the said
Court to answer the char~ against him, and,. in case of his
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RAM LAL v. u. P. STATE (Chin1111ppa Reddy, !.)
451
making default therein, I bind myself (or we bind ourselves)
to forfeit to Government
the sum of rnpees
Dated this
day of
19
(Signature)"
The undertaking to be given by the accused as may be seen from form
No. 42 of Schedule V was to attend the Court on every day of hearing
and to appear before the Court whenever called upon. The undertaking
to be given by the surety was to secure the attendance of the accused
on every day of hearing and his appearance before the Court whenever
called upon. The undertaking to be given by the surety was not that
he would secure the attendance and appearance of the accused in
accordance with the terms of the bond executed by the accused. The
undertaking of the surety to secure the attendance and presence of the
accused was quite independent of the undertaking given by the accused
to appear before the Court whenever called upon, even if both the undertakings happened to be executed in the same document for the sake of
convenience.
Each undertaking being distinct could be separately
enforced. It is true that before a person is released on bail he must
execute a personal bond and, where necessary; sureties must also execute bonds. There can be no question of an accused being released
on bail without his executing a personal bond. But it does not follow
therefrom that if a person is released by mistake without his executing
a personal bond the sureties are absolved from securing his attendance
and appearance before the Court. The responsibility of the surety
arises from the execution of the surety bond by him and is not contin•
gent upon execution of a personal bond by the accused. Nor is the
liability to forfeiture of the bond executed by th!) surety contingent upon
the execution and the liability to forfeiture of the personal bond executed by the accused. The forfeiture of the personal bond of the accused
is not a condition precedent to the forfeiture of (he bonds executed by
the sureties. The Calcutta High Court in Sailash Chandra Chakraborty
v. The State (supra) and single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in
Brahma Nand Misra v. Emperor, (supra) proceeded on the assumption
that the bond executed by the accused and the sureties was single and
indivisible and if the accused did not join in the execution of the bond,
the bonds executed by the sureties alone were invalid. We do not
find any warrant for this assumption in Section 499 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of 1898. We are afraid that there has been some
<:onfusion of thought by the importation of the ideas of 'debt' and 'surety'
from the civil law. As pointed out in Abdul Aziz & Anr. v. Emperor
(supra) under Section 499 Criminal Procedure Code, the surety did
not guarantee the payment of any sum of money by the person accusedl
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452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 3 s.c.tt.
who was released on bail but guaranteed the attendance of that person
and so the fact that the person released on bail himself did not sign
the bond for his attendance did not make the bond executed by the surety
an invalid one. In Mewa Ram & Anr. v. State (supra) the differene<'
between a surety under the Code of Criminal Procedure and a surety
under the Civil Law. was pointed out and the view taken in Abdul Azi::
&. Anr. v. Emperor (supra) was reiterated.
We agree with the view
expressed in Abdul Aziz & Anr. v. Emperor, and Mewa Ram & Anr.
v. State (supra).
In Bakaru Singh v. State of U.P., (supra) the question presently
under consideration did not arise. The question which was considered
in that case was whether it was necessary that the .Personal bond of
the accused should be executed on the other side of the bond executed
by the surety on the same paper. It was held that it was not necessary. And, it was pointed out that the mere fact that form No. 42,
Schedule V Criminal Pr_ocedure Code, printed the contents of the tw<>
bonds, one to be executed by the accused and the other by the surety
together, did not mean that both the bonds should be ou the same sheet
of paper. To the extent that it goes the decision helps the State and
·not the appellant. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed.
N.V.K.
Appeal dismissed.
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