# RAM NARAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1973] 3 S.C.R. 911
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-04-05
- **Case number:** Criminal Rev. No. 2093 of 1967
- **Bench:** K. K. Mathew, I. D. DuA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-narain-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-6580
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 45-Han_dwriting Expert-Sole testimony for conviction--Courts below comparing handwriting for theniselves
and c.greeing with Expert-No illegality in conviction--Sente,nce-Lapse
of tin1e-Sentence reduced to period already undergone.
The appellant was convicted of an offence under s. 384 read with
s. 511 Indian Penal Code.
The conviotion was solely based
<>.ti
the
conclusion that the two anonymous letters dema:nding ransom for
the
kidn•pped boy had been written by him. The appellant having categorically denied his authorship of those letters a handwriting
expert was
produced in support of t~ prosecution case, and believing the expert
testimony the three cpurts below agreed in co!t?Victing
the
appellant.
In this Court the sole question for consideration was as to the legality
and propriety of the appeUant's conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of the handwriting expert. It was urged by the appellant Iha: it
was not safe to record a findi$lg about a person's hand~riting merely on
the basis of comparison because the opinion of the handwriting expert is
not conclusive.
Dismissing the appeal.
HELD : (i) The legal
position
enundiated in
Fakhruddin's case
cannot be said to be inconsistent with the
ratio of ftnyone
of the
earlier decisions to which reference has been made therein. [916A]
Fakhruddin v. State of Madh,va Pradesh, A.LR. 1967 S.C. 1326,
Ram Chandra v. State of U. P., A.LR. 1957 S.C. 381, Ishwari Prasad
Misra v. Mohammad Isa, A.LR. 1963 S.C. 1728 and Sha.lhi Kumar
Banerjee, v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, A.I.R. 1964
S.C. 529,
referred to.
lt is no douPt true that the opinion of a hand-writing expert givtti
in evidence is no less fallible than any other expert opin'ion adduced in
evidence with the result that such evidence has to be received with great
caution.
But this opinion evidepce wh'ich is relevant may be worthy
of acceptance if there is internal or external evidence relating to
the
document in question supporting the view expressed by the expert.
If
after comparison of the disputed and the admitted writings by the Court
itself when the Presiding Officer is familiar with the language,
it is
considered safe to accept the opinion of the expert, then the condusion
so arrived at cannot be assa'iled on special leave on the mere ground
that comparison of handwriting is genera11y considered as hazardous and
inconclusive.
In the present case the Trial Magistrate, the Sessions
111<18"
who
h~ard the •ppeal and the ,High. ~our! themselve. co01pared the writing
with the help of the experts opm1on and came to the conclusion that the
disputed handwriting tallied with tho specime,n
handwriting
of
the
appellant.
There was, therefore no ground for interference by this Court
with the appellant's conviction. [9!6B]
(ii) Though a large number of factors fall for
consideration
in
determining the appropriate sentence the broad object
of punishment
9ll
912
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.ll.
of an accused found guilty in progressive civilized societies is to impress
on the guHty party that commission of crime does not pay and that it is
both against his individu-al interest and also against the larger
interest
of the soclety to which he belongs. The 'e:ntence to
be
appropriate
should, therefore, be neither too harsh nor too lenient.
The sentence
Jf rigorous imprisonment for one year imposed in the present case \vould
not in the normal course be considered to be too harsh but considerable
time had elapsed since the commissio,o of crime and the appellant had
been on bail granted by this Court since
January, 1970.
T-o
send
him back to jail after so many years would be somewhat harsh. c9 l 7B]
[Sentence reduced to period already undergone with fine.]

## Text

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RAM NARAIN
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
April 5, 1973
[K. K. MATHEW AND I. D. DuA, JJ,]
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 45-Han_dwriting Expert-Sole testimony for conviction--Courts below comparing handwriting for theniselves
and c.greeing with Expert-No illegality in conviction--Sente,nce-Lapse
of tin1e-Sentence reduced to period already undergone.
The appellant was convicted of an offence under s. 384 read with
s. 511 Indian Penal Code.
The conviotion was solely based
<>.ti
the
conclusion that the two anonymous letters dema:nding ransom for
the
kidn•pped boy had been written by him. The appellant having categorically denied his authorship of those letters a handwriting
expert was
produced in support of t~ prosecution case, and believing the expert
testimony the three cpurts below agreed in co!t?Victing
the
appellant.
In this Court the sole question for consideration was as to the legality
and propriety of the appeUant's conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of the handwriting expert. It was urged by the appellant Iha: it
was not safe to record a findi$lg about a person's hand~riting merely on
the basis of comparison because the opinion of the handwriting expert is
not conclusive.
Dismissing the appeal.
HELD : (i) The legal
position
enundiated in
Fakhruddin's case
cannot be said to be inconsistent with the
ratio of ftnyone
of the
earlier decisions to which reference has been made therein. [916A]
Fakhruddin v. State of Madh,va Pradesh, A.LR. 1967 S.C. 1326,
Ram Chandra v. State of U. P., A.LR. 1957 S.C. 381, Ishwari Prasad
Misra v. Mohammad Isa, A.LR. 1963 S.C. 1728 and Sha.lhi Kumar
Banerjee, v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, A.I.R. 1964
S.C. 529,
referred to.
lt is no douPt true that the opinion of a hand-writing expert givtti
in evidence is no less fallible than any other expert opin'ion adduced in
evidence with the result that such evidence has to be received with great
caution.
But this opinion evidepce wh'ich is relevant may be worthy
of acceptance if there is internal or external evidence relating to
the
document in question supporting the view expressed by the expert.
If
after comparison of the disputed and the admitted writings by the Court
itself when the Presiding Officer is familiar with the language,
it is
considered safe to accept the opinion of the expert, then the condusion
so arrived at cannot be assa'iled on special leave on the mere ground
that comparison of handwriting is genera11y considered as hazardous and
inconclusive.
In the present case the Trial Magistrate, the Sessions
111<18"
who
h~ard the •ppeal and the ,High. ~our! themselve. co01pared the writing
with the help of the experts opm1on and came to the conclusion that the
disputed handwriting tallied with tho specime,n
handwriting
of
the
appellant.
There was, therefore no ground for interference by this Court
with the appellant's conviction. [9!6B]
(ii) Though a large number of factors fall for
consideration
in
determining the appropriate sentence the broad object
of punishment
9ll
912
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.ll.
of an accused found guilty in progressive civilized societies is to impress
on the guHty party that commission of crime does not pay and that it is
both against his individu-al interest and also against the larger
interest
of the soclety to which he belongs. The 'e:ntence to
be
appropriate
should, therefore, be neither too harsh nor too lenient.
The sentence
Jf rigorous imprisonment for one year imposed in the present case \vould
not in the normal course be considered to be too harsh but considerable
time had elapsed since the commissio,o of crime and the appellant had
been on bail granted by this Court since
January, 1970.
T-o
send
him back to jail after so many years would be somewhat harsh. c9 l 7B]
[Sentence reduced to period already undergone with fine.]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal ~o.
6 of 1970.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
October 10, 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Rev.
No. 2093 of 1967.
J. P. Goyal and R. K. Bhatt, for the appellant.
0. P. Rana, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DuA, J. : This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad
High Court dated October 6, 1969 dismissing the
appellant's
revision from the order of a II Temporary Sessions Judge, Kanpur
dated November 8, 1967 dismissing his appeal from his conviction
by a learned Magistrate under ss. 384/511 I.P.C. and sentence of
rigorous imprisonment for one year.
On August 15,1964, Mannu, a boy about 5 years old, was
found missing from the house of the appellant's relation
Shri
Gajendra Natth (P.W. 19), an Excise
Inspector,
residing in
Mohalla Ashok Nagar, Kanpur within the jurisdiction of police
station Sisamau the following day.
A report was lodged at the
police station Sisamau about this fact and a notice was
also
published in the newspapers
and hand-bills
were distributed
announcing a reward of Rs. 501/- for anyone who furnished the
clue of 1he missing child's whereabouts. ·A post-card (Ext. Ka-1)
bearing post office seals dated 21-8-1964 and later an inland letter
(Ext. Ka-2) bearing the date October 21, 1964 were received by
Gajendra Nath
demanding,
in the first
letter a ransom
of
Rs. 1,000/-, and in the second a ransom of Rs. 5,000/- for the
return of the boy.
In December, 1964, a trainee of. the local
I.T.I., Kanpur, Yashpal
Singh by name,
after
reading the
announcement of the reward.. made attempts to trace the whereabouts of the missing child.
Having found a clue, he gave the
necessary information to the father of the child regarding
his
whereabouts.
Thereupon, on January 11, 1965 the child was
recovered by Rahasbehari, the grand-father of the child, from
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RAM NARAIN v. U.P, STATE (Dua,/,)
the house of Ganga Bux Singh and Chandrabushan Singh in
village Pandeypur District Kanpur. The investigation of the case
revealed that the appellant, Ram Narain, was also responsible for
kidnapping and wrongfully confining the said child and that it was
be who had sent the two anonymous letters (Exts. Ka-1 and K-2)
demanding ransom. All the three persons were prosecuted under
ss. 363, 468 and 384/511, I.P.C.
The trial court convicted Ganga
Bux Singh and Chandrabusban Singh ·under s. 368, I.P.C.' and
Ram Narain appellant under ss. 384/511, I.P.C.
On appeals by
the convicted persons, the learned II Temporary Sessions Judge,
Kanpur, came to the conclusion that the offence under s.
368,
I.P.C. had not ~en established beyond reasonable doubt with the
result that Ganga Bux Singh and Chandrabushan were acquitted.
The appellant, Ram Narain's conviction for an offence · under
ss. 384/511, I.P.C. was, however, upheld. This conviction was
solely based on the conclusion that the two anonymous letters had
been written by him.
The appellant having categorically denied
bis authorship of those letters, Shri R. A. Gregory, a hand-writing
expert was produced in support of the presecution case. Believing
his testimony that the appallant was the writer of those two letters,
all the three courts below have agreed in convicting the appellant.
The short question raised before us relates to the legality and
.properiety of the appellant's conviction on the uncorroborated
testimony of the hand-writting expert. The High Court relied in
support of the appellant's conviction on the decision of this Court
in Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( 1)
in w!Jich after
referring to four of its earlier decisions in, (i) Ram Chandra v.
State of U.P.( 2 ) (ii) lshwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammad lsa( 3 )
(iii) Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee(') (iv)
State of Gujarat v.
Chhotalal Patni(') this Court rejected the
contention that the Court dealing with the authorship of a writing
could not observe for itself the similarity and differences between
the admitted and the disputed hand-writings to verify whether or
not the conclusi.ons of the hand-writing expert were
proper.
Then, after refernng to ss. 45, 47 and 73 of the Indian Evidence
Act, this Court observed :-
"Both under S. 45 and S. 4 7 the evidence is
an
opinion, in the former by a scientific comparison and in
the latter on the basis of familliari1y
resulting from
frequent observations and experience. In either case the
Court must satisfy itself by such means as are open that
the opinion m~y be acted upon. One such means open
to the Court 1s to apply its own observation to the
(f) A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1326.
(3) A. l. R. 1963 S. C. 1728.
(5) [1967]
(2) A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 381.
(4) A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 529.
I S. C. R. 249
914
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 3 S.C.R.
admitted or proved writings and to compare them with
the disputed one, not to become an handwritin~ expert
but to verify the premises of the expert in the one case
an to appraise the value of the opinion in the other
case.
This comparison depends on an analysis of the
characteristics in the admitted or proved wd'tings and
the finding cf the same characteristics in large measure
in the disputed writing. In this way the opinion of the
deponent whether expert or other is sub.iected to scrutiny
and although relevant to start with becomes probative.
Where an expert's opinion is giv.en, the Court must see
for itself and with the assistance of the expert come to
its own conclusion whether it can safely be held that the
1wo writings are by the same person. This is not to say
that the Court must play the role of an expert but to
say that the Court may accent the fact proved only when
it has
satisfied itself on its own observation that it
is safe to accept the opinion whether of the expert or
other witness.
Therefore, to satisfy ourselves whether the testimony
of the handwriting expert is acceptable or not, we sent
for the record and compared the disput~d writings with
some comparable material.
There were two such
writings which were claimed as standard. One was a
register maintained at the office of the Association in
which there was a signature in three places in Hindi
which purported to be that of Fakhruddin
(Exhibit
P-56).
The other was a writing which Fakhruddin
made to the dictation of the
Police
Officer in Jail
(Ex.P.61).
These were, of course, not admitted by
Fakhruddin and the question had to be first
decided
which of the two or bO'!h could be said to be approved
&tandard material.
Mr.
Kohli urged that Ex. P-56
could not be so treated as there was no proof that the
signatures were made by Fakhruddin. In this submission Mr. Kohli is right. The evidence of Tahir Ali,
P.W.14 which has been relied upon is not definite on
this point. He does not say that the signatures were of
Fakhruddin who was the accused in the case. He only
says that the persons whose signatures were made in the
register, signed it and this leaves the ma~t~r at large.
There is, however, proof that the other wntmg was made
r/y Fakhruddin
the
appellant.
The Sub-Inspector,
P.W. 33 took the precaution of having two "'.itnesses
P.Ws. Nos. 16 and 27.
Of these P.W. 16 dtC~ not
identify the appellant as the writer but the other
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RAM NARAIN v. U.P. STATE (Dua, J.)
P.W. 27 did.
Exhibit P-61, therefore,
furnishes the
necessary comparative material."
915
According to the appellant's learned counsel, the High Court
has not properly understood the principle of law laid down by
this Court in its various decisions.
Our avtention was invited
B to Chhota Lal Patni's case (supra) where it is observed :-
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"A Court is competent to compare th\: disputed
writing of a person with others which are admitted or
proved to be his writings. It may not be . safe for a
Court to record a finding about a person's writing in a
certain document merely on the basis of comparison,
but a Court can itself compare the writings in order to
appreciate properly the other evidence produced before
rt in that regard. The opinion of a handwriting expert
is also relevant in view of s. 45 of the Evidence Act,
but that too is not conclusive. It has also been held
that the sole evidence of a handwriting expert is not
normally sufficient for recording a definite fin.ding about
the writing being of a certain person or not. It follows
that it is not essential that the handwriting expert must
be examined in a case to prove or disprove the disputed
writing. It was therefore not right for the learned Judge
to consider it unsafe to rely upon the evidence of the
complainant in a case like this, i.e., in a case in which
no handwriting expert had been examined in support
of his statement."
·
It was emphasised by the appellant's learned counsel that
according to this decision it is not safe to record a finding about
a person's writing merely on the basis of comparison because the
opinion of a hand-whiting expert is not conclusive and his evidence
is normally insufficient for recording a definite finding about the
writing being of a certain person or not.
Indeed the l\l'Pellant's
contention was that in Fakhruddin's case (supra) though reference
was made to this decision, its ratio was not properly appreciated
and the decision in Fakhruddin (supra) is not in conformity with
this earlier decision. We are uable to agree wth this submission.
Reference was also made by the appellant's counsel to Shashi
Kumar (supra) where it is observed that the expert evidence as
to' hand-writing is opinion evidence and it can rarely, if ever, take
the place of subl>tantive evidence and therefore before acting on
it the courts usually look for corroboration either by direct or
circumstantial evidence.
In Shashi Kumar (supra), it may be
pointed out, this Court found all the probabilities against
the
expert opinion and the direct testimony of two witnesses accepted
by this Court also wholly inconsistent with that opinion.
916
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
In our view, the legal position enunciated in Fakhruddin (supra)
cannot be said to be inconsistent with the ratio of any one of 'the
earlier decisions to which refrence has been made therein
How
it is no doubt true that the opinion of a hand-writing expert given
. in evidence is no less fallible than any other expert opfrtion
adduced in evidence with the result that such evidence has to
be received with great caution. But this opinion evidence, which
is relevant, may be worthy of acceptance if there is internal or
external evidence relating to the document in question supportin.~
the view expressed lzy the expert. If after comparison of the
disputed and the admitted writings by the Court itself, when the
Presiding Officer is familiar with that language, it is considered
safe to accept the opinion of the expert then the conclusion
so arrived at cannot be assailed on special leave on the mere
ground that comparison hand-writing is generally considered as
hazardous and inclusive and that the opinion of the hand-writing
expert has to be received with considerable caution. The ques•tion
in each case falls for determination on the appreciation of evidence
and unless some serious infirmity or gave failure of justice
i;
shown, this Court would normally refrain from re-appraising the
matter on appeal by special leave,
Tiie Triaf Court in this case
agreeing with the principle of law enunciated by
this
Court
compared the relevant documents and arrived at the conclusion
that they have all been written in one hand.
The learned II
Temporary Sessions Judge on appeal, after referring to the comparison of the disputed and specimen writings by the Trial Magistrate.
himself compared those writings with the help of the expert's
opinion and his report and came to a definite conclusion "that the
disputed hand-writings tally with the specimen hand-writing". In
the High Court also the learned Single Judge, a.f'ter referring
to the decision in FakhruddJn (supra), observed as follows :-
"I have myself made a comparison of the specimen
writing of the applicant with the writing contained in
the two letters.
I have not the least doubt that the
writing in the post-card and he writing in the admitted
writing of the applicant are the same. Thus. I have no
reason to differ from the finding recorded by the courts
below."
No serious attempt was made on behalf of ihe appellant to
find fault with the approach of the three courts below.
There
is. therefore, no !!fOUnd made out for interference by this Court
with the appellant's conviction. Unfortunately, the record i; not
before us otherwise we would have also tried to examine for ourselves the disputed and the soecimen hand-writings.
How ever,
in view of the concurrent decisions of the three courts beiow, we
did not consider it necessary to adjourn the hearing of th.is case
to have the documents before us for our examination.
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RAM NARAIN v. U.P. STATE (Dua, J.)
917
The next question is one of sentence which is always a matter
of some difficulty. It generally poses a complex problem which
requires a working compromise between the coQipetin.e;
views
based on reformative,
deterrent
and
retributive theories of
punishments. Though a large number of factors fall for consideration in determining the appropriate sentence; the broad object
of punishment. of an accused found guilty in progressive civilized
societies is to impress on the guilty party that commission of
crimes does not pay and that it is both against his individual
interest and also against the larger interest ot the society to which
he belongs.
The. sentence to ~ appropriate should, therefore,
be neither too harsh nor too lenient.
In the case·in hand the
imposition of rigorous imprisonment for one yea{ upheld by the
appellate and the revisional courts may not have been considered
by us in the nomal course to be too harsh calling for interference
under Article 136 of the Constitution. The difficulty now posed
is !hat the . appellant is on bail and he has serve.!l out only one
month's sentence.
He was originally sentenced by the trial Court
on April 17, 1967 for the offence committed as far back as 1964.
The proceeding against him have lasted fq_r more than 8 years.
He was released on bail by this Court in January, 1970. 'l'o send
him back to jail now after the lapse of so many years for serving out
the remaining period of sentence seems to us on the facts and
circumstances of this case to bj:l somewhat harsh. The offence of
attempted exortion undoubtedly reflects to some extent anti-social
deparvity of mind but the attempt did not succeed. We, therefore,
consider that on the facts and circumstances of this case the ends
of substantial justice would be amply met ii we now reduce the
sentence of imprisonment to that already undergone but also
impose fine of Rs. 700/- and in default of payment of fine direct
that he undergoes rigorous imprisonment for a period of three
months.
We order accordingly. The appeal is thus accepted in
part as just stated.
·
G.C.
Appeal allowed in part.
\