# RAM P ADARATH MAHTO v. MISHRI SINGH & ANR

- **Citation:** [1961] 2 S.C.R. 470
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-02-03
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPEI.LATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 388 of 1960
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-p-adarath-mahto-v-mishri-singh-anr-2240
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Election -
Disq11alification-Contract with Govemment for
stocking foodgrains-W hethe7 for performance of services 11ndertaken
by Government-Representation of the People Act, r95r (43 of r95r)
s. 7(d).
The appellant was a member of a joint Hindu family which
carried on the business of Government stockists of grain under
a contract with the Government of Bihar. His nomination for
election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly was rejected on the
ground that he was disqualified under s. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 195r, as he had an interest in a contract
for the performance of services undertaken by the Bihar
Government. The appellant contended that the service undertaken by the Government was the sale of foodgrains under the
Grain Supply Scheme and the contract was not for the sale of
such foodgrains and did not attract the provisions of s. 7(d).
H e/d, that the contract was not one for the performance of
any service undertaken by the Government and the appellant
was not disqualified under s. 7(d). A contract of bailment which
imposed on the bailee the obligation to stock and store the
foodgrains in his godowns was not a contract for the purpose
of the service of sale of grain which the Government had
undertaken.
The Government had undertaken the work of
supplying grain but the contract was not one for the supply of
grain.
N. Satyanathan v. K. Subramanyam, (19551 2 S.C.R. 83 and
V. V. Ramaswamy v. Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli, (1933) 8
E.L.R. 233, distinguished.
CIVIL APPEI.LATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
388 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated February 3, 1959, of the Patna High
Court in Elect.ion Appeal No. IO of 1958.
S. P. Varma, for the appellant.
L. K. Jha and D. Govardhan, for respondent No. I.
L. K. Jha and K. J(. Sinha, for respondent No. 2.
1960. November 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
471
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-I~ the appellant Ram Padac960
rath Mahto disqualified for membership of the Bihar
Ram Padarath
Legislature under s. 7(d) of the Representation of the
Mahto
People Act, 1951 (hereafter called the Act)? That is
v.
the short question which arises for our decision in the
Mishri Singh
present appeal by special leave. The appellant was
& Am.
one of the candidates for the Dalsinghsarai Constitu-
. --
ency in the District of Darb hang a in Bihar for the Ga;cndragadkar l ·
State Legisfo,ture. The said Constituency is a DoubleMember Constituency; it was required to elect two
members, one for the general and the other for the
reserved seat for scheduled castes in the Bihar Legislative Assembly. It appears that the said Constituency called upon voters to elect members on January
19, 1957. January 29, 1957 was fixed as the last date
for the filing of the nomination papers. The appellant filed his nomination paper on January 28, 1957,
and on the next day seven other members filed thei;r
nomination papers. On :February 1, 1957, the 'nomination paper filed by1the appellant was rejected by
the returning officer on two grounds; he held that the
appellant being an Inspector of Co-operative Societies
was a Government servant at the material time and so
was disqualified from standing for election. He also
found that the appellant was a member of a joint and
undivided Hindu family which carried on the-business
of Government as stockist of grain under a contract
between the Government of Bihar and a firm of the
joint family known as Nebi Mahton · Bishundayal
Mahto. Thereafter the election was duly held, and
Mr. Mishri Singh and Mr. Baleshwar Ram, respondents l and 2 were declared duly elected to the
general and reserved sea\ respectively. The validity
of this election was challenged by the appellant by
his Election Petition No. 428 of 1957. To this petition he impleaded the two candidates declared to have
been duly elected and five others who had contested
in the election. Before the Election Tribunal the
appellant urged that he was not in

## Text

November r7.
470
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
RAM P ADARATH MAHTO
v.
MISHRI SINGH & ANR.
[1961]
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Election -
Disq11alification-Contract with Govemment for
stocking foodgrains-W hethe7 for performance of services 11ndertaken
by Government-Representation of the People Act, r95r (43 of r95r)
s. 7(d).
The appellant was a member of a joint Hindu family which
carried on the business of Government stockists of grain under
a contract with the Government of Bihar. His nomination for
election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly was rejected on the
ground that he was disqualified under s. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 195r, as he had an interest in a contract
for the performance of services undertaken by the Bihar
Government. The appellant contended that the service undertaken by the Government was the sale of foodgrains under the
Grain Supply Scheme and the contract was not for the sale of
such foodgrains and did not attract the provisions of s. 7(d).
H e/d, that the contract was not one for the performance of
any service undertaken by the Government and the appellant
was not disqualified under s. 7(d). A contract of bailment which
imposed on the bailee the obligation to stock and store the
foodgrains in his godowns was not a contract for the purpose
of the service of sale of grain which the Government had
undertaken.
The Government had undertaken the work of
supplying grain but the contract was not one for the supply of
grain.
N. Satyanathan v. K. Subramanyam, (19551 2 S.C.R. 83 and
V. V. Ramaswamy v. Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli, (1933) 8
E.L.R. 233, distinguished.
CIVIL APPEI.LATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
388 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated February 3, 1959, of the Patna High
Court in Elect.ion Appeal No. IO of 1958.
S. P. Varma, for the appellant.
L. K. Jha and D. Govardhan, for respondent No. I.
L. K. Jha and K. J(. Sinha, for respondent No. 2.
1960. November 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
471
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-I~ the appellant Ram Padac960
rath Mahto disqualified for membership of the Bihar
Ram Padarath
Legislature under s. 7(d) of the Representation of the
Mahto
People Act, 1951 (hereafter called the Act)? That is
v.
the short question which arises for our decision in the
Mishri Singh
present appeal by special leave. The appellant was
& Am.
one of the candidates for the Dalsinghsarai Constitu-
. --
ency in the District of Darb hang a in Bihar for the Ga;cndragadkar l ·
State Legisfo,ture. The said Constituency is a DoubleMember Constituency; it was required to elect two
members, one for the general and the other for the
reserved seat for scheduled castes in the Bihar Legislative Assembly. It appears that the said Constituency called upon voters to elect members on January
19, 1957. January 29, 1957 was fixed as the last date
for the filing of the nomination papers. The appellant filed his nomination paper on January 28, 1957,
and on the next day seven other members filed thei;r
nomination papers. On :February 1, 1957, the 'nomination paper filed by1the appellant was rejected by
the returning officer on two grounds; he held that the
appellant being an Inspector of Co-operative Societies
was a Government servant at the material time and so
was disqualified from standing for election. He also
found that the appellant was a member of a joint and
undivided Hindu family which carried on the-business
of Government as stockist of grain under a contract
between the Government of Bihar and a firm of the
joint family known as Nebi Mahton · Bishundayal
Mahto. Thereafter the election was duly held, and
Mr. Mishri Singh and Mr. Baleshwar Ram, respondents l and 2 were declared duly elected to the
general and reserved sea\ respectively. The validity
of this election was challenged by the appellant by
his Election Petition No. 428 of 1957. To this petition he impleaded the two candidates declared to have
been duly elected and five others who had contested
in the election. Before the Election Tribunal the
appellant urged that he was not in the employ of the
Government of Bihar at the material time. He pointed out that he had resigned his job on January 13,
472
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
196•
1957, and his resignation had been accepted on JanuRam Padaralh ary 25, 1957, relieving him from his post as from the
MaMu
later date. He also contended that there was a partiv.
tion in his family and that he had no share or interest
Mishri Singh
in the contract in question. Alternatively it was
& Anr.
argued that even if the appellant had an interest in
G .
d -- k
the said contract it did not fall within the mischief of
·•;en ragad ar J. s. 7(d) of the Act. These pleas were traversed by
respondents 1 and 2 w'ko contested the appellant's
election petition.
The Election Tribunal found that the petitioner
was not a Government servant on the day he filed
his nomination paper, and so according to it the
t
returning officer was wrong in rejecting his nomination paper on the ground that he was a Government
servant at the material time. The Election Tribunal
rejected the appellant's case that there was a partition in the family, and held that at the relevant time
the appellant continued to be a member of the joint
.Hindu family which had entered into the contract in
question with the Government of Bihar. However, in
its opinion, having regard to the nature of the said
contract it was not possible to hold that the appellant
was disqualified under s. 7(d), and so it ca.me to the
conclusion that the returning officer was in error in
rejecting· the appellant's nomination paper on this
ground as well. In the result the Tribunal allowed
the election petition, declared that the nomination
pa.per had been improperly rejected, and that the election of the two contesting respondents was void.
Against this decision the two contesting respondents
filed two appeals in the High Court at Patna. (Election Appeals Nos. 9 and 10 of 1958). The High Court
has confirmed the finding of the Tribunal that the
appellant was not a Government servant at the
material time. It has also a.greed with the conclusion
of the Tribunal that at the relevent time the appellant was a member of the undivided Hindu family.
On the construction of the contract, however, it differed from the view adopted by the Tribunal, and it has
held that as a result of the said contract the appellant
was disqualified under s. 7(d) of the Act. This finding
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
473
inevitably led to the conclusion that the appellant's
nomination pa.per had been properly rejected. On Ram Padarath
that view the High Court did not think it necessary
Mahto
to consider whether the Tribunal was.right in declarv.
ing void the election of not only respondent I but of Mishri Singh
respondent 2 as well. It is against this decision of the
r£. .:::_"
High Court that the appellant has come to this CourtGajendragadkar].
by special leave; and the only question which is raised
on his behalf is that the High Court was in error in
coming to the conclusion that he was disqualified
under s. 7(d). The decision of this question naturally
depends primarily on the construction and effect of
the contract in question.
Section 7 of the Act pravides for disqualification for
membership of Parliament or of State Legislatures.
Section 7(d), as it stood at the material time and with
which we are concerned in the present appeal provides,
inter alia, that a person shall be disqualified for being
chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative
Assembly of a State, if whether by himself or by any
person or body of persons in trust for him or for.his
benefit or on his account, he has any share or interest
in a contract for the supply of goods to, or for the
execution of any works or the performance of any
services undertaken by, the appropriate Government.
On the concurrent findings recorded by the High Court
and the TribUila.l it cannot now be disputed that the
appellant has interest in the contract in question; so
that the first part of s. 7( d) is satisfied. The High
Court has found that the contra.ct attracts the last part
of s. 7(d) inasmuch as according to the High Court the
Government of Bihar had undertaken to discharge.the
service of_ supplying grain to the residents of Bihar
and the firm of the appellant's family had entered into
a contra.ct for the performance of the said services ..
The last part of s. 7(~) postulates that the appropriate
Government has unde:rtaken,. to perform certain. speci,
fie services, and it is for the performance of such serviqes tha.t the contract had been enteted into by a cit~
zen.. In ot~ words, if a citizen has entered into a
contract with the appro,Pria.te Government for the
474
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
1960
performance of the services undertaken by the said
Government he attracts the application of s. 7(d). This
Ram T'adarath
Mahto
provision inevitably raises two questions: what are
v.
the services undertaken by the appropriate GovernMishri Singh mcnt? Has the contract been entered into for the
0> Anr.
pe1formance of the said services?
At this stage it is necessary to consider the material
Gajendragadkar J. terms of the contract. This contract was made on
February 8, 1956, between the Governor of Bihar who
is described as the first party and the firm which is
described as the second party. The preamble to the
contract shows that the first party had to stock and
store foodgrains in Darbhanga District for sale in
pursuance of the Grain Supply Scheme of the Government for which a proper custodian and bailee for
reward was necessary. It also recites that the second
party had applied to become such custodian and bailee
of such stock of foodgrains as the first party shall
deliver to the second party in one lump or from time
to time on terms and in the manner expressly specified under the contract, or as may be necessarily implied. Clause 1 of the contract provides that the
second party shall, at the direction of the first party,
take over foodgrains from the railway wagons or from
any place as directed by the first party; thereafter the
second party had to cause the grains to be stored in
his godown at Dalsinghsarai and had to redeliver the
same to the first party after weighing either at the
second party's godown approved by the first party or
at any other place as directed by the first party. The
movement of the gram had to be done by the second
party himself or by a transport contractor appointed
by the first party. Clause 2 imposed on the second
party the liability to maintain a register and keep accounts as prescribed thereunder. Under cl. 3 the second
party undertook to keep such stocks and establishments as may be necessary at his own expense.
Clause 4 imposed upon the second party the obligation
to protect the stock of foodgrains or to make good the
losses except as thereinafter provided. Clauses 5 to 8
are not material for our purpose. Clause 9 provides
that the second party shall deposit the sum of
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
Rs. 5,000 in a Savings Bank account which has been
r9fio
pledged to the District Magistrate, Darbhanga, and Ram Padaralh
comply with the other conditions specified in the
Mahto
clause. Clause 10 deals with the remuneration of the
v.
second party. It provides that the first party shall be Mishri Singh
liable to pay to the second party remuneration for the
& Anr.
undertaking in this agreement at the rate of Re. 1 per Gajendra;,dkar J.
cent. on the value of the stocks moved or taken over
from his custody under the ordeny or directions of the
first party or his agent calculated at the rate fixed by
the Government from time to time for wholesale sales
of grain. The clause adds that no remuneration shall
be payable to the second party if the first party takes
over the whole of .the balance stock lying with the
second party for reasons of the termination of the
agreement. The rest of the clauses need not be recited.
It would thus be seen that the agreement in terms
is one of bailment. The State Government wanted to
entrust the work of stocking and storing foodgrains to
a custodian or bailee. In that behalf the appellant's
firm made an application and ultimately was appointed a bailee. There is no doubt that by this contract
the firm has undertaken to do the work of stocking
and storing foodgrains belonging to the State Government; and if it can be reasonably held that the service
undertaken by the State Government in the present
case was that of stocking the foodgrains the contract
in ·question would obviously attract the provisions of
s. 7(d). Mr. Varma, however, contends that the service
undertaken by the State Government is the sale of
foodgrains under its Grain Supply Scheme; and he
argues that unless the contract shows that it was for
sale of the said goods it cannot attract the provisions
of s. 7(d).
Unfortunately the scheme adopted by the
State Government for the supply of grain has not
been produced before the Election Tribunal, and so
the precise nature and extent of the services undertaken by the State Government fall to be determined
solely by reference to the contract in question. It is
true that the contract relates to the stocking and storing of foodgrains which the State Government wanted
to sell to the residents of Bihar; but can it be said
476
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
1960
that stocking and storing of foodgrains wae such an
integral or essential part of the selling of gnods that a
Ram ;:,.~;rath contract for stocking and storing foodgrains should
v.
necessarily be regarded as a contract fol' their sale?
Mishri Singh In our opinion, it is difficult to accept the argument
& Anr.
that stocking and storing of foodgrain~ is shown t-0 be
.
-
such an essential and integral part of the supply
Ga1endragadkar 1 ·scheme adopted by the State Government.
Theoretically speaking stocking :md storing foodgrains cannot be said to be essential for the purpose
of carrying out the scheme of sale of foodgrains,
because it would conceivably be possible for the State
Government to adopt a scheme whereby goods may be
supplied without the State Government having to
store them; and so the work of stocking and storing of
foodgrains may in some cases be conceivably incidental to the scheme and not its essential part. It is
significant that sale of goods under the contract was
never to take place at the godown of the firm. It had
always to take place at other selling centres or shops;
and· thus, between the stocking and storing of goods
and their sale there is an element of time lag. The
only obligation that was imposed on the firm by this
contract was to be a custodian or bailee of the goods,
keep them in good order and deliver them after weighment as directed by the first party. It cannot be
denied that the remuneration for the bailee has been
fixed at the rate of Re. 1 per cent on the value of the
stocks moved or taken over from his custody; but that
only shows the mode or method adopted by the contract for determining the remuneration including rent
of the godowns; it cannot possibly show the relationship of the contract with the sale of goods even indirectly. Can it be said that the contract entered into by
the State Government for purchasing foodgrains from
agriculturists who grow them or for transporting them
after purchase to the godowns are cont-racts for the
sale or supply of goods? Purchase of goods and their
transport are no doubt preparatory . to the carrying
out of the scheme of selling them or supplying them,
and yet it would be difficult to hold. that cont~acts
entered into by the State Government with the agriculturists or the transport agency is a contract for the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
sale of goods. We have carefully considered the
r960
material terms of this contract, and on the record as it Ram Padarath
stands we are unable to accept the conclusion of the
Mahlo
High Court that a contract of bailment which imposed
v.
on the bailee the obligation to stock and store the Mishri Singh
foodgrains in his godown can be said to be a contract
&- Anr.
for the purpose of the service of sale of grain which G . d-dk 1
the State Government had undertaken withln the a;en raga
ar ·
meaning of s. 7(d).
It appears that before the High Court it was not
disputed by the appellant that the service whose performance had been undertaken by the State Government consisted in the supply of grain to the people of
the State of Bihar; and the High Court thought that
from this concession it inevitably followed that the
firm had a share and was interested in the contract for
the performance of the service undertaken by the
Government of Bihar. It seems to us that the concession made by the appellant does not inevitably or
necessarily lead to the inference drawn by the High
Court. If the service undertaken by the State Govf)rnment is one of supplying grain how does it necessarily
follow that a contract by which the bailee undertook
to store the grain was a contract for the supply of
grain? It may sound technical, but in dealing with a
statutory provision which imposes a disqualification
on a citizen it :would be unreasonable to take merely a
broad and general view and ignore the essential points
of distinction on the ground that they are technical.
The narrow question is: ifthe State Government undertook the work of supplying the grain, is the contract
one for the supply of grain?; in our opinion, the
answer to this question must be in the negative; that
is why we think the High Court did not correctly
appreciate the effect of the contract when it held that
the said contract brought the appellant's case within
the mischief of s. 7(d).
In coming to its conclusion the High Court thought
that its view was supported by a decision of this
Court in N. Satyanathan v. K. Subramanyan (I). In
that case the appellant who was a contractor had entered into an agreement with the Central Government
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 83.
478
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
whereby he had offered to contract with the GoverRam Padarath nor-General for the provision of a motor vehicle
Mahto
service for the transit and conveyance of all postal
v.
articles for the period specified in the contract, and
Mishri s;ngh the Governor-General had accepted the offer.
As a
'"' Anr.
consideration for the same the Government had agreed
Gojendragadkar ]. to p~y to the contractor Rs. 200 per month during the
subsistence of the agreement "as his remuneration for
the service to be rendered by him". It appears that
on this contract two questions were raised before this
Court. First it was urged that it could not be said
that the Central Government had undertaken any
service within the meaning of s. 7(d) of the Act when
it made arrangements for the carriage of mailbags and
postal articles through the contractor. This contention was rejected on the ground that though the
Government was not bound in the discharge of its
duties as a sovereign State to make provision for· postal mail service, it had in fact undertaken to do so
under the Indian Post Offices Act for the convenience
of the public. "It cannot be gainsaid", observed
Sinha, J., as he then was, "that the postal department is rendering a very useful service, and that the
appellant has by his contract with the Government
undertaken to render that kind of service on a specified
route"; and he added, "the present case is a straightforward illustration of the kind of contract contemplated under s. 7( d) of the Act"
This straightforward
illustration, in our opinion, clearly brings out the class
and type of contracts which fall within s. 7(d) of the
Act. Government must undertake to render a specified service or specified services and the contract must
be for the rendering of the said service or services.
That was precisely what the contract in the case of
N. Satyanathan (1) purported to do. It is difficult to
see how this case can be said to support the conclusion
of the High Court that tl1e contract for stocking and
storing of goods is a contract for rendering the service
of supplying and selling the same to the residents of
the place.
In this connection Mr. Jha, for the respondents, has
drawn our attention to a decision of the Madras High
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.E. 83.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
Court in V. V. Ramaswamy v. Election Tribunal, TiruI96°
nelveli (1).
In that case the Court was concerned with Ram Padarath
four contracts by which the contracting party agreed
Mahto
"to hold the reserve grain stock belonging to the
v.
Government of Madras, safely store it, and dispose of Mishri Singh
it according to the directions of the Government"
& Anr.
In other words, it was a contract not only for the G .
1
dk
1
stocking and storing of foodgrains but also of disposaJenc raga
ar
:
ing of it, and that naturally meant that the contract
was for service which the State Government had
undertaken to perform. This decision cannot assist
the respondents.in the present appeal.
In the result we hold that the High Court was not
justified in reversing the finding of the Tribunal that
the contract in yuestion did not attract the provisions
of s. 7(d) of the Act.
The appeal must, therefore, be
allowed and the order passed by the High Court set
aside.
We cannot finally dispose of the matter,
because one question still remains to be considered,.
and that is whether the conclusion that the appellant's
nomination paper had been improperly rejected would
lead to the decision that the election of not only respondent 1 but also respondent 2 shoul<l be declared to
be void. The Election Tribunal has declared the whole
election to be void, and in their respective appeals
filed before the High Court both the respondents have
challenged the correctness of that finding. The High
Court, however, thought that since in its opinion the
nomination paper of the appellant had been properly
rejected it was unnecessary to deal with the other
point. The point will now have to be considered by
the High Court. We would, therefore, set aside the
order passed by the High Court and remand the proceedings to it in order that it may deal with the other
question and dispose of the appeals expeditiously in
accordance with law. In the circumstances of this
case we direct that the parties should bear their own
costs in this Court. Costs in the High Court will be
costs in the appeal before it.
Appeal allowed.
(1) (1953) 8 E.L.R. 233,