# ' RAMA DAY AL MARKARHA v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1978] 3 S.C.R. 497
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-03-14
- **Bench:** S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, D. A. Desai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rama-day-al-markarha-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-7354
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

497
Contempt of Courts Act 1977, Sections 5, 13-Fair com1nents-Publication
of pa1nphlet by an Advocate in1puting niotives to a Magistrare-Tests to judge
if conzment is fair.
The appellant a Senior
Practising Advocate
in Un1aria
District Sahdol,
~fadhva Pradesh was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine Rs. 1,000/- under
s. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, by the High Court. The appellant
appeared on behalf of some accused persons in a criminal trial before the
Additional District hi!agistrate.
The accused were convicted by the Magistrate.
They filed an appeal which was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge.
Before the date for challe1.1ging the said judgment of Addl. Sessions Judge by
\Vay of revision in the High Court expired, the appellant published a pamphlet.
Jn ,the pan1phlct imputations of improper motive to the learned I\1agistrate in
deciding the case \Vere made.
The appellant did not question the authorship
and publication of the pamphlet.
However, his defence was that V.'hat he did
was merely publishing a fair comment on the merits of a crin1inal case which
was heard and finally decided and that therefore he was entitled to the benefit
of s. 5 of the Act. Alternatively it was contended that even if the Court came
to the conclusion that he was guilty of contempt of court no sentence should
be imposed upon him because the publication is not likely
to substantially
interfere or V.'QlJ.l_d tend substantially to interfere with the due course of justice
and therefore, he is entitled to benefit of s. 13.
Partially allowing the appeal
HELD : 1. The statement in the pamphlet "should the judge with his wayward bend of mind go on using \vayward 11en" is nothing short of imputing a
deliberate motivated approach on the part of the Judge.
Similarly to say that
the judgment proceeded in one direction but thereafter it took a somersault
because the Magistrate had resolved to convict the accused in spite .of there
being no evidence would clearly insinuate that the issues were prejudged by
the Judge. [502 C-D]
2. Even prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 a fair
and reasonable criticism of judicial act did not constitute contempt and this cherished and noble facet of the larger liberty of freedom of speech and expression
enshrined in Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has found its echo in s. 5 of
the Act.
The 1imit of fair comment being an integral part of the larger liberty
of freedom of ~.veech and expression it could not be -put in a straight-jacket
formula or converted into a master key which will open any lock.
More or
less it would depend upon the facts and ci_rcumstances of each case, the situation
and circumstances in which the act was done, the language employed the context
in which the criticism was offered and the -people for whose benefit the exercise
was undertaken and the effect which it will -produce on the litigants and society
in relation to courts and administration of justice. [502 Ci-I-I, 503 A.-B]
3. Contempt jurisdiction is a special and to some extent an unusual type of
jurisdiction wherein the prosecutor and the Judge are combined in
one. To
some extent it trenches upon the fundamental right of free speech and expression
and stifles criticism of a public officer concerned with the administration of
public justice in discharge of his public duty. Therefore, the contempt jurisdiction has to be sparinglv
exercised '1.rith utmost
restraint and
considerable
circuinspcction.
[503 H, -504 A, CJ
Baradakanta v. Registrar, Orissa High Court,
AIR 1974 SC 710 at 735;
Queen v. Gray. (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 at 40; Regina v. Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis, ex-parte Blackburn, (1968) 2 Weekly Law Reports 1204 at
1207; referred to.
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498
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
A
Pl-rspectire Publicdtions Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Mahara.~htra, [1969]
B
c
2 SCR 779 at 791-792 applied.
4. Fair and reasonable criticism of a judgment which is a public document
or which is a public act

## Text

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RAMA DAY AL MARKARHA
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
March 14, 1978
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]
497
Contempt of Courts Act 1977, Sections 5, 13-Fair com1nents-Publication
of pa1nphlet by an Advocate in1puting niotives to a Magistrare-Tests to judge
if conzment is fair.
The appellant a Senior
Practising Advocate
in Un1aria
District Sahdol,
~fadhva Pradesh was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine Rs. 1,000/- under
s. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, by the High Court. The appellant
appeared on behalf of some accused persons in a criminal trial before the
Additional District hi!agistrate.
The accused were convicted by the Magistrate.
They filed an appeal which was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge.
Before the date for challe1.1ging the said judgment of Addl. Sessions Judge by
\Vay of revision in the High Court expired, the appellant published a pamphlet.
Jn ,the pan1phlct imputations of improper motive to the learned I\1agistrate in
deciding the case \Vere made.
The appellant did not question the authorship
and publication of the pamphlet.
However, his defence was that V.'hat he did
was merely publishing a fair comment on the merits of a crin1inal case which
was heard and finally decided and that therefore he was entitled to the benefit
of s. 5 of the Act. Alternatively it was contended that even if the Court came
to the conclusion that he was guilty of contempt of court no sentence should
be imposed upon him because the publication is not likely
to substantially
interfere or V.'QlJ.l_d tend substantially to interfere with the due course of justice
and therefore, he is entitled to benefit of s. 13.
Partially allowing the appeal
HELD : 1. The statement in the pamphlet "should the judge with his wayward bend of mind go on using \vayward 11en" is nothing short of imputing a
deliberate motivated approach on the part of the Judge.
Similarly to say that
the judgment proceeded in one direction but thereafter it took a somersault
because the Magistrate had resolved to convict the accused in spite .of there
being no evidence would clearly insinuate that the issues were prejudged by
the Judge. [502 C-D]
2. Even prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 a fair
and reasonable criticism of judicial act did not constitute contempt and this cherished and noble facet of the larger liberty of freedom of speech and expression
enshrined in Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has found its echo in s. 5 of
the Act.
The 1imit of fair comment being an integral part of the larger liberty
of freedom of ~.veech and expression it could not be -put in a straight-jacket
formula or converted into a master key which will open any lock.
More or
less it would depend upon the facts and ci_rcumstances of each case, the situation
and circumstances in which the act was done, the language employed the context
in which the criticism was offered and the -people for whose benefit the exercise
was undertaken and the effect which it will -produce on the litigants and society
in relation to courts and administration of justice. [502 Ci-I-I, 503 A.-B]
3. Contempt jurisdiction is a special and to some extent an unusual type of
jurisdiction wherein the prosecutor and the Judge are combined in
one. To
some extent it trenches upon the fundamental right of free speech and expression
and stifles criticism of a public officer concerned with the administration of
public justice in discharge of his public duty. Therefore, the contempt jurisdiction has to be sparinglv
exercised '1.rith utmost
restraint and
considerable
circuinspcction.
[503 H, -504 A, CJ
Baradakanta v. Registrar, Orissa High Court,
AIR 1974 SC 710 at 735;
Queen v. Gray. (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 at 40; Regina v. Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis, ex-parte Blackburn, (1968) 2 Weekly Law Reports 1204 at
1207; referred to.
A
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F
G
H
498
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
A
Pl-rspectire Publicdtions Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Mahara.~htra, [1969]
B
c
2 SCR 779 at 791-792 applied.
4. Fair and reasonable criticism of a judgment which is a public document
or which is a public act of a Judge concerned with administration of justice
would not constitute contempt.
In fact such fair
and
reasonable
criticism
must be encouraged because after all no one, much less Judges, can claim
infallibility. Such a criticism may fairly assert that the judgment is incorrect
or an error has been committed both with regard to law or established facts.
But when it is said that the- Judge had a pre-disposition to convict or deliberately
took a turn in discussion of evidence because he had already resolved to convict
the accused, or has a wayward bend of mind, is attributing motives, lack of
dispassionate and objective approach and analysis and pre-judging of the issues
which would bring administration of justice into ridicule.
One has to bear in
mind the setting in which the court is functioning and the attack on the administration of justice.
Jn this country justice at grass-root level is administered
by courts set U:!1 in rural backward areas largely inhabitated by illiterate persons.
Their susceptibility is _of a different type than the
urban elire reading newspapers and exposed to wind of change or ·even wind of criticism. Again the
coB.temner is a lawyer belonging to the fraternity of noble and liberal profession .
.A .. criticism by him would attract greater attention than by others because of
his day to day concern with the administrati0n of justice.
Such criticism is
bound to substantially interfere: with due course of justice.
High Court rightly
held that the p<li:1phlet published by the contemner v.•as highly rnischicvious. [505
H, 506 A-H, 507 A-D 508 CJ
D
5. In the ;iresent case a token punishment would serve the ends of justice,
E
because if the contemner while pursuing his object zealously is required to be
kept to the path of rectitude, a token fine will also
consciously
remind the
conte1nner that he is not a gentleman at large.
A tine of Rs. 1,000/- was
therefore reduced to Re. 11-, while maintaining the conviction. [508 El
CRIMINAi APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 100
of J 975.
(From the Judgment and Order dated 14-2-1975 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Misc. Criminal Case No. 127/74).
In Person for the Appellant.
I. lV. Shroff for the Respondent
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DESAI, J. An Advocate, the appellant in this appeal under s. 19
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, was convicted and sentenced to
pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for
one month, by a Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court for committing criminal contempt by scandalising or tending to scandalise, or
G
lowering or tending to lower the authority of the Court of Additional
District Magistrate (J), Umaria, then presided over by
Shri
A. N.
Thakur, by publishing a pamphlet on !st January 1974 commenting
upon a judgment rendered by Shri Thakur in a criminal case of which
he had taken cognizance on a challan filed
by. the police upon a
report made by one Lal Chand against Betai Lal and his servant Abdul
Majid.· The High Court took eognizanc"- of the criminal coniempt
ff
alleged to hav:: been committed by the appellant upon a reference made
to it by the Presiding Officer of the Court of Additional District Magistrate (J) under section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act.
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MARKARHA v. M.P. STATE (Desai, J.)
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A resume of the events leading to the reference may be briefly
noticed.
One Lalchand, a tenant, reported at the police station that
his landlord Betai Lal and landlord's servant Abdul Majid committed
criminal trespass into the premises in his occupation and removed
iron sheets which he had placed in the terrace to arrest leaking of
rain water in the premises and that as the water leaked through the
terrace the goods stored in the premises were damaged and accordingly Betai Lal and Abdul Majid committed offences under sectio;,-s
451 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code. After completing investigation
a charge sheet was submitted in the Court of Addi. District Magistrate
(J). The accused were represented by the present appellant who is a
senior practising advocate in Umaria, District Sahdol (M.P.).
The
learned Magistrate npon appreciation of evidence concluded that both
the charges were brought home to the accused and passed sentence
considered appropriate by him. The conviction and sentence were
questioned in an appeal preferred by the accused in the Cour"t of
Additional Sessions Judge, Umaria, who· by his judgment and order
dated 21st December 1973 allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence.
Soon thereafter, the offending pamphlet was
published by the appellant. Shri Thakur having come to know of the
publication made a reference to the High Court for initiating action far
contempt of court against the appellant. That is how the matter came
before the High Court.
In the reference made by the Court of Additional District M~gi~
trate ( J), certain passages were extracted from the pamphlet as md_1cating the attitude of the appellant towards the Presiding Officer and
the Court and further stated that "the publicaiion tends to create an
apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity,. abHify
or fairness of the judge and it also deters actual and prospective ht1gants from placing complete reliance upon the court's. a.dministration
of justice" and thus scandalised the court and the P!~s1dmg officer as
well as lowered the authority of the court. The ongmal pampnlet 1s
in Hindi. The High Court had before it the translation which but for
minor variation as suggested by the appellant, has been accepted by
both sides as correctly reproducing what has been stated in Hindi.
These passages posed as questions may be reproduced in extenso :
" (a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Was Shri Thakur authorised to overlook the arguments of
counsel ? More so, when
two citizens were to be sentenced to imprisonment ?
Has not Shri·Thakur's conduct been an open insult to the
Advocate concerned as also to the Advocates in general?
Has not Shri Thakur's conduct damaged the prestige of
the sacred post of the Judge '!
Was this witness (a resident of Taithari)
according to
wisdom of Shri Thakur, competent to
give information
after seven months from 21st June 1971 that on this date
at Chandia it was raining, or that damage was caused to
particular person ?
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(e)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
When the nation's entire might, police army etc., is ready
to enforce obedience from every person of the orders of
a Judge, is it proper that the Judge himself should in this
manner with his wayward bent of mind go 011 using his
wayward pen ?
(f) Why did Shri Thakur, after suddenly twisting his cwn
finding, write in the next sentence that the accused entered
in the honse of Lalchand and that they entered in such
a manner that for an offence under section 451 it became
necessary to impose such a ·severe sentence ?
(h) Did Shri Thakur knowingly took (sic) this turn, because
be bad resolved to convict the accused in spite of there
being no evidence ? Otherwise there is no understandable reason for this turn."
Some more questions are also posed by the appellant in the pam ..
pblet of which the High Court has not taken any note of. On an
analysis of the questions posed with necessary innuendos and insinuations contained therein, the High Court concluded that "the imputation
of improper motive to a judicial officer in deciding a case by an
Advocate who has lost, is a very serious matter, more so when: the
Court is concerned with a mofussil place where there are one or two
courts and a few lawyers and the litigating public is mostly illiterate or
poorly educated" and, therefore, the criticism as (contained in the
booklet is highly mischievous and it is bound to undermine the confidence of litigant public in the administration of justice. They are
likely to feel that justice administered by subordinate judicial officers
is not fair and impartial, and, therefore, the, appellant is guilty of
criminal contempt and if it goes unpunished, it will substantially' obstruct the due course of justice.
The appellant does not question the authorship and publication of
the pamphlet by him. In fact, his attempt is to justify the course of
action taken by him. Broadly stated, his defence is that what he hiis
done is merely publishing a fair comment on the merits of a criminal
case which has been heard and finally decided and, therefore, he is
entitled to !he benefit of s. 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Alternatively, it was suggested that even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty of contempt of court, no sentence
should be. imposed upon him because the gublication is not likely to
substantiaJ!y mterfere or would tend substantially to interfere with the
due course of justice and, therefore, he is entitled to the benefit of
s. 13.
Even though the Addi. District Magistrate ( J) while making the
r~ference extract.eel .the passages from the pamphlet which were considered as constitutmg contempt of the Court, it also annexed to the
reference a copy of the pamphlet and the High Court issued notice in
respect of passages extracted by it and reproduced i11 extenso hereinabove.
Ho~ever, while holding the contemner guilty of contempt of
court, the High Court appears to have been mainly influenced by
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MARKARHA v. M.P. STATE (Desai, J.)
501
passages marked 'R' and 'H' by it in the ju~gment. In !hi? background, the contemner made a sort of a prehmmari: subm1ss10n that
while dealino with the appeal this Court should con11m itself to only
those passages noticed by the High Court in holding him
guilty of
contempt and the other passages, even if they find a place m the judgment, should be ignored.
Ordinarily, it is true that this Court while
hearincr an appeal against a conviction for contempt of Court would
confin~ its attention to the materiar which has received consideration of
the High Court while adjudging the contcmner guilty. However, there
would be no lack of jurisdiction to take into consideration thfll passages
in respect of which notice for contempt was issned and served upon
the contcmncr.
But the wider question of law apart, we propose to
confine ourselves only to the material which has received the consideration of the High Court. The question marked 'E' is a composite statement, the first being an innocuous one expostulating the power and
authority behind the judicial pronouncement, but in the latter part the
contemner proceeds to state that though there is tremendous sanction
behind the judicial pronouncement, 'should the judge with his wayward bend of mind
go on using his wayward pen'.
Jn question
marked 'H' it is insinuated that Shri Thakur knowingly took the turi1
at some stage in the judgment 'because he had resolved to convict the
accused in spite of there being no evidence.
Otherwise there is no
undetstandable reason for this turn.
The High Court was of the opinion that it was not possible to say
that the conclusions reached by Shri Thakur even if erroneous, could
not have been reached judicially by him and the reversal of his judgment could not give rise to an inference that in convicting the accused
he was unfair or that he was actuated by an improper motive. The
High Court further observed that a reading of the criticism contained
in the booklet goes to show that the author wanted to convey that
the judgment delivered by Shri Thakur was entirely unfair and that
he knowingly delivered such a judgment and convicted the accused in
spite of there being no evidence and that he twisted bis findings, to that
end.
Do the questions posed with implied insinuates convey to a lay
reader that the judge lacks judicial equipoise, fairness, open mind and
is guilty of prejudging issues which apart from scandalising the court,
would interfere with administration of justice in that the litigant would
be scared away on the apprehension that the judge lacks fairness, objectivity, impartiality and judicial approach?
The contemner, arguing his appeal in person, submitted that the
High Court was in error in infusin~ into r~ord the judgment of the
Addi. Sess10ns Judge m appeal agamst the judgment of Shri Thakur
on which the contemne~ had not relied but which: was called for< by the
High Court while heanng the contempt action, and that averments of
facts in the appellate judgment of the Addi. Sessions Judge could not
have been utilised to hold that even if the conclusions of Shri Thakur
· wern erroneous they were not such as could not ha vc been reached
judicially by him.
The offending pamphlet was published after the
appeal preferred against the judgment of Shri Thakur was allowed by
the learned Addi. Sessions Judge and the conviction and sentence of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
the accused were set aside. As the judgment of Shri Thakur was the
focal point of attack by the contemner, it was imperative for 1he High
Court to take into consideration the app'1late judgment against the
judgment under attack so as to satisfy itself whether the judgment was
so manifestly incorrect or perverse as .to merit a scurrilous attack on
it.
Tlie submission of the contemner that the appellate judgment
should not have been taken into consideration has no merit.
If the two questions extracted above arc read by consumers of
judicial service what effect is likely to: be caused on their minds? On
reading a judgment if it appears that the judgment read as a whole
discloses a wayward bend of mind of a judge which forces a wayward .
pen even i[ it is a contempt it could be ignored because it is a conclusion reachelt on a fair reading of the judgment which consumers of
judicial service have a right to comment upon.
But to say that the
judge with a wayward bend of mind has wielded a wayward pen is
nothing short of imputing a deliberate motivated approach on the part
of the judge which is other than judicial indicating lack of dispassionate analysis and judicial objectivity.
Similarly to say that the judgment proceeded in one direction but thereafter the judgment took a
somersault because he had resolved to convict the accused in spite of
there being 110 evidence would clearly insinuate that the issues were
pre-judged by the judge. There is no greater calumny or infamy for
a judge bound by the oath or dutie~ of his office not to decide a matter
on record placed before him judicially which imply dispassionately
and objectively. Pre-judging an issue is the very anti-thesis of a judicial process. To accuse a judge that he proceeded to reach ;1 concfusion because of his pre-conceived notion or prior resolution is to accuse
him of an entirely injudicious approach. The conclusion, therefore,
reached by the High Court that the criticism of the judgment made by
the contemner was wholly unjustified, is unexceptional.
The contemner strenuously contended that actuated by ,the most
laudable object of contributing to the establishment of rule of law in
our democratic polity, an ideal cherished by our Constitution and
established tor the benefit of the rural backward population, the very
fact which has appealed to the High Court in
convicting the appellant a member of the legal fraternity for contempt, he published the
pamohlet fairly commenting on the merits of a case already decided so
that -people'e faith in administration of justice
is vindicated. Even
prior to the enactment of the Contemp_t of Courts Act,
1971, a fair
and reasonable comment of a judicial act did not constitute contempt
and this cherished and noble facet of the larger liberty of freedom of
speech and expression enshrined in Article 19 (I) I a) of the Constitution has found its echo in s. 5 of the Contempt of Courts• Act which
provides that a person shall not be guilty of contempt of ·court for
publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been
heard and finally decided.
What constitutes fair comment and what'
are its peripheral limits beyoqd which the comment ceases to be fair
and strays into the forbidden field inviting penalty, has been. the subject-matter of a catena of decisions. The limit cf fair comment being
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MARKAJlHA v. M.P. STATE (Desai, !.)
503
an integral part of the larger liberty of freedom of speech and expression it could not be put in a straight-jacket formula or converted into
a master-key which will open any lock. More or less it would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the situation and circumstances in which the comment was made, the langugae employed,
the context in which the criticism was offered and the people for
whose benefit the exercise was undertaken, and the effect it will produce on the litigants and society in relation to courts and administration of justice.
Before we examine t.he most important submission i11 this casd that
the contemner had merely published a fair comment on the merits of
a case which bad been heaP<l and finally decided, a submission made
by Mr. Shroff on behalf of the respondent may be briefly disposed of.
It was submitted that in order to attract s. 5 it must be affirmatively
shown that the case in respect of which comments were offered was
heard and finally decided and that the expression heard 3nd finally
decided, would comprehend that the limitation !or appeal had also
expired and the judgment had become final inter partes.
Proceeding
from this angle it was said that the judgment in appeal was rendered by
the Addi. Sessions Judge on 23rd December 1973 and the offending
publication saw the light of the day on 1st January 1974 and that
the limitation for appeal by the State against the order of acquittal
being 90 days, the limitation had not expired and, therefore, it could
not be said that the case was finally decided.
\'Ir. Shroff submitted
with due deference to the contemner who is an advocate that the
timing of the publication was deliberately chosen with a view to forestalling the appeal that the State might contemplate.
There is considerable force in this submission of Mr. Shroff but we do not propose to deny to the contemner the benefit of s. 5 if in fact he is
entitled to it on the short ground that the case was not finally
decided. Explanation appended to s. 3 would clearly show that the proceeding either civil or criminal shall be deemed to continue to be
pending until it is heard and finally decided, that is to say, in a case
where an appeal or revision is competent, until the appeal or revision
is heard and finally decided or, where no appeal or revision is preferred, until the period of limitation prescribed for such appeal or revision has expired.
Obviously, on 1st January 1974 the limitation for
preferring an appeal by the State against the order of acquittal had
not expired and, therefore, Explanation to s. 3 would be clearly
attracted and the proceeding could be said to be pending and could
not be said to be heard and finally decided.
However, as the High
Court has not shut out the defence of fair comment on the
short
ground that the proceeding was pending, we would
not refuse
to
examine the defence of fair comment if the appellant is in a position
to substantiate the same.
The High Court has held the contemner guilty of criminal contempt in that by the offending
publication
the
contemner
has
scandalised or tended to scandalise or lowered or tended to lower the
authority ot the Court and it substantially interferes with the due
course of justice.
Contempt jurisdiction is a special and to some
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extend an unusual type of jurisdiction where in the prosecutor and
the judge are combined in one. To some extent it trenches upon the
fundamental right of free speech and expression and stifles criticism
of a public officer concerned with administration of public justice in
discharge of his public duty.
In the words of Krishna Iyer, J : "the
cornerstone of the contempt law is the accommodation of two constitutional values, the right of free speech and the right to independent justice.
The ignition of contempt action should be substantial
and mala fide interference with fearless judicial action, not fair comment or trivial reflections on the judicial process
and personnel"
(vide Baradakanta v. Registrar, Orissa High Cour1).(')
Therefore,
the con!empt jurisdiction has to be' sparingly exercised with utmost
restraint and considerable circumspectio~. Undoubtedly, judges and
courts are alike open to criticism and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or
the public good, no court could or would treat that as contempt of
court, vide Queen v. Gray.(')
No criticism of a judgment, however
vigorous, can amount to contempt of court, providing it keeps within
the limits of reasonable courtesy and good faith, vide Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, exparte Blackburn.(')
Lord
Denning. M.R. in the same case further observed that "those who
comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice.
They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions
erroneous.
whether they are subject to appeal or not." After referring to these
cases, the contemner drew our attention to the celebrated passage of
Lord Atkin in Andre Paul v. AttorneycGeneral(•), which has almost
become a classic. It reads as under :
"But where the authority and position of an individual
Judge or the due administration of justice is concerned, no
wrong is committed by any member of the
public who
exercises the ordinary right of criticising in good faith in private or public the public act done in the seat of justice.
The path of criticism is a public way : the wrongheaded
are permitted to err therein : provided that members of
the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those
taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or
attemptit1g to
impair the
administration of
justice, they
are immune. Justice is not a choistered virtue : she must
be allowed to ·suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though
outspoken, comments of ordinary men".
In Perspective Publications Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
v.
State .Of Maharashtra,(') a Bench of three judges of this Court, after referring to.
(!) A.LR. 1974 S.C. 710 at 73 .
(2) (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 at 40.
(3) (1968) 2 Weekly Law Reports 1204 at 1207.
(4) A.LR. 1936 P.C. 141 at 145-146.
(5) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 779 at
791, 792.
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MARKARHA v. M.P. STATE (Desai, J.)
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the leading cases on the subject, formulated the principles which
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·would govern cases of this kind. They read as under :
"(!) It will not be right to say that committals for contempt for sacndalizing the
court
have
become
obsolete .
(2) The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must
be exercised with great care and caution ai1d only
when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice.
(3) It is open to anyone to express fair, reasonable and
legitimate criticism of any '1_Ct or conduct of a judge
in his judicial capacity or even to make a proper
and fair comment o_g any decision given by him
because "justice is not a cloistered virtue and she
must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary
men".
(4) A distinction must be made between a mere libel
or defamation of a judge and what amounts to a
contemp! of the court.
The test in each case would be
whether
the
impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack
on the judge or whether it is calculated to interfere
with the administration of justice "" the proper
administration of law by his
part. It is only in
the latter case that it will be punishable as contempt.
(5) Alternatively the test will be whether the wrong is
done to the judge personally or it is done to the public.
To borrow from the language of Mukherjea,
J. (as he then was) (Brahma
Prakash Shanna's
case, (1953) SCR 1169, the publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public
if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of
the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness
of the judge er to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's
administration of justice or if it is likely to cause
embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in
the discharge of his judicial duties".
Applying the aforementioned formulated tests to the facts of this
case, could it be said that the extracted offending passages with a
tinge of sarcasm offer -reasonable and legitimate criticism of a case
which was heard and finally decided ? Fair and reasonable criticism
of a judgment which is a public document or which is a public act cf
a Judge concerned with administration of justice wonld not constitute
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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contempt.
In fact, such fair and reasonable criticism must be encouraged because afterall no one, much less Judges, can claim infallibility.
A fair and reasonable comment would even be helpful to
the judge concerned because he will be able to see his own shortcomings, limitations_ or imperfection in his work. The society at large is
interested in the administration of public justice because in the words
of Benjamin Cardozo, "the great tides and currents which engulf
the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges
by" (Benjamin N. Cardozo--The Nature of the Judicial Process, P·
168). Such permissible criticism would
itself provide a sensible
answer to sometimes ill-informed criticism of judges as living
in
·ivory towers.
But then the criticism has to be fair and reasonable.
Such a criticism may fairly assert that the judgment is incorrect or an
error has been committed both with regard to law or established facts.
It is one thing to say that a judgment on facts as disclosed is not in
consonance with evidence or the law has not been correctly applied.
Ordinarily, the judgment itself will be the subject-matter of criticism and
not the judge. But when it is said that the judge had a pre-disposition
to convict or deliberately took a turn in discussion of evidence because
be had already resolved to convict the accused, or he has a wayward
bend of mind, is attributing motives, lack of dispassionate and objective
approach and analysis and pre-judging of the' issues which would bring
administration ()_f justice into ridicule if not infamy.
When there is
danger of grave_ mischief being done in the matter of administration of
justice, the animadversion cannot be ignored and viewed with placid
equanimity.
If the criticism is likely to interfere with due administration
of justice or undermine the. confidence which the public rightly repose
in the courts of law as courts of justice. the criticism would cease te>
be fair and reasonable criticism as contemplated by s. 5 but would
scandalise courts and substantially interfere with administration of
justice. As said in Gray's case, (supra) any act done or writing published calculated to bring the court or judge
of the court into
contempt or to lower his authority is a contempt of the court, because
nothing is more pernicious in its consequences than to prejudice the
mind of the public against judges of the Court responsible for dispensing justice.
It is also to be borne in mind the setting in which the court is functioning and the attack on the administration of justice.
In this country
justice at grass-root level is administered by courts set up in rural backward areas lar!(ely inhabitated by illiterate persons.
It is they who
bring their problems to the court for resolution and they are the litigants,
or consumers of justice service
Their susceptibility is of a different
1ype than the urban elite read;ng newspaper and exposed to wind of
change or even wind of criticism.
The people in rural backward areas
unfortunately illiterate have different kinds of susceptibilities.
A slight
suspicion that the judge is pre-disposed or approaches the case with a
closed mind or has no judicial disposition would immediately affect
tbeir susceptibilities and they would lose confidence in the administration of justice. There is no greater harm than infusing or instilling in the
minds of such people a lack of confidence in the character and integrity
of the judge. Conversely, it makes the task of the judge extremely
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MARKARHA v. M.P. STATE (Desai, .1.)
507
difficult when operating in such area. In this case the setting is in a
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small backward rural area in the State of Madhya Pradesh and which
aspect has especially appealed to the High Court in adjudging the appellant g)lilty of contempt. Again, the contemner is a lawyer belonging
to the fraternity of noble and liberal profession. A criticism by him
would attract greater attention than by others because of his day-to-day
concern with the administration of justice in that area and his belief
about the judge's judicial disposition would adversely affect a large
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number of persons. Therefore, when in such a background it is said
that the judge has a wayward bend of mind and wields a wayward pen
and that he took a deliberate turn in the discussion of evidence because
he had resolved to convict the accused would indicate that the judge has
no judicial disposition and that he pre-judges the issues and there cannot
be a greater infamy and calumny apart from the judge of the Court.
People around would lose all confidence in him and in the ultimate
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analysis the admipistration of justice would considerably suffer, and,
therefore, would constitute contempt.
The contemper further submitted that prosecution for contempt for
scandalising the court has become obsolete.
We need not examine this
submission in detail.
In Perspective Publications' case (supra) after
examining this argument and considering the leading decisions it has
been said that prosecutions for scandalising court have not become
obsolete and we are in respectful agreement with it.
It was next contended that even if the comments made by the
appellant appear in bad taste or that they are outspoken or blunt, in
view of s. 13 no sentence can be imposed upon him for contempt unless
the court is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes or tends substantially to interfere with the due course
of justice.
After drawing our attention to Bridges v. California('). in
which it is said that the
judges must be kept mindful of their
limitations and their ultimate
public
responsibility by vigorous
stream of criticism expressed with candour however blunt, it was said
that we should bear in mind the most laudable object with which the
contemner published the comments and in his enthusiasm for a public
cause, viz., establishment of rule of law in backward area, and, therefore,
even if he had strayed slightly from the path of rectitude, the case
does not call for sentence as contemplated by s. 13 of the Contempt
of Courts Act. This submission cannot be fully answered tmless we
refer to one aspect of the matter which the High Court has taken into
consideration and which we were keen to avoid.
The appellant is a
practising advocate and is a mature old man having had tl1c experience
of long practice at the Bar. If he was dissatisfied with the judgment
as lie was appearing for the accused who were convicted by the learned
Magistrate, the proper course was to prefer an appeal which he did
adopt. After the anneal was allowed, the appellate judgment was bound
to be sent to the trial court and the error of the Magistrate must have
been pointed out. If he was still not satisfied, it was open to the contemner to submit a petition to the High Court as envisaged by s. 6.
of tke Contempt of Courts Act, 197 \. Assuming that this course, was
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an optional one and in the words of Lord Denning, silence is
not
an option when things are ill-done, he, actuated by a desire
to
serve the
public
cause, came out with a pamphlet criticising
the judgment, looking to
the language used,
could he be said
to have slightly erred or strayed marginally from the path oi rectitude?
Conceding that judges must suffer criticism willingly, it is not the question of their personal villificafion but the effect it has on the ~dministra
tion of public justice which is the cornerstone of contempt action.
The
judge villified relevant to his judgment would always shudder at the
idea of writing a judgment which cannot meet the high standard of the
present contemner.
In fact the vituperative language was the outcome
of a defeated advocate which appeared to be a very serious matter to
the High Court more so when concerned with a mofussil plate where
there are one or two courts and ai few lawyers, and the litigating public·
is mostly illiterate or porrly educated, and it is such a thing which could
not be ignored or allowed to pass by. Such criticism is bound to substantially interfere with due course of justice because in the opinion o!
the High Court, with which we are in agreement, the pamphlet published
by the contemner was highly mischievous.
Therefore, this is not a fit
case for giving benefit of s. 18 to the contemner.
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The contemner did not recant either before the High Court or even
before us.
Even then the question is whether the sentence of fine of
Rs. 1000 /- is called for in this case. The contemner also showed some
other pamphlets which he had published.
Either he is trying to impose
himself upon conrts or in his mistaken zeal he is publishing pamphlets
criticising judgments of the courts. We are mindful of the fact that the
judges must be feeling extremely inconvenient whenever the contemner
must be appearing before them but we must not be oblivious to the fact
that the path of justice is not strewn with roses and justice being not
a cloistered virtne, it must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful,
even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men, more so, by lawyers
who are directly involved in administration of justice. While, therefore,
not exonerating the contemner, we think a token punishment would
serve the ends of jnstice because if the contemner while pursuing his
object zealously is required to be kept to the path of rectitude, a token
fine will also consciously remind the contemner that he is not a gentlemaJI at large.
We, therefore, modify the sentence of fine awarded by
the High Court and impose a token fine of Re. 1/- on the contemner,
in default to suffer 'simple imprisonment for a week.
Accordingly. this appeal is partly allowed. We confirm the conviction of the appellant contemncr for contempt of court, but modify the
sentence directing him to pay a fine of Re. 1/-, in default to suffer simple
imprisonment for a week.
The fine, if already paid, balance shall be
refunded to him.
In tile circumstances of the case, there shall be no
order as to costs.
P.H.P.
Appeal partly allowed.
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