# RAMAN & RAMAN LTD v. THE STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 256
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1956
- **Bench:** VIVIAN BosE, Jagannadhadas, B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, Chandbasekbaba Aiyab
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raman-raman-ltd-v-the-state-of-madras-and-another-1307
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Road Ttan•port-PoJi.,. of the Stat. ao,,.,.,.,,..,., to IOI and•
orders of 3Uburdinat. authoriti•&-High Court's pow., to int.rfer• bv
writ of CBTtiorari-Motor Vehicle• Act (IV of 1989), as amended by
the Motor Vehicle• (Madras Amendment) Act (XX of 1948), •· 64·A
-Oon•titulion of India, Art. 226.
The appellant and respondent No. 2 along with others applied
for stage-carriage permits for two routes and the Regional Transport
Authority granted a permit for one route to the appellant and for
the other route to the respondent No. 2.
Both sppesled to the
Central Road Traffic Board but the sppeals were dismissed. Neither
the Regional Authority nor the Board recorded any finding as to
which of them had the better facilities for transport operation or
thst they were of equal merit.
They applied to the Stste Government under s. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 as amended
by ·the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act of 1948 and the
State Government set aside the orders passed by the said subordi·
nate authorities and issued permits for both the routes to the res·
pondent No. 2 on the ground tbst he bad better facilities for opera·
tion and would serve the public better.
Against this order of the
Stste Government the appellant moved the High Court for a writ of
certiorari snd a single Judge issued the writ.
On a Letters Patent
appeal that decision was set aside.
The appellant contended that
the State Government had acted in excess uf its powers under s. 64-A
of the Act in setting aside the orders of the subordinate authorities
and that the seetion itself was invalid.
Held, that the State Government was within its powers in passing the order it did and the appeal must be dismissed.
That it was within the competence of the State Legislature to
insert s. 64-A into the Act and its legality could not be questioned
and the clear intention of the legislation was to empower the State
Government to decide the legality, regularity or propriety of any
orders passed by the subordinate authorities in the interest of the
general public.
·
That the State Government was the final authority to decide
which of the rival applicants had the better facilities for operation
of the bus service and where it bad come to a decision in favonr of
an applicant, its decision conld not be interfered with under Ari.
226 of the Constitution merely because its view might be erroneous,
(
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
257

## Text

1956
March 15
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
RAMAN & RAMAN LTD.
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER.
[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA,
JAFER IMAM and CHANDBASEKBABA AIYAB JJ.)
Road Ttan•port-PoJi.,. of the Stat. ao,,.,.,.,,..,., to IOI and•
orders of 3Uburdinat. authoriti•&-High Court's pow., to int.rfer• bv
writ of CBTtiorari-Motor Vehicle• Act (IV of 1989), as amended by
the Motor Vehicle• (Madras Amendment) Act (XX of 1948), •· 64·A
-Oon•titulion of India, Art. 226.
The appellant and respondent No. 2 along with others applied
for stage-carriage permits for two routes and the Regional Transport
Authority granted a permit for one route to the appellant and for
the other route to the respondent No. 2.
Both sppesled to the
Central Road Traffic Board but the sppeals were dismissed. Neither
the Regional Authority nor the Board recorded any finding as to
which of them had the better facilities for transport operation or
thst they were of equal merit.
They applied to the Stste Government under s. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 as amended
by ·the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act of 1948 and the
State Government set aside the orders passed by the said subordi·
nate authorities and issued permits for both the routes to the res·
pondent No. 2 on the ground tbst he bad better facilities for opera·
tion and would serve the public better.
Against this order of the
Stste Government the appellant moved the High Court for a writ of
certiorari snd a single Judge issued the writ.
On a Letters Patent
appeal that decision was set aside.
The appellant contended that
the State Government had acted in excess uf its powers under s. 64-A
of the Act in setting aside the orders of the subordinate authorities
and that the seetion itself was invalid.
Held, that the State Government was within its powers in passing the order it did and the appeal must be dismissed.
That it was within the competence of the State Legislature to
insert s. 64-A into the Act and its legality could not be questioned
and the clear intention of the legislation was to empower the State
Government to decide the legality, regularity or propriety of any
orders passed by the subordinate authorities in the interest of the
general public.
·
That the State Government was the final authority to decide
which of the rival applicants had the better facilities for operation
of the bus service and where it bad come to a decision in favonr of
an applicant, its decision conld not be interfered with under Ari.
226 of the Constitution merely because its view might be erroneous,
(
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
257
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 1 of 1956.
On appeal from the judgment and order dated
the 2nd/21st day of September 1955 of the Madras
High Court in vVrit Appeal No. 65 of 1955 arising out
of the order dated the 5th day of May 1955 of the
said High Court in Writ Petition No. 158 of 1955.
G. S. Pathak, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishan, for the appellant.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.K.B.
Naidu and Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2.
1956. March 15. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
IMAM J.-This appeal comes before us on a certificate granted by the Madras High Court that the case
was a fit one for appeal to this Court as it involved
two important questions, n;i,mely, the powers of the
Government under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor Vehicles
(Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 for the State of
Madras (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to interfere with the orders of subordinate Transport Authorities on the ground of propriety and the limits of
judicial review which the courts have under article
226 of the Constitution of India.
The appellant and respondent No. 2 had applied
for stage-carriage permits in the Mayuram Town Service for routes Nos. I and 2.
These applications,
along with others, were considered by the Regional
Transport Authority, Tanjore.
By its order dated
the 31st of M;ay, 1954, it granted a permit for route
No. I to the appellant and for route No. 2 to respondent No. 2. Both the appellant and respondent No. 2
being dissatisfied appealed under section 64 of- the
Act to the appropriate authority, the Central Road
Traffic Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board),
but the appeals were dismissed by its order dated the
18th of August, 1954. As section 64-A conferred upon
the State Government certain powers, which have
7956
Ramanand
RamanUd.
v.
The State of
Madras and
-
another
1956
Raman and
RamanUd.
v.
The State oj
1.fadras and
another
lmt11n J.
258
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
been described in this case as revisional powers, the
appellant and respondent No. 2 filed representations
thereunder before the State Government against the
orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the
Board. The State Government set aside the orders
passed by the aforesaid authorities and directed that
permits for both the routes Nos. l and 2 be issued to
respondent No. 2.
Against this order, the appellant
filed an application under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari. The application was heard by a single Judge
who issued the requisite writ. Against his decision
there was a Letters Patent appeal by respondent No.
2, which was allowed and the decision of the single
Judge was set aside.
The ground upon which the Regional Transport
Authority granted the appellant and respondent No.
2 permits for routes Nos. 1 and 2 respectively was
that they were experienced and were operating town
buses at Kumbakonam. This opinion was approved
by the Board which also thought that a ~certain
amount of healthy competition was required in the
Mayurarn Town routes. It also considered that the
Regional Transport Authority was within its rights in
not considering the aspect of sector coverage by muffassil buses of the appellant and respondent No. 2. It
appears that respondent No. 2 was covering the entire
route No. 1 and the appellant was covering a portion
of route No.'2. The State Government in setting aside
the orders of the' Regional Transport Authority and
the Board passed the' following order:
.
"As between the claims of Sri Raman & Raman
Ltd. and Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, the Government
consider that it will be in the interest of the public
to grant both the permits to Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Servic!ol, Poryar, since he has better facilities fcii- operation and will be able to serve the public better. The
Government of Madras therefore sets aside as improper the order of the Central Road Traffic Board No.
R 27792/A2/54 dated the 18th of August, 1954 in so
far as it confirms the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore granting one permit of route
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
259
No. 1 to Sri Raman & Raman Ltd. and directs that
the two permits in question be granted to Sri Sathi
Vilas Bus Service, Poryar".
Before dealing with the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, it:would be desirable to make
reference to certain provisions of the Act concerning
. the grant of permits. Section 42 of the Act prohibits
an owner of a transport vehicle from using or permitting it to be used in any public place save in
accordance with the conditions of a permit granted
by a Regional Transport Authority. Section 43 gives
certain powers to the State Government to control
road transport. Section 44 authorises the State Government to constitute a State Transport Authority
as well as a Regional Transport Authority to perform
certain functions mentioned therein. Section 47 sets
forth certain matters which a Regional Transport
Authority shall bear in mind in deciding to grant or
to refuse a stage carriage permit. Section 64 enables
a person aggrieved by the order of the Regional
Transport Authority, with respect to matters mentioned therein, to appeal to the prescribed authority.
Section 64-A states: "The State Government may, of
its own motion or on application made to it, call for
the records of any order passed or proceeding taken
under this Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or
proceeding and after examining such records, may
pay pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks
fit".
Mr. Pathak, for the appellant, contended that having regard to the terms of section 64-A, there were two
stages for the exercise of power thereunder by the
State Government. The first stage was the condition
precedent for assumption of jurisdiction for the exercise of that power. A collateral fact had to be decided,
namely whether the order passed by any authority
or officer subordinate to. the State Government was
in fact illegal, irregular or improper. If the decision
was in the affirmative, then and then only would the
State Government have jurisdiction to revise the
1956
Raman and
RamanUd,
v.
The State of
Madras and
another
ImamJ.
1966
Raman and
RamanUd.
v.
The State of
Madras and
another
Imam}.
260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
order complained against. The decision of the State
Government both with respect to questions of fact
and law could be examined by a court in a proceeding for the issue of a writ of certiorari and such court
in doing so could decide whether the order which was
revised by the State Government was or was not
illegal, irregular or improper. In the present case,
there was no question of illegality or irregularity in
the orders of the Regional Transport Authority and
the Board. The only question was as to whether these
orders were improper. The propriety of an order does
not necessarily mean that it must be correct order.
There must be something extraneous to the order itself which made it improper. Merely because the
State Government took a different view of the facts
to that of the authority or officer subordinate to it
would not make the order of such authority or officer
improper. The second stage, namely, the passing of
an order as the State Government thought fit, could
only be reached after a decision had been arrived at
on the condition precedent conferring jurisdiction on
the State Governμient to revise an order. The substantial ground upon which the State Government
revised the order of the authority subordinate to it
was that respondent No. 2 had better facilities for
operation and would, therefore, be able to serve the
public better. The authorities subordinate to the
State Government, however, had the representations
of the appellant and respondent No. 2, as well as
other applicants, which fully stated all material particulars in this respect and it could not be said that
these matters were not considered by them. The
orders of the subordinate authorities accordingly
must be read to mean that as between the appellant
and respondent No. 2 both had equal facilities for
operation and that things being equal between them
in every way, one permit should be _granted for one
route to the appellant and another for another route
to respondent No. 2.
There could be nothing improper in this. The condition precedent to the exercise
of jurisdiction to revise the order was therefore absent ·and the State Government acted in excess of its
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
261
jurisdiction in revising the orders of its subordinate
authorities.
Mr. Pathak further contended that there was an
error on the face of the .record in the order passed by
the State Government as it had refused to consider
seniority or experience in motor transport as a factor
for the granting of a permit and it thought that it
could come to any conclusion it liked and reference
was made to paragraph 8 of the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government in the High Court. On
the!basis of that affidavit and that paragraph, it was
also urged that the error on the face of the record was
that the Government acted on an erroneous idea of
its own jurisdiction.
He further contended that section 64-A was an in·
valid provision.
In the alternative, he urged that a court or authority, in the exercise of its revisional powers, cannot
take a contrary view of the facts to that taken by
the subordinate court or authority. Exercise of such
revisional power could only be made in cases where
the subordinate court or authority had taken a perverse view of the facts and had arrived at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have arrived
at.
In support of his first contention, Mr. Pathak relied
upon paragraph 116 at page59 ofHalsbury's Laws of
England, third edition, Vol. ll.
It appears from an'
examination of that paragraph and paragraph 117 at
page 60 of the same Volume that there may be cases
where the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may
depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact.
Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which
the inferior tribunal has to try, and the determination of whether it exists or not is logically and in
sequence prior to the determination of the actual
question which the inferior tribunal has to try.
In
such a case, in certiorari proceedings, a court can
enquire into the correctness of the decision of the
inferior tribunal as to the collateral fact and may
reverse that decision if it appears to it, on the
1956
Raman and
Raman Ltd.
v.
The State o/
Madras anc.
attother
1956
Ra,nanand
Ra1nanLtd.
v.
The State of
Madras and
another
Inia1nJ.
262
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
materials before it, to be erroneous.
There may be
tribunals, however, which, by virtue of legislation
constituting them, have the powers to determine
finally the preliminary facts on which the further
exercise of their jurisdiction depends.
With respect
to them, in such cases, their decision even if wrong
on facts or law cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In cases where the fact in question is a part
of the very issue which the inferior tribunal has
to enquire into, a court will not issue a writ of
certiorari, although the inferior tribunal may have
arrived at an erroneous conclusion with regard to it. In
the present case, if there was at all any collateral fact
to be decided, it was whether the appropriate authority had in fact passed any order in respect of which
powers under section 64-A could be exercised. It is
not disputed that in fact orders were passed by the
Regional Transport Authority and the Board, authorities subordinate to the State Government, and that
these orders existed when the appellant and respondent No. 2 moved that Government to exercise
its powers under section 64-A.
The condition precedent and the existence of a collateral fact in that
way for the exercise of powers under that section
were therefore present when the State Government
exercised its powers. In order to satisfy itself whether the order of an authority subordinate to it was
legal, regular or proper, the State Government was
not deciding the existence of a collateral fact but the
issue itself as to the legality, regularity or the propriety of the order.
The satisfaction of the State
Government in this respect would be an expression
of its opinion and not the determination of a fact
upon which depended its jurisdiction to exercise its
powers under section 64-A.
What is the nature of the functions performed
under the Act by the Regional Transport Authority,
the Board and the State Government in the matter
of granting or refusing to grant a permit may now
be considered. That they are not judicial is accepted,
but, it is said, they are not administrative but quasijudicial and therefore amenable to the jurisdiction of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
263
a court possessing the power to issue a writ of certiorari. In proceedings under sections 4 7, 64 and 64-A
of the Act there is no determination of any individual's rights and from that point of view the functions of these authorities may be regarded as executive or administrative. On the other hand, it may be
said that a person has the fundamental right to carry
on his business of plying buses and therefore has the
right to have the statutory functions of these authorities properly exercised in which case they would
be quasi-judicial functions.
Assuming this to be so,
it has yet to be seen whether the State Government
acted in excess of its legal authority.
Chapter IV
of the Act contains provisions concerning the control
of transport vehicles:· The Act authorises the State
Government to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities, and under
section 43, subject to its provisions, it can control
road transport. In the first instance, the authority to
grant or refuse to grant a permit is vested in the
Regional 'I'ransport Authority, but its order is not
final as a dissatisfied party can appeal against the
order under section 64 to the appropriate authority.
Before section 64-A was inserted into the Aqt by an
Act of the legislature of the State of Madras, it might
have been possible to contend that the order of a
Regional Transport Authority which had not been
appealed against and the order of the appropriate
authority under section 64, where an appeal had been
made, were incapable of interference by the State
Government for lack of statutory authority. By
enacting section 64-A, the legislature clearly intended
that that should not be so and that the State Government should have the powers to intervene, if it
was satisfied that the order in question was either
illegal, irregular or improper. In clothing the State
Government with such power th~ legislature clearly
intended the State Government to decide the issue as
to whether any order in question was illegal, irregular
or improper. It would not be open to a court exercising the power of certiorari to intervene merely because it might be of the opinion that the view taken
85
1956
Raman and
Raman Ud.
....
The State of
Madras and
another
lmamJ.
1956
Ranian and
Raman Ud.
v.
The State of
Madras and
another
Imam]~
264
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
by the State Government was erroneous.
The word "propriety" has nowhere been defined in
the Act and is capable of.a variety of meanings. In the
Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. VIII), it has been
stated to mean "fitness; appmpriateness; aptitude
·suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or
conditions; conformity with requil'.ement, rule or
principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy".
If the State Government was of the opinion that
respondent No. 2 had better facilities for operation
than the appellant and their service to the public
would be more beneficial, it could not be said
that the State Government was in error in thinking that the order of the Board confirming the order
of the Regional Transport Authority was improper.
It is to be remembered that under section 47
of the Act a Regional Transport Authority in deciding whether to grant or to refuse .a permit shall
have regard, amongst other things, to the interest of
the public generally and the advantages to the public
of the service to be provided. Assuming that in the
matter of experience there was nothing much to
choose between the appellant and respondent No. 2,
better facilities for operation of the bus service possessed by respondent No. 2, would be to the interest
of.the public generally and an advantage to the public
of the service to be provided and therefore was an
overriding factor when other things were equal. As
between the appellant and respondent No. 2 neither
the Regional Transport Authority nor the Board recorded a finding as to which of thetn had the better
facilities for transport operation or that such facilities as existed between them were of equal merit.
The State Government did not have, therefore, the
advantage of knowing, on the face of the orders of
these authorities, what view they took of this matter.
Even if it is assumed that their orders meant that
the facilities for operation as between the appellant
and respondent No. 2 were of equal merit, still the
State Govenment was not in a position to know on
what material this opinion was based or that it was
a reasonable view. In order to satisfy itself the State
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
265
Government examined the materials available to it
and came to the conclusion that respondent No. 2 had
the better facilities, in other words, it would be unreasonable to hold that respondent No. 2 had not the
better facilities. The learned single Judge of the
High Court more than once held that he could- not
find that there was no material before the State Government to justify its finding that respondent No. 2
had the better facilities, and he further held that that
was a factor which restricted the jurisdiction of the
High Court under article 226 of the Constitution.
That should have concluded the matter so far as the
High Court was concerned. He, however, thought
that it could not be said that the conclusion reached
by the State Government was the only •Conclusion
possible and a mere disagreement on the conclusions
to be drawn from the available materials, wher~
either view was a reasonable one, was not enough to
establish that the orders passed by the Board and the
Regional Transport Authority were improper within
the meaning of section 64-A. The State Government
had therefore acted in excess of its jurisdiction. It
seems to us, that the order of the State Government
as it stands cannot be said to be in excess of its jurisdiction nor can .it be said that in recording a finding
that respondent No. 2 had the bet.ter facilities for
operation and would serve the public better, it went
beyond its powers, in the absence of a finding to the
contrary by the authorities subordinate to it. The
interests of the public and the advantages to it of the
service to be provided were very, if not the most,
important factors to be taken into consideration in
the matter of granting or refusing to grant a permit.
In the conflicting claims of the appellant and respondent No. 2 concerning the facilities available to them
for operation of the bus service, the State Government was bound to decide, in the interests -of the
public generally, which of these had the better facilities. It was within the scope of its authority to
decide this and a court in certiorari proceedings ought
not to interfere with that decision. To hold that the
opinion of the Regional Transport Authority and the
1956
Raman and
Raman Ud.
v.
The State of
Madras and
another
Imam}.
1956
Raman and
RamanUd.
v.
The State of
Madras and
another
Imam}.
266
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
Board that the facilities for operation were equal as
between these persons was a reasonable view would
be to constitute the court as the final authority in a
matter, in which, by the provisions of the Act, that
function was accorded to the State Government. We
are aot prepared therefore to say that the State Government acted in excess of its statutory authority.
There is no error on the face of the record so far as
the order of the State Government is concerned and
reference to paragraph 8 of the State Government's
affidavit in the High Court does not establish any such
thing.
That paragraph was in answer to paragraphs
13 and 14; of the appellant's affidavit and it set out
the contentions of the State Government as to fts
powers. There is nothing in that paragraph to establish that in fact the State Government had declined
to consider seniority or experience in the matter of
selection.
No substantial ground was put forward for supposing that section 64-A was an illegal provision. It
was within the competence of the State Legislature
to insert section 64-A into the Act. It was a reasonable provision in keeping with the entire scheme of
the Act concerning transport vehicles and control
of road transport.
As to the extent of powers of revision in a court or
authority we do not intend to expre.ss any opinion in
this case having regard to the view we take that the
order of the State Government cannot be interfered
with by the issue of a writ of certiorari.
.
As regards the limits of judicial review which the
courts have under article 226 which is one of the
grounds on which the certificate was issued by the
High Court, that question has since been considered
in the various decisions of this Court, which do not
.require recapitulation.
In our opinion, tQ.is is not a case in which it would
be reasonable to hold that the State Government
acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
The appeal is
accordingly dismissed with costs to be paid to respondent No. 2.
·