# RAMASWAMI v. BHARGAVA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.j

- **Citation:** [1967] 1 S.C.R. 586
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1966-09-26
- **Case number:** CRIMINAL APPEi.i.ATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 251 of 1964
- **Bench:** V. Ramaswami, V. Bhargava, Raghubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ramaswami-v-bhargava-and-raghubar-dayal-jj-j-3882
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

B
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (Act
104 of 1956), s. 3(i)-Jngredients-Sing/e instance, sufjiciency--Convlction under Madras Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act-1/ previour conviction.
On information received that the house occupied by the appellant,
was used as a brothel, the police
laid a trap and recovered marked
:urrency notes from the person of the appellant,. and the decoy and a girl
were fOllbd in a. dishevelled condition in a room. Thereupon the appellant
was charged under s. 3 (I) of the Suppression of Immoral Tra11ic
in
Women and Girls' Act and was convicted under s. 4( I). of the Act He
and the State appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed
the appellant's appeal,. hut allowed the State's appeal by allering the conviction under s. 3 (I) and enhancing his pun"-ihment as be was second
offender.
In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that (iJ the
facts did not make out the offence under s. 3(1) of the Act, and (ii) bis
present conviction could not
be considered
10 be a second conviction
under s. 3( 1) of the Act as his previous conviction was under the Madras Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act, 1930.
HELD: (i) The appellant's conviction under s. 3(1) of the Act was
correct The facts in this case justify,the conclusion that the appellant
was keeping a brothel at his house.
One
will be guilty of the offence
under s. 3 (I) of the Act if he does any of the acts mentioned in that
•ub..section in relation to a brothel.
The girls were offered for the purpose of prostitution.
The house was used for such purposes, undoubtedly for the gain of the appellant who pocketed the money for committing
prostitution.
Of course It can be presumed
that the girls who were
being offered for the purpose of prostitution. would also obtain man.,.
tary gain out of the amount paid. [587 H-588 BJ
It was not necessary that there should have been evidence of repe:\led
visits by persons to the place for the purpose 9f prostitution. A single
instance coupled with surrounding circumstances was suffi.cil'-Dt 10 estaO.
lish both that the place was being used as a brothel and that the person
alleged was so keeping it. [588 E]
(H) The conviction of the appellant was a second conviction within
c
D
E
F
the meaning of s. 3 ( 1) of the Act.
When the Act came into force in
G
1956, the corresponding provisions of the Madras Act
stood repealed,
hy virtue of s. 25( I).
By virtue of suh-s.
(2) the conviction of the
r
appellant under the Madras Act would he deemed to be in force at the
time the conviction took place.
[589 EJ
CRIMINAL APPEi.i.ATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 251
of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 19, 1964 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeals
Nos. 197 and 430 of 1963.
H
KRISHNAMURTHY v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (Dayal, J.)
587
A
R. Thiagarajdn and A. V. V. Nair, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain and A. V. Rangam, for the respondent.

## Text

KRISHNAMURTHY @ TAILOR KRISH.t'IAN
. v.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, MADRAS
September 26, 1966
A
(V. RAMASWAMI, V. BHARGAVA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.j
B
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (Act
104 of 1956), s. 3(i)-Jngredients-Sing/e instance, sufjiciency--Convlction under Madras Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act-1/ previour conviction.
On information received that the house occupied by the appellant,
was used as a brothel, the police
laid a trap and recovered marked
:urrency notes from the person of the appellant,. and the decoy and a girl
were fOllbd in a. dishevelled condition in a room. Thereupon the appellant
was charged under s. 3 (I) of the Suppression of Immoral Tra11ic
in
Women and Girls' Act and was convicted under s. 4( I). of the Act He
and the State appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed
the appellant's appeal,. hut allowed the State's appeal by allering the conviction under s. 3 (I) and enhancing his pun"-ihment as be was second
offender.
In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that (iJ the
facts did not make out the offence under s. 3(1) of the Act, and (ii) bis
present conviction could not
be considered
10 be a second conviction
under s. 3( 1) of the Act as his previous conviction was under the Madras Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act, 1930.
HELD: (i) The appellant's conviction under s. 3(1) of the Act was
correct The facts in this case justify,the conclusion that the appellant
was keeping a brothel at his house.
One
will be guilty of the offence
under s. 3 (I) of the Act if he does any of the acts mentioned in that
•ub..section in relation to a brothel.
The girls were offered for the purpose of prostitution.
The house was used for such purposes, undoubtedly for the gain of the appellant who pocketed the money for committing
prostitution.
Of course It can be presumed
that the girls who were
being offered for the purpose of prostitution. would also obtain man.,.
tary gain out of the amount paid. [587 H-588 BJ
It was not necessary that there should have been evidence of repe:\led
visits by persons to the place for the purpose 9f prostitution. A single
instance coupled with surrounding circumstances was suffi.cil'-Dt 10 estaO.
lish both that the place was being used as a brothel and that the person
alleged was so keeping it. [588 E]
(H) The conviction of the appellant was a second conviction within
c
D
E
F
the meaning of s. 3 ( 1) of the Act.
When the Act came into force in
G
1956, the corresponding provisions of the Madras Act
stood repealed,
hy virtue of s. 25( I).
By virtue of suh-s.
(2) the conviction of the
r
appellant under the Madras Act would he deemed to be in force at the
time the conviction took place.
[589 EJ
CRIMINAL APPEi.i.ATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 251
of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 19, 1964 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeals
Nos. 197 and 430 of 1963.
H
KRISHNAMURTHY v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (Dayal, J.)
587
A
R. Thiagarajdn and A. V. V. Nair, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain and A. V. Rangam, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Raghubar Dayal, J. Krishnamurthy @ Krishnan was convicted
by the III Presidency Magistrate, Saidapet, Madras, of the offence
B
under s. 4(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women
and Girls Act, 1956 (Act 104 of 1956), hereinafter called the Act,
and was sentenced to nine months' rigorous imprisonment, though
he was charged with an offence under s. 3(1) of that Act. He appealed against his conviction to the High Court. The State Government appealed to the High Court against the acquittal of the appelC · 1ant of the offence under s. 3(1) of the Act. The High Court dismissed the appellants' appeal but allowed the State appeal and altered
the appellant's conviction to one under s. 3(1) of the Act and
sentenced him to two years'. rigorous imprisonment and a fine of
Rs. 50/- as he was a second offender. It is against this order of
the High Court that the appellant appeals, by special leave.
D
E
F
G
H
The prosecution case, briefly, is that the Assistant Commissioner
of Police (Vigilance), P.W.4, having information that the house
occupied by the appellant 'was being used as a brothel with thtee
girls, Saroja, Ambika and Lakshmi. deputed Shanmugham, P.W.2,
as a decoy, on August 22, 1962. Shanmugham was given three
marked JO-rupee currency notes by P.W.4. He went to the appellant's place and was shown the three girls. He selected Ambika
and paid Rs. 30/- in those marked currency notes to the appellant.
He and Am bika then went inside a room. Thereafter, the police
party raided the house and found the decoy Shanmugham and
Ambika in a dishevelled condition in that room. P.W. 4 recovered
the marked currency notes from the possession Of the appellant.
The main question in this appeal is whether the facts found
make out the offence under s. 3(1) of the Act.
Section 3(1) reads:
"Any person who keeps or manages, or act& or assists in
the keeping or management of, a brothel shall be punishable on first conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a
term of not less than one year and not more than· three
years and also with ajine which may extend to two thousand
rupees and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less
than two years and not more than five years and also with
fine which may extend t6 two thousand rupees."
'Brothel' is defined in cl. (a) of s. 2. It includes any house, room
or place or any portion of any house, room or place which is used
for purposes of prostitution for the gain of another person or for
the mutual gain of two or more prostitutes. One will be guilty of
the offence under s. 3(1) of the Act if he does any of the acts mention-
588
(1967] I S.C.ll.
ed in that sub-section in relation to a brothel.
The appellant's
house, on the facts found, was being used as a brothel. The girls
were
offered
for the purpose of prostitution. The house was
used
for such purposes, undoubtedly for the gain of the appellant who pocketed the money which was given by P.W.2 for committing prostitution on Ambika. Of course, it can be presumed that
the ,girls who were being offered for the purpose of prostitution,
would also obtain monetary gain out of the amount paid by P. W.2.
The appellant can therefore justifiably be said to be 'keeping a
brothel'.
It has been urged. however,
that a solitary instance of the
house of the appellant being used for the purpose of prostitution
will not suffice for establishing that the house was being 'kept as a
brothel'.
h may be true that a place used once for the purpose of
prostitution may not be a brothel, but it is a question of fact as to
what conclusion should be drawn about the use of a place about
which information had been received that it was being used as a
brothel, to which a person goes and freely asks for girls, where the
person is shown girls to select from and where he does engage a girl
for the purpose of prostitution. The conclusion to be derived from
these circumstances about the place and the person 'keeping it'
can be nothing else than that the place was being used as a brothel
and the person in charge was so keeping it.
It is not necessary that
there should be evidence of repeated visits by persons to the place
for the purpose of prostitution.
A single instance coupled
with
the surrounding circumstances is sufficient to establish both that
the place was being used as a brothel and that the rerson alleged
was so keeping it.
We are of opinion that the facts found in the present case
justify the conclusion that the appellant was keeping a brothel at his
house. The appellant's conviction under s. 3(1) of the Act is
therefore
correct.
The appellant has been awarded enhanced punishment as his
present conviction was a second conviction.
His first conviction
was under ss. 5(1) and 8(1) of the Madras Suppression of Immoral
Traffic Act, 1930 (5 of 1930) hereinafter called the Madras Act,
in Criminal Case No. 1028 of 1955 from the Court of the Ill Presidency Magistrate, Madras.
The previous conviction is not disputed.
What is urged for the appellant is that it was not a conviction under the Act and therefore his present conviction cannot be
considered to be a second conviction under s. 3(1) of the Act.
Section 5( I) of the Madras Act provided that any person who
kept or managed or acted or assisted in the management of a brothel would be punished with imprisonment which might extend to
two years or with fine which might extend to one thousand rupees
A
B
c
D
E
'
G
H
B
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D
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Y.RISHNAMURTHY v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (Dayal, J.)
589
or with both. The appellant's conviction under s. 5(1), therefore,
was for an offence which would have been an offence under s. 3(1)
of the Act also.
Section 25 of the Act reads:
"(!) As from the date of the coming into force in any
State of the provisions other than section I of this Act,
all State Acts relating to suppression of immoral traffic in
women and girls or to the prevention of prostitution, in
force in that State immediately before such date shall stand
repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of any State
Act referred to in sub-section (I), anything done or any
action taken (including any direction given, any register,
rule or order made, any restriction imposed) under the provisions of such State Act shall in ·so far as such thing or
action is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act be
deemed to have.been done or taken under the provisions
of this Act as if the said provisions were in force when
such thing was done or such action was taken and shall
continue in force accordingly until superseded by any
thing done or any action taken under this Act."
Thus, when the Act came into force in 1956, the corresponding
provisions of the Madras Act stood repealed, by virtue of subs.(!) of s. 25. By virtue of sub-s. (2), the conviction of the appellant
under s. 5(1) of the Madras Act would be deemed to be conviction
under s. 3(1) of the Act, an Act deemed to be in force at the time tile
conviction took place . It follows that the present conviction of
the appellant will have to be taken as a second conviction, within
the meaning of the expression in sub-s. (!) of s. 3 of the Act,and the
appellant would be liable to suffer enhanced punishment under that
sub-section.
The result is that there is no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed_
Y. P.
Appeal dismissed.