# ) , - RAMESH BIRCH & ORS. ETC v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC

- **Citation:** [1989] 2 S.C.R. 629
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1989-04-21
- **Bench:** Sabyasachi Mukharji, S. Ranganathan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ramesh-birch-ors-etc-v-union-of-india-ors-etc-10296
- **Pages:** 58

## Headnote

Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966: s. 87-Power to extend enactments to Union Territory of Chandigarh-Delegation of to the
Executive-Validity of-Held, not a case of abdication or effacement of
legislative power-Contains sufficient declaration of guideline-Power
A
B
to extend future laws and amendments necessary corollary.
C ·
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act 1985Extension of to Union Territory of Chandigarh by Central Government
Notification dated December 15, 1986--Validity of.
D
Constitution of India, Article 246(4)-Executive-Power of adaptation by extension of laws to Union Territory of Chandigarh by
notification-Constitutional validity of .
Administrative Law: Central Government Notification dated
December 15, 1986--Extension of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction E
(Amendment) Act, 1985 to Union Territory of Chandigarh-Nature
and scope of-Whether suffers from vice of impermissible delegation.
Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 empowered the
Central Government to extend, with such restrictions and modifications
as it thought fit, to the Union Territory of Chandigarh any enactment F
which was in force in a State at the date of the notification. Section 89
provided for adaptation and modification by the appropriate Government of any law made before the appointed day, whether by way of
repeal or amendment, for application in relation to the State of Punjab
or Haryana or to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh or
Chandigarh before the expiration of two years. The State of Punjab, of G
which the Union Territory of Chandigarh originally formed part, was
then governed by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
Section 2(j) of that Act defined 'urban area' as any area administered
by a municipal committee, a cantonment board, a town committee, or a
notified area committee or any area declared by the State Government
by notification to be an urban area for the purposes of the Act.
H
629·
A
B
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
The Central Government had issued under s. 89 of the Reorganisation Act, the Punjab Reorganisation ,(Chandigarh) (Adaptation of
Laws on State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1968 with effect from
Isl November, 1966 Paragraph 4 of which directed that in all the exist-
~~
ing laws, in its application to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, any
reference to the State of Punjab should be read as a reference to the
Union Territory of Chandigarh. In exercise of the power conferred by
)...
s. 2(j) of the Rent Act, the Central Government had also issued on 13th
October, 1972 a notification declaring the area comprising Chandigarh -~
to be an "urban area" for the purpose of that Act.
-
c
0
E
This notification was, however, quashed by the High Court in
Harkishan Singh v. Union, AIR 1975 P & H 160, on the ground that no
notification had been issued priorto 1st November, 1966 under s. 2(j)
declaring Chandigarh to be an urban area, and there was no notification under s. 87 making the 1949 Act operative in Chandigarh with the
necessary adaptation. Thereupon, Parliament enacted the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974. Section 3
of that Act extended to Chandigarh the 1949 Act subject to modifications specified in the schedule with retrospective effect from 4th
November, 1972 with a view to regularies all proceedings for eviction
which might have been initiated during the interregnum. These
included a modification of the definition of 'urban areas' as including
the area comprising Chandigarh, as defined in s. 2 of the Capital of
Punjab (Development Regulation) Act, 1952, and such other areas comprised in the Union Territory of Chandigarh as the Central Government may by notification declare to be urban for the purposes of the
Act.
·-,.
In 1982 Parliament passed the East Punjab Urban Rent Restric-
. )....
f
tiou (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 effecting-certain amendments
in the 1949 Act in its application to Chandigarh.
t ·
In 1985 the Leg1stat

## Text

_Characters 0–39,967 of 147,950. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39967 for what follows._

-
. )...,
-
RAMESH BIRCH & ORS. ETC.
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.
APRIL 21, 1989
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.)
Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966: s. 87-Power to extend enactments to Union Territory of Chandigarh-Delegation of to the
Executive-Validity of-Held, not a case of abdication or effacement of
legislative power-Contains sufficient declaration of guideline-Power
A
B
to extend future laws and amendments necessary corollary.
C ·
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act 1985Extension of to Union Territory of Chandigarh by Central Government
Notification dated December 15, 1986--Validity of.
D
Constitution of India, Article 246(4)-Executive-Power of adaptation by extension of laws to Union Territory of Chandigarh by
notification-Constitutional validity of .
Administrative Law: Central Government Notification dated
December 15, 1986--Extension of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction E
(Amendment) Act, 1985 to Union Territory of Chandigarh-Nature
and scope of-Whether suffers from vice of impermissible delegation.
Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 empowered the
Central Government to extend, with such restrictions and modifications
as it thought fit, to the Union Territory of Chandigarh any enactment F
which was in force in a State at the date of the notification. Section 89
provided for adaptation and modification by the appropriate Government of any law made before the appointed day, whether by way of
repeal or amendment, for application in relation to the State of Punjab
or Haryana or to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh or
Chandigarh before the expiration of two years. The State of Punjab, of G
which the Union Territory of Chandigarh originally formed part, was
then governed by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
Section 2(j) of that Act defined 'urban area' as any area administered
by a municipal committee, a cantonment board, a town committee, or a
notified area committee or any area declared by the State Government
by notification to be an urban area for the purposes of the Act.
H
629·
A
B
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
The Central Government had issued under s. 89 of the Reorganisation Act, the Punjab Reorganisation ,(Chandigarh) (Adaptation of
Laws on State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1968 with effect from
Isl November, 1966 Paragraph 4 of which directed that in all the exist-
~~
ing laws, in its application to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, any
reference to the State of Punjab should be read as a reference to the
Union Territory of Chandigarh. In exercise of the power conferred by
)...
s. 2(j) of the Rent Act, the Central Government had also issued on 13th
October, 1972 a notification declaring the area comprising Chandigarh -~
to be an "urban area" for the purpose of that Act.
-
c
0
E
This notification was, however, quashed by the High Court in
Harkishan Singh v. Union, AIR 1975 P & H 160, on the ground that no
notification had been issued priorto 1st November, 1966 under s. 2(j)
declaring Chandigarh to be an urban area, and there was no notification under s. 87 making the 1949 Act operative in Chandigarh with the
necessary adaptation. Thereupon, Parliament enacted the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974. Section 3
of that Act extended to Chandigarh the 1949 Act subject to modifications specified in the schedule with retrospective effect from 4th
November, 1972 with a view to regularies all proceedings for eviction
which might have been initiated during the interregnum. These
included a modification of the definition of 'urban areas' as including
the area comprising Chandigarh, as defined in s. 2 of the Capital of
Punjab (Development Regulation) Act, 1952, and such other areas comprised in the Union Territory of Chandigarh as the Central Government may by notification declare to be urban for the purposes of the
Act.
·-,.
In 1982 Parliament passed the East Punjab Urban Rent Restric-
. )....
f
tiou (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 effecting-certain amendments
in the 1949 Act in its application to Chandigarh.
t ·
In 1985 the Leg1stature of .the. State of Punjab enacted East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 to make the
1949 Act more effective. This amendment came into force with effect
G
from 16th November, 1985.
~
By a notification dated 15th December, 1986 purportedly in exercise of its power under s. 87 of the Reorganisation Act the Central
Government extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh the provisions of the 1985 Act as in force in the State of Punjab at the date of the
H notification and subject to the modifications mentioned therein, with
-
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I
is •
' -
~
.\
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1.
631
the resulf il;iat while the provisions of the 1949 Act had been brought
into force with effect from 4th November, 1972 by the Act of Parliament, the provisions of the 1985 Act had been extended to the said
territory by means of a. Notification of the Central Government issued
under s. 87. The High Court upheld the validity of the said notification.
In these appeals by special leave and the writ petitions it was
contended for the appellants/petitioners that in the purported exercise of its
~. power under Article 246(4) of the Constitution, the Parliament could not
~-
_.l
__l_
~
delegate its legislative function in favour of an executive authority to
such an extent as to amount to an abdication of its legislative function;
that by enacting s. 87, Parliament instead of legislating for the Union
Territory had left it to the Central Government to decide for all time to
come what should be the law in force in that Territory; whereas s. 89
gives a limited transitory power to the Central Government to adapt
existing laws within a period of two years; that such adaptation could
hold the field only until they were altered, repealed or amended by a
competent legislature or authority; that s. 87 confers on the executive
government a wide power of cb.oice, for application to Chandigarh, of
not only one legislative enactment on any subject in operation in various
parts of the country but also groups of provisions from one or more of
them and thus enforce a law which would be an amalgam of various
statutory provisions; that there was no legislative guidance as to the
manner in which these choices should be exercised by the executive;
that s. 87 enables extension by Government notification even of any
legislation which might have come into force in any part of India at any
time between 1966 and the date of the notification; that the effect,
therefore, of s. 87 could be that the entire legislation for the Union
Territory in respect of any particular subject would entirely depend
upon the fancy of the Central Government without any sort of legislative or parliamentary application of mind; that a power to exercise such
wide power could not be described as a ministerial power, it is essential
legislative power; that these facets of s. 87 clearly render it an instance
of excessive delegation by Parliament to executive amounting in effect,
to the total abdication of its legislative powers in regard to .Chandigarh.
It was further contended that s. 87, on its proper construction,
permits the extension of the laws of another State to Chandigarh only so
long as there is a vacuum of• laws on any particular subject; that once
Parliament itself steps in and assumes legislative responsibilities in
respect of that subject, a transplantation of laws from elsewhere by
extension is neither necessary nor valid; that as early as 1974 Parliament having applied its mind and legislated in respect of landlordA
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632
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
tenant matters for the Union Territory, it was for Parliament and Parliament alone to legislate on the subject thereafter; that by purporting
to extend by an executive notification nnder s. 87 the provisions of the
1985 Act to Chandigarh what the Central Government had really done
was to modify or amend an existing parliamentary law operating
already in the State, which was impermissible, and that the notification
dated 15th December, 1986 having thus exceeded the purview of s. 87 it
was, therefore, ultra vires.
Dismissing the appeals and the writ petitions,
HELD: 1.1 Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966
should he interpreted constructively so as to permit its object being
achi.eved rather .than in a manner that will detract from its efficacy or
purpose. So construed, its validity has to he upheld. [683C]
--,,,..
1.2 It is impossible to carry on the government of a modern State
with its infinite complexities and ramifications without a large devolution of power and delegation of authority. While Parliament should,
D therefore, have ample and extensive powers of legislation, these should
include a power to entrust some of those functions and powers to
another body or authority. Such entrustment, however, could not be so
extensive as to amount to abdication or effacement. The legislatures
cannot wash their hands off their essential legislative function of laying
down the legislative policy with sufficient clearness and enunciating the
E standards which are to he enacted into a ·rule of law. This function
cannot he delegated. What can he delegated is only the task of subordinate legislation which is by its very nature ancillary to the statute which
delegates the power to make it and which must he within the policy and
framework of the guidance provided by the legislature. [668G-H;
669C-D]
F
1.3 Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act did not cross the line f"
beyond which d~legation amounts to abdication and self-effacement. It
was not the power to make laws that was delegated. The provision only
conferred a power on the executive to determine, having regard to the
local conditions prevalent in the Union Territory, which one of several
G laws, all approved by one or the other of the legislatures in the country,
...,,
would he the most suited to Chandigarh. The power given as such was
H
more in the nature of ministerial than in the nature of legislative power
because all that the Government had to do was to study the laws and
make selection out of them. Thus viewed, it was not really an unguided
and arbitrary power. [675F-G I
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•
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1.
633
In re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747 applied.
Registrar of Cooperative Societies v. Kunhambu [1980] 2 S.C.R.
260; R. v. Burah, [1878] 5 I.A. 178; Jatind;a Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar & Ors., [1949] FCR 595; Harishankar Bag/a & Anr. v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] ·1 SCR 380; Rajnarain Singh v.
A
The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna & Anr., [1955]
B
-\ 1 SCR 290; Sardar Jnder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, [1957] SCR
·'' 605; Pandit Banarsi Das v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.,
[1959] SCR 427; The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. Beawar v. The State of
Ajmer, [1955] 1 SCR 735; The Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Poona, [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 71; Hamdard
Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of India, [1960] 2 SCR 671;
Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala ·V, The State of Bombay & Ors.,
C
·.lf· [1961] l SCR 341; Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, [1962] 2 SCR 125; Shama Rao v. The Union Territory of
Pondichery, [1967] 2 SCR 650; Mohammad Hussain Gu/am Mohammad & Anr .. v. Th~ State of Bombay & Anr. [!962] 2 SeR 659;
Corporation of Calcutta & Anr. v. Liberty Cinema, [1965J 2 SCR 477,
D
Devi Das Gopal Krishan & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1967] 3
SCR 557; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton, Spinning &
Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 251; Sita Ram Bishambhar
_\l
Dayal v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1972] 2 SCR 141; Hira Lal Rattan Lal
...J...
etc. etc" v. State of U.P. & Anr. etc. etc., [1973] 2 SCR 502; Gwalior
Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. The Asstt. Commissioner of Sales
E
Tax & Ors., [1974] 2 SCR 879; M.K. Papiah & Sons. v. The Excise
Commissioner & Anr., [1975] 3 SCR 607; Brii Sundar Kapoor v. First
Additional District Judges, [1980] I SCC 651 and Sprigg. v. Sigcau,
[ 1897] AC 238, referred to .
2.1 Section 87 was quite valid even on the policy and guidelines
-~ theory. It is not necessary that the legislature should "dot all the i's and
cross all the t's" of its policy. It is sufficient if it gives the broadest
indication of a general policy of the legislature. [673E-F]
F
2.2 The policy behind s. 87 seems to be that it was necessitated by
G
~ changes resulting in territories coming under the legislative jurisdiction
of the Centre. These were territories situated in the midst of contiguous
territories which had a proper legislature. They were small territories
falling under the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament, which had
hardly sufficient time to look after the details of all their legislative
needs and requirements. To require or expect Parliament to legislate
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634
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
for them would have entailed a disproportionate pressure on its legislative schedule. It wonld also have meant the unnecessary utilisation of
the time of a large number of members of Parliament for, except the few
members returned to Parliament from the Union Territory none else
was likely to be interested in such legislation. In such a situation the
most convenient conrse of legislating for them was the adaptation by
extension of laws in force in other areas of the country. [673F; 674A-B]
2.3 There could have been no objection to the legislation if it had j ,
provided thl!t the laws of one of the contiguous States should be
extended to Chandigarh. But such a provision would have been totally
inadequate to meet the situation for two reasons. There might have
been more than one law in force on a subject in the contiguous States--
say one in Punjab, one in PEPSU and one in Himachal Pradesh etc.-
and Parliament was anxious that Chandigarh should have the benefit of ·---y..
that one of them which would most adequately have met the needs of the
situation in tllat territory. Or, again, there might have been no existing
law on a particular subject in any of the contiguous areas which was
why the power had to include the power of extending the laws of any
State of India. While in a very strict sense this might have involved a
choice, it was in fact, and in general run of cases, only a decision on
suitability for adaptation rather than choice of a policy. It was a delegation not of policy, but of matters of detail for a meticulous appraisal of
;,,·
which Parliament had no time. Even if it be assumed that this involved
E
a choice of policy, the restriction of such policy to one that was approved
by Parliament or a State Legislature constituted a sufficient declaration
-
of guideline within the meaning of the "policy-guideline theory."
-
F
G
[675G-H; 676A-C]
In re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747 referred to.
3. Once it is held that the delegation of a power to extend a
present existing law is justified, a power to extend future laws is a
necessary corollary. If Parliament had no time to apply its mind to the
existing law initially to be adapted, it could have hardly found time to
consider the amendments from time to time engrafted on it in the State
of its origin. It would then seem only natural as a necessary corollary
that the executive should be permitted to extend future amendments to
those laws as well. [676D-E]
In re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747 referred to.
4.1 The concept of vacnnm is as much relevant to a case where
H
there is absence of a particular provision in an existing law as to a case
,.,,.l....
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RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.J.
635
where there is no existing law at all in the Union Territory on a subject.
For instance, if Parliament had not enacted the 1974 Act but had only
enacted an extension of the Transfer of Property Act to Chandigarh, it
could not have been said that a subsequent notification cannot extend
the provisions of the 1949 Act to Chandigarh simply because the subject
of leases was governed by the Transfer of Property Act, which had. been
--{,
already extended and there, was, therefore, no "vacuum" left which
could be filled in by such extension. Again, suppose, initially, a Rent
.. _. Act was extended by Parliament which did not contain a provision
regarding one of the grounds on which a landlord could seek evictionsay, one enabling the owner to get back his house for reoccupationand then the Government thought that another enactment containing
such a provision also be extended, it could not perhaps be said that the
. .. latter was a matter on which there was no legislation enacted in the
-1' Territory and that the extension of the latter enactment only lilied up a
void or vacancy. Again, suppose the provisions of a general code like,
say, the Code of Civil Procedure were extended to the Union Territory.
In that case s. 87 could not be construed so as to preclude the extension
of a later amendment to one of the rules to one of the orders of the
C.P.C. merely on the ground that it will have the effect of varying or
amending an existing law. There is no warrant to thus unduly restrict
the scope of a provision likes. 87. [6820-H]
4.2 The extension of an enactment which makes additions to
A
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the existing law would thus also be permissible under s. 87 of the
E
Reorganisation Act, S!!_Jqng as it does not, expressly or impliedly
repeal or conflict with, or is not repugnant to, an already existing
law. [683A-B]
In the instant case, the extension of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 to the Union Territory of Chandigarh only added provisions in respect of aspects not covered by the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974
and in a manner not inconsistant therewith. [683F]
Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, [1976] 2 SCR 795 and Hari
Shankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] I SCR 380 referred
to.
F
G
5. A notification while extending a law can make only such modifications and restrictions in the law extended as are of an incidental,
ancillary or subservient nature and as do not involve substantial deviations therefrom. In the instant case, the 1985 Act has been extended as
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
it is, with only very minor modifications. The notification dated 15th )<-
December, 1986 was, therefore, quite valid and not liable to be struck
down. [684E-F]
Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, [1976] 2 SCR 785; referred to
and Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, (1980] 1SCR854; distinguished.
6. Any addition, however, small does amend or vary the existing
).._
law but so long as it does not really detract from or conflict with it, f ~
there is no reason why it should not stand alongside the existing law. In
the instant case the modifications introduced by the 1985 Act in the
1949 Act, as were reenacted by the 1974 Act were minor modifications
and restrictions. They do not incorporate substantial changes in the
scheme of the pre-existing law. Both sets of provisions can stand together and effectively supplement each other. [684F, H]
-f·
Hari Shankar Bag/av. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1SCR380 and
Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, (1976] 2 SCR 795 referred to.
7. There is a very crucial difference between s. 87 and 89 in as
much as within the period of two years mentioned ins. 89, the Central
Government could while adapting pre-existing laws make any changes
by way of repeal or amendment. But s. 87, though capable of enforce·
J<.
ment indefinitely, confers a more limited power. It can be invoked only
E
to extend laws, already in existence, to the Union Territory and cannot
make any substantial changes therein. The power under s. 89 is limited
in time hut extensive in scope' while under s. 87 the power is indefinite
in point of duration but very much more restricted in its scope. Therefore, resort to s. 87 did not renders. 89 redundant. [686E-F]
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil
Appeal
No.
~~~~.
~
From the Judgment and Order dated 25,5:1988 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in C. W .P. No. 736-of 1987.
G
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General; Harbhawan
'>r
Walia, Kapil Sibal, M.S. Gujral, Anil Dev Singh, M.R. Sharma, D.V.
Sehgal, Naresh Bakshi, R. Bana, Jitendra Sharma, S.M. Sarin, S.K.
Mehta, D. Mehta, Atul Nanda, P.N. Puri, B.B. Sawhney, M.C.
Dhingra, A.K. Gupta, T.C. Sharma, Mrs. Sushma Suri, Ms. Indu
Goswami, R.S. Yadav, Manoj Prasad, Manoj Swamp M.L. Verma, S.
'H
Bagga, D.S. Gupta, B.R. Kapur, Anis Ahmad Khan, S. Sehgal and
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RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATIIAN, J.I
637
-)< N.K. Aggarw~lforthe appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANA THAN, J. This is a batch of appeals and writ petitions challenging the validity of a notification issued on,.15 .12.1986 by
-~ the Centr(al Government under section 87)of the Punjab Reorganisa1
tion Act Act of Parliament No. 31of1966 , hereinafter referred to as
·' "-t 'the Reorganisation Act'. By this notification, the Central Government purported to extend to the Union Territory of Chandigarhhereinafter referred to also as 'Chandigarh'-the provisions of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 (Punjab
Act 2 of 1985) (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1985 Act'), as it was in
force in the State of Punjab at the date of the notification and subject
~ to the modifications mentioned in the said notification. The Punjab
and Haryana High Court by its judgment in Ramesh Birch v. Union,
AIR 1988 P & H 281 upheld the validity of the above notification and
hence the special leave petitions. The writ petitions have been dirtctly
filed in this Court challenging the validity of the notification. In view
of the importance of the question involved, we have heard the parties
on the merits of the cases. We, therefore, grant special leave in the
special leave petitions and rule nisi in the writ petitions and proceed to
)L dispose of the appeals and the writ petitions by this common judgment.
Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act is in the following terms:
"87. Power to extend enactment to Chandigarh-The Cen-.
tral Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, extend with such restrictions or modifications as it
thinks fit, to the Union Territory of Chandigarh any enactment which is in force in a State at the date of the
notification."
There are other provisions of this Act which will be referred to
later. But it is necessary to refer to s. 87 here for a specific purpose and
that is to point out that the provisions of section 87 are pari materia
with the pr0visions of Section 7 of the Debi Laws Act, 1912 and Section 2 of the Ajmer.Marwara' (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, which,
for convenience, we shall refer to.as Act I and Act II respectively.
These provisions read as follows:
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"Section 7 of Act I: The Provincial Government may, by
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
notification in the Official Gazette, extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, to the Province
of Delhi or any part thereof, any enactment which is in
force in any part of British India at the' date of such
notification."
x-
"Section 2 of Act Il: The Central Government may, by
}.--
notification in the' official Gazette, extend to the province
of Ajmer Marwara with such restrictions and modifications t ·
as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in any other
province at the date of such notification."
It is also necessary here to contrast the above two provisions with
section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred
to, for purposes of convenience, as Act III). That provision reads as
follows:
"Section 2 of Act III: The Central Government may, by
notification in the official Gazette, extend to any Part C
State (other than Coorg and the Amendment and Nicobat.
Islands) or any part of such State, with such restrictions and
modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in
force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and
~.
provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the
repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a
Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that
Part C State."
The reference to these provisions is being made at this stage
because the validity of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912 and
section 2 of Ajmer Marwara (Extension of Laws) Act 1947 were
upheld by this court in the decision reported as In re Delhi Laws Act, ,,
[1951] S.C.R. 747. The decisio.n also upheld the validity of the first
part of section 2 of Act III but struck down the second part of that
provision (underlined above) as vitiated by the vice of excessive delegation. A good deal of the arguments addressed before us naturally
turned on the"'ratio and effect of the decision of this Court in the Delhi
Laws Act case (supra), but, before turning to the arguments, it is
necessary to give a brief history of s. 87, the interpretation of which is
presently in question.
WI\ en the Constitution of India came into force on 26th January,
1950, the component units of the Indian Union were grouped into four
' '
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RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.]
639
-Y types of territories. There were nine States in Part A (one of which was
Punjab, earlier known as East Punjab), nine States in Part B (which
included Pepsu), ten States in Part C (which included Himachal
Pradesh) and only one State, namely, Andaman and Nico.bar Islands,
in Part D. At tliis stage, although several of the former Indian States
had acceded to the Indian Union_, the process of their integratior. as
. component units of the Indian Union was not complete. Some units
----\
were accepted as units of the Union in the form in which they existed
.> .. at the time of independence while some were formed by grouping
· together one or more of the former princely States. After the recommendations of the States Reorganisation Commission in 1955, the
Constitution was amertded to classify the units of the Indian Union
into States and Union Territories.
At the time of the 1956 reorganisation one State of Punjab was
created by merging the erstwhile States of Pepsu and Punjab. In 1966 a
new State of Haryana was created by carying out certain territories
from the'Staie of Punjab. Certain hill areas of the Punjab were merged
with the adjoining Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. A new
Union Territory of Chandigarh was carved out which became the joint
capital of Punjab and Haryana. The Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966
gave effect to these proposals. Sections 3 and 4 dealt with the delimita-
)<. tion of the territories of the States of Pu.njab and Haryana and the
Union Territories of Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh. One of the
important aspects of the reorganisation, in respect of which specific
statutory provision was needed, was regarding the applicability of laws
to the various territories which underwent reoganisation. This was
effected by Part X of the Reorganisation Act Comprising of sections 86
. ..l...
·~
to 97. It is however sufficient for our present purposes to refer to the
provisions contained in sections 87 to 90. These provisions were in the
·followin£terms: -
---- ·
· -
- ·· ·· ·
Section 87: Power to extend enactments· to ChandigarhAs set out earlier.
A
B
c
D
E
F
Section ·ss:· Territorial extent of laws- The Provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any
G
change in the territories to which any law in force
immediately before the appointed day extends or applies,
and territorial references in any such law to the State of
Punjab shall, until otherwise provided by a competent
Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as
meaning the territories within the State immediately before
H
the appointed day.
640
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
Section 89: Power to adapt laws- For the purpose of \'-
facilitating the application in relation to the State of Punjab
or Haryana or to the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh
or Chandigarh of any law made before the appointed day,
the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of
two years from that day, by order, make such adaptations
and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or
\
amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and therer
upon every such law shall have effect subject to the adapta- ·-A
tions and modifications so made until altered, repealed or
amended by a competent Legislature or other competent
authority.
-
Section 90: Power to construe laws- (1) Notwithstanding
that no provision or insufficient provision has been made "'f411
under section 89 for the adaptation of a law made before
D
E
the appointed day, any court, tribunal or authority,
required or empowered to enforce such law may, for the
purpose of facilitating its application in relation to the State
of Punjab or Haryana, or to the Union of territory of
Himachal Pradesh or Chandigarh construe the law in such
manner, without affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper in regard to the matter before the court,
.~
tribunal or authority.
(2) Any reference to the High Court of Punjab in any law
shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed,
on and from the- appointed day, as a reference to the High
Court of Pun jab and Haryana.
F
The dispute in this batch of cases is regarding the applicability of _).,.
certain rent laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The territories t' '
originally comprised in the former Province of East Punjab-later
designated as the State of Punjab-were governed by the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the
'principal Act' or the' 1949 Act'). This Act applied to all urban areas in
G
the State of Punjab. Section 2(j) of that Act defined 'urban area' as
any area administered by a municipal committee, a cantonment board, )r
a town committee or a notified area committee or any are.a declared by
the State Government by notification to be an urban area for the
purposes of the Act. The Central Government had earlier issued,
under section 89, the Punjab-Reorganisation (Chandi_garh) (AdaptaH tion of Laws on State and Concurrent Sub.iects) Order, 1968 w.e.f.
...
•
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.O.I. (RANGANAIBAN, J.]
641
-Y 1.11.66. Paragraph 4 of the Order directed that in all the existing laws,
in its application to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, any reference
to the State of Punjab should be read as a reference to the Union
Territory of Chandigarh and para Z(l)(b) of the Order defined the
expression 'existing Jaw'. The Central Government, in exercise of the
power conferred by section Z(j) of the principal Act, issued on
.
13.10. 72 a notification declaring the area comprising Chandigarh to be
-\ an 'urban area' for the purposes of the principal Act. The notification
,..~was published in the Gazette of India on 4.11.72. This notification was
however quashed by the Pun jab & Haryana High Court by its decision
in the case of Harkishan Singh v. Union, AIR 1975 P & H 160. That .
was on the short ground that, as no notification had been issued prior
to 1.11.66 under s. Z(j) declaring Chandigarh to be an urban area, the
Act could not be said to have been in force within the said area prior to
A
B
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I ~
1.11.66. Neither s. 88 not the notification of 13.10.72 could, it was
held, be effective to make the principal Act operative in Chandigarh
unless it had first been applied to the Union Territory of Chandigarh
or any part thereof by a notification under s. 87 with the necessary
adaptation. This decision, of a Full Bench of the High Court, was
rendered on 9.10.1974.
~
Two courses were open to the Government to set right the lacuna
pointed out by the High Court. The first, as pointed out by the Full
Bench, was to extend the principal Act.to Chandigarh by a notification
under s. 87. The second was to invoke the legislative powers of Parliament available in respect of Chandigarh under article 246(4) of the
Constitution to enact a legislation for this purpose. But it was
important that any corrective measure had to be made retrospective in
its operation ifthe large number of suits for eviction that had been
filed in the meanwhile on the strength of the notification and were
pending disposal in various courts were to be saved from being
rendered non-maintainable consequent on the decision of the High
Court. Presumably for this reason, the second of the above courses
was adopted and Parliament enacted the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act (Central Act 54 of 1974)
hereinafter referred to as 'the 1974 Act'. Section 3 of this Act provided
for the enforcement of the principal Act in Chandigarh. It reads:
"Section .3: Extension of East Punjab Act Ill of 1949 to
ChandigarhD
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Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, the Act shall, subject to the H
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642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19891 2 S.C.R.
modifications specified in the Schedule, be in force in, and Ybe deemed to have been in.force with effect from 4th day of
November, 1972 in the Unio11 Territory of Chandigarh, as if
the provisions of the Act so modified had been included in
and formed part of this section and as if this section had
been in force at all material times."
Three features of the above legislation may be emphasised at this
'>--
stage. The first was that, though this purported to extend the principal •
A
Act to Chandigarh, it was in truth and substance a Parliamentary '
enactment applicable to Chandigarh incorporating within itself by
reference, for purposes of convenience and to avoid repetition, all the
C provisions of the principal Act. The second was that the Act was given
retrospe,ctive effect from 4.11.72, the date on which the previous
notification under section 89 had been gazetted with a view to ~
j.
regufarise all proceedings for eviction which might have been initiated
I
during the interregnum. Thirdly, the principal Act was re-enacted subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule. These included a
D modification of the definition of 'urban area' as including the area
comprising Chandigarh as defined insection 2 of the Capital of Punjab
(Development Regulation) Act, 1952 and such other areas comprised
in the Union Territory of Chandigarh as the Central Government may
by notification declare to be urban for the purposes of the Act.
E
Before turning to the issues before us, it is necessary to refer to
F
G
three subsequent developments:
(i) In 1976, when Parliament was not in session, the President of India promulgated Ordinance 14 of 1976 on 17.12.76. By
this Ordinance, the 1949 Act, as in force in Chandigarh, was
amended in the following respects:
(a) In section 13, an exlanation and sub-section (4A) were 1'
introduced;
(b) New sections 13A, 18A and 18B were inserted;
(c) A new sub-section (2A) in section 19 was inserted;
. ( d) A Schedule II prescribing the form of summons to be issued
in proceedings under the newly inserted s. 13A was edded. Thi>
ordinance was allowed to lapse and was not enacted into law
H
tl'ereafter.
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RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.)
643
(ii) In 1982, Parliament passed the East Punjab Rent
Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act (No. 42) of 1983
(hereinafter referred to as 'the 1982 Act'). By this Act, two
amendments were effected to the principal Act in its application
to Chandigarh. One was a formal one replacing reference to
"East Punjab" by a reference to "Punjab". The second was the
substitution of a new definition of "non-residential building" in
s. 2(d) of the Act. This amendment Act did not, however,
incorporate the amendments ea~lier effected in the principal Act
(as in force in Chandigarh) by the Ordinance of 1976 which had
lapsed, though this opportunity could have been availed of by
Parliament had it been so minded, to introduce those amendments as well.
A
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(iii) In 1985, the prov1S1ons of the principal Act were
amended in their application to the State of Punjab. The legislature of the State of punjab enacted Punjab Act 2 of 1985
(hereinafter referred to as 'the 1985 Act') by which the principal
Act was amended to insert therein new sections 13A, 18A and
D
18B and a new Second Schedule and to make certain amendments in sections 13 and 19 of the Act. These amendments were
substantially the same as those that had been effected by the
Ordinance of 1976 except that a new definition of "specified
landlord" was added in s. 2 and the other provisions verbally
altered in consequence. This amendment came into force w .e.f.
E
16.11.1985.
When the last of the above developments took place, the Central
Government considered it necessary to extend the 1985 Act to the
territory of Chandigarh. In order to effectuate this object, it issued a
notification dated 15.12.86 purportedly in exercise of its powers under F
section 87 of the Reorganisation Act. By this notification the Central
Government extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh the provisions of the 1985 Act as in force in the State of Pun jab at the date of
the notification (i.e. to say as on 15.12.1986) and subject to the modifi ·
cations mentioned therein. The resultant position is that while the
provisions of the principal Act had been brought into force in the G
Union Territory of Chandigarh w.e.f. 4.11.72 by an Act of Parliament,
the provisions of the 1985 Act have been extended to the territory of
Chandigarh by means of a notification of the Central Government
issued under s. 87. The short question posed before us is whether the
latter "extension'' is pem1issible and valid in law.
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644
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
Ex facie, the impugned notification appears to be intra vires s. ¥-
A
87. The 1985 Act is an enactment in force in a State on the date of the
notification and s. 87 clearly permits the Central Government to
extend it to Chandigarh. If the petitioners/appellants seek to challenge
its validity, they have either to contend that s. 87 itself is ultra vires the
Constitution or that, though s. 87 is a valid provision, on a proper
B construction thereof, the notification travels beyond the area of exten-
'>.-
sion permitted tinder it and is hence invalid. Both these contentions
have been urged before us. Sri Gujral had so.much confidence in the ·---
latter ·argument that he had made it his principal argument, taking up
the former as a plea in the alternative. But young Sri Swamp boldly
..
concentrated on attacking the validity of s. 87 while also lending supc port to Sri Gujral's principal argument as an argument in the alternative. We shall proceed to examine these two contentions.
"'--
The argument contesting the validity of s. 87 proceeds on the
following lines. The main premise of the argument is that, under
Article 246( 4) of the Constitution, Parliament has exclusive power to
D make laws on matters enumerated in the State List and Concurrent
List (i.e. List II and List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution) in respect of a Union Territory except where (as in the case, say,
of Pondicherry) the territory has a legislative assembly, in which event
the power will vest in such assembly under s. 18 of the Government of
~
Union Territories Act (18 of 1963). There being no legislative assemE bly set up for Chandigarh, Parliament and Parliament alone has any
legislative power with regard to that territory. This power, however,
plenary and .extensive, cannot be self effacing. In purported exercise of -
such power, Parliament cannot delegate its legislative function in
favour of an executive authority to such an extent as to amount to an
"abdication" of such legislative function. The argument is that this is
~
F
exactly what has been done under s. 87. By enacting s. 87, Parliament,
instead of legislating for the Union Territory, has left it to the Central
~
Government to decide for all time to come what should be the laws in
force in that territory.