# RAMESHWAR AND ORS v. JOT RAM & ORS

- **Citation:** [1976] 1 S.C.R. 847
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-09-18
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 817 to 819 of A 1968 and 1456 to 1458 of 1969
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rameshwar-and-ors-v-jot-ram-ors-6682
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

847
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1~53 (Punjab
Act X of !953),
Section 2(2) and sub-sectwns (I) and (4) of Section
IS-Tenant of large
landowner deenied owner on deposit of first
installnenJ of purchase priceDeath df landowner subse,,quent to deposit-Landowner's heirs becoming small
landowners-Tena.nts if disentitled to purchase land.
Section 18(1) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. lays down
that, notwithstanding to the· contrary contained in any law, usage or contract ..
a tenant of a land owner other thCNl a small land-owner shall be entitled to
purchase from the land-owner the land so held by him in the case of a tenant
falling within CL (i) or cl. (ii) at any time. and in the case of a tenant falling
within Cl. (iii) within a period of onei year from the date of commencement
of this Act. Section 18(4)(a) provided that the tenant shall be competent t<>
pay the purchase price either in a lump sum or in six-monthly instalments not
exceeding ten in the manner prescribed. Clause (b) provided that. on the
purchase price or the first instalment thereof, as
the case
may be, being
deposited, the tenant shall be deemed to have become the owner of the land.
Teja, the landlord was a large land-owner under whom there were three
tenants. Each of them a,pplied for purchase of ownership under sectio!l 18(1)
of the Act. The Assistant Collector found them eligible, fixed the orice and
the· instalments of payment, and they duly deposited the first instalment. A ft er
this Teja died. Before the Financial Commissioner, the appellants contended
that on the death of Teja, they as the heirs of Teja, became entitled to shares
and, in this process of fragmentation, they became small landowners within
the meaning of section 2(2) of the Act and therefore the tenants will be disentitled to purchase the land. Their plea was that an appeal is a continuation
of the original proceedin~ and, therefore. if there is a change of circumstances
in the landlord's ownership during the pend.ency of the appeal, resulting in his
legal representatives becoming small landowners' the tenants will be disentitled
to purchase the land. 'rhe appellants succeeded before the Financial Commissioner, but failed before the High Court. This appeal has been preferred on
the basis of the special leave granted by this Court.
Dismissing the appe_als.
HELD : (i) It is absolutely plain that on the deposit of the first instalment
of the purchase price, the tenant shall be deemed to have become the. owner
of the land. In the present case, all these happenings had resulted in the respondents becoming the owners. (849-H]
Oi) Where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified:
or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in law and it
is made applicable at any stage.
[852-BJ
P. Venkataswarlu v. Motor & General Traders A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409, 1410,
Bhajan Lal v. State of Punjab [1971] (I) S.C.C. 34, Patterson v. State of Alabama
(1934) 294 U.S. 600. 607 Lachmeshwar Prosed Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chau-
(1934) 294 U.S. 600, 607 Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri
and Rmnji Lal v. The Stare of Punjab. I.LR. [1966] Punj. 125 referred to.
The death of the large landowner occurred pending the appeal. The right
of the respondents is fixed under sub-sections (I) and (4) of S-18 of the Act
and that cannot be uprooted by supervening circumstances. A plain reading
of section 18 yields the only conclusion that the rights of parties are determined
on the date they come to court. [853-DJ
6-1127SCT/75
848
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.

## Text

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RAMESHWAR AND ORS.
v.
JOT RAM & ORS.
September 18, 1975
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND. S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.]
847
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1~53 (Punjab
Act X of !953),
Section 2(2) and sub-sectwns (I) and (4) of Section
IS-Tenant of large
landowner deenied owner on deposit of first
installnenJ of purchase priceDeath df landowner subse,,quent to deposit-Landowner's heirs becoming small
landowners-Tena.nts if disentitled to purchase land.
Section 18(1) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. lays down
that, notwithstanding to the· contrary contained in any law, usage or contract ..
a tenant of a land owner other thCNl a small land-owner shall be entitled to
purchase from the land-owner the land so held by him in the case of a tenant
falling within CL (i) or cl. (ii) at any time. and in the case of a tenant falling
within Cl. (iii) within a period of onei year from the date of commencement
of this Act. Section 18(4)(a) provided that the tenant shall be competent t<>
pay the purchase price either in a lump sum or in six-monthly instalments not
exceeding ten in the manner prescribed. Clause (b) provided that. on the
purchase price or the first instalment thereof, as
the case
may be, being
deposited, the tenant shall be deemed to have become the owner of the land.
Teja, the landlord was a large land-owner under whom there were three
tenants. Each of them a,pplied for purchase of ownership under sectio!l 18(1)
of the Act. The Assistant Collector found them eligible, fixed the orice and
the· instalments of payment, and they duly deposited the first instalment. A ft er
this Teja died. Before the Financial Commissioner, the appellants contended
that on the death of Teja, they as the heirs of Teja, became entitled to shares
and, in this process of fragmentation, they became small landowners within
the meaning of section 2(2) of the Act and therefore the tenants will be disentitled to purchase the land. Their plea was that an appeal is a continuation
of the original proceedin~ and, therefore. if there is a change of circumstances
in the landlord's ownership during the pend.ency of the appeal, resulting in his
legal representatives becoming small landowners' the tenants will be disentitled
to purchase the land. 'rhe appellants succeeded before the Financial Commissioner, but failed before the High Court. This appeal has been preferred on
the basis of the special leave granted by this Court.
Dismissing the appe_als.
HELD : (i) It is absolutely plain that on the deposit of the first instalment
of the purchase price, the tenant shall be deemed to have become the. owner
of the land. In the present case, all these happenings had resulted in the respondents becoming the owners. (849-H]
Oi) Where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified:
or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in law and it
is made applicable at any stage.
[852-BJ
P. Venkataswarlu v. Motor & General Traders A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409, 1410,
Bhajan Lal v. State of Punjab [1971] (I) S.C.C. 34, Patterson v. State of Alabama
(1934) 294 U.S. 600. 607 Lachmeshwar Prosed Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chau-
(1934) 294 U.S. 600, 607 Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri
and Rmnji Lal v. The Stare of Punjab. I.LR. [1966] Punj. 125 referred to.
The death of the large landowner occurred pending the appeal. The right
of the respondents is fixed under sub-sections (I) and (4) of S-18 of the Act
and that cannot be uprooted by supervening circumstances. A plain reading
of section 18 yields the only conclusion that the rights of parties are determined
on the date they come to court. [853-DJ
6-1127SCT/75
848
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 817 to 819 of
A
1968 and 1456 to 1458 of 1969.
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From the Judgment and order dated the 19th May, 1966 and appeals
by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 7th November,
1968 of the Punjab &"Haryana High Court in C.W. No. 2205, 2206 and
2215 of 1965 and in C. Revsn. Nos. 771 to 773 of 1967 respectively.
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Rameshwar Dial and A. D. Mathur for the appellants (In all the
appeals).
K. L. Gosain and E. C. Aggarwala for respdt. Nos. 1 (In C.A. Nos.
817/68, 1456-14:i7/69) respdt. Nos. I and 3 (in Cas. Nos. 818/68
and 1458/69) and respdt. No. 1 (In CA No. 819/68).
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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KRISHNA IYER, J. These two batches of appeals stem from the same
judgment but raise two different questions of law under the Punjab
Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (Punjab Act X of 1953) (for short,
the Act), the forensic focus being turned on two different facets of s. 18
of. the Act. The first set of appeals relates to the right of the tenants to
purchase the ownership of the common landlord, Teja, while the second
,._
set of appeals turns on the principles of compensation awardable to the
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landlord pursuant to the. vesting of ownership in the tenant.
Teja, the landlord, was admittedly a large land-owner under whom
there were three tenants. Each of them applied for purchase of ownership under s. 18(1) of the Act. The Assistant Collector,_ who is the
primary authority, found them eligible, fixed the price and the instalments of payment, and they duly deposited the first instalment. 'The
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statutory consequence of such deposit was that title to the property vested
in the tenants on that date.
All these events took place in the early '60s.
Had the scheme of agrarian reform in the Punjab been simple and had
the virtue of early finality so necessary in such a measure been present,
the law would have operated with speed and changed the rural landscape radically, instead of provoking a heavy run of never-ending litigation. Section 24 of the Act has had this unwitting effect. Too many
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tiers of quasi-judicial review, too long at each deck and in a system
which is slow-moving, tempt disappointed parties to litigate to the
disastrous end. Such a statutory creation, calculated to give ultimate
justice, is like a Frankenstein's monster, the very prolonged over-indiciaJised litigative engine, bleeding justice to death. A legislature, with care
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and concern for the agrarian community should be vigilant enough to
design a quick and competent legal engineering project-absent by conG
trast in most land-reform laws blessing the rural poor. And it is noteworthy that legal battles are fought largely before Collectors, Commis-
·sioners and Financial Commissioners and then the writ chapter begins.
This litigation, if is worthy of note, began before the Collector in 1961/
~2. A fundamental assessment of the comparative economic and social
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~osts of multi-decked determination procedure would have induced the
legislature to reduce institutional levels of adjudication. This is by the
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way, although we strongly !ecommend that ~he . legislatures do pay
serious attention to producmg an early termmallon to land-reform ret0rdering by a mammoth and immediate decision-making instrumentality.
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RAMESHWAll, v. JOT RAM (Krishna Iyer, 1.)
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C.As 817-819/68
Shortly put, aud shorn of details, the simple contention of the appellants in these appeals is that although their prepositus Teja was a large
landowner, on his death his heirs, the present appellants, became entitled to shares and, in this process of fragmentation, they became 'small
landowners' within the meaning of s. 2(2) of the Act. This event occurred after the tenants had been found entitled to purchase from the
landowner the lands held by them and after they had deposited the first
instalment as set down in s. 18 ( 4). The plea is that an appeal is a
continuation of the original proceeding and, therefore, if there is ·a
change of circumstances in the landlord's ownership
during the
pendency of the appeal, resulting in his legal representatives becoming
'small landowners', the tenants will be disentitled to purchase the
land. 0£ course, a tenant of a 'small landowner' has no right to purchase
the land. But, in the present case, the landowner admittedly was a
large landowner at the time the tenants applied for purchase. Section
18 ( 1) reads, dropping the irrelevant portions, thus :
"18. Right of certain tenants to purchase land :-(1) ·
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any
law, usage or contract, a tenant of a land-owner other than a
small landowner . ...
(i)
(ii)
(iii) .
shall be entitled to purchase from the land-owner the land so
held by him .... in the case of a tenant falling within cl.(i)
or cl. (ii) at any time, and in the case of a tenant falling within
cl. (iii) within a period of one year from the date of commencement of this Act."
It is common case that the application has been made in time and that at
the time such application was made, the tenants were comyetent to buy
the land. Section 18(4) (a) and (b) may, at this stage, be read:
"18(4) (a) The tenant shall be competent to pay the
purchase price either in a lump sum or in six-monthly instalments not exceeding ten in the manner prescribed.
(b) On the purchase price or the first instalment thereof, as the case may be, being deposited, the tenant shall be
deemed to have become the owner of the land, and the Assistant Collector shall, where the tenant is not already in possession and subject to the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act
(XVI of 1887), put him in possesion thereof."
It is absolutely plain that on the deposit of the first instalment of the
purchase price, the tenant shall be deemed to have become the owner
of the land. In the present case, all these happenings had resulted in
the respondeqts becoming the owners.
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
The death of the large landowner occurred pending the appeal. The
argument of counsel for the appellant, which found favour with the
Financial Commissioner, but failed before the High Court, is that an
appeal being a re-hearing of the suit, relief must be given to the legal
representatives of the original landowner who, by devolution, became
small landholders. If this contention be sound, the tenants would have
to be denied relief since they would be holding under small landowners.
The solitary point which thus falls for determination is as to whether
the subsequent event of the landowner's death at the appellate stage
unsettles the right acquired by the tenants or whether the tribunal must
uphold rights which have crystallized as on the date the applications were
made and, in any event, the deposits of the first instalment were made
by each of the tenants. We see no difficulty in answering this question
against the appellant, but, in view of the persistent submission based
upon a few rulings of this Court, the Federal Court and the High Courts,
m~de by counsel for the appellant, we may as well consider the question
of h.v,. adopting an interpretative attitude which will further and not
frustrate the legislative will in case there are alternative choices for the
Court. Of course, a construction which will promote predictability of
results, maintenance of reasonable orderliness, simplification of the
judicial task, advancement by the Court of the purpose of the legislation
and the judicial preference for what it regards as the sounder rule of
law as between competing ones, must find favour with us. A plain reading of s. 18, without reference to consideration of subsequent events at
the appellate level, yields the easy and only conclusion that the rights
of parties are determined on the date they come to Court and what is
an insurmountable obstacle to apy other construction is that once the
deposit is made the title to the land vests in the tenant. Agrarian reform
law affects a considerable number of people and to keep rights uncertain
over a long stretch of time till appeals and reviews and revisions and
other processes are exhausted, is to inject unpredictability of results, for
it is quite on the cards that a landlord may die in the long course of
litigation, or other events may happen at later stages beyond the trial
Court.
Can rights of parties fluctuate with such uncertain contingencies ? If so, stabilization of !and-ownerships, so vital to the new pattern of
agrarian relations, will be postponed for a long time. Is not the judicial
task simplified by adopting the golden rule that the rights of parties
must be determined when they seek justice and not when the last Court
has had its last say, long years after the litigation was initiat,ed? A system
of orderliness about rights in land will result from this approach. More
than all, the sounder rule of law as between rival claims to consideration
of, or indifference to, subsequent events is surely that which excludes
the later event factually or legally.
Such a reading of the statutory
scheme rhymes well with rapid agrarian reform contemplated by the
framers.
The philosophy of the approach which commends itself to us is that
a litigant who seeks justice in a perfect legal system gets it when he asks
for it. But because human institutions of legal justice function slowly,
and in quest of perfection, appeals and reviews at higher levels are
provided for, the end product comes considerably late. But these higher
".Courts pronounce upon the rights of parties as the facts stood when the
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RAMESHWAR v. JOT RAM (Krishna Iyer, J.)
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first Court was first approached. The delay of years flows from the
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infirmity of the judicial institution and this protractio.n of the c;;ourt
machinery shall prejudice no one.
Actus curiae nemmem gravabzt(I).
Precedential support invoked by the appellant's counsel also lets him
down provided we scan the fact situation in each of those cases and the
legal propositions therein laid down.
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The realism of our processual justice bends our jurisprudence to
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mould, negate or regulate reliefs in the light of exceptional developments
having a material and equitable import, occurring during the pendency
of the litigation so that the Court may not stultify itself by granting what
has become meaningless or does not, by a myopic view, miss decisive
alterations in fact-situations or legal positions and drive parties to fresh
litigation whereas relief can be given right here. The broad principle,
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so stated, strikes a chord of sympathy in a court of good conscience. But
a seeming virtue may prove a treacherous vice unless judicial perspicacity, founded on well-grounded rules, studies the plan of the statute, its
provisions regarding subsequent changes and the possible damage to the
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social programme of the measure if later events are allowed to nnsettle
speedy accomplishment of a re-structuring of the land system which is
the soul of the whole enactment.
No processual equity can be permitD
ted to sabotage a cherished reform, nor individual hardship thwart social
justice. This wider perspective explains the rn!ings cited on both sides.
and the law of subsequent events on pending actions.
In P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders(') this Court dealt
with the adjectival activism relating to post-institution circumstances.
Two propositions were laid down. Firstly, it was held that 'it is basic
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to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged
to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding'. This is
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an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts
as they exist on the date the action is instituted. Granting the presence of
such facts, then he is entitled to its enforcement. Later developments
cannot defeat his right because, as explained earlier, had the court found
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his facts to be true the day he sued he would have got his decree. The
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Court's procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal justice or rights
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crystallised in the initial cause of action. This position finds support in
Bhajan Lal v. Slate of Punjab(•).
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The impact of subsequent happenings may now be spelt out. First
its bearing on the right of action, second, on the nature of the relief and
third, on its impotence to create or. destroy substantive rights. Where the
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nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of
developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage,
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it is but fair that the relief is· moulded, varied or re-shaped in the light
of updated facts.
Patterson(') illustrates this position. It is important
(1) "An act of the court shall prejudi~e no one" -Lalin for lawyers-Sweet &
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Maxwell.
(2) A. I. R. 1975 s. c. 1409, 1410.
(3) [1971! (I) S. C. C. 34.
(4) Patterson v. Stal• Qf Alabama (1934) 294 U.S. 600, 607; ·
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 1 s.c.R.
that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same
right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to
mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights· have already vested in a party,
they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where
there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad Shuku4 v. Keswar Lal Chaudhuri( 1) falls in this category.
Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case
oblige them, shape reliefs-<:annot rights-to make them justly relevant
in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary, couris
may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the
right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or
absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately
granted, the Court, even in appeal, can take note of such supervemng
facts with fundamental impact.
Venkateswarlu (supra), read in its
statutory setting, falls in this category. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in
order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit amendment and continue
the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All
these are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot be done if
the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its
scheme or otherwise', such change in cause of action or relief. The
primary concern of the court is to implement the justice of the legislation.
Rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested by this equitable
doctrine (See Chokalingam Chetty : 54 Mad.L.J. 88 P.C.). The law
stated in Ramji Lal v. The State of Punjab(') is sound :
"Courts do very often take notice of events that happen
su]Jsequent to the filing of suits and at times even those "that
have occurred during the appellate stage and permit pleadings
to be amended for including a prayer for relief on the basis
of such events but this is ordinarily done to avoid multiplicity
of proceedings or when the original relief claimed has,
by
reason of change in the circumstances, become inappropriate
and not when the plaintiff's suit would be wholly displaced by
the proposed amendment (sec, Steward v. The North Metropolitan Tramways Company (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 178) and a
fresh suit by him would be so barred by limitation."
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One may as well add that while taking cautious judicial cognisance of
'post-natal' events, even for the limited and exceptional purposes exG
plained earlier, no court will countenance a party altering, by his own
manipulaticm, a change in situation and plead for relief on the altered
basis.
The apparently divergent strains of the several decisions has persuaded us to dilate on this branch of processual jurisprudence. Let us now
apply the law to the ci!cumstances here. The legisl.ation we are il.1terpreting relates to agranan reform, regarded as the vital base to bmld a
(1) [1940] F. C. R. 84~A.I.R. 1941 PC 5.
(2) I. L. R. [1966] Punj. 125.
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RAMESllWAR v. JOT RAM (Krishna Iyer,!.)
853
new social order. The Constitution has stressed not merely the supreme.
significance of this rural transformation but the fleet-footed implementation thereof, even going to the extreme extent of walling off Jitigative
assaults on constitutionality by creation of the Ninth Schedule and the
like. Moreover, the Act itself takes care to prevent future accumulation
of lands or motivated slimming process by transfers, interfering with the
scheme of surplus pool and settlement of ejected tenants and the like.
Peasant proprietorship is a cherished goal of the statute and so it provides that even on the payment of the first instalment of the price the
tenant gets the title of the landlord. To hold that, if the landlord dies
at some distant date after the title has vested in the tenant, the statutory
process would be reversed if by such death, his many children, on
division, will be converted into small landholders, is to upset the day of
reckoning visualized by the Act and to make the vesting provision 'a
teasing illusion'. a formal festschrift to agrarian reform, not a flaming
programme of 'now and here'. These surrounding facts drive home the
need not to allow futurism,, in a dawdling Jitigative scene, to foul the
quick legislative goals.
Moreover, the right of the res;iondents is fixed under s. 18 (I) and
( 4) and that cannot be uprooted by supervening circumstances. We are
not called upon to mould the relief but to reject the right. We are not
asked to avoid multiplicity of suits but to non-suit and thus stultify the
agrarian law. We are not required to permit the appellate authority to
re-a~sess the facts as they stood when the action was brought (that is
part of appellate power) but to project the landholder's subsequent
death backwards to refuse a right already acquired. A flash-back
camera, in this context, frustrates forensic objectives. Individual misfortune may be real but larger social changes will claim martyrs in law
and in fact.
How can we miss the sublime impact of the Passion of
Christ for the Redemption of Mankind ? The great fact is that, if uniformly, relentlessly and swiftly enforced, neither landlord nor tenant
can keep more than the 'permissible area'. That is the equity and
equality of this agrarian law.
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We see no merit in the appeals and dismiss them, leaving parties to
bear their respective costs throughout.
C.As. 1456-1458/69'
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These appeals raise an interesting question of law bearing on compensation payable to landholders whose lands are vested in tenants and this
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turns on the connotation of 'similar land' ins. 18(2) of the Act in the
context of averaging the price for ten years before the filing of the
application for purchase. The primary fact which projects this point
S54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
of law is as to whether the purchased land is irrigated or non-irrigated
for purposes of valuation. We are relieved from the need to investigate
the implications of the issue because the factual foundation about the
nature of the land in question was never put in issue nor considered in
the High Court. Thus the appellants have missed the bus and we cannot hear them on a question raised de novo and demanding enquiry
into facts not raised at the next-below level.
We dismiss these appeals, without costs.
V.M.K
Appeals dismissed.
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