# Ramjilal v. Jncamt•tax Officer, Mohit'lt!argarh

- **Citation:** [1951] 1 S.C.R. 128
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1948-08-20
- **Bench:** Shr1 Harilal Kania C.J, SAIYID FAzL. Au, Patanjali Sastri, MuKHERJEA, DAs JJ
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ramjilal-v-jncamt-tax-officer-mohit-lt-argarh-168
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Constitution of India,
Arts. 14, 31 (1), 32, 265-Patiala and
East Puniab States Union
General Provisions (Administration)
Ordinance (XVI of 2005)-Union of States-Law relating to Income-tax-Uniform law introduced in all States from
August 20,
1948-Provision that
pending proceedings shall be
governed
by
existing law-Assessment at different rates in different StatesEquality of law-Infringement of fundamental right-Assessment
t>f income which accrued before
August 20, 1948-LegalityFundamental right not to be deprived of property save under
authority of law-Whether applies to taxation-Scope of Arts.
31 (1) and 265-Application under Art. 32 for protection against
tax laws-Maintainability.
Section 3 (1) of the Patiala ·and East Punjab States Union
General Provsions (Administration) Ordinance (No. XVI of 2005)
which came into force on February 2, 1949, and re-enacted s. 3 of
an earlier Ordinance which was in force from August 20,
1948,
provided that as from the appointed day (i.e., August 2Q, 1948) all·
laws in force in the Patiala State shall apply mutatis mutandis to
the territories of the said
Union, provided that all
proceedings
pending before courts and other authorities of any of the Covenanting States shall be disposed of in
accordance with the laws
governing such
proceedings in force in such
Covenanting State
immediately before August 20, 1948.
In one of the Covenanting
States, viz., Kapurthala, there was a law of income-tax in
force
on the said date, the rate of tax payable under which was lower
than that payable under the Patiala Income-tax
Act, and in another Covenanting State, Nabha, there was no law of income-tax
at all.
For the accounting year ending April 12,
1948,
assessees
of Kapurthala State were assessed at the lower rates fixed by the
Kapurthala Income-tax Act, in accordance with the proviso in s. 3
of the Ordinance .relating to pending proceedings, and the asse9sccs of Nabha were assessed at the higher rates
fixed by the
Patiala Act as there was no income-tax law in Nabha on August
1951
Jan. 12·
1951
Ramjilal
v.
Jncamt•tax
Officer,
Mohit'lt!argarh.
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
20,
1948,
and no income-tax proceedings were therefore pending
in Nabha.
The petitioner who was an asscssee residing in Nabha
and who was assessed under the Patiala Act applied under Art. 32
of the
Constitution for a writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari
quashing the assessment on the ground (i) that he hlld been denied
the fundamental right of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art.
14 of the Constitution inasmuch as he was assessed at a higher rato than that
at
which
asscssces of Kapurthala were assessed, (ii) that, as the Ordinance
bringing the Patiala Income-tax Act into force in Nabha was enacted only on August 20,
1948, it cannot operate retrospectively
and authorise the levy of tax on income which had accrued in the
year ending April 12, 1948, and therefore he was threatened with
infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 31 (1)
of the Constitution that no one shall be deprived of his property
save under autt.>rity of law :
Held, (i) that the discrimination, if any, between the assessecs
of Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance
but by the
circumst'Ulcc
that there
was no incomc·ta.X law in
Nab ha and consequently there was no case of assessment pending
against any Nabha assessces; and in
any case the provision that
pending
proceedings should be concluded according to the
law
applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities accrued and
the proceedings commenced, was a reasonable law founded upon a
reasonable
classification
of
the
assessees
which is
permissible
under the equal protection clause;
(ii) that, as there is a special provision in Art.
265 of the
Constitution that no tax shall be levied or collected except by
authority of law, cl. (1) of Art. 31 must, be regarded as conocrned
with deprivation of property otherwise than by the imposition or
co

## Text

-
RAMJILAL
"·
INCOME-TAX OFFICER, MOHINDARGARH
[SHR1 HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL. Au,
PATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.J
Constitution of India,
Arts. 14, 31 (1), 32, 265-Patiala and
East Puniab States Union
General Provisions (Administration)
Ordinance (XVI of 2005)-Union of States-Law relating to Income-tax-Uniform law introduced in all States from
August 20,
1948-Provision that
pending proceedings shall be
governed
by
existing law-Assessment at different rates in different StatesEquality of law-Infringement of fundamental right-Assessment
t>f income which accrued before
August 20, 1948-LegalityFundamental right not to be deprived of property save under
authority of law-Whether applies to taxation-Scope of Arts.
31 (1) and 265-Application under Art. 32 for protection against
tax laws-Maintainability.
Section 3 (1) of the Patiala ·and East Punjab States Union
General Provsions (Administration) Ordinance (No. XVI of 2005)
which came into force on February 2, 1949, and re-enacted s. 3 of
an earlier Ordinance which was in force from August 20,
1948,
provided that as from the appointed day (i.e., August 2Q, 1948) all·
laws in force in the Patiala State shall apply mutatis mutandis to
the territories of the said
Union, provided that all
proceedings
pending before courts and other authorities of any of the Covenanting States shall be disposed of in
accordance with the laws
governing such
proceedings in force in such
Covenanting State
immediately before August 20, 1948.
In one of the Covenanting
States, viz., Kapurthala, there was a law of income-tax in
force
on the said date, the rate of tax payable under which was lower
than that payable under the Patiala Income-tax
Act, and in another Covenanting State, Nabha, there was no law of income-tax
at all.
For the accounting year ending April 12,
1948,
assessees
of Kapurthala State were assessed at the lower rates fixed by the
Kapurthala Income-tax Act, in accordance with the proviso in s. 3
of the Ordinance .relating to pending proceedings, and the asse9sccs of Nabha were assessed at the higher rates
fixed by the
Patiala Act as there was no income-tax law in Nabha on August
1951
Jan. 12·
1951
Ramjilal
v.
Jncamt•tax
Officer,
Mohit'lt!argarh.
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
20,
1948,
and no income-tax proceedings were therefore pending
in Nabha.
The petitioner who was an asscssee residing in Nabha
and who was assessed under the Patiala Act applied under Art. 32
of the
Constitution for a writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari
quashing the assessment on the ground (i) that he hlld been denied
the fundamental right of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art.
14 of the Constitution inasmuch as he was assessed at a higher rato than that
at
which
asscssces of Kapurthala were assessed, (ii) that, as the Ordinance
bringing the Patiala Income-tax Act into force in Nabha was enacted only on August 20,
1948, it cannot operate retrospectively
and authorise the levy of tax on income which had accrued in the
year ending April 12, 1948, and therefore he was threatened with
infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 31 (1)
of the Constitution that no one shall be deprived of his property
save under autt.>rity of law :
Held, (i) that the discrimination, if any, between the assessecs
of Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance
but by the
circumst'Ulcc
that there
was no incomc·ta.X law in
Nab ha and consequently there was no case of assessment pending
against any Nabha assessces; and in
any case the provision that
pending
proceedings should be concluded according to the
law
applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities accrued and
the proceedings commenced, was a reasonable law founded upon a
reasonable
classification
of
the
assessees
which is
permissible
under the equal protection clause;
(ii) that, as there is a special provision in Art.
265 of the
Constitution that no tax shall be levied or collected except by
authority of law, cl. (1) of Art. 31 must, be regarded as conocrned
with deprivation of property otherwise than by the imposition or
collection of tax, and inasmuch as the right conferred by
Art. 265
is not a right conferred by Part III of the Constitution, it could
not be cnforoed under Art. 32.
•
-
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129 .
ORIGINAL JUlllso1cnoN: Petition No. 135 of 1950.
Application under Art. 32 of the Constitution for
a
writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari and prohibition.
Dr. Tek Chand (Hardayal Hardy
and
findra Lal,
with him) for the petitioner.
M. C. SetalvaJ,
Attorney-General for India
(S. M.
Sikri, with him) for the respondent.
1951. January 12. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
DAs J.-This is an application under
article 32 of the
Constitution for appropriate orders for the protection
of what the petitioner claims to be his fundamental
rights guaranteed by articles 14 and 31. This is said to
be a test case, for on its decision, we are told, depend
the rights of numerous other persons whose interests
are similar to those of the petitioner.
There is
no serious
controversy
as to
the facts
material for the purposes of
this
application. They
are shortly as follows : On May 5, 1948, the then
Rulers of eight Punjab States
including Patiala and
Nabha with the concurrence and guarantee of the
Government of India entered into a convenant agreeing
to unite and integrate their
territories in one
State
with a commori executive, legislature
and
judiciary
by the name of Patiala and East Punjab States Union
hereinafter competidiously referred
to
as
the
Pepsu.
By article III (6) of the covenant the then Ruler of
Patiala became the first President or Raj Pramukh of
the Council of Rulers and he is to hold the office during
his lifetime. Article VI of the covenant is as follows :-
" (1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall,
as soon as may be practicable, and in any event not
later than the 20th of August, 1948, make over the
administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh, and
thereupon,
(a) all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain, or are incidental to
the Government of the Convenanting State shall vest in
1951
Ramjilal
v.
/ncome•tax
Officer,
Mohindargarh • .
Das]
1951
RaJJ!iilal
v.
Income.tu
Officer,
Mohindargarh.
Das].
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
the Union and shall thereafter be exercisable only
as
provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be
framed thereunder ;
(b) all duties
and obligations
of
the
Ruler
pertaining or incidental to the
Government of the
Covenanting State shall devolve on the Union and shall
be discharged by it ;
( c) all the assets and liabilities of the Covenanting State shall be the assets and liabilities of the Union,
and
( d) the military forces, if any, of the Covenanting
State shall become the military forces
of the
Union."
Article X provides for the formation of a Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution of a unitary
type for the Union within the framework of the Covenant and the Constitution of India.
This Constituent
Assembly was also to function as the interim Legislature of the Union until an elected
legislature
came
into being. The proviso to clause (2) of that Article
runs as follows :-
"Provided that until a
Constitution framed by
the Constituent Assembly comes
into operation
after
receiving the assent of the
Raj
Pramukh,
the
Raj
Pramukh shall have power to make and promulgate
Ordinances for the peace and good government of the
Union or any part thereof, and any Ordinances so
made shall, for the space of not more than six months
from its promulgation have· the like force of law as an
Act
passed
by the Constituent Assembly ; but any
such Ordinance may be controlled or superseded by
any such Act"
This Union was inaugurated on July 15, 1948, and
the Raj Pramukh thereafter took over the administration of the different Covenanting States.
The Administration of Nabha State was
taken over by
the Raj
Pramukh on August 20, 1948.
On the same day the
Raj Pramukh, in exercise of the powers vested in him,
promulgated an Ordinance (No. 1 of 2005) called the
Patiala and East Punjab States Union (Administration)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
Ordinance, 2005.
The following provisions
of
this
Ordinance are relevant for our purpose :
"1. (2) It shall extend to the territories included
in the Covenanting States on and from the date on
which the administration of any of the said State or
States has been or is made over to the Raj Pramukh.
2.
3. As soon as the administration
of any
Covenanting State has been taken over by the Raj Pramukh
as aforesaid, all laws, Ordinances, Acts, Rules, Regulations, Notifications,
Hidayats
and
Hirmans-i-Shahi
having fore of law in Patiala State
on • the date
of
commencement of this Ordinance shall apply mutatis
mutandis to the territories of the said State and with
effect from that ·date all laws in force in such covenanting
State
immediately
before
that
dat~ shall
be
repealed :
Provided that proceedings of any nature whatsoever·
pending on such date in the Courts or offices of any
such
Covenanting
State
shall, notwithstanding anything contained
in this
Ordinance
or
any other
Ordinance, be disposed of in accordance with the laws
Governing such proceedings in force for the time being
in any such Covenanting State."
Section 6 provides for the adaptation
of
the
laws
etc.
enforced
under
section 3 and, amongst other
things, any reference in these laws, etc., to the Patia!a
State and the like was to be construed as a reference
to the State of the Union.
A notification (No. 35,
dated 27-5-05/11-9-1948) was issued over the signature
of the Revenue Secretary notifying
that the Patiala
Income-tax Act of 2001 and the Rules thereunder had
come into force in the various Covenanting States from
August 20, 1948, thereby repealing the law or laws in
force in that behalf in those States before that date,
except
:&s
to pending proceedings. It may be mentioned here that prior to that date there was no law in
the Nabha State imposing income-tax on the subjects
of that State. On November 14, 1948, the Commissioner of In.-ome-tax issued a Notification (No. 4, dated
1951
Ramjilal
v,
lncom•-IOJ<
Ojfieer,
Mohindargarh,
Das:J.
!951
Ramjilal
v.
Jncoffle-tax
Officer,
Mohindargarh.
Das],
132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19511
29-7-2005) intimating that persons belonging to the
Covenanting States of Nabha and Nalagarh would be
assessed to income-tax under the Patiala Income Tax
Act, 2001. It was mentioned that persons of those
States whose income reached the taxable limit "should
henceforward keep regular and proper accounts for
purposes of audit by the Income Tax Department."
On February 2, 1949, Ordinance 1 of 2005 was repealed
and replaced by Ordinance No. XVI of 2005 promulgated by the Raj Pramukh and called the Patiala and
East Punjab States Union General Provisions
(Administration) Ordinance, 2006.
Section 3 (1) runs as
follows:
"3. (I) As from the appointed day,
all
laws and
rules,
regulations,
bye-laws
and notifications
made
thereunder, and all other provisions having the force
of law, in Patiala State on the said
day
shall apply
mutaJis matandis to the territories of
the Union and
all laws in force
in
the
other Covenanting
States
immediately before that day shall cease to have effect;
Provided that all suits, appeals, revisions, applications, reviews,
executions
and
other proceedings, or
any of them, whether Civil or Criminal or Revenue,
pending in the Courts and before authorities of any
Covenanting States shall,
notwithstanding
anything
contained in this Ordinance, be disposed of in accordance with the laws governing such proceedings in force
in any such Covenanting State immediately before the
appointed day."
By section (2) (a) the "appointed day" was defined as
meaning the 5th day of Bhadon, 2005, corresponding
to August 20, 1948. There was a section providing for
adaptation similar to section 6 of the Ordinance 1 of
2005. There was another Ordinance to which reference
has to be made, namely,
Ordinance No. 1 of 2006
called the Finance Ordinance promulgated on April 13,
1949, which came into force on that very date. Section 5 of that
Ordinance introduced several amendments to the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001. It recast
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
sections 3 and 34 of that Act and introduced a new
section as section 23B.
Section 6 of
that Ordinance
runs thus :
"6. For the assessment year beginning on the 1st
day of Baisakh, 2006, that is to say, in respect of the
accounting the income, profits and gains of
the previous year ending on the last day of Chet, 2005,-
(a) income-tax
shall be charged
at
the
rates
specified in Part I of the ,Second
Schedule to this
Ordinance, and
(b) rates of super tax shall, for the
purposes
of section 55 of the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001,
be specified in Part II of the Second Schedule to
this
Ordinance."
It is in this setting that the facts leading to the
present petition have to be considered.
The petitioner is a resident of Ateli in the district of
Mohindargarh
now
in Pepsu but which
formerly
formed part of the Nabha State. The petitioner has
been carrying on his business at Ateli for a number
of years under the name and style of Raghunath
Rai Ram Parshad.
He never paid any
income-tax
as no such tax was imposed by any law in
the
Nabha State.
On October 20, 1949,
the
petitioner
was served with a notice under sections 22(2) and 38
of the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001, requiring him to
submit a return for the Income Tax year
2006
(13-4-1949 to 12-4-1950) disclosing his income during
the previous
year
(13-4-1948
to
12-4-1949).
The
petitioner, on December 4, 1949, filed his return for the
year 2006 and on February 14, 1950, he was assessed
to income-tax. On May 23, 1950, the petitioner received a notice under
section 34 calling upon him to file
his return for the year ending the last day of Chet
2005, i.e., for the year 13-4-1948 to 12-4-1949.
In this
return he had to specify his income of the previous
year, namely, 2004
(i.e., 13-4-1947
to
12-4-1948).
It
appears that the petitioner along with other assessees
of Ateli and Kanina submitted a petition before the
Income Tax Officer on July 9, 1950, asking him not to
1951
Ramjilal
<J
Income-tait
Ojfieer,
Mohintlargark.
Das J.
)951
Roniiilal
v
lntom1-taJt
Offien,
.Mohindargarh.
Das J.
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
proceed with the assessment for the year 2005 but on
July 13, 1950, the Income Tax Officer assessed him to
the best of his judgment under section 34 ( 4) read with
section 22 ( 4) of the Income Tax Act. The petitioner
along with other
assessees
similarly
situated
moved
the Income Tax Commissioner and the Central Board
of Revenue, New Delhi, but without any success. No
formal appeal
under the
Patiala
Income
Tax
Act
appears to have been filed by
the petitioner against
assessments for either of the two years 2005 and 2006.
On August IO, 1950, the petitioner filec"I his
present
petition
before this Court under article 32
of
the
Constitution praying that a writ in the nature of a writ
of certiorari be issued for quashing the assessments of
the petitioner's income accrued in the years 2004 and
2005 and other ancillary reliefs.
During the pendency
of this petition the income-tax authorities have issued
a notice under section 46 intimating that penalty will
be imposed if the tax was not paid up.
The contention of the petitioner in the first place is
that he has been denied the fundamental right of equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed to him by article 14 of the Constitution.
His grievances are formulated in paragraphs IO and 11
of his petition
It is
said that while the people of
Kapurthala which is included in Pepsu have been asked
to pay income-tax for the period prior to August 20,
1948, at the old rate fixed by the Kapurthala Income
Tax Act which was lower than die rate fixed by the
Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001, the
people of Nabha
who had not to pay any income-tax prior to August 20,
1948, at all have been made liable to pay at the higher
Patiala
rate
and that such discrimination
offends
against the provisions
of article 14.
This
charge is
refuted
by paragraph 10 of the affidavit
of
Sardar
Gurbax Singh, the Additional Director
of
Inspection
(Income Tax), New Delhi, who was.formerly the Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab and Pepsu, which
ha' been filed in opposition to the present petition. It
is there stated that for the assessment year 2005, in
Kapurthala the
a~sessees whose cases were pending on
•
j
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
August 20, 1948, were assesssed under the Kapurthala
Income Tax Act at rates fixed thereunder but that for
the assessment year 2006 the provisions of the Patiala
Income Tax Act and the rates
prescribed thereunder
were uniformly applied in all areas of the Pepsu, including Kapurthala. This allegation which is not denied
in the affidavit filed by the petitioner in reply must be
taken as correct. The
assessment of Kapurthala assessees for the year 2005 at the old Kapurthala rate
was
obviously made under the proviso to section 3 of Ordinance. No. 1 of 2005, which was reproduced in the
proviso to section 3(1) of the Ordinance No. XVI of
2006 and both of which required all pending proceedings to be completed according to the
law applicable
to those proceedings when they were initiated. No case
of assessment was pending as against any ~bha assessee on August 20, 1948, for there was no Income Tax
Act in Nabha prior to that date and, therefore, there
could be no occasion for completing any pending proceedings against any of such assessees.
In the premises,
there can be no grievance by them on the score of
discrimination.
The discrimination, if any, was not
brought
about by the two Ordinances, but by the
circumstance that there was no Income Tax Act in
Nabha and consequently there was no case of assessment pending against any Nabha assessees. In any case
the provisions that pending proceedings should be concluded according to the law applicable at the time when
the rights or liabilities 'accrued and the proceeding
commenced is a reasonable law founded upon a reasonable classification of the assessees which is permissible
under the equal protection clause and to which no
exception can be taken.
In our opinion the grievance
of the alleged infringement of fundamental right under
Article 14 is not well-founded at all.
Dr. Tek . Chand appearing in support of the petition next contends that the administration of Nabha
State having be.en
taken over by the Raj Pramukh
onty on August 20, 1948, and the Patiala law including
the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001, having been brought
1951
Blllnjilal
v.
l111:om1-l1U1
O.ffic11
Mo4illtlar1111ll,
D111:J.
J95J
R"Jlfii/ol
v.
lncomtt0%
Offien,
Mdintlargarb.
Dru].
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951)
into operation on and from August 20, 1948, the assessment of the tax on
the petitioner's income which
accrued prior to August 20, 1948, was
wholly
illegal
and not authorised by the
said Ordinances and the
State by insisting on collecting the
tax
so
illegally
assessed
was
threatening to invade the petitioner's
fundamental right to property
guaranteed
by
article
31 (1) of the the Constitution.
Article 31 (1) runs as follows:
"(1) No person shall be deprived of
his
property
save by authority of law."
It will be noticed that clause (1)
reproduces
subsection ( 1) of section 299 of the Government of India
Act,
1935,
without the words
"in British India".
Reference has next to be made to article 265 which is
in Part XII, Chapter I, dealing with "Finance".
That
article provides that no tax shall be levied or collected
except by authority of law.
There
was
no similar
provision in the corresponding chapter of the Government of Indian Act, 1935.
If collection of taxes
amounts ·to deprivation of property within the meaning
of article 31 (1), then there was no point in making a
separate provision again as has been made
in article
265.
It, therefore, follows that clause (1) of article 31
must be regarded as concerned
with deprivation
of
property otherwise than by the imposition or collection
of tax,
for
otherwise
arttcle 265
becomes
wholly
redundant. In the United States of America the power
of taxation is regarded as distinct from the exercise
of police power or eminent domain.
Our Constitution
evidently has also treated taxation as distinct from
compulsory acquisition of property and has made inde·
pendent provision giving protection
against taxation
save by authority of law. When Dr. Tek Chand was
asked if that was not the correct position, he did not
advance any cogent or convincing answer to refute the
conclusion put to him. In our opinion, the protection
against imposition and collection
of
taxes
save
by
authority of law directly comes from
article 265, and
is not secured by clause (1) of article 31. Article 265,
•
' <
__,,
--
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
not being in Chapter III of the Constitution, its protection is not a fundamental ·right which can be enforced by an application to this court under article 32.
It is
not our purpose to say that the right secured by article 265 may not be enforced.
It · may
certainly
be
enforced by adopting proper
proceedings.
All
that
we wish to state is that this application in so far as it
purports to be foundc::d on article 32 read with article
31 (1) to this Court is misconceived and must fail.
The whole of Dr. Tek Chand's argument was founded on the basis that protection against i~position and
collection of taxes save by authority of law was
guaranteed by article 31 (1) and his endeavour was to
establish that the Pepsu Ordinances could not, in law,
and did not, on
a correct interpretation of them.
impose any income-tax
retrospectively,
that
the
Jn.
come Tax Officer on an erroneous view of the law had
wrongly
assessed
the tax on income accruea prior
. to August 20, 1948, and that consequently the petitioner was being threaten~d with deprivation
of property otherwise than by authority of law. In the view
we have taken,
namely,
that the
protection against
imposition or collection of taxes save by
authority of
law is secured by article 265 and not by article 31 (1),
the questions urged by Dr. Tek Chand do not really
arise and it is not necessary to express any opinion on
them on this application. Those questions can only
arise in appropriate proceedings and not on .an application under article 32. In our judgment this application
fails on the simple ground that no fundamental right
of the petitioner has been infringed either under article 14
or under article 31 (1) and we accordingly
dismiss the petition with costs.
Petition dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: Naunit Lal.
Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta. ·
1951
Ramjilal
v.
/a<ome-taJt
Ojfieer,
Mohindargarj.
Das].