# RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE CORP. OF INDIA & ANR

- **Citation:** [2022] 10 S.C.R. 986
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2022-04-27
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 6950 Of 2009
- **Bench:** Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Surya Kant, Vikram Nath
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ranbir-singh-v-sk-roy-chairman-life-insurance-corp-of-india-anr-35672
- **Pages:** 79

## Headnote

Labour Laws - Absorption - Of persons engaged by Life
Insurance Corporation of India as temporary/badli/part-time
workers - Claim for regularisation of workers employed from 20
May 1985 till 4 March 1991 - Dogra Report - Objections of LIC to
the Dogra report - Tulpule and Jamdar Awards - Srivastav award
- Validity of verification in the Dogra Report - Palpable conflict
between decisions of the Supreme Court - Held: The conflict must
be harmonised by taking recourse to jurisdiction under Art.142 of
the Constitution - Directions accordingly issued in the facts and
circumstances of the case - Service Law.
Service Law - Public employment - Equal opportunity and
fairness in public employment - Held: LIC as a statutory corporation
is bound by the mandate of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution - As
a public employer, the recruitment process of the corporation must
meet the constitutional standard of a fair and open process -
Allowing for back-door entries into service is an anathema to public
service - A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to carry
out a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on flawed premises
without following a recruitment process which is consistent with the
principles of equality of opportunity governed by Arts. 14 and 16
of the Constitution - Such an absorption would provide the very
back-door entry, which negates the principle of equal opportunity
 [2022] 10 S.C.R. 986
986
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and fairness in public employment - Constitution of India - Arts.
14 and 16.
Labour Laws - Absorption - In Life Insurance Corporation
- Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and s.48 of
the LIC Act 1956 - Discussed - Held: Mere fact that a person is
appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC, does not entitle such a
person ipso jure to seek absorption merely by virtue of or only by
reason of such an appointment - Life Insurance Corporation Act,
1956 - s.48 - Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff
Regulations), 1960 - Regulation 8 - Industrial Disputes Act 1947 -
- Service Law.
Practice and Procedure - Precedent - Conflicting judgments
of different Benches - Two-judge Bench not at liberty to take a
final view at variance with binding decisions of a larger Bench and
of a co-ordinate Bench - In case of difference of opinion, it had to
refer the matter to a larger Bench.
Disposing of the Writ Petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. None of the Counsel appearing on behalf of the
workers in the present batch of cases disputed the factual position,
asserted on behalf of LIC, that the judgment of the two-judge
Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association affirming the
validity of the Srivastav Award contains no reference whatsoever
to the final order dated 7 February 1996 in the batch of civil
appeals arising from the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v.
Their Workmen. The interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v.
Their Workmen, which forms the basis of the judgment in TN
Terminated Employees Association, was passed in the backdrop of
a compromise which was arrived between LIC and eight out of
the nine Unions and Associations representing the workers. Since
the appeals were pending at that stage, the Court granted liberty
to the parties to the compromise to implement its terms as an
interim measure, without prejudice to the contentions of the ninth
Union which had not entered into the compromise. But noticeably,
there is a clear omission on the part of the Court in TN Terminated
Employees Association to refer to the admitted position that
subsequently on 7 February 1996, this Court in LIC v. Their
Workmen accepted the submission of LIC that since eight out of
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the nine unions (representing nearly 99 per cent of the workers
in Class III and Class IV posts) had accepted the compromise,
there was no justification for the ninth Union to object. The Court
held that it would be in the interest of

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RANBIR SINGH
v.
SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE CORP. OF INDIA &
ANR.
(Miscellaneous Application No.1150 of 2019)
In
(Contempt Petition (Civil) No.1921 of 2017)
In
(Civil Appeal No. 6950 Of 2009)
APRIL 27, 2022
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, SURYA KANT
AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
Labour Laws - Absorption - Of persons engaged by Life
Insurance Corporation of India as temporary/badli/part-time
workers - Claim for regularisation of workers employed from 20
May 1985 till 4 March 1991 - Dogra Report - Objections of LIC to
the Dogra report - Tulpule and Jamdar Awards - Srivastav award
- Validity of verification in the Dogra Report - Palpable conflict
between decisions of the Supreme Court - Held: The conflict must
be harmonised by taking recourse to jurisdiction under Art.142 of
the Constitution - Directions accordingly issued in the facts and
circumstances of the case - Service Law.
Service Law - Public employment - Equal opportunity and
fairness in public employment - Held: LIC as a statutory corporation
is bound by the mandate of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution - As
a public employer, the recruitment process of the corporation must
meet the constitutional standard of a fair and open process -
Allowing for back-door entries into service is an anathema to public
service - A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to carry
out a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on flawed premises
without following a recruitment process which is consistent with the
principles of equality of opportunity governed by Arts. 14 and 16
of the Constitution - Such an absorption would provide the very
back-door entry, which negates the principle of equal opportunity
 [2022] 10 S.C.R. 986
986
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and fairness in public employment - Constitution of India - Arts.
14 and 16.
Labour Laws - Absorption - In Life Insurance Corporation
- Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and s.48 of
the LIC Act 1956 - Discussed - Held: Mere fact that a person is
appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC, does not entitle such a
person ipso jure to seek absorption merely by virtue of or only by
reason of such an appointment - Life Insurance Corporation Act,
1956 - s.48 - Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff
Regulations), 1960 - Regulation 8 - Industrial Disputes Act 1947 -
- Service Law.
Practice and Procedure - Precedent - Conflicting judgments
of different Benches - Two-judge Bench not at liberty to take a
final view at variance with binding decisions of a larger Bench and
of a co-ordinate Bench - In case of difference of opinion, it had to
refer the matter to a larger Bench.
Disposing of the Writ Petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. None of the Counsel appearing on behalf of the
workers in the present batch of cases disputed the factual position,
asserted on behalf of LIC, that the judgment of the two-judge
Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association affirming the
validity of the Srivastav Award contains no reference whatsoever
to the final order dated 7 February 1996 in the batch of civil
appeals arising from the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v.
Their Workmen. The interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v.
Their Workmen, which forms the basis of the judgment in TN
Terminated Employees Association, was passed in the backdrop of
a compromise which was arrived between LIC and eight out of
the nine Unions and Associations representing the workers. Since
the appeals were pending at that stage, the Court granted liberty
to the parties to the compromise to implement its terms as an
interim measure, without prejudice to the contentions of the ninth
Union which had not entered into the compromise. But noticeably,
there is a clear omission on the part of the Court in TN Terminated
Employees Association to refer to the admitted position that
subsequently on 7 February 1996, this Court in LIC v. Their
Workmen accepted the submission of LIC that since eight out of
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the nine unions (representing nearly 99 per cent of the workers
in Class III and Class IV posts) had accepted the compromise,
there was no justification for the ninth Union to object. The Court
held that it would be in the interest of industrial peace that the
ninth Union should also fall in line and act on the terms of the
compromise. The civil appeals in LIC v. Their Workmen were
disposed of in terms of the above order dated 7 February 1996.
The terms of compromise clearly envisaged that the management
and the workers had agreed that the awards of the NIT dated 17
April 1986 (Tulpule Award) and 26 August 1988 (Jamdar Award)
"be substituted by the terms and conditions of compromise in
relation to the question of regular employment of the workmen
concerned in the said references". Once the awards were
substituted by the terms of compromise, it would be an
impermissible interpretation of law to hold that the awards
continued to be operative and binding, notwithstanding the final
order of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen.
The final order dated 7 February 1996 has not been adverted to
by the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association.
The factual finding is based only on the interim order dated 1
March 1989. The final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v.
Their Workmen had a crucial bearing on the special leave petitions
arising from the judgment of the Delhi High Court setting aside
the Srivastav Award. [Para 53][1044-E-H; 1045-A-E]
2. The two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees
Association opined that the scheme which was framed in E
Prabavathy was the outcome of an order which was passed in writ
petitions filed by the workers and not in the course of the
adjudication of an industrial dispute. On this ground, the Court
held that the decision in E Prabavathy would not come in the way
of an adjudication by the CGIT or NIT while deciding a reference
under Section 10 of the ID Act. The decision in E Prabavathy was
rendered on 23 October 1992 in a batch of civil appeals which
was being considered by a three-judge Bench. During the
pendency of the civil appeals, the Court called upon LIC to
formulate a scheme for the regularisation of workers who had
been granted ad hoc employment for at least 85 days from time
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to time. The three-judge Bench held, after assessing the terms
of the scheme proposed by LIC, that it was reasonable and
commended itself for acceptance. The scheme proposed by LIC
was approved by this Court with a specific observation that the
clauses of the scheme extracted in the order would form a part of
the order of this Court. The decision of three Judges in E
Prabavathy was thereafter interpreted by a two-judge Bench in
its order dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar. Noticing that
the scheme which has been accepted in E Prabavathy governed
workers of the Tamil Nadu Division of LIC, the Court held that
the scheme would be equally applicable to the workers of all
divisions of LIC in the country. The Court therefore held that it
was not necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a different group
of workers, in that case under the directions of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court. As a matter of fact, it is also material to
note that in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award itself there was
a specific finding that though the E Prabavathy group of workers
had been impleaded in the reference and had filed a statement of
the claim, having regard to the fact that the order of this Court
dated 23 October 1992 was between the same parties, the
workers had no valid ground to challenge the legality of this
Court's order before the tribunal. Despite the clear observations
in the Srivastav Award, the judgment of the two-judge Bench in
TN Terminated Employees Association has come to the conclusion
that the order of the three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy would
not preclude an industrial adjudication by the tribunal. The twojudge Bench which delivered the judgment in TN Terminated
Employees Association was bound by the order in E Prabavathy ,
which was of a larger Bench of three judges, and the interpretation
which was placed on it by another two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar.
If the two-judge Bench differed, it had to refer the matter to a
larger Bench but it was not at liberty to take a final view at variance
with binding decisions of a larger Bench and of a co-ordinate
Bench. [Para 54][1045-E-H; 1046-A-F]
3. There cannot be any dispute over the principle that the
judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association, followed by
the order in review dated 9 August 2016, are between the present
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parties and finality has attached to them. LIC is, however, before
this Court urging that as a statutory entity with a nationwide
presence, it is faced with a situation involving conflicting directions
of this Court. LIC has submitted that while on the one hand, the
Tulpule and Jamdar Awards were substituted by the terms of
compromise on 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen, this
was preceded by the order dated 23 October 1992 of a threejudge Bench in E Prabavathy which accepted the scheme of
absorption proposed by LIC and followed by the order dated 22
November 2001 of a two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar which
interpreted the decision in E Prabavathy as being applicable to
all divisions of LIC. The impact of the judgment in TN Terminated
Employees Association is to substitute and supplant the schemes
which were evolved before this Court for providing absorption
on specified terms. The essence of the schemes which were
accepted by this Court was that those temporary, badli and parttime workers who fulfilled the requirement of the threshold period
of service would be eligible to be considered for the grant of the
permanency, subject to certain conditions. The orders passed by
this Court envisage that these workers would be considered for
the grant of permanency in the course of a recruitment process.
The impact of the judgment of the two-judge Bench in TN
Terminated Employees Association is that while on the one hand
the Court's orders dated 23 October 1992, 7 February 1996 and
22 November 2001 continued to hold the field, on the other hand
the restoration of the Srivastav Award brings in place a regime in
conflict with what has been accepted by this Court in these orders.
Faced with this predicament, it is necessary for this Court to
step in and to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice caused by
the decision in TN Terminated Employees Association which has
been urged to be per incuriam. The consequence of not doing so
is serious. [Para 56][1047-B-G]
4. The Court is now confronted with claims on behalf of the
workers that the principle which has been enunciated in the
Srivastav Award and which has been restored by the two-judge
Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association must apply to all
workers subsequently engaged by applying Section 18(3)(d) read
with Section 17A of the ID Act. Hence, a balance will now
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have to be drawn by this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 142 of the Constitution, which while on the one
hand factors in the finality which has attached to the judgment in
TN Terminated Employees Association but on the other hand also
factors in the essential concerns which have been expressed
before this Court by LIC. LIC had been restrained, due to the
interim orders which were passed in the course of the various
proceedings, from taking recourse to recruitment through the
open market. LIC having been restrained by judicial orders from
pursuing an open recruitment process, the situation which has
now arisen is that unless a balance were to be drawn, absorption
of part-time and badli workers would become a substitute for a
recruitment process based on sanctioned posts, consistent with
the principles of reservation and pursued on the basis of a
structured recruitment which gives equal opportunities to all
applicants. Such a consequence is a serious detriment to
constitutional parameters and to the duty of LIC as a public
employer to follow a process which is fair and in consonance with
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An open and competitive
process for recruitment will enable LIC to recruit the best among
the available talent. Substituting this by a back-door entry will be
detrimental to the interests of the corporation which is governed
by statute. [Para 57][1047-H; 1048-A-C, E-G]
5. The Dogra Report eventually concludes that the group
of workers, who are governed by the order of this Court in E
Prabavathy, would also be eligible for absorption. By considering
the workers who are governed by the order in E Prabavathy to
be eligible for absorption, the Dogra Report has fallen into a clear
error. The report has considered those workers who were clearly
outside the ambit of its remit since they were governed by a
specific order of this Court. That apart, it is evident that the Dogra
Report has proceeded on a generalised assumption that a majority
of workers had produced documents are eligible for absorption
(having drawn a negative inference from LIC's non-production
of documents). In this backdrop, it would be necessary to bring
about a proper verification before the claims of the workers can
be truly considered. The deficiency of the Dogra Report in carrying
out a proper verification stands clearly established. [Para
60][1051-D-G]
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6. Section 48 of the LIC Act confers a rule making power
on the Central Government. Clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of
Section 48 was introduced by Act 1 of 1981 with effect from 31
January 1981. Simultaneously by the Amending Act, sub-Sections
(2A), (2B) and (2C) were introduced into Section 48. By virtue of
sub-Section (2A), the regulations governing the terms and
conditions of service of the employees and agents of LIC which
were in force immediately before Amending Act 1 of 1981, are
deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2)
and have effect subject to the other provisions of the Section. By
a deeming fiction of law, the regulations which were in existence
on the date of the Amending Act in relation to the terms and
conditions of service are given the status of rules framed under
clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48. The effect of subSection (2C) is that the provision of clause (cc) of sub-Section (2)
and any rules made under it with retrospective effect, shall also
be deemed to have had effect from that date notwithstanding any
judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority
and notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act, or in any
other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other
instrument for the time being in force. The rules which are framed
under Section 48(2)(cc) operate with a non-obstante clause which
prevails, inter alia, notwithstanding anything contained in the ID
Act. The vires of the Amending Act was upheld in a judgment of
a three-judge Bench of this Court in A V Nachane. Earlier the
employees were governed by the regulations framed by LIC
under Section 49 as well as by the provisions of the ID Act. Hence,
it was open to the workers to enforce their rights and remedies
in terms of the regulations framed under the LIC Act or in
accordance with the provisions of ID Act. However, after the
amendments which were introduced by Parliament in Section 48,
the employees of LIC would not be entitled to the protection of
the ID Act to which they were entitled before the enforcement of
the amendment. [Para 61, 62, 63 and 67][1051-G-H; 1052-B,GH; 1053-A-C; 1056-G-H; 1057-A-B]
7. It becomes necessary at this stage to advert to the
provisions of Regulation 8 of the Life Insurance Corporation of
India (Staff Regulations), 1960. Regulation 8(1) deals with
temporary staff and is prefaced with a non-obstante provision.
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Clause (1) of Regulation 8 is an enabling provision empowering
LIC to employ staff in Classes III and IV on a temporary basis,
subject to such general or specific directions which may be issued
by the Chairperson from time to time. Clause (2) of Regulation 8
stipulates that no person who is appointed under Regulation 8(1)
is, only by reason of such appointment, to be entitled to absorption
in the service of LIC or to claim preference for recruitment to
any post. The expression "shall only by reason of such
appointment be entitled to absorption" in this sub-clause (2) is
crucial. What the expression postulates is that a person who is
appointed on a temporary basis can nether claim an entitlement
to absorption or a preference in recruitment merely by having
been appointed on a temporary basis. In other words, Regulation
8(2) does not postulate an absolute bar to a claim for absorption
but it stipulates that absorption cannot be claimed merely on the
ground that a person was engaged on a temporary basis.
Regulation 8(2), for instance, will not preclude a claim for
absorption being made in terms of a scheme which is propounded
by LIC, so long as the scheme contains provisions which facilitate
absorption on stipulated terms and conditions. But the mere fact
that a person is appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC, does
not entitle such a person ipso jure to seek absorption merely by
virtue of or only by reason of such an appointment. [Para
70][1058-B-F]
8. The impact of the provisions of clause (cc) of sub-Section
(2), sub-Section (2A) and sub-Section (2C) of Section 48 on the
clams of the workers appointed after 4 March 1991 must now be
considered. The workers who have worked as temporary, badli
or part-time workers after 4 March 1991, seek to assert their
claims on the basis of Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act. Section 18
specifies the person on whom settlements and awards are binding.
Section 18(3)(a) stipulates that a settlement or award would bind
all the parties to the industrial dispute. Further, clause (d)
specifies that where a party to the dispute is composed of workers,
the settlement and award binds not only persons who are
employed in the establishment to which the dispute relates on
the date of the dispute but all persons who subsequently become
employees in that establishment or a part of it. Section 18(3)(d),
in other words, extends the applicability of a settlement or award
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beyond the workers who were engaged on the date of the dispute
to all persons who subsequently become employees in the
establishment. Regulation 8 of the Staff Regulation expressly
permits the engagement of temporary workers and clause (2)
contains a provision to the effect that a person who engaged under
its clause (1) shall not, only by reason of such appointment, be
entitled to absorption or to claim a preference for recruitment on
any post. The effect of sub-Section (2A) of Section 48 is that
Regulation 8 is deemed to be a rule which is framed under clause
(cc) of sub- Section (2) of Section 48. Moreover, the provisions
of Section 48(2C) postulate that a rule which is made under the
clause shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in
the ID Act. Hence, the workers who have been recruited post 4
March 1991 cannot make a claim for absorption ipso jure under
Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act, as a result of the overriding
provision which is contained in sub-Section (2C) of Section 48.
[Para 71][1051-F-H; 1059-A-D]
9. In structuring the relief in present proceedings, it is
essential to recapitulate the key legal findings that will govern
the determination of rights and equities, which are as under:
(i) On 7 February 1996, a two-judge Bench of this Court in
LIC v. Their Workmen had accepted the terms of compromise
which was arrived at on 1 March 1989 between the management
of LIC and eight Unions, and imposed them upon the ninth Union
as well. In addition, the two-judge Bench of this Court had issued
certain directions;
(ii) On 23 October 1992, a three-judge Bench of this Court,
while disposing of the civil appeals in E Prabavathy, specifically
accepted the scheme formulated by LIC for regularising the
workers who were engaged on a temporary basis. The scheme
was also specifically incorporated as a part of the order. The threejudge Bench in E Prabavathy held that the scheme proposed by
LIC is reasonable and that: (a) the regularisation will be by
selection for appointment; and (b) the above clauses of the scheme
would constitute a part of the order of this Court;
(iii) On 22 November 2001, a two-judge Bench of this Court
in G Sudhakar directed that though the order dated 23 October
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1992 in E Prabavathy applied to the workers of the Tamil Nadu
division, the scheme would equally be applicable to the workers
of all divisions of LIC in the country;
(iv) The judgment of the two-judge Bench of this Court
dated 8 March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees Association failed
to notice that as a result of the final order dated 7 February 1996
in LIC v. Their Workmen, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards had
been substituted by the terms of compromise. The two-judge
Bench of this Court overlooked the final order dated 7 February
1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen and while adverting only to the
interim order dated 1 March 1989, it arrived at a palpably
erroneous conclusion that the Jamdar and Tulpule Awards were
still operative and binding; and
(v) Though the petition seeking review of TN Terminated
Employees Association and the curative petition stand dismissed,
LIC is confronted with a situation in which it is equally bound by
the earlier decision of the three-judge Bench dated 23 October
1992 in E Prabavathy, the judgment of the two-judge Bench dated
7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen dealing with the appeals
arising out of the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and the judgment
of the two-judge Bench dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar.
[Para 73][1059-F-G; 1060-B-C, H; 1061-A-F]
10.1. There is a palpable conflict between the two judge
Bench decision in TN Terminated Employees Association dated
18 March 2015 on the one hand and the earlier binding decision
of a larger Bench in E Prabavathy on 23 October 1992 and of
subsequent Benches. This conflict must be harmonised by taking
recourse to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution. In arriving at a conclusion, this Court finds that:
(i) The remit of the CGIT which resulted in the Dogra
Report was confined to the process of verification, as distinct
from an adjudication of rights and liabilities;
(ii) The Dogra Report is flawed because: (a) The report
failed to carry out an accurate verification of only those Class III
workers who had put in at least 85 days of work in a period of two
years and Class IV workers who had put in 70 days of work in a
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period of three years; (b) The lists which are appended to the
report contain patent inconsistencies and errors as a consequence
of a failure to carry out an adequate verification; and (c) The report
accepted the claims for absorption of those workers who were
specifically governed by the decision of this Court in E Prabavathy,
in spite of an express stipulation to the contrary in the order of
this Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy as well as in
paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award;
(iii) A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to
carry out a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on such flawed
premises without following a recruitment process which is
consistent with the principles of equality of opportunity governed
by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such an absorption
would provide the very back-door entry, which negates the
principle of equal opportunity and fairness in public employment.
[Para 74][1061-G-H; 1062-A-F]
10.2. The dispute is now of an antiquity tracing back to
nearly four decades. The claims of those workers who are duly
found upon verification to meet the threshold conditions of
eligibility should be resolved by the award of monetary
compensation in lieu of absorption, and in full and final settlement
of all claims and demands. Directions accordingly issued. [Para
75][1062-F-H]
Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC
Employees Association v. Life Insurance Corporation
of India (2015) 9 SCC 62 : [2015] 5 SCR 806 - held
per incuriam.
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raghavendra
Seshagirirao Kulkarni, (1997) 8 SCC 461 : [1997]
4 Suppl. SCR 207; LIC of India v. G Sudhakar [Decision
of Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No 2104 of 2000]; A V
Nachane v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 205 : [1982]
2 SCR 246; M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC,
Machilipatnam, (1994) 2 SCC 323 : [1994] 1 SCR 433
and E Prabavathy v. Life Insurance Corporation of India
[Decision of Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No 10393 of
1992] - referred to.
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Case Law Reference
[1982] 2 SCR 246
referred to
Para 2
[1994] 1 SCR 433
referred to
Para 2
[1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 207
referred to
Para 2
[2015] 5 SCR 806
held per incuriam
Para 15
INHERENT JURISDICTION : Miscellaneous Application
No.1150 of 2019. In Contempt Petition (Civil) No.1921 of 2017. In Civil
Appeal No.6950 of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.03.2007 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No.690 of 2004.
With
MA 1151/2019 IN C.A. NO.6950/2009, MA 1868/2019 in
CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1862/2019
in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1861/
2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA
1874/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009,
MA 1873/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1660/2018 in C.A. No.6950/
2009, MA 1940/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A.
No.6950/2009, MA 1882/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in
C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1883/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) Nos.1921/2017
in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1876/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/
2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1888/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.
1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1866/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C)
No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1860/2019 in
CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1393/2019
in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 31-32/2018 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1875/
2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1660/2018 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA
1765/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1944/2017 in C.A. No.6956/2009,
MA 1402/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1965-1967/2017 in C.A. No.
6953/2009, MA 1859/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A.
No.6950/2009, MA 1869/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in
C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1870/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017
in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1864/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/
2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1872/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.
1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, W.P.(C) No.43/2020, MA 1867/2019
in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1889/
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE
CORP. OF INDIA
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[2022] 10 S.C.R.
2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA
1878/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009,
MA 1884/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/
2009, MA 1887/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A.
No.6950/2009, MA 1891/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in
C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1880/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017
in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1886/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/
2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1893/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.
1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1894/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C)
No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1892/2019 in
CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1895/2019
in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1987/
2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) Nos.1968-1969/2017 in C.A. No. 6953/2009,
W.P.(C) No. 110/2020, MA 2085/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 19651967/2017 in C.A. No. 6953/2009, MA 2339/2019 in C.A. No. 6951/
2009, MA 557/2020 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1965-1967/2017 in C.A.
No. 6953/2009, MA 858/2020 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1965-1967/2017
in C.A. No. 6953/2009, MA 412/2021 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 19681969/2017 in C.A. No. 6953/2009, MA 1865/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C)
No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1879/2019 in
CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1881/
2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA
1890/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009,
MA 1885/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/
2009 AND MA 1877/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A.
No. 6950/2009
E. M. Sudarshan Nachiyappan, Pallav Sishodia, Dr. Manish
Singhvi, A. N. S. Nadkarni, R. Singaravelan, Salman Khurshid, Dr. P.
Ravishankar, Sr. Advs., Yadav Narender Singh, P. Mahadevan, P. V.
Yogeswaran, M. A. Chinnasamy, Ms. C. Rubavathi, M. Veeraragavan,
C. Raghavendran, V. Senthil Kumar, P. Rajaram, Ashish Upadhyay, B.
K. Pal, Vishal, Arun Mishra, Rajiv Kumar, Shailesh Madiyal, Krishna
M. Singh, Ajay Amrit Raj, Ashish Prakash, Sanjeev Gupta, Vaibhav Manu
Srivastava, Bankey Bihari Sharma, Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari, D. K. Devesh,
Ram Lal Roy, Ashok Panigrahi, Ms. Geetanjali Das Krishnan, Nabab
Singh, Salvador Santosh Rebello, Arzu Paul, Ms. Deepti Arya, Adiraj
Bali, V. N. Subramaniam, Ms. Anzu K. Varkey, Ms. Aiswariya Gupta,
Randhir Kumar Ojha, S. Nandakumar, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Anand
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999
Murthi Rao, M. S. Saran Kumar, Srinivasa Rao, P. Vasu, Naresh Kumar,
Raktim Gogoi, G. Ananda Selvam, Samarth Shandilya, Ms. Lakshmi
Ramamurthy, Ms. Lubna Naaz, Ms. Sommya Chaturvedi, Mayilsamy
K., Aayush Kumaran Natarajan, S. Vinayak, P. Soma Sundaram, Vivek
Sharma, Ms. Resmitha R. Chandran, Biju Joseph, Hardik Vashisht, Ms.
Pooja Rohatgi, Pramod P., Anand Dilip Landge, Rakesh Shukla, Ms.
Sumita Hazarika, Karunakar Mahalik, A. Venayagam Balan, V. N.
Raghupathy, C. B. Gururaj, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Ms. Khyali Singh, S.
K. Roshan, M. M. Singh, Jitendra Kumar, Anurag Bhardwaj, Rameshwar
Prasad Goyal, Dhirendra Kumar Mishra, P. B. Reddy, Mrs. Kawaljit
Kochar, Utkarsh Vats, Deepanshu, Kusum Chaudhary, Advs. for the
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
This judgment has been divided into sections to facilitate analysis.
They are:
A
Introduction............................................................... 7*
B
Dogra Report.......................................................... 23*
C
LIC's objections to the Dogra Report .................... 30*
D
The E Prabavathy Group ....................................... 32*
E
Sequel to E Prabavathy .......................................... 37*
F
Submissions ............................................................ 41*
G
Prelude - Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, and their
Aftermath ............................................................... 52*
H
Srivastav Award and the Judgement of this Court . 57*
I
Validity of the verification in the Dogra Report...... 69*
J
The Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act
1947 and Section 48 of the LIC Act 1956.............. 74*
K
Structuring the Relief ............................................. 84*
A Introduction
1. This litigation has a long and chequered history. The dispute, a
familiar terrain in service jurisprudence, pertains to the claim for absorption
of persons who were engaged by the Life Insurance Corporation of
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE
CORP. OF INDIA
* Ed. Note : Pagination is as per the original Judgment
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India1 as temporary/badli/part-time workers. Section 23(1) of the Life
Insurance Corporation Act 19562 enables LIC to employ such number
of persons as it thinks fit to discharge its functions. Pursuant to clauses
(b) and (d) of Section 49(2), LIC has framed the Life Insurance
Corporation of India (Staff Regulations) 19603. Regulation 8 empowers
LIC to appoint persons on a temporary basis in Class III and Class IV
posts. After an amendment which was notified on 7 August 1971,
Regulation 8 provides as follows:
"8.Temporary Staff:-
(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations the
Managing Director or Executive Director (Personnel), a Zonal
Manager or a Divisional Manager may employ staff in classes III
and IV on a temporary basis, subject to such general or special
directions as may be issued by the Chairman from time to time.
(2) No person appointed under sub-regulation (1) shall only by
reason of such appointment be entitled to absorption in the services
of the Corporation or claim preference for recruitment to any
post."
2. On 31 January 1981,Sections 48 and 49 were amended to impart
statutory force to the Staff Regulations. According to LIC, its staff and
employees are governed by the parent enactment and fall outside the
purview of the Industrial Disputes Act 19474. The validity of the
amendment to Sections 48 and 49 has been upheld by this Court in AV
Nachane v. Union of India5.
3. On 13 August 1982, an industrial dispute was raised by the
Western Zonal Insurance Employees Association alleging that LIC had
been engaging in unfair labour practices by employing temporary, badli
and part-time workers and was restricting their employment to short
tenures to deprive them of the claim for permanency.
4. On 20 May 1985, the dispute was referred for adjudication by
the Central Government to the National Industrial Tribunal6, Bombay
1 "LIC"
2 "LIC Act"
3 "Staff Regulations"
4 "ID Act"
5 (1982) 1 SCC 205 ("AV Nachane"). See also: M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager,
LIC, Machilipatnam, (1994) 2 SCC 323; and Life Insurance Corporation of India
v. Raghavendra Seshagirirao Kulkarni, (1997) 8 SCC 461
6 "NIT"
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presided over by Justice RD Tulpule7, a former Judge of the Bombay
High Court. The terms of reference were as follows:
"What should be the wages and other conditions of service of
badli, temporary and part-time workmen of the Life Insurance
Corporation of India as well as the conditions of their absorption
into regular cadre?"
5. On 15 January 1986, the Tulpule Tribunal issued an interim
order restraining LIC from recruiting regular employees and from
terminating the services of the ad hoc workers working with LIC.
6. On 18 April 1986, the Tulpule Tribunal passed an award8 which
was gazetted on 7 June 1986 stipulating that those ad hoc workers who
were in employment between 1 January 1982 and 20 May 1985 will be
entitled for absorption. The award, inter alia, stipulated that:
(i)
Workers claiming absorption in Class III posts should have
worked for 85 days in a period of two years; and
(ii)
Workers in Class IV posts should have worked for 70 days
in a period of three years.
The calculation of the number of days worked was to be upto the
date of the reference. The award contemplated that in the future there
would be no occasion for LIC to employ workers in temporary and
badli categories, save and except for occasional and temporary work.
7. On 1 June 1987, LIC issued circulars for implementing the
Tulpule Award. These circulars were disputed by the Unions and
Associations representing the workers. Following this dispute over the
LIC circulars, the Central Government referred the Tulpule Award for
interpretation under Section 36-A of the ID Act to another NIT presided
over by Justice MS Jamdar9, a former Judge of the Bombay High Court.
The terms of reference were:
"Can the Award dated 17/4/1986 special reference to paragraph
44,45,46, 48, 49, 51,52,54,56,57,60,64 and 66 and the interim order
dated 14/3/1986 be interpreted to mean that the central office of
the Life Insurance Corporation of India is empowered to issue
instructions/ guidelines, as contained in their circulars issued in
7 "Tulpule Tribunal"
8 "Tulpule Award"
9 "Jamdar Tribunal"
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
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this behalf to implement the directions of the Award. If not what
could be the correct interpretation of various directions covered
by the said paragraphs in the circumstances of the case? Whether
the term 'absorption' referred to at various places in the Award
can be interpreted to mean 'recruitment'?"
8. By an interim order dated 29 June 1987, the Jamdar Tribunal
prohibited LIC from recruiting persons to Class III and Class IV posts
from the 'open market' during the pendency of the proceedings. LIC
has argued before this Court that on account of the restraint imposed on
it from recruiting regular employees (through the interim orders dated
15 January 1986 of the Tulpule Tribunal and 29 June 1987 of the Jamdar
Tribunal), a large number of ad hoc workers were appointed to carry
out the day-to-day administration of LIC all over India.
9. The Jamdar Tribunal rendered its award on 26 August 198810
and it was notified in the gazette on 1 October 1988. It held that the
absorption contemplated in the Tulpule Award did not imply recruitment.
LIC challenged the interpretation rendered by the Jamdar Award under
Article 136 of the Constitution. This Court granted leave in the
proceedings11. During the pendency of the proceedings, terms of
compromise were arrived at between LIC and all the Unions representing
the workers, save and except the Akhil Bharatiya Jeevan Bima Nigam
Chathurthi Sreni Karmachari Sangh12. The terms of compromise
envisaged that the Jamdar and Tulpule Awards should be substituted by
the terms and conditions of the compromise "in relation to the question
of regular employment of the workmen concerned in the said references".
The terms of compromise which were filed before this Courtare extracted
below:
"TERMS OF COMPROMISE
1.
The Management and the workmen agree that the Award
of the National Industrial Tribunal presided over by Mr.
Justice R.D. Tulpule, in Reference No.NTB-1 of 1988,
published on 7th June 1986, and the Award of the National
Industrial Tribunal presided over by Mr. Justice M.S. Jandar,
dated 26th August 1988 in Reference No. NTB-1 of 1987,
10 "Jamdar Award"
11SLP (Civil) No14906 of 1988, which was numbered as Civil Appeal No1790 of 1989
on the grant of leave
12 "Karmachari Sangh"
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published on 1st October 1988, be substituted by the Terms
and Conditions of Compromise set out hereinafter in relation
to the question of regular employment of the workmen
concerned in the said Reference.
2.
The Management agrees to consider the temporary/
part-time/badli workmen employed by the petitioner
for 85 days in any two years in a Class III post and for
70 days in any three years in a Class IV post in any of
its establishments during the period 1.1.82 to 20.5.85,
for regular employment on the basis and in the manner
stated hereinbelow. The temporary/part-time/badli
workmen who had made applications for regular
employment on or before 7.7.86 or those temporary/parttime/badli workmen whose applications had been received
after 7.7.86 but before 6.3.87 and had been rejected on
account of late submission, shall be eligible for consideration
for regular employment.