# ·- - . . ' -.•: .; ~:,. -•·' ,, RANCHHODLAL v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1965] 2 S.C.R. 283
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-11-27
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeals G Nos. 218 to 221 of 1964
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ranchhodlal-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-3406
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

•
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A
B
·-
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. ' -.•:
.; ~:,. -•·' ,,
RANCHHODLAL
Y.
. ..
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
November 27, 1964
. [K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND
N .. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.]
"
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, (Act 5 o/ 1898), ss. 222, 233, 234 and
235-lndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 o/ 1860), s. 409-Crimina/ Breach · ·
C
of Trust-Separate -Trial:r--Sentence Awarded-To run consecutively-
. Whether illegal.
The appellant was convicted in four cases for an offence under 1~ 409
IJ>.C. He was sentenced to imprisonment and fine in the first t\vo cases.
The sentences imposed in the .other two cases for the offence under_ s.. 409
l.P.C. were t<> run consecutively. ··The High Court dismissed the appellant's
~~
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D
HELD: (i) There had been no illegality in the Court's trying the
•
E
F
appellant in four cases. regarding amounts embezzled within· a few months
and in not ordering the various sentences_ awarded in different Sessiom
Trials to run concurrently_. (288 CJ
·
The ·normal rule is that there should be a charge for each distinct
offence, as provided in Si 233 of the Code. Section 222 mentions what
the contents of the charge should be. It is only in certain circumstances
that the- court is authorised· to lump up the various items with respect to
which criminal breach of trust was committed and to mention the total
amount misappropriated v.tithin a year in the charge.
When so done .
. the charge is deemed to be the charge of one offence. (286 H-287 BJ
(ii) Section 234 is an enabling provision and is an exception to •. 233
of Code of Criminal Procedure. There is nothing illegal in trying each of
the several offences separately.
[287 E]
(iii) Assuming without deciding, that these offences coulc! be said
to have been committed in the course of the same transactions, the sepa ..
rate trial for certain specific offences is not illegal.
Section 23S too is
mi enabling section. (287 F-0)
CRIMINAL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal Appeals
G
Nos. 218 to 221 of 1964.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders, dated
May 21, 1964 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench)
at Inaore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 30 and 31 of 1962 Nos. 246
and 258 cf 1963 respectively.
·
f
H
Jai Gopal Sethi, R. C. Mukati and R. L. Kohli, for the apjielJant (in all the appeals).
I. N. Shroff, for the respondeni (in all the appeals).
%8'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 2 s.c.R.

## Text

•
'
A
B
·-
- .
. ' -.•:
.; ~:,. -•·' ,,
RANCHHODLAL
Y.
. ..
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
November 27, 1964
. [K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND
N .. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.]
"
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, (Act 5 o/ 1898), ss. 222, 233, 234 and
235-lndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 o/ 1860), s. 409-Crimina/ Breach · ·
C
of Trust-Separate -Trial:r--Sentence Awarded-To run consecutively-
. Whether illegal.
The appellant was convicted in four cases for an offence under 1~ 409
IJ>.C. He was sentenced to imprisonment and fine in the first t\vo cases.
The sentences imposed in the .other two cases for the offence under_ s.. 409
l.P.C. were t<> run consecutively. ··The High Court dismissed the appellant's
~~
.-
-
•
D
HELD: (i) There had been no illegality in the Court's trying the
•
E
F
appellant in four cases. regarding amounts embezzled within· a few months
and in not ordering the various sentences_ awarded in different Sessiom
Trials to run concurrently_. (288 CJ
·
The ·normal rule is that there should be a charge for each distinct
offence, as provided in Si 233 of the Code. Section 222 mentions what
the contents of the charge should be. It is only in certain circumstances
that the- court is authorised· to lump up the various items with respect to
which criminal breach of trust was committed and to mention the total
amount misappropriated v.tithin a year in the charge.
When so done .
. the charge is deemed to be the charge of one offence. (286 H-287 BJ
(ii) Section 234 is an enabling provision and is an exception to •. 233
of Code of Criminal Procedure. There is nothing illegal in trying each of
the several offences separately.
[287 E]
(iii) Assuming without deciding, that these offences coulc! be said
to have been committed in the course of the same transactions, the sepa ..
rate trial for certain specific offences is not illegal.
Section 23S too is
mi enabling section. (287 F-0)
CRIMINAL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal Appeals
G
Nos. 218 to 221 of 1964.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders, dated
May 21, 1964 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench)
at Inaore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 30 and 31 of 1962 Nos. 246
and 258 cf 1963 respectively.
·
f
H
Jai Gopal Sethi, R. C. Mukati and R. L. Kohli, for the apjielJant (in all the appeals).
I. N. Shroff, for the respondeni (in all the appeals).
%8'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 2 s.c.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Raghubar Dayal, J. The appellant, in these four appeals by
special leave, was convicted in four cases of an offence under s. 409
I.P.C. and was sentenced to 4 years' rigorous imprisonment and
fine in the first two cases on January 17, 1962, by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain, Shri H. B. Aggarwal. He was also
B
convicted in these two cases of offences under s. 467 read with
s. 471 and s. 477 A l.P.C. The sentences imposed for these offences
were to run concurrently with the ·sentence of imprisonment for the
offence under s. 409 l.P.C. The sentences imposed in the two cases
for the offence under s. 409 I.P.C. were to run consecutively as no
order had been made by the Sessions Judge for the sentence in .c
the case in which judgmenf was pronounced later, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in the other case.
In each of the other two cases, the appellant was sentenced to
3 years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 409 l.P.C. by Shri Dube,
First Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain, on July 20, 1963. The
Sessions Judge ordered the sentences in these two cases to run I>
concurrently, but did not order them to run concurrently with the
sentence awarded in the first case on January 17, 1962.
The appeals against the conviction of the appellant in the four
cases were dismissed by the High Court. With respect to the
sentence in the appeal against the first conviction in Sessions Trial E
No. 35 of 1961, the High Court said :
"Coming to the sentences, the .basic offence is
criminal breach of trust under section 409 IPC and a
sentence of four years' rigorous imprisonment cannot, in
these circumstances, be considered excessive. If anything, I would call it somewhat lenient."
The sentence of fine of Rs. J,000 was considered to be 'feeble'.
In disposing of the. appeal against the conviction in the second
case, Sessions Trial No. 36 of 1961, the High Court said with
respect of the sentence :
"The sentence of imprisonment is also low; but
possibly the Sessions Court took account of the fact that
there were other and similar cases against Ranchhodlal
in which there was a possibility of a conviction."
In the third appeal from the order in Sessions Trial No. 55 of
1962, the High Court said :
"If there had been an application for enhancement of
sentence, I would not have hesitated to increase the
F
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RANCHHODLAL v. STATB (Dayal, /.)
285
A
sentence because this paying himself on the part of the
appellant is a very serious matter. But there being no such
prayer by the State, the matter has to be left at that."
B
c
In the fourth appeal, the High Court said :
"The trial Court has awarded a sentence of three
years without fine. It is quite lenient."
The result of the four convictions and sentences passed in these
cases is that the appellant has to undergo imprisonment for 11
years for mainly oommitting the offences under s. 409 I.P.C. with
respect to different amounts, in his capacity as Sarpanch of the
Mandal Panchayat, Ujjain.
·
Special leave was granted on the question of sentence only.
One of the grounds taken in the special leave petitions was that
his being tried in four cases for committing criminal breach of
trust with respect to different amounts, led to the petitioner's
prejudice and harassment inasmuch as he was to undergo sentences
D of imprisonment consecutively.
Sub-section (1) of s. 397, Cr. P.C. provides that when a person
already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a
subsequent conviction to imprisonment, such imprisonment shall
commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has
been previously -sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subE
sequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous
sentence. It follows that a subsequent sentence of imprisonment
is ordinarily to commence at the expiration of imprisonment under
the previous sentence, and that the Court recording the conviction
has the discretion to order that the later sentence would run concurrently with the previous one.
F
The Additional Sessions Judge who convicted the appellant in
two cases in January 1962 did not exercise his discretion in favour
of the appellant.
The other Sessions Judge who convicted the
appellant in two cases in 1963 exercised his discretion to the extent
that he made the sentences in those two cases concurrent and did
G not make those sentences concurrent with the earlier sentences
imposed on the appellant in January 1962. The judgments in the -
four Sessions Trials are not before us and we are not in a position
to say whether this aspect of the matter was urged before the
Sessions Judges when they recorded the convictions and sentenced
H
the appellant in the four Sessions Trials.
It was not urged before the High Court that the sentences in
all the four cases be made to run concurrently. If it had been
urged, the decision _might have gone against the appellant if one
286
SUPllEMB COURT 11.BPOll.TS
[l 965j 2 S.C.R.
considers the remarks of the High Court on the nature of the
A
sentence in each case. The High Court considered that the sentences were inadequate.
Learned counsel for the appellant has not urged that there
ls any illegality in the sentences awarded to the appellant in the
various Sessions cases or in not making them run concurrently
with the sentence awarded in the first Sessions Trial No. 35 of
B
1961. He has, however, urged that the various .acts of criminal
breach of trust which formed the basis of the convictions took
place within a period of a few months, from November 19, 1955
to February 23, 1956, and that therefore the appellant should
have been charged for committing criminal breach of trust with
.
c
respect to the total amount he had misappropriated, in view of
s. 222 Cr. P.C. and that if he had been so charged, the charge for
misappropriating the total amount would have been the charge
for one offence and the appellant would have been tried on such
one charge at one trial and, on conviction, would have been
awarded only one sentence which would not have ordinarily
0
exceeded 4 years' rigorous imprisonment.
Section 222 Cr. P.C. reads :
"(1) The charge shall contain such particulars as to
the time and place of the alleged offence, and the person
(if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect
of which, it was committed, as are reasonably sufficient
to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is
charged.
(2) When the accused is charged with criminal
breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money,
it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect
of which the offence is alleged to have been committed,
and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have
been committed, without specifying particular items or
exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed
to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of
section 234 :
Provided that the time included between the first and
last of such dates shall not exceed one year."
Sub-section (2) is an exception to meet a certain contingency
and is not the normal rule with respect to framing of a charge
in cases of criminal breach of trust.
The normal rule is that
there should be a charge for each distinct offence, as provided
in s. 233 of the Code. Section 222 mentions what the contents
of the charge should he. It is only when it may not be possible
E
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RANCHHODLAL v. STATB (Daya/, /.)
287
A te specify exactly particular items with respect to which criminal
breach of trust took place or the exact date on which the individual
items were misappropriated or in some similar contingency,_ that
Lhe Court is authorised to lump up the various items with respect
to which criminal breach of trust was committed and to mention
the total. amount misappropriated within a· year in the charge.
B When so done, the charge is deemed to be the charge of one
offence. If several distinct item with respect to which crimin1I
breach of trust has been committed are not so lumped together,
no illegality is committed in the trial of those offences. In fact, a
separate trial with respect to each distinct offence of criminal
breach of ~st with respect to an individual item is the correct
C mode of proceeding with the trial of an offence of criminal breach
of trust.
Learned counsel for the appellant also relied on s. 234 Cr. P.C.
and urged that three offences of criminal breach of trust could
have been tribd at one trial as s. 234 provides that when a person
D is aceused of more offences than one of the same kind committed
within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of
such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he
may be charged with, and tried at one trial for any number of
them not exceeding three. This again, is an enabling provision
and is an exception to s. 233 Cr. P.C. If each of the several
E offences is tried separately, there is nothing illegal about it. It may
also be mentioned that the total number of items charged in the
four cases exceed~ three.
Lastly, reference was made, on behalf of the appellant, w
s. 235 Cr. P.C. and it was urged that all these offences were
F committed in the course of the same transaction, and therefore,
they should have been tried at one trial. Assuming, without deciding, that these offences could be said to have been committed in
the course of the same transaction, the separate trial of the appellant
for certain specific offences is not illegal. This section too is an
enabling section.
G
Apart from the fact that the separate trials of the appellant in
four cases for committing breach of trust with respect to several
items was not illegal, there is nothing on record to show that the
investigating agency had worked out all the cases of criminal breach
of trust prior to prosecuting the appellant for the offences of which
he was tried at Sessions Trial No. 35 of 1961. If all the offences
H had not been worked out prior to that, there could not have been a '
joint trial for all of them even if that could have been thought to be
more reasonable way of proceeding against the appellant.
288
SUPREME C:OUllT REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.ll.
The fact that the first two Sessions Trials ended in a conviction
A
in January 1962 on commitments made sometime in 1961 and
that the Sessions Trials ending on July 20, 1963 were on commitments made sometime in 1962, prima facie indicate that the
investigating agency submitted the charge sheets against the appellant for the offences, tried in 1963 after-and possibly long afterit had submitted charge-sheet with respect to the first two cases.
B
There cannot therefore be any design in prosecuting the appellant
for different offenc~,s in four cases.
We are, therefore, of opinion that there had been no illegality
in the Court's trying the appellant in four cases and in not ordering
the various sentences awarded in different Sessions Trials to run c
concurrently with the sentences awarded in Session Trial No. 35
of 1961.
It has been strongly urged that the total sentence of 11 years
which the appellant has to undergo for committing the various
offences of criminal breach of trust is severe and that if he had
been tried for these offences at one trial after taking advantage of D
the provisions of s. 222 Cr. P.C., the sentence which would have
been awarded to him would not have exceeded 4 years, as that
is the normal ma'timum sentence awarded for an offence under
s. 409 I.P.C. An offence under s. 409 I.P.C. is punishable up to
imprisonment for life or imprisonment up to 10
years.
The
measure of the sentence is usually governed by the nature of the I:
offences committed and the circumstances of their commission and
it cannot be held as a hard and fast rule that a sentence is not
to exceed a certain period of imprisonment when the law has itself
laid down the extent up to which a sentence can be inflicted for a
certain offence and has left discretion to the Court to adjust the r
sentence according to the circumstances of each case. We need
not detail the circumstances of these cases, but would simply note
that they do not justify taking any lenient view about the sentences
for the offences committed by the appellant who held a very
responsible position as Sarpanch of the Societies and as such had
to deal with the proper disbursement of public money for the G
purposes of public benefit.
He miserably failep in discharging
these duties in the manner expected of him. A deterrent sentence is
always essential so that others in such resnonsible positions and
having occasions to deal with large sums of public money do not
tall victim to greed and dishonesty.
We, therefore, dismiss these appeals.
H
Appeals dismissed.