# RANGASWAMI, THE TEXTILE COMMISSIONER & ORS v. SUGAR TEXTILE MILLS (P) LID. & ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 825
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-01-27
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1182 of 1972
- **Bench:** Y. V. Chandrachud, P. K. Goswami, P. N. Shinghal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rangaswami-the-textile-commissioner-ors-v-sugar-textile-mills-p-lid-another-7111
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Coton Textiles (Control) Order 1948, clause 20(1)-Whether the provisions
make it obligatory upon the Textile Commissioner to specify the period of
operation of his direction's-Meaning of thi! word "may",
~lause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948 empoweni
the
A
Textile Commissioner, having regard to the capacity of the producer to produce
cloth and yarn of different description or specification and to the needs of the
general public, to issue from time to time such directions in writin.11 to any manuC
facturer or manufacturers generally regarding the class or specifications of cloth
or yarn and the maximum or the minimum quantities thereof which they shall
or shall not produce during such periods as may be specified in the directions.
The respondents' challenge to the vires of the notification issued by the
appellant which prohibited the printing of any border or heading on sarees etc.
for an indefinite period was accepted by the Gujarat High Court.
Dismissing the appeals by special leave, the Court,
HELD : ( 1) The impugned notification in so far as it prohibits the printin&
D
of any border and heading on sarees etc., for an indefinite period ie ultra vire.r
clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order 194g since the aforesaid clause
casts an obligation or a duty upon the Textile Commissioner to speciy the period
during which the prohibition shall remain in force.
[827 B·C]
(2) It is well settled that the word "may" is capable of meaning ~must" or
"shall" in the light of the context and that where a discretion is conferred upon
a public authority coupled with an obligation the word "may" which denotes
E
discretion should be construed to mean a command.
Considering the purpose
of the relevant empowerment and its impact on those who are likely to be affected by the exercise of the power, it is clear that the power conferred on the Textile Commissioner in the Cotton Textile (Control) Order 1948 to issue directiom
is coupled with a duty to specify the particular period for which the directiomi
,shall be operative" [826 F-G]
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh [1964] 2 SCR 197 @J 202, princiF
pies reiterated.
CIVJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 1182
of
1972.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
4-8-71 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. No. 1346/69 and
G
CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1545-1546
of 1972.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 4-8-1971 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 972
and
1527 of 1970 respectively.
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
826
SUPREME C:OURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 S.C.R.
V. P. Raman, Addi. Sol. Gen., S. N. Prasad and Girish Chandra
for the Appellant in CA 1182/72 and CAS.1545-46/72.
~
V. M. Tarkunde, V. N. Ganpule, (Miss) M Tarkunde and P. C_
Kapoor for Respondents in C.A. 1182/72.
V. N. Ganpule, A. K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar for RR.
No. 1 in C.As. 1545-46/72.

## Text

(
825
RANGASWAMI, THE TEXTILE COMMISSIONER & ORS.
v.
SUGAR TEXTILE MILLS (P) LID. & ANOTHER
January 27, 1977
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]
Coton Textiles (Control) Order 1948, clause 20(1)-Whether the provisions
make it obligatory upon the Textile Commissioner to specify the period of
operation of his direction's-Meaning of thi! word "may",
~lause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948 empoweni
the
A
Textile Commissioner, having regard to the capacity of the producer to produce
cloth and yarn of different description or specification and to the needs of the
general public, to issue from time to time such directions in writin.11 to any manuC
facturer or manufacturers generally regarding the class or specifications of cloth
or yarn and the maximum or the minimum quantities thereof which they shall
or shall not produce during such periods as may be specified in the directions.
The respondents' challenge to the vires of the notification issued by the
appellant which prohibited the printing of any border or heading on sarees etc.
for an indefinite period was accepted by the Gujarat High Court.
Dismissing the appeals by special leave, the Court,
HELD : ( 1) The impugned notification in so far as it prohibits the printin&
D
of any border and heading on sarees etc., for an indefinite period ie ultra vire.r
clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order 194g since the aforesaid clause
casts an obligation or a duty upon the Textile Commissioner to speciy the period
during which the prohibition shall remain in force.
[827 B·C]
(2) It is well settled that the word "may" is capable of meaning ~must" or
"shall" in the light of the context and that where a discretion is conferred upon
a public authority coupled with an obligation the word "may" which denotes
E
discretion should be construed to mean a command.
Considering the purpose
of the relevant empowerment and its impact on those who are likely to be affected by the exercise of the power, it is clear that the power conferred on the Textile Commissioner in the Cotton Textile (Control) Order 1948 to issue directiom
is coupled with a duty to specify the particular period for which the directiomi
,shall be operative" [826 F-G]
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh [1964] 2 SCR 197 @J 202, princiF
pies reiterated.
CIVJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 1182
of
1972.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
4-8-71 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. No. 1346/69 and
G
CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1545-1546
of 1972.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 4-8-1971 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 972
and
1527 of 1970 respectively.
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
826
SUPREME C:OURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 S.C.R.
V. P. Raman, Addi. Sol. Gen., S. N. Prasad and Girish Chandra
for the Appellant in CA 1182/72 and CAS.1545-46/72.
~
V. M. Tarkunde, V. N. Ganpule, (Miss) M Tarkunde and P. C_
Kapoor for Respondents in C.A. 1182/72.
V. N. Ganpule, A. K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar for RR.
No. 1 in C.As. 1545-46/72.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD, J.
Under the power conferred by Section 3
of
the Essential Suppiies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, the Central
Government issued an Order called "The Cotton Textiles (Control)
Order, 1948".
Clause 20 of that Order, as amended, reads thus :-
"20( 1) The Textile Commisisoner may from
time
to
time issue directions in writing to any manufacturer
or
class of manufacturers or the manufacturers generally regarding the classes or specifications of cloth or yarn,
and
the maximum or the minimum quantities
thereof,
which
they shall or sha,11 not produce during such periods as n:iay
be specified in the directions, and they shall comply with such
directions.
20(2) In the exercise of the powers conferred upon him
by sub-clause (1) the Textile Commissioner
shall
have
regard to the capacity of the producer to produce cloth and
yarn of different descriptions or specifications and
to
the.
needs of the general public." ...
The question for our determination in these appeals is
whether, if
the Textile Commissioner decides to issue appropriate directions to
any manufacturer or class of manufacturers, it is obligatory
upon
him to specify therein the period for which the directions will remain
in operation.
As hold by this Court in State of Uttt!r Pradesh v. }ogendra
-..Singh,(1) it is well settled that the" word "may" is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of the context and that where a
discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes discretion should be construed
to mean ··a command.
Considering the purpose of the relev_ant
empowerment and its impact on those who are likely to be affected by
the exercise of the power, we are clear that the power conferred on
the Textile Commissioner to issue directions is coupled
w:th
the
duty to specify the particular period for which the directions shall be
operative.
Directions of the kind envisaged by clause 20 are influenced and justified oy exigencies which render it imperative that
the directions be revie\\-. d from time to time.
That becomes feasible
only if the directions as . mlted expressly to a determinate period of
(1) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 197 at 202.
..
)
\
•
•
RANGASWAMY, TEXT. COMMR. v. SUGAR TEXTILE MILL!! 827
(Chandrachud. /.)
time at the end of which a fresh review of facts and circumstances
A
becomes obligatory.
There is a fear that a direction not limited in
point of time may continue to operate even after it has outlived its
utility for the reason merely that the need to review it is not clearly
perceived.
Besides, the manufacturers must know,
in
order that
they may organize their business in their own interest as well as in
. the interest of the community at large, as to how long any particular
embargo is going to be operative.
B
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the High Court though on
the ground only that the impugned Notification in so far as it prohibits the printing of any border or heading on sarees
etc.
for
an
indefinite period is ultra vires clause 20 of
the Cotton
Textiles
(Control) Order, 1948, ~ince the aforesaid clause casts an obligation
or a. duty upon the Textile Commissioner to
specify
the
period
f!
during which the prohibition shall remain in force.
We
express
no opinidn on the other points, including Point No. 6 urged before
the High Court for its consideration.
The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
The appellants will pay
one set of costs of these appeals to the respondents.
S.R.
Appeals disnii~sed.
I
5-206501/77
D