# RANGILDAS VARAJDAS KHANDW ALA v. COLLECTOR OF SURAT AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1961] 1 S.C.R. 951
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1959
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, P. B. Gajendragad.Kar, K. Subba Rao, K. N. Wanohoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rangildas-varajdas-khandw-ala-v-collector-of-surat-and-others-2189
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Inams-Abolition of Personal Ina1ns~Constitutional validity
of Enactment-Land .used for non-agricultural purpose-Levy of
full assessment by Collector-V alidity~Bombay Land Revenue Code.
r879 (Rom. 5 ~f i879), ss. 45, 48. 52. II7-R-Bombay Personal
Inams Abolition Act. 1952 (Bom. 42 of i953), ss. 4, 5, 7-Constitution of India, Arts. 31-A, 294(b).
The appellant was the holder of a personal inam which he
had purchased from the original inamdar to w horn a San ad had
been issued under Bombay Act No. VII of 1863.
He was paying Rs. 7 as salami and Rs. 6-3-0 as quit rent, the full assessment· of the land being Rs. 56-8-0. The land which formed part
of the inam was originally in a village but subsequently became
a part of the suburbs of the city of Surat and as the land was
being used for non-agricultural purpose and a large bungalow
h~d been erected on it, the Collector decided that it was liable
to non-agricultural assessment under s. 52 of the Bombay Land
Revenue Code, i879, with effect from August I, 1955, in view of
provisp (b) to s. 4 of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act,
1952. The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the
Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952. on the grounds,
inter alia, (1) that the Act was not protected by Art. 31-A of the
Constitution of India as the property which had been dealt with
under the Act was not an estate and no compensation had been
provided in the Act for taking away the property of the appellant, and (2) that in view of the fact that the holder of the
inam was given a S .. nad when his inam was recognised, it was
not open to the State 0f Bombay to enact a law which would in
any way vary the tern's of the Sanad. The appellant also contended that, in any cas,,, the Collector's order to the effect that
the land should be as>essed under s. 52 of the Bombay Land
Revenue Code, 1879, as 11on-agricultural was incorrect because
(r) s. 7 of the Act created"1an exception to ss. 4 and 5 with respect to lands of inamdars used for building or for other nonagricultural purposes and therefore the appellant's inam land
which was used entirely for ;ion-agricultural purposes could not
be assessed under s. 5 of tL"e Act, (2) that s. 52 of the Code
which-gave pi>wer to the Colleotor to make assessments of lands
not wholly exempt from the p.iyment of land revenue did not
apply to this case because here the assessment had been fixed
under the provisions of Cb. VII{-A of the Code and s. 52 only
applied when no assessment had l:ieen fixed under Ch. VIII-A.
October 3.
IQ60
Rangildas
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Held: (1) that the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act,
1952, was valid and was protected by Art. 3r-A of the Constitution of India.
Varajd••
Gangadharrao Narayanrao Majumdar v. Stale of Bombay,
Hha.,du·ala
[1961) r S.C.R. 943, Thakur fagannalh Baksh Sin~h v. U>nled
v.
Prot'inas. [1946) F.C.R. III and Maharaj llmeg S<ngh v. The
Col/"tor of Surat Stale of Bombay, (1955] 2 S.C.R. i64, followed.
IYanchoo ] . •
(2) that the exception made ins. 7 of the Act only saved
such inam lands as were used for building or other non-agricultural purposes by the inamdar from vesting in the Government,
but they remained subject to the provisions of ss. 4 and 5 of the
Act.
(3) thats. 52 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879,
when it said that the section would not apply where assessment
had been fixrd under Ch. VIII-A of the Code, referred to actual
assessment under the Chapter and not to what was deemed to
be an assessment under that Chapter by virtue of s. u7-R, and
that as the land in the present case was not wholly exempt
frorn revenue and as in fact no assessment had been fixed on the
land under Ch. VIII-A, s. 52 would apply and the Collector
would have power to make an assessment in the manner prc>-
vided by that section.

## Text

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1 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
RANGILDAS VARAJDAS KHANDW ALA
v.
COLLECTOR OF SURAT AND OTHERS.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR,
P. B. GAJENDRAGAD.KAR, K. SUBBA RAO and
K. N. WANOHOO, JJ.)
Inams-Abolition of Personal Ina1ns~Constitutional validity
of Enactment-Land .used for non-agricultural purpose-Levy of
full assessment by Collector-V alidity~Bombay Land Revenue Code.
r879 (Rom. 5 ~f i879), ss. 45, 48. 52. II7-R-Bombay Personal
Inams Abolition Act. 1952 (Bom. 42 of i953), ss. 4, 5, 7-Constitution of India, Arts. 31-A, 294(b).
The appellant was the holder of a personal inam which he
had purchased from the original inamdar to w horn a San ad had
been issued under Bombay Act No. VII of 1863.
He was paying Rs. 7 as salami and Rs. 6-3-0 as quit rent, the full assessment· of the land being Rs. 56-8-0. The land which formed part
of the inam was originally in a village but subsequently became
a part of the suburbs of the city of Surat and as the land was
being used for non-agricultural purpose and a large bungalow
h~d been erected on it, the Collector decided that it was liable
to non-agricultural assessment under s. 52 of the Bombay Land
Revenue Code, i879, with effect from August I, 1955, in view of
provisp (b) to s. 4 of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act,
1952. The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the
Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952. on the grounds,
inter alia, (1) that the Act was not protected by Art. 31-A of the
Constitution of India as the property which had been dealt with
under the Act was not an estate and no compensation had been
provided in the Act for taking away the property of the appellant, and (2) that in view of the fact that the holder of the
inam was given a S .. nad when his inam was recognised, it was
not open to the State 0f Bombay to enact a law which would in
any way vary the tern's of the Sanad. The appellant also contended that, in any cas,,, the Collector's order to the effect that
the land should be as>essed under s. 52 of the Bombay Land
Revenue Code, 1879, as 11on-agricultural was incorrect because
(r) s. 7 of the Act created"1an exception to ss. 4 and 5 with respect to lands of inamdars used for building or for other nonagricultural purposes and therefore the appellant's inam land
which was used entirely for ;ion-agricultural purposes could not
be assessed under s. 5 of tL"e Act, (2) that s. 52 of the Code
which-gave pi>wer to the Colleotor to make assessments of lands
not wholly exempt from the p.iyment of land revenue did not
apply to this case because here the assessment had been fixed
under the provisions of Cb. VII{-A of the Code and s. 52 only
applied when no assessment had l:ieen fixed under Ch. VIII-A.
October 3.
IQ60
Rangildas
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Held: (1) that the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act,
1952, was valid and was protected by Art. 3r-A of the Constitution of India.
Varajd••
Gangadharrao Narayanrao Majumdar v. Stale of Bombay,
Hha.,du·ala
[1961) r S.C.R. 943, Thakur fagannalh Baksh Sin~h v. U>nled
v.
Prot'inas. [1946) F.C.R. III and Maharaj llmeg S<ngh v. The
Col/"tor of Surat Stale of Bombay, (1955] 2 S.C.R. i64, followed.
IYanchoo ] . •
(2) that the exception made ins. 7 of the Act only saved
such inam lands as were used for building or other non-agricultural purposes by the inamdar from vesting in the Government,
but they remained subject to the provisions of ss. 4 and 5 of the
Act.
(3) thats. 52 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879,
when it said that the section would not apply where assessment
had been fixrd under Ch. VIII-A of the Code, referred to actual
assessment under the Chapter and not to what was deemed to
be an assessment under that Chapter by virtue of s. u7-R, and
that as the land in the present case was not wholly exempt
frorn revenue and as in fact no assessment had been fixed on the
land under Ch. VIII-A, s. 52 would apply and the Collector
would have power to make an assessment in the manner prc>-
vided by that section.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 6 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment e.nd
order dated March 5, 1957, of the Bombay High
.Court in Special Civil Application No. 3255 of 1956.
Dhan Prasad Balkrishna Padhye and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor.Generai of India,
N. P. Nathwani, K. N. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for
the respondents.
1960. October 3. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCHOO J.-This appeal hy special leave raises
questions relating to the constitutionality and interpretation of certain provisions of the Bombay Personal Iuams Abolition Act No. XLII of 1953, (hereinafter called the Act). The brief facts neceBB&ry for
present purposes are these. The appellant wae the
holder of a personal inam which he had purchased
from the original inamdar to whom a Sanad had been
issued under Bombay Act No. VII of 1863. The land
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
953
which forms part of the inam was originally in village
,96o
Athwa but is now in the suburbs of the city of Surat.
R
·
S l
Rangildas
The appellant was paying
s. 7 as
a ami and
varajdas
Rs. 6-3-0 as quit.rent, the full assessment of the land
khandwala
being Rs. 56-8-0. In November, 1952, the City·
v.
Survey Officer of Surat wanted to levy non-agricultu. Collector of Surat
ral assessment on this land under s. 134 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, (hereinafter called the
Wanchoo f.
Code), as the land was being used for non-agricultural
purpose and a large bungalow had been erected on
it. The appellant objected to this and eventually in
September, 1954, he wa:s informed by the Collector
that he would not be assessed under s. 134 of the Code
but was liable to non-agricultural assessment with
effect from August 1, 1955, in view of proviso (b) to
s. 4 of the Act. The appellant objected to this also.
The Collector decided on July 28, 1955, that the land
was liable to full assessment from August l, 1955, as
non-agricultural under s. 52 of the Cod,e.
The appellant then went up 'in appeal to the Bombay Revenue
Tribunal which was dismissed. He filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the order of the
Revenue Tribunal and also challenging the constitutionality of the Act.' The High Court rejected the application. It relied on an earlier decision of that Court so
far as the challenge to the constitutionality of the
Act was concerned. It also held that the order of the
Collector by which non.agricultural assessment }Vas
to be levied on the applicant from August 1, 1955,
was correct. The appellant then applied for a certifi-
!Jate to appeal to this Court which was rejected. He
then filed a special leave petition in this Court and
was granted special leave ; and that is how the matter
has come up before us.
So far as the constitutionality of the Act is concerned we have considered it in Gangadharrao Narayanrao
Mafumdar v. State of Bombay (1) in which judgment
is being delivered to-day, and have upheld the Act.
The only fresh point that has been urged in this con- .
neotion is that in view of Art. 294(b) of the Constitution and in view· of the fact that the holder was given
(1)[1g61] 1 S.C.R. 943-
954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
a San&d when his inam w&s recognized, it was nut
Rang•ldas
open to the State of Bombay to en&ct & law which
varajdas
would in &ny way vary the terms of the S&n&d. This
Kha .. dwala
argument. based on the immutability of S&n&ds was
v.
rejected by the Feder&! Court in Thakur Jagannath
Colleclor 0! Surat Baksh Singh \'. The United Provinces(') &nd h&B also
Wonchoo J.
been rejected by this Court in Maharaj Umeg Singh
and others v. The State of Bombay and others (').
We
also reject it for reasons given in tho two cases cited.
The challenge therefore tu the constitutionality of the
Act fails in the present appeal also.
This brings us to the contention of the appellant
that in any case the Collector's order to the effect
...
that the land should be &BBessed under s. 52 of the
Code as non-agricultural is not correct.
W c a.re of
opinion that there is nu force in this contention either.
Under s. 4 of the Act, all personal inams have been
extinguished &nd sa.vo as expressly provided by or
under tho Act, all rights legally subsisting on the said
date in respect of such personal in&ms are also extinguished. Therefore the appellant cannot claim protection from being assessed fully after the Act came
into force.
Section 5 makcB it dear that all ina.m
'
lands shall be liable to the payment of land-revenue
in accordance with the provisions of tho Code &nd
would thus be liable to full assessment &R provided by
the Code. The appellant however relied ou s. 7 of the
Act &nd contended that s. 7 created an exception to
es. 4 and 5 with respect to lands of inamdars used fur
building or for other non-agricultural purposes and
therefore the appellant's in&m land which was used
entirely for non-&gricultural purposes (namely, build.
ing) could not be assessed under s. 5 of the Act.
As
we reads. 7, we find no warrant for holding that it is
an exception to ss. 4 and 5. As already pointed out,
s. 4 abolishes personal inams and tho rights of inamd&rs witli respect to such inams and s. 5 makes a.II
inam villages or inam lands subject to the payment of
full assessment of land.revenue in accordance with
the Code. Section 7 deals with vesting of certain.
.-'
parts of in&m
land~ in the State, (namely, public
(1) [1946] F.C.R. '"·
(1) [1955] • S.C.R. 164.
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
955
roads, lanes and paths, all unbuilt village site lands,
'96°.
all waste lands and a.II uncultivated '!ands and so on);
Rangildas
but an exception has been ma.de so far as vesting is
Varajdas
concerned with respect to lands used for building or
Khandwala
other non-agricultural purposes by the ina.mdar. The
v.
appellant relies on this exception and it is urged on Collector of su,.t
his behalf that this exception takes out the land so
w anchoo 1.
excepted from the provisions of sS: 4 and 5. This
reading of s. 7 is in our opinion incorrect. That sec.
tion vests certain parts of inam lands in the Govern·
ment and but for the exception even those ina.m lands
which were used for building and non-agricultural
purpose would have vested in the Government. The
exception made in s. 7 only saves such inam lands
from vesting in the Government and no more. The
result of the exception is that such ina.m lands do not
vest in the Government and remain what they were
before and a.re thus subject to the provisions of ss. 4
and 5 of the Act. The appellant therefore cannot
claim because of the exception contained in s. 7 that
the lands excepted· from vesting a.re not subject to
ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. .The argument therefore based
on s. 7 must fail.
The next contention on behalf of the appellant is
that the Collector has no power to assess this land to
non-agricultural assessment under s. 52 read with
ss. 45 and 48 of the Code. Section 45 lays down that
all land unless specially exempted is liable to pay
land-revenue. Section 48 lays down that the land
revenue leviable on ariy land shall be assessed with
reference to the use of the land (a} for the purpose of
agriculture, (b) for the purpose of building .and (c) for
any purpose other than agriculture or building. Reading the' two sections together it is obvious that the
assessmeμt depends,upon the Ulltl to which the land is
put and is to be ma.de according to the rules framed
under the Code. In the present case it is not disputed
that the land of the appellant is not being used for
agriculture and is actually being used for non-agricultural purposes, namely, for the purpose of building ;
therefore, if the land is to be assessed, as it must now
be assessed iu view of s. 5 of the Act to full assess-
956
SUPHE~IE COURT REPORTS
[19611
1960
ment, it can only be assessed a.s non-a.gricultura.l. For
the purpose of such assessment it is immaterial when
Rungildas
va.aJdas
the non-agricultural use of tho land started. lt was
Khandw•ia
in a. special category being a. persona.I inam land and
v.
was upto the timu tho Act ca.me into force governed
Colleclu• of Su>al by the law relating to persona.I inams. The persona.I
inams and a.II rights thereunder were abolished hy the
Wamhoo 1·
Act and tbe land is now to be assessed for the first
time to full assessment under s. 5 of the Act read with
the provisions of the Code; it can only be assessed as
non-a.gricultura.l la.nd for that is the use to which it is
being put now when tho assessment is to bo mado.
Section 48 makes it clear that the assessing officer
when assessing the land should look to tho use to
which it is being put at the timo of the assessment and
assess it according to such use.
As the assessment is
to be ma.de after tho coming into force of the Act it
has to be on non-agricultural basis for that is the use
for which the land is being put a.t the time of assessment.
Lastly, it is urged thats. 52 which gives power to
the Collector to make assessments of lands not wholly
exempt from the payment of land-revenue does not
apply to this case because here the assessment has
been fixed under the provisions of Ch. VI II-A of the
Code ands. 52 only applies when no assessment has
been fixed under Ch. VI II-A.
Reference was also
ma.de to s. 117-R which appears in Ch. VIII-A. Tna.t
Chapter was introduced in the Code in 1939 and deals
with assessment and settlement of land-revenue on
a.gricultura.l la.nds. Section 117-R is a. deeming provision and lays down that a.II settlements of la.ndrevenue hereto before ma.de and introduced and in force
before the c01μmencement
of the Bombay
Land
Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1939, by which this
Chapter was introduced in tho Code sha.11 be deemed
to have been ma.de and introduced in accordance with
the provisions of this Chapter and shall notwithstanding anything contained ins. 117-E (which deals with
the duration of a. settlement) be deemed to continue in
force until the introduction of a. revision settlement.
The argument is that because of this deeming
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l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
provision, the settlement on which this land was held
1960
as inam land must be deemed to have been made under
this Chapter and therefore it cannot be said that no
Rangildas
Varajdas
assessment has been fixed under the provisions -of Ch.
Khandwala
VIII-A in this case. We are of opinion that there is
v.
no force in this argument. Section 117. R of the Code Collector of SuYa
is a deeming provision. Section 52 on the other hand
when it says that that section will not apply where
Wanchoo J.
assessment has been fixed under Ch. VIII-A, refers to
actual assessment under Ch. VIII-A and not to what
is deemed to be an assessment under that Chapter by
virtue of s. 117-R. It is not in dispute that there has
in fact been no assessment under Ch. VIII-A in this
case. We are therefore af opinion that as the land in
this case was not wholly exempt from revenue and as
in fact no assessment has been fixed on this land
under Ch. VIII-A, s. 52 would apply and the Collector would have power to make an assessment in the
manner provided by that section.
There is therefore no force· in this appeal and it is
hereby dismissed with costs.
Appeal diBmiBBed.
MADHAORAO PHALKE
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT
(B. P. SINHA, C. J., J. 1. KAPUR,
·p. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and
K. N. WANOHOO, JJ.)
Hereditary Military Pension-Bachat-Right to receive guaranteed by Katambandis issued by Rulers of Gwalior-If can .be termi11ated by executive order-Kalambandis, if existing law-Katambandis of r9rn and i935 (Gw.alior)-Constitution of India, Art. 372.
The appellant was the recipient of a hereditary military
pension called Bachat granted by the Rulers of Gwalior to his
ancestors in recognition of military service. The right to
receive the said pension was recognised by the Kalambandis of
":I
i912 and 1935 issued by the said Rulers. When Gwalior integrated wilh Indore and Malwa in i948 to form a union, s. 4 of
122
October 3.