# RANI & ANR v. SANTA BALA DEBNAIB & ORS

- **Citation:** [1971] 2 S.C.R. 603
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-10-14
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rani-anr-v-santa-bala-debnaib-ors-5199
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Hindu Law-Legal necessity-Proof of-Recitals in deed, ev/dentiary
talue of.
S. a Hindu female ¥overned by Dayabhaga system of law, executed
a sale·deed. It WH recited in the agreement that she agreed to sell "on
ac,count of financial need and to pay off certain debts". After her death
her son1 flied .a suit for a declaration that the sale-deed was not blndln1
. on them as It was executed without legal necessity .. ·The Trial Court
held that the sale deed was supported by legal necessity. The Court a!SG
observed, that the .contention that, there was fraud, misrepresentation and
undue influence was ·not seriously pressed as there was no evidence
adduced to prove the same.
The High Court, in appeal, reversed the
decree holding that the defendants' case of 'legal necessity was not proved
and on that account the sale deed was not binding upon the plaintiffs.,
The High Court, without adverting to the record, observed that the case
of the plaintiffs that S was induced to exeoute the sale deed because of
persuation and undue intluence had to be accepted.
In appeal by cer·
tificate, this Court,
HELD : (i) The Appell&nts-defendants had amply ,made out that the
sale deed was supported by ·1egal necessity. The observations of the High
Court were not supported by any evidence and they seriously -vitiated the
appreciation of the evidence oh record.
·
(ii) Legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion : it means pres·
sure upon the estate whi.ch in law may be regarded as serious and .sufli·.
cient.
The cn•1s of proving legal necessity may be discharged by the
alienee by proof of actual necessity . or by proof that he made proper
and bonfide enquiries about the existence of the necessity and that he
did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existenee' of the
necessity. [608 DJ
Recitals in a deed, of legal necessity, do not by themselves prove legal
necessity,
The recitals are. however, admissible in evidence, their value
varying according to the circumstances in which the transaction was'
entered into.
Where the evidence which could be brought before the
Court and is within the special knowledge of the person who seek.s to set
aside the sale is withheld, such evidence being normally not available to
the alienee, the recitals go to his aid with greater force, and the Court
may be justified in appropriate cases in raising. an inference against the
party seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of absence of legal
necessilv wholly or partially when he withholds evidence in his posses·
sion.
Jn the present case the recitals in the deed about the existence of
pressure upon the estate are amply corroborated by the circumstances.
[608 F]
(iii) Since the plaintiffs only claimed relief against defendants. 1 & 2
for declaration that the alienation in their favour was not binding on the
plaintiffs and that relief cannot be granted to the plaintiffs, the circum·
SUP.REME COD.RT REPORTS
[1971] 2 S.C.R.
·'ance that the heirs of the I 0th detendant are not Im pleaded in their
ppeal does not affect the right of the defendants to claim tbe appeal
A
must bo dismissed. [610 Cl
C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1943 of
1966.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 7, 1962
B
of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No.
173 of. 1956.
S. V. Gupte and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants.
Purushottam Chatterjee, P. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Das, for
respo.ndent N13. 2.

## Text

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603
RANI & ANR.
v.
SANTA BALA DEBNAIB & ORS.
October 14, 1970
[J. C. SHAH AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Hindu Law-Legal necessity-Proof of-Recitals in deed, ev/dentiary
talue of.
S. a Hindu female ¥overned by Dayabhaga system of law, executed
a sale·deed. It WH recited in the agreement that she agreed to sell "on
ac,count of financial need and to pay off certain debts". After her death
her son1 flied .a suit for a declaration that the sale-deed was not blndln1
. on them as It was executed without legal necessity .. ·The Trial Court
held that the sale deed was supported by legal necessity. The Court a!SG
observed, that the .contention that, there was fraud, misrepresentation and
undue influence was ·not seriously pressed as there was no evidence
adduced to prove the same.
The High Court, in appeal, reversed the
decree holding that the defendants' case of 'legal necessity was not proved
and on that account the sale deed was not binding upon the plaintiffs.,
The High Court, without adverting to the record, observed that the case
of the plaintiffs that S was induced to exeoute the sale deed because of
persuation and undue intluence had to be accepted.
In appeal by cer·
tificate, this Court,
HELD : (i) The Appell&nts-defendants had amply ,made out that the
sale deed was supported by ·1egal necessity. The observations of the High
Court were not supported by any evidence and they seriously -vitiated the
appreciation of the evidence oh record.
·
(ii) Legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion : it means pres·
sure upon the estate whi.ch in law may be regarded as serious and .sufli·.
cient.
The cn•1s of proving legal necessity may be discharged by the
alienee by proof of actual necessity . or by proof that he made proper
and bonfide enquiries about the existence of the necessity and that he
did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existenee' of the
necessity. [608 DJ
Recitals in a deed, of legal necessity, do not by themselves prove legal
necessity,
The recitals are. however, admissible in evidence, their value
varying according to the circumstances in which the transaction was'
entered into.
Where the evidence which could be brought before the
Court and is within the special knowledge of the person who seek.s to set
aside the sale is withheld, such evidence being normally not available to
the alienee, the recitals go to his aid with greater force, and the Court
may be justified in appropriate cases in raising. an inference against the
party seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of absence of legal
necessilv wholly or partially when he withholds evidence in his posses·
sion.
Jn the present case the recitals in the deed about the existence of
pressure upon the estate are amply corroborated by the circumstances.
[608 F]
(iii) Since the plaintiffs only claimed relief against defendants. 1 & 2
for declaration that the alienation in their favour was not binding on the
plaintiffs and that relief cannot be granted to the plaintiffs, the circum·
SUP.REME COD.RT REPORTS
[1971] 2 S.C.R.
·'ance that the heirs of the I 0th detendant are not Im pleaded in their
ppeal does not affect the right of the defendants to claim tbe appeal
A
must bo dismissed. [610 Cl
C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1943 of
1966.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 7, 1962
B
of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No.
173 of. 1956.
S. V. Gupte and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants.
Purushottam Chatterjee, P. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Das, for
respo.ndent N13. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J.
One
Sashi Bhusan was possessed of a piece of
land at Mou~a Behala District 24-Parganas
admeasuring .98
acres.
The land devolved on the death of Sashi Bhusan in 1920
upon his daughter Sarala. Under the Dayalihaga system of law;
Sarala inherited the propP.rty of her father as a limited owner.
Sarala married Kunja Behari.
The latter died in 1937 reaving
him surviving Sarala, two sons
Tulsi and Gobinda,
and four
daughters were married during the life-time of · Kunja Behai·i.
Kunja Behari left no estate except a residential house constructed
on the land at M auza Behal a. Kunja Behari was ailing for about
one year before his death in 1937. He was in an humble walk
of life, and was apparently not profitably employed during his
life-time.
At the time of his
death the two sons
Tulsi and
Gobinda were minors.
On October 22, 1941, Sarala executed a deed, Ext. E, agreeing to sell a part of the land (.90 acres) for Rs.· 1,100/-
to
Chapalabala wife of Saklia Nath Ghosh.
It was recited in the
agreement of sale that Sarala had agreed to sell .90 acres of
land possessed by her 'on account of financial need and to pay off
certain debts".
Sarala acknowledged receipt' of Rs. 101/- as
earnest money.
It appears that Sarala was for some time thereafter disinclined to cany out the bargain.
However on March
13, 1942 she executed a deed, Ext. C, conveying the land agreed
to be sold for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/- to Chapalabala
and Banikana. It was recited in the deed :
"Now on account of financial
needs and to meet
certain debt5 and out of other legal necessity, I announced to sell .90 acre land at rent of R5. 23/- per
annum free from defects and encumbrances leaving a
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RANI V. S~DEBNATH (Shah, J.)
605
portion of homestead J~nd measuring .08 acre."
It was also recited in the deed that Rs. 101/- were paid on
the date of the agreement of
sale, that Sarala had
received
Rs. 899/- before the date of sale, and Rs. 500/- were paid to
her in the presence of the Sub-Registrar.
An endorsement of
payment of Rs. 500/- before the Sub-Registrar was made by that
Officer.
The thumb-mark of Sarala was attested by
Abinash
Chandra Chakravarty and the deed was attested by four persons
including her son Gobinda.
On the date of the sale the rent in respect of the land was in
arrears.
It also appears that before the date of sale Mangala
had been given in marriage and the youngest daughter Radha
remained to be married. Sarala had also to provide for food and
clothing for at least five persons.
Sarala had only a residential
house and the land in dispute and she had no source of income.
Sarala died on
April 12, 1950.
On
January 24, 1953
Tulsi and Gobinda sons of Sarala filed a suit in the Court of the
Subordinate Judge, 24-Parillnas, for a decree declaring that the
sale deed dated March 13, 1942, execlited by Sarala was not
binding upon the plaintiffs, because it was executed without legal
necessity.
The suit was resisted by Chapalabala and BanikP.na
(defendants 1 & 2) an:! by alianees of the land from
them.
The Trial Court held that the sale deed was supported by legal
necessity.
The learned
Judge
observed that
Sarala was in
"strained financial circumstances", and she executed the sale deed
to meet expenses for maintaining herself and her family, and
for payment of debts.
She had, 10 meet municipal taxes, rent
for the land, and expenses for the marriage of her
daughter.
Radha. The learned Judge observed that the plea that execution
of the sale deed was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation and
undu<: influence was not seriously pressed "inasmuch as there
was no evidence worth the name adduced" to support that case.
Against the decree dismissing the suit the plaintiffs appealed
-to the High Court. In the view of the High Court there Willi
"no such serious and sufficient pressure on the estate" of Sarala
as to compel her to sell her property, and the case of the plaintiffs that she was induced to do so "by persuasion and undue
influence" of Sakha Nath Ghosh husband of defendant 1 must
be accepted. The High Court al!!l'l observed that it was doubtful
whether even full consideration for the sale was paid. The High
Court held that the defendants' case of legal necessity wa• not
proved and on that account the sale deed executed by Sarala
\\'as not binding upon the plaintiffs.
But bec~use one Dhiren
Chandra an intermediate transferee was oot made party to the
suit and Dhiren Chandra had obtained a fresh settlement
the
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 2 S.C.R.
High Court was of the opinion that the decree of the Trial Court
in respect of I 0 cottahas out of ihe land sold by Sarala could
not be reversed. The High Court accordingly modified the decree
passed by the Trial Court . and allowed the appeal in part, and
dismissed the plaintiffs' suit against defendants 4, 5, 6 and 16
in respect. of 10 cottahas
of land in the northern part of the
land. ·The plaintiffs were given by the decree opportunity . to
amend the plaint by making a claim for actual possession which
was ·not till then claimed in the plaint.
Accordingly the suit
was decreed in . respect of the remaining defendants in frespect
of the portion of the land· not covered by 10 cottahs in 1possess.ion of defendants 4, S, 6 and 16. With certificate granted by
the High Court, the heirs of original defendants 2 and 3 have
appealed to this Court.
In the plaint it was averred in paragraph·4 .that Sarala was
"illiterate and unpractical in worldly matters", ·that "she was a
simple and pardanashin lady", that_ Sakha Nath Ghosh husband
of Chapalabala was an l'offic('.r" of one of the partner of the
famous Roy. family and was "shrewd and cunning", that Sai:ala
called him "Dharamapita", and .ustd to "depend
upon him in
many atiairs" and used to be guided by his instructions, and on
that account the said Sakha Nath and the husband of Banikana
in collusion with the scribe made fraudulent representation and
exercised undul' influence over Sarala and got the. sale deed. executed in their favour.
This plea was denied by the contesting
defendants.
At the trial no issue was raised 'and no evidence
was led in support of that plea. It was. conceded that the plea
of fraud and undue .influence could not be supported. The Trial
Court observed :
"Though it was ·also tried to be said that there was
fraud, misrepresentation and undμe influence exercised
for the execution and registration of the Kabala (sale
deed) yet that branch o.f argument was· not seriously
pressed inasmuch as there was no evidence worth the
name adduced to show that there was really any fraud
practised for the
execution and
registration of the
kobalq in favour of defendants 1 and 2(Chapalabala
and Banikana) by Sarala Bala Dasi:"
Tue High Court without adverting to this state of the record
observed that the case of the plaintiffs that Sarala was induced
to sell the land because of persuasion and undue influence of
Sakha Nath Ghosh. must .be accepted.
The High Court also
observed that it was doubtful whether full consideration for ·the
sale was· paid, and :that since Sakha Nath Ghosh was "a _rent
coll~tor under one of Roy Babus of Behala, in order to grab the
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RANI V, S. DEBNATH (Shah, /,)
607.
valuable prl)perty belonging to Sarala he had induced Sarala to
enter into a transaction of sale". These observations of the
High Court are not supported by any evidence, and they seriously
vitiate the appreciation of the evidence on record.
·
In the sale deed it was (lXpressly recited that Rs. 101/- were
paid at the time of the agreement of sale. That recital was supported by the recital in Ext. E in the agreement of sale. It was
also recited in the sale deed, Ext C, that Rs. 899 /- were received
before the. date of the sale, and Rs. 500/- were received before
the Sub-Registrar.
Payment of Rs. 500/- is supported by the
endorsement on· the sale deed itself.
It is true that apart from
the recital about the payment of Rs. 899/- there is no other documentary evidence to prove that payment. The burden of proving
that the consideration was not received by the vendor, however,
lay upon the plaintiffs and no serious attempt was made to discharge that burden. The plaintiffs set up the case that Rs. 500 /-
were taken back from Sarala after: she left the Sub-Registrar's;
office. The High .Court disbelieved this part of the case about
repayment of the amount of Rs. 500/-
by Sarala received
by her before the Sub-Registrar.
The High Court observed
that about the payment of the balance of the consideration, namely Rs. 899/-, "there was no evidence at all on the side
.of the defendants that the same was paid"
In our judgment,
the High Court misconceived !Qe nature of th.e onus which lay
upon the plaintiffs to prove that tbe consideration which it was
recited in the deed was received by Sarala was not in fact recCivedi
by her and a false recital was made. The recitals in the deed are
supported br the testimony of Sailendra Nath Nan di who said,
that the entire consideration was received by Sarala. We are
unable to accept the view of the High Court that the sale deed
was not supported by full consideration.
The agreement of sale and the sale deed were attested by
Gobinda son of Sarala. Before us it was cqhtended that
Gobiiida Vl'.as at the date of the agreement of sale, and at the date
of the Sale deed, a minor and his attestation was of no value.
But· on this part of the case there is no reliable evidence.
· Jogindra Nath Monda! who wrote the two deeds was examined
on behalf of the defendants. He de~ that Ext. E-the agreement of sale-was read over and the i;ontents were explained to
Sarala after it was written', and she understood the implications
of the deed and also received Rs. 101/-. In his cross~xamination
he stated that he had written down the deed according to what
was said to him by Sarala, Gobinda and by Sakha Nath Ghosh
and thereafter Sarala executed the deed. There is no reason to·
disbelieve the
testimony of this · witness.
Abinash
Chandra·
608
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 2 S.C.R.
Chakravarty who attested the sale deed-Ext. C-and the agreement of. sale-Ext. E-could not be examined for he had died
before the date of the trial. Attestation by him of the two deeds
has significance.
Gobinda Chandra Debnath a witness examined on behalf of the plaintiffs stated that the family of the plaintiffs had confidence in Abinash Chandra Chakravarty as he was
"the friend and well-wisher of the family".
There is no ground
for believing that Abinash Chandra Chakravarty who was present
at the time of the
execution and had attested the two
deeds
misused the confidence Ieposed in him and was guilty of being
a party to the bringing into existence a deed containing false
recitals to defraud Sarala and her sons.
Legal necessity to support the sale must however be established by the alienees. Sarala owned the land in dispute as a limited
O\rner.
She was competent to dispose of the whole estate in the
property for legal necessity or benefit to the estate. In adjusting
whether the sale conveys the whole estate, the actual pressure
en the estate, the danger to be averted, and the benefit to be conferred upon the estate in the particular insistance must be considered.
Legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion :
it
means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded
as serious and sufficient.
The onus of providing legal necessity
may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity. or
by proof that he made proper and bona fide enquires about the
existence of the necessity and that he did aj\ that was reasonable
to satisfy himseif as to the existence of the necessity.
Recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves
prove legal necessity.
The recitals are, however, admissible in
evidence, their value varying according to the circumstances in
which the transaction was entered into.
The recitals may be
used to corroborate other evidence of the existence of legal necessity.
The weight to be attached to the recitals varies according
to the circumstances. Where the evidence which could be brought
· before the Court and is within the special knowledge of the person who seeks to set aside the sale is withheld, such ·evidence
being- normally not available to the alienee, the recitals go to
his aid with greater force, and the Court may be justified in
appropriate cases in raising an inference against the party seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of absence of legal necessity wholly or partially when he withholds
evidence in his
possession ..
Kunja Behari husband of Sarala had died in 1937 after a
protracted illness : there is no reliable evidence that he left any
property except the residential house. built on a part of the land
r:hicb Sarala had inherited from her father.
Sarala had two SOlll
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RANI i', s. !)£Bc.ATH (Shah. !.)
609
who were the:i minors and two daughters who were yet to be
married. There were five members in the family to be fed and
clothed, and the marriage expenses of two daughters had to be
met.
The case that '!'ulsi the eldest son obtained gainful employment shortly after his father's death and before the sale deed
was executed was rightly . disbelieved by the Trial Court.
The
story that Gobinda had taken to hawking vegetables has also
been rightly disbelieved by the Trial Court. Sarala had to meet
several obligations : she had to pay the annual rent accruing due
in respect of the land in dispute and also to pay municipal taxes :
she had to feed and clothe herself and her children and to perfonn the marriage of her daughter Radha.
She had no other
property and she had no income. The recitals in the deed about
the existence of pressure upon the estate are therefore amply corroborated by the circumstances.
Mr. Purshottam Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs contended that there was evidence only of the debts amounting to 75/-, Rs. 25/- as rent for the land pa'fable to the head-.
lessor and Rs. 50/- expenditure incurred for the marriage of the
daughter Mangala.
Counsel relied upon the recitals made in a
plaint filed in a suit for recovery of rent by the landlord against
Sarala after the sale deed in which the rent for the years 1941,
1942 and 1943 was claimed. Counsel also relied upon the evidence that in the community to which
Sarala l>elonged, the
marriage of a daughter only costs Rs. 50/-. That evidence, in
our jilQgment, is wholly unreliable. In any event apart from the
obligation to pay rent and to meet the expenses of marriage of
her daughter Mangala various other obligations had to be met.
The argument that Sarala belonged to a community in which
the male members used to be employed as "household servants'"
and that Tulsi and Gobinda were so employed is also not supported by any reliable evidence. In our judgment, the High
Court ignored the strong inference which arose out of these circumstances and especially out of the participation by Gobinda
in the execution of the agreement of sale and the sale deed.
In our vim· the case of the defendants 1 and 2 that the sale
deed was supported by legal necessity of Sarala was amply made
out and the Trial Court was right in holding that the sale deed
was
executed for legal
necessity.
From the
attestation by
Gobinda one of the sons of the agreement of sale and the sale
deed and the recitals in those deeds. viewed in the light of the
other evidence. we are ot the opinion that the level necessity
set up by the defendants I and 2 is amply proved.
I~ was urged before us that because the 10th defendant died
before tl1e certificate was given by the High Court for appeal to
610
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 2 S.C.R.
.this Court, and the heirs of the 10th defendant were not brought
on the record, the appeal abates in its entirety. There is, how-
.ever, no clear evidence whether the 10th defendant died before
or after the judgment of the High· Court. Again, the plaintiffs
.had in the suit only claimed a relief for declaration that the alienation in.favour of defendants 1 and 2, i.e. Chapalabala .and
Banikana made on March 13, 1942, was without legal necessity
and was not binding upon them, and for a declaration of their
. title to the disputed land.
The alienees from defendants 1 and
2 were, it is true, impleaded as parties, but no relief was
.claimed against them. Nor was any averment made in the plaint
about the reasons for and the circumstances in which they were
so impleaded.
Since the plaintiffs only claimed relief against
defendants 1 and, 2, and that relief cannot be granted to the
plaintiffs, we think, the circumstance Lliat the heirs of the 10th
defendant are not impleaded in this appeal does not affect· the
right of the defendl!nts to claim that the appeal must be dismissed.
The appeal is therefore allowed
and the suit filed by the
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plaintiffs is dismissed with costs throughout.
D
Y.P.
Appeal allowed;