# RANill SINGH AND OTHERS v. STATE 01' PUNJAB AND OTHERS - **Citation:** [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964-08-20 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ranill-singh-and-others-v-state-01-punjab-and-others-3263 - **Pages:** 14 ## Headnote RANill SINGH AND OTHERS v. STATE 01' PUNJAB AND OTHERS (And Connected Appeals) August 20, 1964 (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. I., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. c. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPAL.\ AYYANGAR IJ.) East Punjab Holdings (Con.rolidation and Pr.ventlon of Fragmtnla· lion) Act (50 of 1948) as amended by Punjab Act (27 of 1960) and the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act (I of 1954)-Validlty-- Constitution of India, 1950, Arrs. 19, 31 and 31-A. & a mult of procecdinp for consolidation of holdings in certain villages in Punjab, some lallds had been taken away from the propric· ton, reserved and given ·over to the village panchayats or allotted to aoni>roprietors, under powers derived from various enactments, namefy, the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmenta· tion) Act (L of 1948) as amended by Punjab Act (27 of 1960), the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act ( 4 of 1953) and the Punjab Village Commoo Lands (Regulation) Act (I of 1954). Under ·s. 7 of the last Act the proprietors were not entitled to any compensation. They challenged by writ petitions the •·alidity of the proceedings and the enactments undor which the proprietor's interest was acquired without ccimpensation as being in breach of Arts. 19(1)(() and 31 of the Constitution. The High Court di.roprietors, under powers derived from various enactments, namefy, the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmenta· tion) Act (L of 1948) as amended by Punjab Act (27 of 1960), the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act ( 4 of 1953) and the Punjab Village Commoo Lands (Regulation) Act (I of 1954). Under ·s. 7 of the last Act the proprietors were not entitled to any compensation. They challenged by writ petitions the •·alidity of the proceedings and the enactments undor which the proprietor's interest was acquired without ccimpensation as being in breach of Arts. 19(1)(() and 31 of the Constitution. The High Court di.trative duties on the Panchayat like sanitation, drainage, supply of water, looking after burial and cremation grounds, public health, providing schools, hospitals etc. and also emphasin:d- "(f) pounds for animals; F (n) the development of agriculture and village industries, and the destruction of weeds and pests; (o) starting and maintaining a grain fund for the cultivators and lending them seed for sowing purposes on such conditions as the Gram Panchayat may G approve. (q) allotment of places for preparation and conservation of manure; H (t) framing and carrying out schemes for the improved methods of cultivation and management of land to increase production." 18 SUPREME COUil? lll!PCtllTS I 1965) 1 3.C.R. Tho last was added in 19S4. In the &a.me year the legislature A enacted tho Punjab Village Common L'IDds (Regulation) Act' (I of 1954) with the object of regulating the rights in sluimlar deh and abadi deh. The provi5ions of the Common Lllnds Regulation Act resulted in the vesting of all rights of management in the sham/at deh in the village Panchayat and in the land in the abadi 4eh under a house owned by a non-proB prietor, in the non-proprietor ( s. 3). Section 4 provided: "All lands vested in a panchayat by virtue of the provisions of this Act shall. be utilised or disposed of by the panchayat for the benefit of the inhabitants of the village concerned, ·in the manner prescribed." C Section 6 provided : "Any income accruing from the use and occupation of the lands vested in a panchayat shall be credited to the panchayat fund and >hall be utilised in the manner prescribed." Finally, section 7 provided : "No person shall be entitled to any compensatioa fo• any loss su1fcred or alleged to have been suficmi &, a result of the coming into force of this Act." D The Common Lands Regulation Act was challenged in ttublm Singh v. State of Punjab(') but was upheld. The High Q)nn, E however, observed that Art. 31 ( 2) would have rendered the Act void but for the enactriient of Art. 31-A. The last Act to which a brief reference may be made is the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, (10 of 1953) &nd ita amendment by Act 57 of 1953 and Act 11 of 1955. By that F Act security of land tenures, fixing of areas for "self-cultivation" was provided and there was conferment of rights on tenants to purchase 11111ds undec thoir cultivation from the land-boldem. The validity of these Acts was challenged but they were upheld in Atma Ram v. Statl!' of P11njab( 2 ) to which we shall refer later. The appellants in this appeal bad filed a Civil Writ Petition G (No. 319 of 1961 ) contending that the distribution of sham/at lands was illegal and such lands, if they had to be redistrib~ted, could only be distributed among the proprietors but could not De given to non-proprietors. Grover J., who heard the petition dismissed it on the authority of Jagat Singh v. Punjab Statt('). Against bis order special leave was g.ranted by this Court and H (I) I.L.R. [t955] Pul\iab 1334. (2) [l9S9[ S.C.R. I Supp. 748. (3) t962 64 l'.L.lt. :Mt. .. ... ... ; . RANJIT v. STATE (llidayatullah I.) 89 A Civil Appeal No. 743 of 1963 is the result. The other two appeals- arise from other writ petitions. Writ Petition -No. 761 of 1957 (Civil Appeal No. 553 of 1962) was dismissed by Grover J. against whose decision a Letters Patent Appeal was filed. Writ Petition No. 454 of 1958 (Civil Appeal No. 554 of 1962) was heard by the Bench which heard the said Letters Patent B Appeal and both were dismissed on August 18, 1960. The High Court did not certify the judgments as fit for appeal but the appellants obtained special leave and Civil Appeals Nos. 553 and 554 of 1962 were filed. These appeals were heard together and they challenge the c correctness of the decision in lagat Singh's case(') and thus question the validity of the Amending Act 27 of 1960 because they contend it is in breach of Arts. 19 ( 1 )( f) and 31 of the Constitution. Rules 16(i) and (ii) are also challenged. They further challenge the Common Lands (Regulation) Act which is a part of the entire scheme. The High Court in /agat Singh's D case(') has held that Act 27 of 1960 gives retrospective validity to rules 16(i) and (ii) and the position which existed when M unsha Singh' s case (2) was decided does not obtain now. The High Court has also decided that Act 27 of 1960 is saved by Art. 31-A and the case of this Court in K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras(') which interpreted Art. 31-A, as amended by E the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 195$, is not applicable. In the appeals before us the same points are raised and the Common Lands (Regulation) Act is also challenged. These appeals were heard and closed for judgment on April 27, 1964 but as the Court went into vacation at the end of the F first week of May, judgment had to be postponed till after the vacation. The Court reassembled on July 20, 1964 but on June 20, 1964 the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, received the assent of the President. That amendment inter alia substituted retrospectively from January 26, 1950, a new sub-clause {a) in clause (2) of Art. 31-A and added a proviso G to cl. (1). These cases were decided in the Wgh Court under Art. 31-A as it was formerly. The appeals were set down to be mentioned on July 20/23, 1964 before a different Bench, and counsel were asked if, in view of the amendnl.ent, they wished to say anything. Surprisingly enough none of the parties wished to argue the appeals and though we cannot now refer to sub-cl. H (a) of cl (2) of Art 31-A as it was fomicrly, because that sub- (!} (1962) 64 P.L.R. 241. (2) 1.L.R. (1960) I PuD.iab 519. . (3) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887. !! 0 SCPREMP. COURT RF.PORTS [1965) l S.C.R. clause must be deemed to have never e:Wtcd, we are in the unA happy position of not being able to express any opinion on Art. 31-A as .it must be deemed to have been all the time. In view of the attitude of learned counsel the Bench before which the statements were made recorded the followin,; order:- "These appeals were set down for hearing tC'Clay to enable the learned counsel appearing for both the parties, B to argue whether the provisions of Arc. 31-A, as they have been amended by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1.964, had any relevance and bearing on the case which had been fully argued before another· Bench before this Court closed 'for C the summer vacation. The counsel appearing for both the parties made it clear that the amended provisions had no bearing and they wanted us to decide the said appeals without reference to the said amendment. The appeals will, therefore, be set down for judgment in due course." D The appeals thus remain to be decided on the old arguments though it is clear to us that the amendment of Art. 31-A, farreaching as it is, must have affected one or other of the partiei It seems that the implications of the amendment of the Constitution will have to be worked out in some other case. The short poi.lit which we think arises is this: whether ·the E transfer of sham/at deh owned by the proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purposes of management in the manner descn'bed above and the conferment- of proprietary rights on nonproprietors in respect of lands in abadi deh is illegal and the several provisions of law allowing this to be done are ultra vires F An. 31 inasmuch as no compensation is payable or whether the law and the action taken are protected by An. 31 cA? The argument of Mr. Bishan Narain in these appeals was that they were covered by the Kochuni case('). In that case this Court observed that the Madras Marumakkathyam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 was invalid by reason of Art. 19(1)(f) G inasmuch as it deprived a sthanee of his properties and vested them in the tanvad contrary to Art. 19( 1 )(f). It was also held (as has been correctly summaril5ed in the head-note) that it was not saved by Art. 31-A (as it then stood) because even if the stbnam properties held in janmam rights could be regarded as "estates", An. 31-A did not protect them since, properly construH ed, the article envisaged agrarian reform only and provided for the (I) (1960) 3 S.C.R. 88~. - . .. -. , . .• .ii RANJIT v. STATE (Hidayatullah 1.) 91 A acqumt10n, extinguishment, or modification of proprietary and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called the estate solely for that purpose. It was pointed out that although the -statement of objects and reasons could not properly be looked into for purposes of interpretation, it could be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the B time of the Fourth Amendment. . It was pointed out that Art. 31-A cl.(b) must be read with cl.(l)(a) and as the impugned Act did not contemplate any agrarian reform or seem to regulate the rights inter se between landlords and tenants or modify or extinguish any of the rights appertaining to janmam right, C leaving all the characteristics intact, it did · not come within the purview of Art. 31-A of the Constitution. In lagat Singh's case(') the Full Bench of five Judges agreed that the impugned provisions did come within the conception of agrarian reforms but conflicting views were expressed regarding the ambit of Art. 31-A as expounded in the Kochuni case(2). A D part of the statement of objects and reasons which accompanied the Fourth Amendment has been set out in the Kochuni case(2 ) · but from the lines of operations which were in contemplation in the proposed amendment only one appears to have been quoted there. Perhaps No. (ii) is also important to consider in this connection and it reads: E " (ii) The pro pet planning of urban and rural areas require the beneficial utilisation of. vacant and waste lands and the clearance of slum areas." Consolidation of holdings is really nothing more than a proper planning of· rural areas and this planning must of necessity take note of vacant and waste Ian~. While we do not seek to interF pret the impugned rules and Acts, nor even Art. 31-A of the Constitution with the aid· of this statement of Objects arid Reasons, for such a canon is not approved of in our practice, we have only completed the picture which to our minds emerges from these objects and state)nents, if they are at all considered relc:.- G vant for any purpose. In Kochuni case( 2) re.ference was made to Atma Ram v. Stat~ of Punjab c• > and the following passage was quoted to show that agrarian reform was the core of Art. 31-A:.- "Keeping in view the fact that Art. 31 cA was enacted by two successive amendmen~ne in 1951 (First H Amendment), and the second in 1955 (Fourth (I) (1962] 64 P.L.R 241. (2) (1960] 3 S.C.& 887. (3) (1959] S.C.R. I Supp. 748. . 92 SUPllEMB COURT REPORTS (196SJ I S.C.R. Amendment)-with retrospective effect, in order to A save legislation effecting agiarian refol'lll.1, we have every reason to hold that those expressio~ have been used in their widest amplitude, consistent with the purpose behind those amendments." The expres.siona from Art. 31-A which were given such wide B connotation were "any estate or of any rights therein" and "the extinguishment or modification of any such rights" occurri~g m Art. 31A(l). The Act there considered was the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act ( l 0 of 1953) as amended by Act 11 of 1955. It limitCd the area o~ land for "self cultivation", gave the tenants rights to purchase lands with them and in thi5 way C "modified" the rights of landlords. It also released excess land for redistribution. This was regarded to be· agrarian reform and thus within the protection of Art. 31-A. The obscrvatiom of this Court in Thakur Ragh11bir Singh's case( 1 ) were explained and were confined to the facts of that case. Article 31-A was appa0 rently not then viewed from the angle later adopted in the Kochuni case('), namely, that Art. 31-A was concerned with "tenures" as such. There is reason to think that the Kochuni case was re1arded on other occasions' too, as one decided on it• own facts. in Gangadhar Narayanrao Majumdar v. State of Bombay(1) in considering the words "estate" and "righls in an estate", the right E of an 11Nlmdw- under Bombay Acts Nos. II, VII of 1863 to appropriate to himself the difference between the full assessment and the quit rent was treated as a right in an estate and its u.tiopi!ltme\lt, Of modification. was considered lei protected by Art. 31-A. Similady, in RClm Narain MtiUii v, State of Bombay(') the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1956 J (which amende