# RanJJnjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and Others

- **Citation:** [1955] 1 S.C.R. 677
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954-09-16
- **Bench:** Mehr Chand Mahajan C. J
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ranjjnjaya-singh-v-baijnath-singh-and-others-376
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN
BosE and GHULAM
HASAN JJ.]
Cont-;mpt of Court-Court hearing a case-Leaflet distributed
by a party in
Court premises
during hearing-Language usedAtfecting the
fudges-Time and place of distribution-Hindering
or obstructing due administration of justice.
The petitioner was an applicant in one of the writ petitions
which had been filed in the Supreme Court challenging the validity
of U. P. Road J'ransport Act, 1951.
During the hearing of the
writ petitions a leaflet printed in the Hindi language and intituled
"Our Transport Department" purporting to be
written
by
the
petitioner was distributed in the
Court premises.
The leaflet
contained a graphic account of the harassment and indignity said
to have been meted out to the writer by the State officers and the
then State Minister of Transport in connection with the cancellation and eventual restoration of his license in respect of a
passenger bus.
1954
RanJJnjaya Singh
v.
Baijnath Singh
and Others.
Das].
1954
Octob1r 1.
1954
In ;1 HirtJ Lal
Dixit.
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The second paragraph at page 15 of that leaflet contains a
passage of which the following is the English translation :
"The public has full and firm faith in the Supreme Court, but
sources that are in the know say that the Government acts with
partiality in the matter of appointment of those Hon'ble Judges as
Ambassadors, Governors, High
Comn1issioners,
etc., who give
judgments against Govern1nent but this has so far not made any
difference in the firmness and justice of the Hon'ble Judges."
Held, (1) that the offending passage and the time and place of
its distribution tended to hinder or obstruct the due administration
of justice and was a contempt of Court.
(2) It was not fair com1nent on the proceedings
but an
attempt to prejudice the
Court
against the
State and to sir up
public feeling on the very question then pending for decision. The
manner in which the leaflets were distributed, the language used
in them and the timing of their publication could only have had
one object, namely, to try and influence the Judges in favour of the
petitioner and the others who were in the same position as himself.
This again was clear conte1npt of the Supreme Court.
(3) It is not necessary that there should in fact be an actual
interference with the course of administration of justice but it is
enough if the offending publication is likely or if it tends in any
way to interfere
\Vith the proper
administration of law.
Such
insinuations as were implicit in the passage in
question were
derogatory to the dignity of the Court and were calculated to
undermine the
confidence of the
people in the
integrity of the
Judges.
Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The
State of Uttar
Pradesh ((1953] S.C.R. 1169) referred to.
ORIGINAL
JurusDICTION : In
the
matter
of
the
Contempt of Court proceedings relating to the printing,
publishing and
circulation
of a pamphlet over the
name
of Hira
Lal
Dixit (General-Secretary,
Praja
Socialist Party, Mainpur) entitled "HAMARA VAHAN
VIBHAG" arising
out of (Civil) Petition No. 379 of
1953. (Hira Lal Dixit 11. The State of Uttar Pradesh).
The Attorney-General for India (P. A. Mehta, with
him) to assist the Court.
S. C. Issacs ( R. Patnaik and S. S. Shukla,
with
him) for respondent No. l (Hira Lal Dixit).
Moh an Lal Sexena and S. S. Shukla for respondent No. 2 (Kishore Dutta Paliwal).
S. S. Shukla for respondent No. 3 (Printer, Sainik
Press).
•
..
-
t
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
1954. October 1. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
DAs J.-This Rule was issued by this Court on the
16th
September, 1954, calling upon the respondents
to appear and show cause why they should not be
proceeded against for contempt of this Court.
It is desirable
to
mention at the outset the circumstances in which it became necessary for this Court
to issue this Rule. On the 14th September, 1954, there
were on that day's cause list for
hearing and final
<lisposal
two appeals,
being Appe

## Text

-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the
Act and the rules and the arguments advanced before
us we are of opinion that the appellant cannot in the
circumstances of this case be held to be guilty of any
corrupt practice under section 123(7) as alleged against
him. It follows from this that pot having incurred any
expenditure over and above what was shown by him in
his return of
election expenses he cannot be said to
have concealed
such
expenditure and,
therefore, he
cannot be held to have been guilty of any minor corrupt
practice under section 124(4) of the Act. In the view
we have ·taken, namely, that these extra men were not
employed or paid by
the appellant, it is unnecessary,
for the purpose of this appeal, to discuss the question
whether, if one's own
servants are also utilised or
employed in the conduct of the
election, their salary
for the. period they are so utilised or employed should
be regarded as election
expenses and shown in the
return. On that we prefer not to express any
opm1on
on this occasion. No other point having been raised we
allow this appeal with costs.
Appeal allowed.
In re HIRA LAL DIXIT AND TWO OTHERS
[MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN C. J.,
MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN
BosE and GHULAM
HASAN JJ.]
Cont-;mpt of Court-Court hearing a case-Leaflet distributed
by a party in
Court premises
during hearing-Language usedAtfecting the
fudges-Time and place of distribution-Hindering
or obstructing due administration of justice.
The petitioner was an applicant in one of the writ petitions
which had been filed in the Supreme Court challenging the validity
of U. P. Road J'ransport Act, 1951.
During the hearing of the
writ petitions a leaflet printed in the Hindi language and intituled
"Our Transport Department" purporting to be
written
by
the
petitioner was distributed in the
Court premises.
The leaflet
contained a graphic account of the harassment and indignity said
to have been meted out to the writer by the State officers and the
then State Minister of Transport in connection with the cancellation and eventual restoration of his license in respect of a
passenger bus.
1954
RanJJnjaya Singh
v.
Baijnath Singh
and Others.
Das].
1954
Octob1r 1.
1954
In ;1 HirtJ Lal
Dixit.
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The second paragraph at page 15 of that leaflet contains a
passage of which the following is the English translation :
"The public has full and firm faith in the Supreme Court, but
sources that are in the know say that the Government acts with
partiality in the matter of appointment of those Hon'ble Judges as
Ambassadors, Governors, High
Comn1issioners,
etc., who give
judgments against Govern1nent but this has so far not made any
difference in the firmness and justice of the Hon'ble Judges."
Held, (1) that the offending passage and the time and place of
its distribution tended to hinder or obstruct the due administration
of justice and was a contempt of Court.
(2) It was not fair com1nent on the proceedings
but an
attempt to prejudice the
Court
against the
State and to sir up
public feeling on the very question then pending for decision. The
manner in which the leaflets were distributed, the language used
in them and the timing of their publication could only have had
one object, namely, to try and influence the Judges in favour of the
petitioner and the others who were in the same position as himself.
This again was clear conte1npt of the Supreme Court.
(3) It is not necessary that there should in fact be an actual
interference with the course of administration of justice but it is
enough if the offending publication is likely or if it tends in any
way to interfere
\Vith the proper
administration of law.
Such
insinuations as were implicit in the passage in
question were
derogatory to the dignity of the Court and were calculated to
undermine the
confidence of the
people in the
integrity of the
Judges.
Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The
State of Uttar
Pradesh ((1953] S.C.R. 1169) referred to.
ORIGINAL
JurusDICTION : In
the
matter
of
the
Contempt of Court proceedings relating to the printing,
publishing and
circulation
of a pamphlet over the
name
of Hira
Lal
Dixit (General-Secretary,
Praja
Socialist Party, Mainpur) entitled "HAMARA VAHAN
VIBHAG" arising
out of (Civil) Petition No. 379 of
1953. (Hira Lal Dixit 11. The State of Uttar Pradesh).
The Attorney-General for India (P. A. Mehta, with
him) to assist the Court.
S. C. Issacs ( R. Patnaik and S. S. Shukla,
with
him) for respondent No. l (Hira Lal Dixit).
Moh an Lal Sexena and S. S. Shukla for respondent No. 2 (Kishore Dutta Paliwal).
S. S. Shukla for respondent No. 3 (Printer, Sainik
Press).
•
..
-
t
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
1954. October 1. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
DAs J.-This Rule was issued by this Court on the
16th
September, 1954, calling upon the respondents
to appear and show cause why they should not be
proceeded against for contempt of this Court.
It is desirable
to
mention at the outset the circumstances in which it became necessary for this Court
to issue this Rule. On the 14th September, 1954, there
were on that day's cause list for
hearing and final
<lisposal
two appeals,
being Appeal No. 182 of 1954
(Saghir Ahmad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others)
:and Appeal No. 183 of 1954 (Mirza Hasan Agha v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others). A large number of
writ petitions, 224 in number, under article 32 of the
Constitution
raising the satpe questions were also on
~e cause list for that day. Both
the
appellants and
all
the
petitioners
were
engaged
in carrying on
businesses as carriers of passengers and goods by motor
buses or lorries on different routes under licenses issued
by the State of Uttar Pradesh and in cases where the
route
passed into or through the
State
of
Delhi,
cow1ter-signed by that State. Some
of these persons
had originally been granted permanent permits by the
Regional Transport Authority. Pursuant to the policy
of nationalisation of road transport business the State
of Uttar Pradesh made declarations under section 3 of
the Uttar Pradesh 'State Road Transport Act, 1950, to
the effect that road transport services on certain routes
should be run and operated by the State Government
in the manner mentioned in the relevant declarations
and it also published
schemes bf road transport services
under section 4 of that
Act.
In furtherance
of its
object the
State Government began to serve notices on
the licensees to stop plying buses on specified routes.
The appellant
thereupon
applied
to
the Allahabad
High Court for a writ of mandamus directing the State
Government and its Minister of Transport to withdraw
the declaration made under section 3 of the Uttar
Pradesh Road Transport Act, 1950, in respect of their
respective routes and directing them and their officers
to refrain from proceeding further under sections 4 and
1954
In rt Hira Lal
Dixit.
Das],
1954
Jn· re Hira I.al
Dixit.
D41 J.
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
5 of that Act and not to interfere with the operation
of
their
respective
stage
carriages and
for
other
ancillary reliefs.
By
an order
made on the 17th
November, 1953, the Allahabad High Court dismissed
those applications. The two petitioners thereupon filed:
these two appeals in this Court after having obtained a
certificate from the Allahabad High Court under article
132(1) of the Constitution. The appellants
obtained
orders for stay of proceedings until the determination
of their appeals.
In view
of
the decision of the·
Allahabad
High
Court
many other persons holding
licenses
for plying motor
stage
carriages
or contract
carriages came direct to this Court with applications
under article 32 for appropriate writs and obtained:
interim stay. As. already stated, the two appeals and
all those numerous applications
were
posted
on the
·cause list
for
the 14th September, 1954,
for final
disposal. The respondent, Hira Lal Dixit,
was the
petitioner in one of those writ applications.
The tw<>
appeals were called on for hearing on that day and were
part-heard. The hearing continued for the whole of
the 15th and 16th September, 1954, and was concluded
on the 17th September, 1954, when the Court took time·
for considering its decision. The
Court has not yet
delivered its
judgment.
A large
number of persons,.
presumably the petitioners in the
writ petitions
or
otherwise interested therein, attended the Court un all
those dates, for the result of the decision of the appeals
would also conclude the writ petitions. It appears that
on the 15th September,
1954, a
leaflet printed in the·
Hindi language and c~aract~rs, consisting of 18 pages,
intituled "Hamara
Vahan
Vibhag"
meaning "Our·
Transport Department", purporting to
be written by
the respondent Hira Lal Dixit and containing a foreword purporting to be written by Sri Krishna Dutt
Paliwal and a block photqgraph of the respondent, Hira
Lal Dixit, on the front page was distributed in the
Court premises. The leaflet
contained
a graphic
account of the harassment and indignity said to have
been meted out to the writer by the State officers and
the then State Minister of Transport in connection with
the cancellation and eventual
restoration of his license
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-
...
~.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
in respect of a passenger bus. The
second paragraph
on page 15 of that leaflet contained a passage of which
the following is an English
translation prepared by an
advocate of this Court dulv authorised in that behalf-
"The public has full a~d firm faith in the Supreme
Court, but sources that are
in the know say that the
Government acts
with partiality in the
matter
of
appointment of those Hon'ble Judges as
Ambassadors,
Governors,
High
Commissioners, etc., who give judgments against
Government but this
has
so far not
made any difference in the firmness and justice of the
Hon'ble Judges."
The leaflet containing the above offending paragraph
having been brought to its notice the Court on the 16th
September, 1954, issued the present
rule
and sent a
copy of the rule to the Attorney-General for India.
All the respondents have been duly served. They
have filed affidavits and have appeared before us by
their respective advocates.
The respondent, Sri Krishna
Dutt Paliwal, the writer of the foreword; who was
present in
Court, made the
following statement to
the
Court
through
his
advocate. Sri
Mohan
Lal
Saksena :-
"When I wrote the foreword I did not go through
the whole manuscript.
I was only told that it dealt
\Vith the working of the Transport Control. Now that
my attention has been drawn to the passage objected
to I am sorry that I wrote a foreword to the· pamphlet
and I offer my apology to the Court. I never knew
that the pamphlet was intended for circulation and I
was not a party to its circulation."
One, Devendra Sharma. the General Manager of the
Sainik Press, Agra, where the offending leaflet was
printed, filed an affidavit on behalf of the respondent
Press stating that at the time when the leaflet had been
given to the Press for being printed he did not notice
the paragraph in question, that his
attention
was
drawn to it only after the service of the present Rule,
that he was sorry that it had been printed in the Press
and
that he never
had
the slightest intention of
cornnuttmg any contempt of this Court. In his affidavit
as well as
through his advocate, Sri S. Sukla, the
1954
In re Hira Lal
Dixit.
Das J.
1954
.Jn re Hita Lal
DV&it.
Dai J.
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
respondent Press represented by Devendra Sharma who
was present in Court tendered an unqualified apology
to the Court. In view of the statements made in Court
by the advocates of these two respondents this Court
accepts their apology and discharges the rule as against
them and nothing further need be said about them.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, Hira
Lal Dixit, strongly urged that the passage complained
of could not possibly be capable
of any derogatory
meaning or implication and could not be regarded as
constituting a contempt of
Court.
There are innumerable ways by which attempts can be made to hinder
or obstruct the due course of administration of justice
in Courts. One type of such interference is to be found
in cases were there is
an act or publication which
scandalises the
Court itself.
A situation of that type
was considered by this Court in the case of Brahma
Prakash
Sharma and Others v.
The State
of Uttar
Pradesh('), and the principles governing a case of that
typE were discussed and laid down in the judgment of
the Court. The present
case does not fall within that
category, for here there
has been no scandalising of
the Court itself.
The question here is
whether the
offending passage is of such character and import or
made in such circumstances as would tend to hinder
or
obstruct
or
intefere
with
the due course of
administration of justice by the Court. To begin with,
the leaflet
was written by a person who was himself
the petitioner in one of the writ petitions which were
on the cause list for hearing. The actual timing of the
publication of the leaflet is significant. It was circulated
at a time when
the appeal and the writ petitions
including that of the respondent, Hira Lal Dixit, himself
were posted on the cause list and the appeals, on the
decision of which depended the fate of those numerous
petitions,
were being
actually heard. The place of
publication was also not without significance.
It was
distributed in the Court premises where a very large
number
of licensees had
foregathered. The fact of
distribution of the leaflet in the Court premises was
denied in the affidavit of this respondent but when a
(') [1953] S. C. R. u69.
...
'
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
suggestion was made that evidence be recorded on this
point the learned counsel appearing
for him did not
press for it and accepted the position that the leaflet was
in ·fact
distributed
in the Court premises. In the
circumstances, the only other question that remains is
as to what was the meaning and purpose of the offending passage in the leaflet.
Learned counsel for the respondent, Hira Lal Dixit,
maintained that the passage in question
was perfectly
innocuous and
only
expressed a laudatory sentiment
towards the
Court and that such flattery
could not
possibly have the slightest effect on the minds of the
Judges of
this
august tribunal. We do not think
flattery was
the
sole
or even the main object with
which this passage was written or
with which it was
published at the time when the hearing of the appeals
was in progress. It no doubt begins with a declaration
of public faith in this Court but this is immediately
followed by other words
connected
with
the earlier
words by the significant conjunction "but." The words
that follow are to the effect
that sources that
are in
the know say that the Government acts with partiality
in the matter
of appointment
of those
Judges as
Ambassadors,
Governors,
High Commissioners,
etc.,
who give judgments against
the
Government. The
plain
meaning of these words is that the Judges who
decide against the
Government do not get these high
appointments.
The necessary
implication
of
these
words is that the Judges who decide in favour of the
Government are rewarded by the Government with
these appointments. The attitude of the Government
is thus depicted surely with a purpose and that purpose
cannot but be to raise in the rninds of the reader a
feeling
that the
Government,
by holding out high
hopes of future employment, encourages the Judges to
give decisions
in its favour. This insinuation is made
manifest by the words that follow, namely,
"this has
so far not made any difference in the firmness
and
justice of the Hon'ble Judges." The linking up of these
words with the preceding words by the
conjunction
"but" brings into relief the real significance and true
meaning of the earlier words. The
passage read as a
1954
lnre Hira Lat
Dixit.
Das].
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1954
whole
clearly
amounts to this : "Government
dis-
~.,. Hira Lal
favours
Judges who
give
decisions against it but
Dixit.
favours those Judges with high appointments
who
Das J.
decide in its favour : that although this is
calculated
to tempt
Judges to give judgments in favour of the
Government it has so far not made any difference in
the firmness and justice of the Judges." The words "so
far" are significant.
What, we ask, was
the purpose
of writing this passage and what was the object of the
distribution
of the
leaflet in the Court premises at a
time when the Court was in the midst of hearing the
appeals ?
Surely, there was hidden in the offending
passage a warning that although the Judges have "so
far" remained
firm
and resisted the temptation of
deciding cases in favour of Government in expectation
of
getting high
appointments.
nevertheless, if they
decide in favour of the Government on this occasion
knowledgeable
people
will know
that
they
had
succumbed to the temptation and had given judgment
in favour of the Government in expectation of future
reward in the shape of high appointments of the kind
mentioned in the
passage. The obiect of writing this
paragraph and particularly of publishing it at the time
it was actually done was quite clearly to
2ffect
the
minds of the Judges and to deflect them from the
strict
performance
of
their
duties. The
offending
passage
and the time and place of its
publication
certainly tended to hinder or obstruct the due administration of justice and is a cantempt of Court.
These is another aspect of the matter. Even if the
passage about the Judges were not in the leaflet the
rest would still amount to a serious contempt of Court.
There is in it a strong denunication of the State of
Uttar Pradesh, a party to the appeal and the petitions,
regarding the very matters then ·under the consideration of this Court.
It was not fair comment on the
proceedings but an attempt to
prejudice the. Court
against the
State and to stir up public feeling
on the
very question then pending for decision.
The manner
in which the leaflets
were distributed, the language
used in them and the timing of their publication could
only have had one object, namely, to try and influence
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•
..
-
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
the Judges in favour of the petitioner and the others
1954
who were in the same position as himself. This
agam
In re Hira Lal
is a clear contempt of this Court.
Dixit.
It is well established, as was said by this C,ourt in
Das J.
Brahma
Prakash
Sharma and Others v. The State of
Uttar
Pradesh (supra), that it is not necessary that
there should in fact be an actual interference with the
course
of administration of justice
but that it
is
enough if the offending publication is likely or if it tends
in any way to interfere with the proper administration of law.
Such insinuations as are implicit in the
passage in question are derogatory to the dignity of the
Court and are calculated to undermine
the
confidence
of the people in the integrity of the Judges. Whether
the passage is read as fulsome flattery of the Judges of
this
Court or is read as
containing the insinuations
mentioned
above
or the rest of
the
leaflet which
contains •an attack on a party to the
pending proceedings is taken separately it is equally contemptuous of
the
Court in that the object of writing it and the time
and place of its publication were, or
were calculated,
to deflect the Court from performing its
strict duty,
either by flattery or by a veiled threat or warning or
by creating prejudice in its mind against
the
State.
We are, therefore, clearly of opinion and we hold that
the respondent, Hira Lal Dixit, by writing the leaflet
and in particular
the passage in
question
and
by
publishing it at the time and place he did has committed
a gross
contempt of this Court and the qualified
apology contained in his affidavit and repeated by
him
through
his
counsel
cannot
be taken as
sufficient
amends for his misconduct.
It should no doubt be constantly borne in mind that
the summary jurisdiction exercised by superior Courts
in punishing contempt of their authority exists for the
purpose of preventing interference with
the course of
justice and for maintaining the authority of law as
is administered in the
Court and
thereby
affording
protection
to public
interest in the purity
of the
administration
of justice.
This is certainly an extraordinary power which must be sparingly exercised but
where the public interest demands it,
the
Court will
19:;4
In re Hira Lal
Dixit.
Das .7.
19:;4
October I.
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
not shrink from exercising it and imposing punishment
even by way of imprisonment, in cases where a mere
fine may not be adequate.
After anxious consideration
we have come to the
conclusion that in all the circumstances of this case it
is a fit case where
the power of the Court should be
exercised and that it is necessary to impose the punishment of imprisonment.
People must
know that they
cannot with impunity hinder or obstruct or attempt to
hinder or. obstruct the due course of administration of
justice.' We, therefore, find respondent, Hira Lal Dixit,
guilty of contempt
of
Court, make the Rule absolute
as
against him and direct that he be arrested and
committed
to civil
prison
to
undergo
simple
imprisonment for a fortnight.
He must also pay the
costs, if any, incurred by the Union of India.
Order accordingly.
R. M. SESHADRI
ti.
THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, TANJORE,
AND ANOTHER.
[MEHR
CHAND
MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs,
VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASSAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 19(1)(g) -Cinematograph Act (II of
1918), s, 8-0wner of cinema theatre-Granted license-Conditions
-Restrictions-Whether reasonable.
The appellant, the owner of a permanent cinema theatre in the
Tanjore District, was granted a license by the District Magistrate,
Tanjore, subject to certain conditions imposed by him in pursuance
of 2 notifications (G. 0. Mis. 1054, Home, dated 28th March, 1948,
and G. 0. Mis. 3422 dated 15th September, 1948) issued by the
State of Madras purporting to act iQ exercise of powers conferred
by s. 8 of the Cinematograph Act (II of 1918).
The impugned conditions inter alia were as follows :-
"4( a) The licensee shall exhibit
at each
performance one or
more approved films of such length and for such length of time, as
the Provincial
Government or the Central Government may, by
general or special order, direct.
, .
•
•
•