# RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS

- **Citation:** [2016] 9 S.C.R. 373
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2016-11-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 11307 of2016
- **Bench:** Jagdish Singh Khehar, Arun Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ravindra-ramchandra-waghmare-v-indore-municipal-corporation-ors-31469
- **Pages:** 90

## Headnote

Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956:
A
B
s.305 - Rapid Transport System - BRTS corridor scheme for
improvement of public transport system - Widening of public roads
C
for BRTS corridor - Action taken by Municipal Corporation u/s.305
for removal of building projecting beyond regular line of public
street -
Propriety of. challenged by land owners - Held: The
opening part of s.305(1) and latter part after clause (b) make it
clear that a building or a part of the portion which projects into the
periphery of regular line of public street can be removed - The
D
provisions of s.305 cast a mandate upon the Corporation to remove
whatever is projecting beyond the regular line of public street - No
fault in action taken by Corporation.
s.305 - Deemed vesting - Held: The vesting takes place, as
soon as the building is removed or notice is served for the building
E
to be set back - As soon as the building or the projecting part is
removed or when the Corporation issues a notice when such rebuilding shall be set back or to the front line, the line added by
such action by setting back or removal, shall henceforth without
any further formalities, be deemed to be a part of public street and
F
shall vest in the Corporation - Vesting does not depend upon the
volition of the owner - Considering the deeming fiction in s.305
and y'!_stinf{ provision, de jure and de facto possession automatically
vest in the Corporation on the happening of the exigencies as
provided in s.305 - Municipalities - Expropriatory legislation -
Interpretation of statute.
G
s.305 - No specific provision for taking over possession -
Held: By deeming fiction, vesting takes place, as such there was no
necessity of specific provision for taking over of the possession
that is implicit in the deeming part and vesting of the property by
373
H
374
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016] 9 S.C.R.
legal fiction.
ss.305, 306, 387 - Compensation - Relevant provisions in
the Act - Held: s.387 provides for procedure in case compensation
determined u/s.306 is not acceptable - Dissatisfied claimants can
resort to s.387 which require determination of dispute by Panchayat/
arbitration, and in case arbitration fails, parties can approach the
District Court ll'hich shall follow the procedure provided in Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - The provision of s.387 is very wide and
covers all the cases in ll'hich an agreement is not arrived at with
respect lo compensation or damages which are under the Act directed
to be paid - s.387 would cover the provisions of compensation
payable under ss.305 and 306 of the Act of 1956 - ss.305 and 306
use the expression 'reasonable compensation has to be paid· which
would mean, reasonable on the principle acceptable in accordance
with law -
Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
ss.305, 78, 79 - Public street - Acquisition whether can be
resorted u/ss. 78, 79 - Held: The language of s.305 is plain, simple
and clear - The exigencies when the notice can be issued including
the vesting part and deeming fiction are very clear - There is no
omission or lacunae, much less casus omissus in the provisions
contained in s.305 of the Act - lf the provision as lo public street is
made dependent upon the acquisition of land. the very purpose
behind the provisions of s.305 would be frustrated - Development
plan once prepared is binding upon the Development Authorities in
the planning area as well as on the Municipal Corporation and the
local authorities and all concerned including owners -
lf the land
falls in a regular line of public street. 110 construction can be raised
and no projection can be made by 011•11er whereas it can be removed
or set back, as the case may be - 111 case acquisition is resorted to
under ss. 78 and 79, public street can never be widened and the
entire purpose of preparation of Development Plan shall stand
defeated.
s.305 - Removal of building falling in regular line of public
street - Applicability of Maxim "Generalia specialibus non derogant
and

## Text

_Characters 0–39,902 of 214,765. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39902 for what follows._

[2016] 9 S.C.R. 373
RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE
v.
INDORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 11307 of2016)
NOVEMBER 29, 2016
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND ARUN MISHRA, JJ.]
Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956:
A
B
s.305 - Rapid Transport System - BRTS corridor scheme for
improvement of public transport system - Widening of public roads
C
for BRTS corridor - Action taken by Municipal Corporation u/s.305
for removal of building projecting beyond regular line of public
street -
Propriety of. challenged by land owners - Held: The
opening part of s.305(1) and latter part after clause (b) make it
clear that a building or a part of the portion which projects into the
periphery of regular line of public street can be removed - The
D
provisions of s.305 cast a mandate upon the Corporation to remove
whatever is projecting beyond the regular line of public street - No
fault in action taken by Corporation.
s.305 - Deemed vesting - Held: The vesting takes place, as
soon as the building is removed or notice is served for the building
E
to be set back - As soon as the building or the projecting part is
removed or when the Corporation issues a notice when such rebuilding shall be set back or to the front line, the line added by
such action by setting back or removal, shall henceforth without
any further formalities, be deemed to be a part of public street and
F
shall vest in the Corporation - Vesting does not depend upon the
volition of the owner - Considering the deeming fiction in s.305
and y'!_stinf{ provision, de jure and de facto possession automatically
vest in the Corporation on the happening of the exigencies as
provided in s.305 - Municipalities - Expropriatory legislation -
Interpretation of statute.
G
s.305 - No specific provision for taking over possession -
Held: By deeming fiction, vesting takes place, as such there was no
necessity of specific provision for taking over of the possession
that is implicit in the deeming part and vesting of the property by
373
H
374
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016] 9 S.C.R.
legal fiction.
ss.305, 306, 387 - Compensation - Relevant provisions in
the Act - Held: s.387 provides for procedure in case compensation
determined u/s.306 is not acceptable - Dissatisfied claimants can
resort to s.387 which require determination of dispute by Panchayat/
arbitration, and in case arbitration fails, parties can approach the
District Court ll'hich shall follow the procedure provided in Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - The provision of s.387 is very wide and
covers all the cases in ll'hich an agreement is not arrived at with
respect lo compensation or damages which are under the Act directed
to be paid - s.387 would cover the provisions of compensation
payable under ss.305 and 306 of the Act of 1956 - ss.305 and 306
use the expression 'reasonable compensation has to be paid· which
would mean, reasonable on the principle acceptable in accordance
with law -
Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
ss.305, 78, 79 - Public street - Acquisition whether can be
resorted u/ss. 78, 79 - Held: The language of s.305 is plain, simple
and clear - The exigencies when the notice can be issued including
the vesting part and deeming fiction are very clear - There is no
omission or lacunae, much less casus omissus in the provisions
contained in s.305 of the Act - lf the provision as lo public street is
made dependent upon the acquisition of land. the very purpose
behind the provisions of s.305 would be frustrated - Development
plan once prepared is binding upon the Development Authorities in
the planning area as well as on the Municipal Corporation and the
local authorities and all concerned including owners -
lf the land
falls in a regular line of public street. 110 construction can be raised
and no projection can be made by 011•11er whereas it can be removed
or set back, as the case may be - 111 case acquisition is resorted to
under ss. 78 and 79, public street can never be widened and the
entire purpose of preparation of Development Plan shall stand
defeated.
s.305 - Removal of building falling in regular line of public
street - Applicability of Maxim "Generalia specialibus non derogant
and Generalibus specialia derogant" - Held: Recourse to the provisions
of acquisition under ss. 78 and 79 is clearly ousted by the special
provision contained in s.305 of the Act of 1956-,- Being a special
provision with respect to maintaining a regular line of a public street
RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE
375
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.
which has been carved out by the Legislature under s.305 of the
A
Act of 1956, it would prevail upon the general provisions with respect
to acquisition of land as provided in ss. 78 and 79 thereof - Madhya
Pradesh Town and Country Planning Act, 1973 - s.56 - Maxims.
ss.305, 306, 387 - Computation of compensation - Held: The
provisions of ss.305 and 306 cannot be read in isolation - They
B
have to be read with wholesome provision of s.387 and what is
contemplated under s. 387 has to be taken to be the principle of
reasonable compensation even in ss.305 and 306 - The principles
laid down in ss.305, 306 and 387 are quite reasonable - Reasonable
compensation is payable by the Corporation for building or part C
thereof excluding the land under proviso to s.305(1) and
compensation for inclusion of land in public street is payable under
s.306(3) of the Act- There is no ground to read down the provisions
- Holl' the compensation is to be worked out at the appropriate
stage, is the outcome of the authorities concerned and the job of
the arbitrator/District Court, as the case may be - Appellants are at D
liberty to raise the question with respect to the adequacy of
compensation and how the provision of s.387 has to be interpreted
and what would be the just compensation at the appropriate stage
of datermination of compensation.
s.387 - Compensation - s.387(5) empower the Corporation
to take possession after determination of compensation by arbitrator
or by District Court - Applicability of s.387(5) in case of deemed
vesting - Held: The provisions contained in s.387(5) would be
applicable only to the acquisition resorted to under ss. 78 and 79,
and not to a case which is covered by the special provisions
contained in s.305 where the vesting is deemed to be by operation
of law and as soon as there is deemed vesting, the area shall vest in
the Corporation and it shall be deemed to be a part of public
street - Thus, the provision of s.387(5) is not attracted when it is
deemed to be part of the public street on vesting in the Corporation.
E
F
Compensation - Delayed payment of compensation - BRTS G
corridor project - When no time limit is fixed for payment of
compensation, it has to be all'arded within a 'reasonable time' -
Law envisages speedy action without unreasonable delay and that
is what is expected of the concerned authorities, in respect of the
obligation imposed on them to be discharged - Municipalities.
H
376
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2016] 9 S.C.R.
Constitution of India:
Art.14 - Vires of s.305 of 1956 Act - Held: The provision of
s.305 when it deals with the public streets and removal of building
falling in regular line is a wholesome one and being a special
provision, based on classification made for the purpose of s.305 as
to public street cannot be said to be suffering from vice or
discrimination and violative of Art. 14 - The procedure under s.305
of the Act of 1956 cannot be said to be onerous or harsh and it
cannot be tested on the anvil of provisions of s. 78179 of the Act of
1956 or s.56 of the Act of 1973 - Madhya Pradesh Town and
Country Planing Act, 1973 - s.56 - Madhya Pradesh Municipal
Corporation Act, 1956 - s.305.
Art.300A - Scope of - Held: Art.300A enables the State to
put restrictions on the right to property but the same should not be
arbitrary or excessive or beyond what is required in public interest -
The imposition of restriction must not be disproportionate to a
D situation or statute -
Legislation providing for deprivation of
property under Art.300A must be just, fair and reasonable.
E
F
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: In re: Provisions of the Act of 1973: 1. The
provisions of Act of 1973 show that the development plan once
prepared is binding upon the development authorities in the
planning area as well as on the Municipal Corporation and other
local authorities as the case may be. They cannot modify and
permit the user in contravention thereof. In other words,
restriction is imposed upon the owners on enjoyment of the
property in violation of the development plan/regional plan, as
the case may be. Three different provisions are contained in the
Act of 1973 for preparation of regional plan, development plan
(master plan) and town development scheme. The regional plan
is prepared by the State Government. Development plan is
G prepared as per the provisions contained in Chapter IV, sections
13 to 19. Town development scheme can be framed by the
development authorities and it may declare its intention to do so
with the prior approval of the State Government. [Paras 20, 23)
[402-C-D; 403-H;404-A-B]
In re : Town Planning Scheme of the Act of 1956:
H
RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE
377
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.
2. Section 291 of the Act of 1956 enjoins upon the Municipal A
Corporation to prepare town planning scheme. In case the
scheme has been sanctioned under the provisions of Town
Improvement Act, it is provided by section 292 of the Act of 1956
that no town planning scheme shall be made by the Corporation.
It is apparent that section 292 of the Act of 1956 refers to Town
B
Improvement Act which was in vogue in different areas of
erstwhile Madhya Pradesh which has ultimately consolidated the
different Acts into the M.P. Town Improvement Trust Act, 1960.
The Act of 1960 provided for various improvement schemes under
section 30. The Act of 1960 has ceased to be operative in the
areas, once the Act of 1973 has been made applicable by C
establishing the authorities under the provisions of sections 38
to 40. The expression 'scheme' in section 292 has to be taken to
mean the regional plan, development plan and also to any scheme
under section 49 framed under the Act of 1973. The provision is
not confined to a scheme prepared under sections 49 and 50 of D
the Act of 1973. There cannot be two schemes for the same area.
[Paras 24, 25)(404-C; 407-B-F]
In re : Scope of power of Corporation under Section 305 :
3.1 Section 305 deals with the power of Corporation to
regulate line of buildings. If any part of the building falls within
the regular line of a public street either existing or as determined
for the future or beyond the front of immediately adjoining
building, the Corporation may issue a notice either that part which
is projecting or some portion of the part projecting, shall be
removed or that when the building is rebuilt, the p-0rtion
projecting shall be set back to and the portion of the land added
to the street by such "setting back or removal'', shall henceforth
be deemed to be part of the public street and shall vest in the
Corporation. The words 'that the part or some portion of the
part projecting beyond the regular line' of the public street may
be: (a) greater portion of such building which has not fallen down;
or (b) that projecting part is verandah, step or some other
structure external to the main building; or (c) whenever any
material portion or such material part has been taken down,
burned down or has fallen down. All these exigencies are covered
in the ken of section 305(1). Section 305 only contemplates
E
F
G
H
378
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016] 9 S.C.R.
issuance of a notice, in the case of a public street that the part
projecting is beyond the regular line of public street and is greater
portion or material portion of such building or external portion
to the main building, shall be removed. It has to intimate its
intention to remove the structure. In case any portion of such
material part has been taken down, burned down or has fallen
down, the Corporation may require by notice such portion shall
be set back to. [Para 29][409-G-H; 410-A-D]
3.2 Section 305 is a wholesome provision with respect to
maintaining the regular line of a public street, existing or as
determined for the future, it clearly empowers the Corporation
to intimate its intention to remove that part of the structure
projecting beyond the regular line of public street under section
305. The primary statutory mandate is on Corporation to act for
removal. Obviously, its power to remove is apparent from plain
language otherwise the provision will be of no utility. The point
when the notice can be issued is clearly culled out in section 305.
In the case of clause (a) when the projecting part is external to
the main building such as verandah, step etc. then notice can be
issued at any time and two points of happening of exigencies are
provided separately in clause (b) : first, whenever projecting part
is not an external structure but is a greater portion of such building
and it projects beyond the regular line of public street and second
exigency provided in clause (b) has to be read as "whenever any
material portion of such projecting part has been taken down or
burned down or has fallen down". [Para 30][410-E-H]
3.3 Even in clause (b) of section 305, 'removal' is
contemplated and is not confined to a case under clause (a). The
Legislature has used two expressions : "whenever greater portion
of such building" and secondly "whenever any material portion
of projecting part has been taken down or burned down or has
fallen down", which means that clause (b) clearly fixes the time
for action that 'whenever' projecting part of greater portion of
such building is projecting beyond the regular line of public street,
removal can be made or 'whenever' material portion of such
projecting part has been taken down, burned down or fallen down,
it has to be set back and part which has not fallen down, has to be
removed. The removal is contemplated even in the latter exigency
RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.
of clause (b) when material portion of such part has been taken
down, burned down or fallen down, still some portion other than
'material portion' projecting in line may require removal which
has not been taken down, fallen down or burned down. It is not
that the expression that entire building projecting in regular line
of public street has been taken down, burned down or fallen down.
The expression in the latter part of clause (b) is taken down,
fallen down or burned down is not related to the entire projecting
part. Thus the earlier part "whenever greater portion of such
building" is projecting beyond the regular line of public street,
has to be read with respect to a building which has not fallen
down, taken down or burned down. The word 'or' in section
305(l)(b) used between greater portion of such building or
whenever any material portion of such building has to be read
disjunctively. Nonetheless 'removal' is contemplated in all the
exigencies. In case it has been taken down, burned down or fallen
down, it may require the material portion to be set back and
remaining portion can be removed in the latter exigency of clause
(b) itself. A notice can be issued by the Corporation for removal
of the existing structure also. The opening part of section 305(1)
and its latter part after clause (b) make it abundantly clear that a
building or a part of the portion which projects into the periphery
of regular line of public street, can be removed. The interpretation
suggested on behalf of the appellants that in case the building
has been taken down, burned down or fallen down, only in that
exigency action can be taken under section 305(b) and not
otherwise, would render the provision contained in section 305
and the provision as to public street in the development plan
otiose. Where an adjudicatory process is involved, person can
show sufficient cause why the building or work shall not be
removed, altered or pulled down but in the cases falling within
the purview of section 305, there is no such adjudicatory process
or discretion provided. [Paras 31, 32 and 34][411-A-H; 412-C)
3.4. Section 309 deals with the provisions regarding
building unfit for human habitation. In that eventuality certain
procedure is specified. There is absolutely no ground to accept
the submission that the procedure prescribed under section 309
or the provisions thereof should guide the interpretation of
379
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
380
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016] 9 S.C.R.
A section 305 and for similar reason the provisions contained in
sections 310 and 313 relating to dangerous building and removal
of building material from any places in certain cases which may
be considered harming or breeding places for riot or other source
of danger or nuisance to the occupier, then a notice shall be
B
required to be issued; and on failure the Commissioner is
empowered to remove; whereas the provisions of section 305
cast a mandate upon the Corporation to remove whatever is
projecting beyond the regular line of public street. The
intendment of these provisions is different, hence render no help
or guide so as to interpret the provisions of section 305. In fact
C when all the provisions are considered, the interpretation of
section 305 is fortified that it primarily mandates the Corporation
to take action of removal on satisfaction of exigencies specified
therein. [Para 35][412-F-H; 413-AJ
In re : Possession/deemed to be part of public street and vesting
D
under section 305 of the Act of 1956:
E
F
4. Coming to question as to when vesting takes place. As
soon as the building or the projecting part has been removed or
when the Corporation has issued a notice when such re-building
shall be set back or to the front line, the line added by such action
by setting back or removal, shall henceforth without any further
formalities, be deemed to be a part of public street and shall vest
in the Corporation. Vesting does not depend upon the volition of
the owner. Otherwise no public street can ever be brought in
regular line. The Corporation has the power to remove. As
deemed vesting is provided under Section 305, as such there is
no requirement of separate provision for taking possession. For
removal there is specific provision and adequate safeguards have
been provided for fixing the regular line of a public street while
preparing the development plan or the town development
scheme, as the case may be. In removal of the building under
G section 305 of the Act of 1956, it is implicit that once removal is
made, vesting follows and possession stands transferred as part
of public street. When considering the deeming fiction in section
305 and vesting provision, de jure and de-facto possession
automatically vested in the Corporation on the happening of the
exigencies as provided in section 305. [Paras 36, 38)(413-B-D;
H
RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE
381
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.
415-G, HJ
A
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram 2013 (2) SCR 301 :
(2013) 4 sec 280 - Distinguished.
Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors.
(1953) SCR 533; Pw~jab Land Development &
Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Chandif{arh 1990 (3) SCR 111 : (1990)
3 SCC 682; Union of India & Anr. v. Deoki Nandan
Aggarwal (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 323; Padma Sundara
Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of T. N. & Ors. 2002 (2)
SCR 383 : (2002) 3 SCC 533 - referred to.
Jones v. Wrotham Park Settled Estates & Anr. (1979) 1
AER 286; Inca Europe Ltd & Ors. v. First Choice
Distribution (a firm) & Ors. (2000) 2 AER 109 -
referred to.
B
c
In re : Section 78/79 of the Act of 1956 and Section 56 of the Act D
of 1973 :
5.1 Private street means a street which is not a public street.
Public street means any street over which the public have a right
of way or which have been leveled, paved, metalled, asphatled,
channeled, sewered or repaired out of municipal or other public
funds or which under the provisions of the Act, becomes a public
street as provided in section 330 and which includes the roadway
over any public bridge or causeway, footway attached to any such
street, public bridge or causeway; and the drains attached thereto.
Street means any road, footway, square, court alley or passage,
accessible whether permanently or temporarily to the public.
Public street and private street are separately defined - though
the public street may also include any street provided in section
5(49) but every street is not a public street and private street is
a street which is not a public street. Any street may be declared
E
F
to be public street under the provisions of section 330. In the G
exigencies as provided in sub-section (1) ;thereof and
Commissioner may also after inviting objections, declare a street
or part of the same to be public street, and an appeal is provided
against the decision. Under Section 305, the power is conferred
on the Municipal Corporation to remove building or any part of H
382
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016] 9 S.C.R.
A the building beyond the regular line of a "public street"; whereas
the provisions contained in section 79(3) is with respect to a new
street or for widening or improving an existing street. There is
difference when there is a public street line, the special provision
contained in section 305 is attracted. The recourse to the
B
c
provisions of acquisition under sections 78 and 79 is clearly ousted
by the special provision contained in Section 305 of the Act of
1956. Being a special provision with respect to maintaining a
regular line of a public street which has been carved out by the
Legislature under section 305 of the Act of 1956, would prevail
upon the general provisions with respect to acquisition of land as
provided in sections 78 and 79 thereof.[Para 49][424-C-H; 425A]
Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram AKarwal 2003 (1) SCR 634 :
(2003) 2 sec 577 - referred to.
"The Principles of Statutory Interpretation" by G.P.
D
Singh, 13•h Edn. 2012, Chapter 2 - referred to.
E
F
5.2 Ji is apparent that the maxims Gener"li" speci"/ibus non
derogant and Generalibus speci"li" derogant have to be applied in
particular situations. If a particular provision is made on a certain
matter, that matter is excluded from the general provision. Even
assuming that public street is also a street, considering the special
provisions contained in section 305, recourse can be had to the
provision without having adverting to the procedure prescribed
under sections 78 and 79 of the Act and the compensation in the
case of action is taken under section 305 is provided under
proviso to section 305 and section 306 read with section 387 to
which the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have been
made applicable for determination. Section 387 provides for
procedure in case compensation determined under section 306
is not acceptable, dissatisfied claimants can have resort to section
387 which require determination of dispute by Panchayat/
G arbitration, and in case arbitration fails, parties can approach the
District Court which shall follow the procedure provided in Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. The provision of section 387 is very wide
and covers all the cases in which an agreement is not arrived at
with respect to compensation or damages which are under the
Act directed to be paid. Section 387 would cover the provisions
H
RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE
383
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.
of compensation payable under sections 305 and 306 of the Act A
of 1956. Sections 305 and 306 use the expression 'reasonable
compensation has to be paid' which would mean, reasonable on
the principle acceptable in accordance with law.[Paras 50, 51)(427C, E-H; 428-A)
Venkateshwar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh
B
AIR 1966 SC 828 : 1966 SCR 172; C.lT. Patiala v.
Shahzada Nand & Sons AIR 1966 SC 1342 : 1966
SCR 379; State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramajibhai
Danabhai 1979 (3) SCR 788 : (1979) 3 SCC 347; State
of Bihar v. Yogendra Singh 1982 (3) SCR 332 : (1982)
1 SCC 664; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary
C
and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh
Kumar Sheth (1984) 4 SCC 27 - referred to.
5.3 The submission raised by the appellants that for
acquisition of land, sections 78 and 79 should be resorted to for
the purposes mentioned in section 305 cannot be accepted for
D
yet another reason, if the provision as to public street is made
dependent upon the acquisition of land, the very purpose behind
the provisions of section 305 would be frustrated as well as the
public interest, there is already a regular line of public street
fixed under development plan and is binding under section 19(5)
and section 25 of the Act of 1973. Various rights of ownership
which ordinarily vest in an owner, are restricted by the regional
plan, development plan or the town development scheme, as the
case may be. User of the owner's land, property cannot be in
derogation to any of them. Development plan is binding upon the
Corporation and local authorities and all concerned including the
owners. Though they can transfer the property but subject to
such restrictions which the property will carry with it. If the land
falls in a regular line of public street, no construction can be raised,
no projection can be made by owner whereas it can be removed
E
F
or set back, as the case may be. In case acquisition is resorted to
under sections 78 and 79, public street can never be widened G
and the entire purpose of preparation of Development Plan shall
stand defeated. [Para 52)[428-B-E)
In re : Development Plan and Town Planning Scheme :
6. Section 305 is a reasonable method of acquisition of the
property and it follows a detailed procedure for preparation of H
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016] 9 S.C.R.
A development plan/master plan or a town improvement scheme,
as the case may be, which involves adjudicatory process and once
action is taken under section 305, reasonable compensation
follows, special procedure as prescribed, is a complete Code in
itself and even if a person is not satisfied, he can claim adjudication
B
c
under section 387 where the procedure of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 is applicable. Development plan has to be implemented
by the Corporation not only under the provisions of section 292
but also under the provisions of section 66(1)(y) of the Act of
1956 which mandates a duty upon the Corporation for fulfilling
any obligation imposed by the Act or under any other law for the
time being in force. Thus Corporation while taking action, is simply
carrying out the mandate of sections 19(5), 25 and other
provisions of the Act of1973. Framing of the scheme under section
291 is precluded by virtue of the provisions of section 292, in
view of the existence of development plan which is final as to
D width of road or town development scheme, as the case may be.
Applying the rule of strict construction, the action is permissible
under the provisions of section 305 as the Corporation has
implemented the provisions of development plan, it is bound to
implement the development plan prepared after following the
exhaustive procedure consistent with the principles of natural
E
justice, and is in the larger public interest.(Paras 57, 60 and
61)(432-A-C; 433-B-C, E; 436-G-H)
F
In re : Vires of sections 305 and 306 of the Act of 1956 :
7.1 The provision of section 305 when it deals with the
public streets and removal of building falling in regular line is a
wholesome one and being a special provision, based on
classification made for the purpose of section 305 as to public
street cannot be said to be suffering from vice or discrimination
and violative of Article 14. The procedure under section 305 of
the Act of 1956 cannot be said to be onerous or harsh and it
a cannot be tested on the anvil of provisions of section 78/79 of the
Act of 1956 or section 56 of the Act of 1973. [Para 64)[444-A-BJ
H
Nagpur Improvement Trust & Am: v. Vithal Rao & Ors.
1973 (3) SCR 39 : (1973) 1 sec 500 -
held
inapplicable.
RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE
385
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.
7.2 Article 300A enables the State to put restrictions on A
the right by law but the same should not be arbitrary or excessive
or beyond what is required in public interest. The imposition of
restriction must not be disproportionate to a situation or statute.
Legislation providing for deprivation of property under Article
300A must be just, fair and reasonable. Thus, it cannot be said B
that illusory compensation is provided under section 306 read
with section 387. [Para 67)(448-F-G]
Rajiv Sarin & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. 2011
(9) SCR 1012 : (2011) 8 SCC 708 - distinguished
7.3 The provisions of sections 305 and 306 cannot be read
in isolation. It has to be read with wholesome provision of section
387 and what is contemplated under section 387 has to be taken
to be the principle of reasonable compensation even in sections
c
305 and 306. Monetary value has to be worked out and it can be
balanced with FAR in appropriate cases which is quite reasonable
method of arriving at compensation. The principles laid down in D
sections 305, 306 and 387 are quite reasonable. Reasonable
compensation is payable by the Corporation for building or part
thereof excluding the land under proviso to section 305(1) and
compensation for inclusion ofland in public street is payable under
section 306(3) of the Act. There is no ground to read down the E
provisions. How the compensation is to be worked out at the
appropriate stage, is the outcome of the authorities concerned
and the job of the arbitrator/District Court, as the case may be.
The appellants are at liberty to raise the question with respect to
the adequacy of compensation and how the provision of section
387 has to be interpreted and what would be the just compensation
at the appropriate stage of determination of compensation. [Paras
70, 73)(450-F-G; 460-D-G)
P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. The Special Deputy Collector,
West Madras AIR 1965 SC 1017 : 1965 SCR 614;
F
Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar & Ors. 2015 (11) SCR
G
179 : (2015) 10 SCC 241; The Municipal Corporation,
Indore v. K.N. Pa/sikaf'A.m 1969 SC 579 : 1969 SCR
13 - held inapplicable.
Rajendra Shankar Shukla & Ors. v. State of
Chhattisgarh & Ors. (2015) 10 SCC 400 - referred to.
H
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016] 9 S.C.R.
A
8. Law envisages speedy action without unreasonable delay
and that is what is expected of the concerned authorities, in respect
of the obligation imposed on them to be discharged. Due to this,
the provision cannot be struck down as arbitrary nor it can be
said to be confiscatory in nature. [Para 75][461-G)
B
Yogendf'a Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2016)
3 sec 183 - held inapplicable.
c
D
E
F
G
Bhusawal Municipal Council v. Nivrutti Ramchandra
Phalak & Ors. 2013 SCR 259 : (2015) 14 SCC 327;
The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow v. Mis.
Parson Tools & Plants, Kanpur (1975) 4 SCC 22;
Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. v. Vemuganti Ramakrishan
Rao & Ors. 2013 (9) SCR 658 : (2013) 8 SCC 789;
Ajjal Imam v. State of Bihar & Ors. 2011 (5) SCR 771
: (2011) 5 SCC 729; Bhavnaf{ar University v. Palitana
Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors. 2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 517 :
(2003) 2 SCC 111; Girnar Traders (3) v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. 2011 (3) SCR 1 : (2011) 3 SCC
1; Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure
Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. 2007 (6) SCR
799 : (2007) 8 SCC 705; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.
Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors. 2005 (3) Suppl.
SCR 388 : (2005) 7 SCC 627; Suraj Mall Mohta &
Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri & Am: AIR 1954 SC 545
: 1955 SCR 448; K. T. Plan talion Pvt. Ltd. & Am: v.
State of Karnataka 2011 (13) SCR 636 : (2011) 9 SCC
1; l.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of T.N. 2007 (1)
SCR 706 : (2007) 2 SCC 1; Rustom Cava5jee Cooper
v. Union of India 1970 (3) SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC
248; Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad
& Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. 1973 (1) SCR 1 :
(1972) 1 sec 802 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
1969 SCR 13
2013 (2) SCR 301
H (1975) 4 sec 22
held inapplicable
Distinguished
referred to
Para 37
Para 38
Para 39
RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE
387
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.
(1953) SCR 533
referred to
Para40
A
19~Q (3) SCR 111
referred to
Para 40
(1992) Supp. 1 sec 323
referred to
Para 40
2002 (2) SCR 383
referred to
Para 40
20p (9) SCR 658
referred to
Para 42
B
20Q~ (1) SCR 634
referred to
Para 46
1966 SCR 172
referred to
Para 50
1966 SCR 379
referred to
Para 50
1979 (3) SCR 788
referred to
Para 50
c
1982 (3) SCR 332
referred to
Para 50
(1984) 4 sec 27
referred to
Para 50
2on (5) SCR 771
referred to
Para 54
D
2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 517
referred to
Para 55
2015 (11) SCR 179
held inapplicable
Para 56
2011 (3) SCR 1
referred to
Para 57
20Q7 (6) SCR 799
referred to
Para 61
E
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 388
referred to
Para 61
c2015) 10 sec 400
referred to
Para 63
1955 SCR 448
referred to
Para 64
1973 (3) SCR 39
held inapplicable
Para 65
F
1965 SCR 614
held inapplicable
Para 66
2011 (13) SCR 636
referred to
Para 67
20Q7 (1) SCR 706
referred to
Para 67
2011 (9) SCR 1012
distinguished
Para 68
G
1970 (3) SCR 530
referred to
Para 69
1973 (1) SCR 1
referred to.
Para 71
(2916) 3 sec 183
held inapplicable
Para 72
H
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016] 9 S.C.R.
A 2013 SCR 259
referred to
Para 75
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11307
of2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.09.2010 of the High Court
B of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Writ Appeal No. 397 of 2010.
WITH
C.A. Nos. 11308, 11309-11316, 11317-11318, 11319-11324, 11325,
11326, 11327-11330, 11331, 11332, 11333, 11334, 11335, 11336of2016.
C
Tushar Mehta, ASG, Dhruv Mehta, Sushil Kumar Jain, Rakesh
Dwivedi, Sr. Advs., Gaurav Agrawal, Siddharth Gupta, Abhikalp Pratap
Singh, Abhishek Rai, Ms. Anupama D., B. K. Satija, Puneet Jain,
Mrs. Christi Jain, Abhinav Gupta, Pankaj Sharma, Manu Maheshwari,
Ms. Pratibha Jain, Apoorv Shukla, Kuna] Cheema, Yogesh Ahirrao,
D Neelmani Pant, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Sanjay Kapur, Anmol Chandan,
Ms. Priyanka Das, Akshay Girish Ringe, Manan Popli, Manoj Munshi,
A. V. Rangam, Buddy A. Ranganadhan, D. V. Raghu Vamsy, Ms. Shivali
Chaudhary, Sagar Suri, C. D. Singh,Anil K. Shanna, Praveen Chaturvedi,
Mishra Saurabh, Sunny Chaudhary, Ankit Kr. Lal, Ms. Pragati Neekhra,
Akshay Chandra, Advs., with them for the appearing parties.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The appeals arise out of judgment and order dated 9.5.2016
F passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur and as against
order dated 30.9.2010 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Indore thereby affirming the judgment and order
passed by the learned Single Judge.
3. The matter arises out of Bhopal Municipal Corporation and
G Indore Municipal Corporation. The action taken by the Municipal
Corporations of Bhopal and Indore under section 305 of Madhya Pradesh
Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of
1956') has been questioned. The Single Bench at Jabalpur had allowed
the writ application and held that the land be acquired under the provisions
of the Act of2013. Aggrieved thereby, writ appeals were filed by Bhopal
H
RAVINDRA RAMCHANDRA WAGHMARE v. INDORE
389
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA,. J.]
Municipal Corporation which have been allowed by the impugned
A
judgment and order dated 9 .5.2016 by a Division Bench of the High
Court of M.P.
4. With respect to Bhopal the facts are being narrated from the
matter in-between A.K. Pali & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors. The State
Government through Municipal Corporation, Bhopal as a nodal agency
B
decided to develop Bus Rapid Transit System Corridor (for short 'BRTS
corridor') on the stretch of around 8 kms. As per Bhopal Development
Plan, 2005 which was notified in the year 1995, the proposed width of
the road is 66 mtrs. Initially, the writ petitions were filed by the appellants
before a Single Bench in the year 2014 questioning the action initiated
C
by the Municipal Corporation on the ground that such an action was
impermissible under the provisions of section 305 of the Act of 1956. At
that time the width of the road was 54 mtrs. The appellants' main
submission was that they had obtained the permission from the Municipal
Corporation so as to raise construction. For acquisition of the land, the
provisions contained in the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency D
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of2013 ')ought to have been resorted
to.
5. Under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission,
the Central Government had sanctioned the scheme called BRTS corridor
E
for improvement of public transport system at Bhopal in order to avoid
hazardous traffic. The Central Sanctioning & Monitoring Committee
was constituted by the Ministry of Urban Development which had
sanctioned a sum ofRs.357.20 crores for implementation of said scheme.
After due sanction by the Committee, NHAI entered into an agreement
with Municipal Corporation, Bhopal on 22.9.2009 and handed over
F
particular part ofland to it for the purpose ofBRTS corridor.For betterment
of public transport system 225 low floor buses were also sanctioned by
Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee of the Central Government. For
BRTS corridor survey was undertaken by the Expert Committee of the
Central Government namely Urban Mass Transit Council of Bhopal City.
G
Plan was duly approved by the State Government and the routes were
notified as per Plan by the State Transport Authority. Presently only
1.25 lakh passengers are getting the services oflow floor buses. It is not
in dispute that most of the BRTS corridor has been constructed and the
route from Misrod to Bairagarh is under operation. Buses are plying
H
390
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016] 9 S.C.R.
continuously. The appellants are land-holders in-between Misroad to
Ampree Chouraha. The Master Plan was prepared under the provisions
ofM.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (Town & Country
Planning Act) hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1973 '. The
Development Plan/Master Plan was prepared as per the provisions of
section 18 after inviting objections, suggestions. None of the appellants
had raised objection when the development plan was prepared. It was
finalized and published as per provisions contained in section 19( 4).
6. The development permission was granted by the competent
authority under the Act of 1973 as per the provisions contained in section
13(1)(b) and Rule 21(1) framed under the Bhopal Vikas Adhiniyam,
1984 since repealed with effect from April, 2012. The appellants have
raised the construction of their building as perthe conditions mentioned
in the map sanctioned by the authority under the Act of 1973. They
were required to keep the land for widening of road in question.
Accordingly, the landowners submitted their lay-out leaving requisite land
D
from the centre of the road for widening of road. On that basis
Municipal Corporation had granted permission to appellants. They were
aware of the proposed width of the road.
E
F
7. The appellants at the stage of the final hearing of writ appeals
before the High Court filed fresh writ petition/amended writ petition for
questioning the vires of the provisions contained in sections 305 and 306
of the Act of 1956. It was averred that there is no provision under the
Act of 1973 of vesting ofland on publication of Master Plan/Development
Plan, particularly the land belonging to private landowners. The acquisition
has to be made under the provisions contained in sections 8, 11and16 of
the Act of 2013. State Government has no power to reduce quantum of
compensation prescribed under the Act of2013.