# REGIONAL DIRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPN. AND ANR v. FRANCIS DE COSTA AND ANR - **Citation:** [1992] 3 S.C.R. 23 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1992-05-05 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1174 of 1979 - **Bench:** K. Ramaswamy, B.P. Jeevan Reddy - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/regional-director-e-s-i-corpn-and-anr-v-francis-de-costa-and-anr-11547 - **Pages:** 47 ## Headnote A B _ '- Employees' State Insurance Act, 1949: Sections 2(8), 51A, 51C, 51D, - 75 and 76. 'Employment Injury'-Test to detennine-What is Expressions-'ln the C course of employment' and 'Arising out of employment'-Scope of-Injury caused to employee by Employer's lorry on public road while employee was on way to join duty- Whether arises out of and in the course of employment. 'Employment lnjury'-Relief-Availability of remedy under General Law of tort or unfler Special Law in other Acts-U'hether bars relief under D E.S./. Act. Doctrine of Coming in and Going from Work Place-Exceptions. Maxim-'Eundo Morando, et Redeundo'-Meaning of. Wordf and Phrases: E 'Accident'-Meaning of. Interpretation of Statutes-Social Legislation-Interpretation of. Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 38,39,41 and 43. F Social Justic~orkers-R.ight to health and medical treatment. ' The first-respondent was employed with J.P. Coats (P) Ltd., Koratty. On June 26, 1971 while he was going on his bicycle to join duty, on the road G leading to the factory at a distance of 1 K.M. the Company's lorry hit him on left side or his body and knocked him down on the road. As a result or the accident, he suffered severe injuries and ultimately the Insurance Medical Officer certified that he was totally and permanently incapacitated to work in the factory. He laid a claim for the benefits before the Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation which was H 23 24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 s.c;.R. A rejected. Thereupon be fded a claim before the Employees' Insurance Court under Section 75 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 contending that since the injury was suffered by him while on the way to bis duty, it is an 'employment injury'. The respondent Corporation contended that it is not so, inasmuch as the accident took place on a public B road. The Employees' State Insurance Court held in favour of the firstrespondent by holding that the respondent was going on the usual route along which be passes and repass~s every day to and from the factory on the cycle purchased by him from the advance given by the employer and was not negligent in riding the cycle. Therefore, the injuries were caused to him in an accident while in the course of bis employment and conseC quently be was entitled to the benefits under the Act. On appeal the High Court confirmed the findings of the Employees' State Insurance Court. Against the decision of the High Court an appeal was preferred in this Court. D Referring the matter to a larger Bench, this Court, HELD: Per K. RAMASWAMY, J. 1. The respondent was trekking the road to attend to duty which found to be the accustomed route to reach the factory and just few minutes before reporting to duty he was struck by the truck resulting in the employment injury. It, therefore, occurred during E the course of bis employment and thereby be is entitiled to the amount as compensation under the Act. [56 GH, 57-A] 2. In determing whether a given accident occurred in the course of employee's employment, the factual picture as a whole must be looked at, and any approach based on fallacious concept that any one factor is F conclusive must be rejected. The facts are of crucial importance, and the addition to or subtraction of one factor in a given situation may tilt the balance, whereas in another situation the addition or subtraction of the same factor may make no difference. This, however, does not indicate that there are no principles in the light of which a court can decide whether an G employee was acting in the course or arising out of his employment at the material time when the accident bad occurred. [36 D-E] 3. Literal construction of the phrase 'arising out of his employment' conveys the idea that there must be some sort of connection between the employment and the injury caused to a workman due to the accident. But H it is wide enough to cover the case where there may not necessarily be a J. ---Z,_ - i. E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS D ## Text _Characters 0–39,814 of 115,640. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39814 for what follows._ REGIONAL DIRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPN. AND ANR. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA AND ANR. MAY 5, 1992 [K. RAMASWAMY AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.] A B _ '- Employees' State Insurance Act, 1949: Sections 2(8), 51A, 51C, 51D, - 75 and 76. 'Employment Injury'-Test to detennine-What is Expressions-'ln the C course of employment' and 'Arising out of employment'-Scope of-Injury caused to employee by Employer's lorry on public road while employee was on way to join duty- Whether arises out of and in the course of employment. 'Employment lnjury'-Relief-Availability of remedy under General Law of tort or unfler Special Law in other Acts-U'hether bars relief under D E.S./. Act. Doctrine of Coming in and Going from Work Place-Exceptions. Maxim-'Eundo Morando, et Redeundo'-Meaning of. Wordf and Phrases: E 'Accident'-Meaning of. Interpretation of Statutes-Social Legislation-Interpretation of. Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 38,39,41 and 43. F Social Justic~orkers-R.ight to health and medical treatment. ' The first-respondent was employed with J.P. Coats (P) Ltd., Koratty. On June 26, 1971 while he was going on his bicycle to join duty, on the road G leading to the factory at a distance of 1 K.M. the Company's lorry hit him on left side or his body and knocked him down on the road. As a result or the accident, he suffered severe injuries and ultimately the Insurance Medical Officer certified that he was totally and permanently incapacitated to work in the factory. He laid a claim for the benefits before the Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation which was H 23 24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 s.c;.R. A rejected. Thereupon be fded a claim before the Employees' Insurance Court under Section 75 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 contending that since the injury was suffered by him while on the way to bis duty, it is an 'employment injury'. The respondent Corporation contended that it is not so, inasmuch as the accident took place on a public B road. The Employees' State Insurance Court held in favour of the firstrespondent by holding that the respondent was going on the usual route along which be passes and repass~s every day to and from the factory on the cycle purchased by him from the advance given by the employer and was not negligent in riding the cycle. Therefore, the injuries were caused to him in an accident while in the course of bis employment and conseC quently be was entitled to the benefits under the Act. On appeal the High Court confirmed the findings of the Employees' State Insurance Court. Against the decision of the High Court an appeal was preferred in this Court. D Referring the matter to a larger Bench, this Court, HELD: Per K. RAMASWAMY, J. 1. The respondent was trekking the road to attend to duty which found to be the accustomed route to reach the factory and just few minutes before reporting to duty he was struck by the truck resulting in the employment injury. It, therefore, occurred during E the course of bis employment and thereby be is entitiled to the amount as compensation under the Act. [56 GH, 57-A] 2. In determing whether a given accident occurred in the course of employee's employment, the factual picture as a whole must be looked at, and any approach based on fallacious concept that any one factor is F conclusive must be rejected. The facts are of crucial importance, and the addition to or subtraction of one factor in a given situation may tilt the balance, whereas in another situation the addition or subtraction of the same factor may make no difference. This, however, does not indicate that there are no principles in the light of which a court can decide whether an G employee was acting in the course or arising out of his employment at the material time when the accident bad occurred. [36 D-E] 3. Literal construction of the phrase 'arising out of his employment' conveys the idea that there must be some sort of connection between the employment and the injury caused to a workman due to the accident. But H it is wide enough to cover the case where there may not necessarily be a J. ---Z,_ - i. E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA 25 direct connection of the workman. There may be circumstances tending to A show that the workman received personal injury due to the accident that arose during the course of or out of his employment. It would not mean that personal injury only must have resulted from the mere nature of the employment, nor it be limited to cases where the personal injury is referable to duties to which the employee has to discharge. The phrase B 'arising out of the employment' applies to employment as such, to its nature, its condition, its workman is brought within the zone of danger and resultant injury, disease or death. In the context of the claims of the labour for social justice under welfare legislation, the principle is that the employer and the employees are so inter-related and depend on each other, than itis in the interest of each that the other should survive, and it is in C the interest of society that both should be kept fuctioniong in harmony with each other. The expression 'arising out or, therefore, requires the assistance of causal connection between the employment and the accident. The employment is the cause and the accident is the effect. The causal relationship between employment and the. accident does not logically D necessitate direct or physical connection. It may be of various steps, namely, direct, physical, approximate, indirect or incidental. [33 GH, 34-A-D] 4. As a general rule the employment does not begin until the employee has reached the place of work. The ambit, scope or scene of his E duty does not continue after he has left the place and the period of going and returning are excluded. But duty is not confined to the actual performance of work, it also applies when it is reasonably connected or incidental to the work. When the workman proceeds on a public road to his work place or factory which is the accustomed road or route, the proximity.of F the place of accident, time and the obligation to report to duty are relevant and material facts to be kept in mind. (38-F] S. The doctrine of coming in and going from work place is subject to reasonable extension. It is common knowledge that the home is the employee's base from which it is his duty to start for work. When an G employee travels by direct route from his home to the place of work but for that he has no occasion to traverse the way though private/public road way is the normal or agreed or accustomed route to reach the work place, ht must be treated to be travelling in the course of bis emplojment as incidental to join the duty or leaving the work place. (54 D-E] H A B 26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 s.c.R: 6. The motive to use public or private transport or route to reach the place of accident is not relevant. The employee may use the place, publi~ road or trans.,ort services as usual course of means of attending to o~going from the place of work, office or factory. The test is whether the employee has exposed to a particular risk by reason of his employment or whether he took the same risk as is incurred by any other public using the public way otherwise then his employment. (54 F-G] 7. When a workman walks, rides the bicycle etc. along the public road/street to get to his work, his right to walk does not spring, undoubtedly, from employment, and he also may exercise it as a member of the C public. Nevertheless the workman too uses the public/permitted private way as access/means to attend to duty. The question whether he had encountered the danger or the accident exercising his right and to be at the place of incident as a member of the public or as his integral course of employment must always be born in mind. While as a member of the D public he may have a right to walk or ride a cycle, drive a car etc. but while walking or crossing the road/driving to reach the place of work or duty he encounters the danger or the accident, which he would not have encountered but for that employment, then it must be incidental to his employment. The motive which induces the employee to do a thing is not material. His motive to go by a particular route is also immaterial, whether E it was to save time or to save himself from trouble. Whether the place at which the injury/death occurred was on the only route or at least the normal/accustomed route which the employee must traverse to reach the place of work and became the hazard of the employment is also relevant fact. The fact that the risk is common to all mankind does not prove that F the accident had not arisen out of employment. [54H, 5SA-E] 8. Sections SIA and SIC of the Act give statutory presump· lions/grounds as to when an accident happen while travelling i9 an employer's transport, etc. The Act intends to reiterate the law declared by G this Court, apart fr"m creating some statutory presumptions. But it is no corollary to conclude that an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, in any other way, by necessary implication, should stand excluded. To the extent covered under Sections SIA to SID by statutory amendment stands incorporated in the Act but in other respects the .court has to consider whether the accident had arisen out of and in the course H of employment, dehors the statutory presumptions etc. provided in Sec- >- .,..... E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA 27 ).._ 1 tions 51A to 510. (55 F-H, 56 A-BJ A Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar & Ors., (1985) Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 1, referred to. 9. The contention that the Motor Vehicles Act provides the remedy B for damages for an accident resulting in death of an injured person and that, therefore, the remedy under the Act cannot be availed of lacks force ' or substance. The general law of tort or special law in Motor Vehicles Act or Workman Compensation Act may provide a remedy for damages. The coverage of insurance under the Act in an insured employment is in addition to but not in substitution of the above remedies and cannot on c that account be denied to the employee. [56 C-EJ K Bharati Devi v. G./.C./., A.I.R 1988 A.P. 361, referred to. ~>- 10. The Employees' State Insurance Act fastens in an insured D employment statutory obligation on the employer and the employee to contribute in the prescribed proportion and the manner towards the welfare fund constituted under the Act - Sections 38 to 51 of the Act - to provide sustenance to the workmen in their hours of need, particularly when they become economically inactive because of a cause attributable to E > their employment or disability or death occurred while in employment. The fact that the employee contributed to the fund out· of his hard earned wages cannot but have a vital bearing in adjudicating whether the injury or occupational disease suffered by an employee is an employment injury. The liability is based neither on any contract nor upon any act or omission by tlie employer but upon the existence of the relationship which employer F bears to the employment during the course of which the employee had been .. ..J... injured. (33 D-F] ,, 11. It falls foul from the mouth of the appellant, a trustee de son tort who collected the premium from the employee and employer with a G promise to expand it for disability, to attempt to wriggle out from the promise or to deprive the employee the medical benefit for employment _;- injury covered by the insurance on the techni~lities. It is estopped to deny medical benefit to the insured employee. Though the plea of estoppel was not raised by the respondent yet it springs from the conduct of the appellant. (56-FJ H 28 SUPREME COURT Rf::PORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R. A 12. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a social security legisla- .A, tion. To promote justice and to effectuate the object and purpose of the welfare legislation, broad interpretation should be given, even if it requires a departul'li) from literal construction. The Court must seek light from loadstar Articles 38 and 39 and the economic and social justice envisaged B in the Preamble of the Constitution which would enliven meaningful right to life of the worker under Article 21. [32-F] 13. Right to health, a fundamental human right stands enshrined in socio-economic justice of our Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Concomitantly right to medical benefit to a workman is C his fundamental right. Right to medical benefit is, thus, a fundamental right to the workman. [32-H, 33-A] 14. De hors the human Right and Constitutional goal, the march of jurisprudence emphasises that the law did not remain static but kept pace with the changing social demands to secure socio-economic justice to D workman. (54-B] Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja & Ors., A.I.R.1958 S.C. 881; Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. (P) Ltd. v. lbrahim Mahommed /ssak, (1970) 1 S.C.R. 869; B.E.S. T. Undertaking, Bombay v .Agnes, (1964) 3 S.C.R. E 930, referred to. The Regional Director of the E.S./.C. v. L. Ranga Rao & Anr., (1981) 2 Karnataka Law Journal 197; Sadugunjaban Amrutlal & Ors. v. E.S./. Corporation, 22 (1981) Gujarat Law Reporter, 773; Bhagubai v. Central Railway, (1954) 2 L.L.J. 403; Regional Director, E.S.I. Corpn., Trichur v. K. F Krishnan, 1975 K.L.T. 712; Commissioner for the Port of Calcutta v. Mst. Kaniz Fathema, A.I.R.1961Calcutta310, referred to. Upton v. Great Central Railway Co., 1924 A.C. 302; Fitzgerald v. WJ. Clarke & Son, 1008 (2) King's Bench 796; Mcdonald v. Steamship Co., 1902 (2) King's Bench 926; Titley & Co. v. Cattra/I, 1926 (1) King's Bench 488; G Rosen v. S.S. Querous (Owners), 1933 Appeal Cases, 494; Simpson v. L.M. & S. Railway Co., 1931 A.C. 351; Ne/ens Colliery Co. Ltd. v. Hewitson, 1924 - Appeal Cases 59; Weaver v. Tredeger Iron & Coal Co. Ltd., 1940 ~ppeal --'-i. Cases 955; McCullum v. Northmbrian Shipping Co. Ltd., 1932 (147) Law Times Report 361; Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Lockhart, 1942 Appeal H Cases 591; Blee v. London & North Eastern Railway Co., 1937 (4) All E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA 29 )._ England Reports 270; Noble v. Southern Railway Co., 1940 A.C. 583; Scott A v. Seymour, (1941) 2 AH E.R. 717 (C.A.); Dover Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Graig, 1939 (4) All England Reports 558; Dennis v. White (AJ.) & Co., 1917 A.C. 479; In R. v. Industrial Injuries Commissioner, 1966 (1) All England Reports 97; Monco//as v. Insurance Officer and Ball v. Insurance Officer. (1985) 1 All England Reports 833; Smith v. Stages &Anr., (1989) 1 All England Reports B 833; united States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Elizabeth W. Giles, 276 U.S.154; Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Mary Ann Parramore, 263 U.S. 418; Freire - / v. Matson Navigation Co., 19 Cal 2d 8, 118 p.2d 80'J (1941), referTed to. Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 33, para 490 at p.369, referred to. c Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol.I s.15.11, referred to. Per B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. -~ 1. The respondent-employee cannot claim any disablement benefit under the Employees' State Insurance Act for the injuries suffered by him. D [69-D] 2. A reading of the definition of 'employment injury' under Section 2(8) of the Employees' State Insurance Act shows that for constituting an _.>-. employment injury it must not only be caused bY an accident arising out E of his employment but must be one arising in the course of his employment. The words 'arising out of and in the course of employment' are not defined in the Act or the Rules and Regulations thereunder. While both ......,_ the expressions 'arising out or and 'in the course or do not ·mean the same thing, both of them do denot~ and contemplate a causal connection beF tween the accident (which leads to injury) and the employment. The _L accident, in order words, must not be unconnected with the employment. (58-C, 60 C-D] 3. Any irijury suffered by an insured employee as a result of an accident occurring on a public road or a public place, even while going to G or returning from the place of employment cannot be treated as an employment injury. Once it is found that the accident took place on a >-- public road, it becomes immaterial whether that place is one mile or one _, furlong away from the work place. Of course, if the employee sutlers an injury while travelling, whether voluntarily or as a condition of service, by a transport provided or arranged by the employer it will be an employment H 30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R. A uyury. Similarly, if the accident takes place on the premises of the employer, it will be treated as one arising out of and in the course of employment. It is, however, necessary to clarify that if an employee suffers an injury while travelling by a public transport or while proceeding along a public road in the course of performance of his duties e.g., medical B representatives, linesmen employed by Electricity and Telephone under· takings, repair and maintenance personnel employed to go to the residen· tial and other places, (where the units/gadgets are installed), to attend them and so on. (68 ff, 69 A·C] 4. In respect of injuries suffered in accidents not arising out of and C in the course of employment, i.e., in the case of injuries other than employment injuries, remedies and forums are different e.g., Motor Vehicles Act, (Section 110-A) Railways Act (Sections 82-A and 82-J) and so on. If an employee covered. by the Act suffers an injury on account of an accident not arising out of and not in the course of his employment, he is not without a remedy in law. Forum may be different; procudure may D be different; but he certainly has a remedy; just as any other citizen of this country; neither less nor more. (60 F·G] Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Company v. Bai Valu Raju and Ors., A.l.R. 1958 S.C. 881; General Manager, B.E.S. T. Undertaking, Bombay v. E Mrs. Agnes, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 930; Mackinnon Machenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, [1970) 1 S.C.R. 869, referred to. Bhagubai v. Central Railway, Bombay, 1954 (2) Labour Law Journal 403; Regional Director ESIC v. L. Ranga Rao & Anr., 1981 (2) Kamataka Law Journal 197; Sadgunaben Amrutlal & Ors. v. The Employees' State F Insurance Corporation, (1981) 22 Gujarat Law Report 773; Regional Director E.S.I. Corporation, Trichur v. K Krishnan 1975 Kerala Law Times 712; Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Mst. Kaniz Fatema, A.l.R. 1961 Vol. 48 Calcutta 310, referred to. Cremins v. Guest, Keen & Nettle/olds, Ltd., 1908 (1) K.B. 469; Gane G v. Norton Hill Colliery Co., (1909) 2 K.B. 539; John Stewart and Son ( 1912) v. Longhurst, (1917) Appeal Cases 249; Howells v. Great Western Railway,' (1928) 97 L.J. K.B. 183; Weaver v. Tredegar Iron & Coal Co. Ltd., (1940) 3 -~ All England Reports 157; Hill v. Butterley Co. Ltd., (1948) 1 All England Law Reports 233; Aldem1an v. Great Western Railway Company, (1937) H Appeal Cases 454; Netherton v. Coles, (1945) 1 All England Law Reports __ .( _..JE.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA [RAMASWAMI, J.] 31 227; Jenkins v. Elder Dempster Lines Ltd., (1953) 2 All England Law Reports A 1133; Blee v. London and North Eastern Railway Co., (1938) Appeal Cases 126, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1174 of 1979. From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.1977 of the Kerala High Court in A.S. No.638 of 1974. K.T.S. Tulsi, Addi. Solicitor General, Ms. Anil Katyar, T.C. Sharma and C.V.S. Rao for the Appellants. N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by B c K. RAMASWAMY, J. This appeal, by special leave, arises against the judgment of the Kerala High Court in AS. No.638 of 1974 dated November D 25, 1977. The respondent was an employee in M/s. J & P Coats (P) Ltd. at Koratty. He had to attend the duty in the second shift at 430 p.m. On June 26, 1971 while he was going on his bicycle to join duty, on the road leading to the factory at a distance of 1 k.m. the company's lorry hit him at 4.15 p.m. on left side of his body and knocked him down on the road. E As a result his left · collar bone and left shoulder were fractured and ultimately the Insurace Medical Officer certified that the respondent was totally and permanently incapacitated to work in the factory. He, therefore, laid the claim before the E.S.I. Court under S.75 of the Employee's State Insurance Act, Act No.34 of 1948 for short 'the Act' which found that the . respondent was going on the usual route along which he passes and F. repasses every day to and from the factory. The cycle was purchased by him from the advance given by the employer. He was not negligent in riding the cycle. The injuries were caused to him in an accident while in the course of his employment and that, therefore, he is entitled lo the benefits under the Act. On Appeal the High Court confirmed these findings. G Section 2(8) of the Act defines employmen! injury thus:- "employment injury" means a personal injury to an employee caused by accident or an occupational disease arising out of aiid in the course of his employment, being an insurable H A B 32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R. employment, whether the accident occurs or the occupational desease is contracted within or outside the territorial limits of India". A reading thereof would show that a personal injury caused to an employee by an accident or occupationaJ disease arising out of and in the course of his insurable employment whe:ther the accident occurred within or outside the territorial limits of India is an employment injury. The crucial but tiklish question of considerable importance is whether the injury caused by an accident on a public road, while on his way to join the duty just 15 minutes before reporting to duty at a distance of 1 k.m. from the C factory premises, arises out of and in the course of his employment_? Accident has not been defined under the Act. The popular and ordinary sense of the word 'accident' means the mishap or an untoward happening not expected and designed to have an occurrence is an accident. D It must be regarded as an accident, from the point of view of the workman who sliffers from it, that its occurrence is unexpected and without design on his part, although either intentionally caused by the author of the act or otherwise. It may also arise in diverse forms and not capable of precise definition. The .common factor is some that concrete happening at a definite point of time and an injury or in:capacity result from such happenE ing. The Act seeks to cover sickness, maternity, employment injury, occupational disease, etc. The Act is a social security legislation. It is settled law that to prevent injustice or to promote justice and to effectuate the F object and purpose of the welfare legislation; broad interpretation should be given, even if it requires a departure from literal construction. The Court must seek_ light from loadstar Arts. 38 and 39 and the economic and social justice envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution which would enliven meaningful right to life of the worker under Art. 21. Article 39( e) enjoins the State to protect the health of the workers under Art.41 to G secure sickness and disablement benefits and Art.43 accords decent standard of life. Right to medical and disability benefits are fundamental human rights under Art. 25(2) of Universal Declara~ion of Human Rights and Art.7(b) of International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Right to health, a fundamental human right stands enshrined in H socio-economic justice of our constitution and the Universal Declaration _,..1..: -- - ' .. r>· E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA [RAMASWAMI, J.J 33 of Human Rights. Concomitantly right to medical benefit to a workman is A his/her fundamental right. The Act seeks to succour the ·maintenance of health of an ensured workman. The interpretative endeavour should be to effectuate the above. Right to medical benefit is, thus, a fundamental right to the workman. Moreover, even in the realm of il\terpretation of statutes Rule of Law B is a dynamic concept of expansion and fulfilment for which the interpretation would be so given as to subserve the social and economic justice envisioned in the Constitution. Legislation is a conscious attempt, as a social direction, in the process of change. The fusion between the law and social change would be effected only when law is introspected in the C context of ordinary social life. Life of the law has not been logic but has been of experience. It is a means to serve social purpose and felt necessities of the people. In times of stress, disability, injury, etc. the workman needs statutory protection and assistance. The Act fastens in an ensured employment statutory obligation on the employer and the employee to contribute D in the prescribed proportion and the manner towards the welfare fund constituted under the Act (Ss.38 to 51 of the Act) to provide sustenance to the workmen in their hours of need, particularly when they become economically inactive because of a cause attributable to their employment or disability or death occurred while in employment. The fact that the employee contributed to the fund out of his/her hard earned wages cannot E but have a vital bearing in adjudicating whether the injury or occupational disease suffered/contracted by an employee is an employment injury. The liability is based neither on any contract nor upon any act or omission by the employer but upon the existence of the relationship which employer bears to the employment during the course of which the employee had F been injured. The Act supplant the action at law, based upon not on the fault but as an aspect of social welfare, to rehabilitate a physically and economically handicapped workman who is adversely effected by sickness, injury or livelihood of dependents by death of a workman. Literal construction of the phrase "arising out of his employment" G conveys the idea that there· must be some sort of connection between the employment ~d. the injury caused to a workman due to the accident. But it is vide enough to cover the case where there may not necessarily be a direct connection of the workman. There may be circumstances tending to show that the workman received personal injury due to the accident that H 34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R. A arose during the course of or out of his employment. It would not mean that personal injury only must have resulted from the mere nature of the employment, nor it be limited to cases where the personal injury is referable to duties to which the employee has to discharge. The phrase "arising out of the employment" applies to employment as such, to its B nature, its condition, its workman is brought within the zone of danger and resultant injury, disease or death. In tlie context of the claims of the labour for social justice under welfare legislation, the principle is that · the employer and the employees are so inter-related and depend on each other that it is in the interest of each that the other should survive, and it is in the interest of society that both should be kept functioning in harmony with C each other. The expression "arising out of', therefore, requires the assistance of .casual connection between the employment and the accident. The employment is the cause and the accident is the effect. The casual relationship between employment and the accident does not logically necessitate direct or physical connection. It may be of various steps, namely, direct, D physical, approximate, indirect or incidental. E F G H In Upton v. Great Central Railway Co., 1924 A.C. 302 it was held that the right to compensation given under the Workman Compensation Act is no remedy for negligence on the part of the employer but is rather in the nature of an insurance of the workman against certain sort of accident. The peril of injury which the workman faces must not be something personal to him; "it must be incidental ·to his employment". In Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 881, relied on by Sri Tuls~ learned Additional Solicitor General, construing the words "in the course of employment" under Section 3(1) of the Wrokman Compensation Act, 1923, this Court held that as a rule the employment of the workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the place of employment being excluded. However, that strict rule was held to be subject to the theory of notional extension. In Fitzgerald v. W J. Clarke & Son, 1908(2) King's Bench 796 Buckley, LJ. explaining the phrase 'out or and 'in the course of employment' observed thus: "The words 'out pr point, I think, to the origin or cause of the accident; the words 'in the course or to the time, place and -- - ' _>- ) .. I -'- E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA [RAMASWAMI, J.) 35 circumstances under which the accident takes place. The A former words are discriptive of the character or quality of the accident. The latter words relate to the circumstances under which an accident of that character or quality takes place. In Mcdonald v. Steamship Co., 1902(2) King's Bench 926 laying . emphasis on the role of place in determination of the course of employB ment of a workman, it was pointed out thus:- "If path of his duty both to go and to proceed from the working where he is engaged and so long as he is in a place which his person other than those was engaged would have no right to C be, and indeed, he himself would have no right to but for the · work of his employment, he was, I think normally still be in the course of employment. Lord Halsbury in Titley & Co. v. Cattrall, 1926(1) King's Bench 488 at 490 observed that actual ownership or control by the employer of the D spot where an accident occurred is not essential. The workman goes there on his way to and from his working and he may be regarded as in the course of his employment while crossing the dock or other open space to and from the spot where his work actually lies. Such passage is within the contemplation of both the parties to the contract as necessarily incidental to it. E In Bai Valu Raja's case, AIR 1958 SC 881 it was held that "the strict rule is subject to the notional extension of the employer's premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and prepasses in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in F the course of his employment, even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises". Therefore, facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose G out of and in the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times not only the theory of notional extension as a link but also social ,r justice envisaged under the Constitution and the Act, to alleviate the hardship suffered by the employee. The Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co.(P) Ltd. v. Ibrahim H 36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R. A Mahommed /ssak, [1970] 1 SCR 869 at 878 noticed the development of the law from the decisions of the House of Lords that the place of accident need not necessarily be in the factory premises but outside thereto as well. In Rosen v. S.S. Querous (Owners), 1933 Appeal Cases, 494 Lord Buckmaster explained the phrase of Lord Thankerton in Simpson v. L.M. & S. B Railway Co., 1931 A.C. 351 that the place referred to therein was not the exact spot at which the accident may have occurred, but meant, in that case the train on which the workman was travelling and in the' later case the ship on which the workman was employed. Thus, it could be seen that the accident may occur while the workman was on his way to attend the duty or during his return from duty. The place need not necessarily be in the C premises of the factory etc. In determining whether a given accident occurred in the course of employee's employment, the factual picture as a whole must be looked at, and any approach based on fallacious concept that any one factor is D conclusive must be rejected. The facts are of crucial importance, and the addition to or subtraction of one factor in a given situation may tilt the balance, whereas in another situation the addition or subtraction of the same factor may make no difference. This, however, does not indicate that there are no principles in the light of which a court can decide whether an employee was acting in the course or arising out of his employment at the E material time when the accident had occurred. The course of employment has been used in tort law as a test to determine the vicarious liability of the employer to the world at large. The A. J._ Latin phrase "eundo morando, et redeundo" to mean that while at his place -- F of employment and while entering and leaving it the doctrine of employer's liability was eXtended to matters arising while the workman was coming to G the place of work, or leaving it, workman is on the employer's premises. ,,.A ~ But duty is not confined to the actual performance of work, but also applies when it is reasonably connected or .. incidental to the work. The question in this case is· whether the casual connection between the accident and the employment would be extended beyond the factory premises to a distance of.one Km., while the injured workman was on his way on a public road to attend to the duties. Before adverting to the concepts of duty, time and place of accident, in the context of an acccident H to an employee, it may be necessary to notice the development of law in -( ' E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA [RAMASWAMI, J.J 37 various countries in relation to compensation to the workman under the A respective workman compensation statutes. New Zealand Workmen's compensation system, pursuant to the recommendation in 1966 by the Royal Commission appointed in that behalf, recommended that the Workman Compensation Act based on contract should be replaced by a unified system of accident rehabilitation and was accepted by the House of RepB resentatives'; abolished the common law action for damages for personal injilries and adopted in all embracing "national accident insurance system". In Australia the Committee of enquiry, appointed in this behalf, in its report stated that: (1) The systems have failed to grapple, in any way, with the C rehabilitation of the injured worker. (2) There is no uniformity between compensation systems throughout Australia. D (3) It provides no protection for the 15 per cent of the work force who are self-employed. (4) Though in name the system aims to protect injured workmen, it limits coverage to injuries sustained during working hours leaving the workers to fend themselves thereafter. It recommended full coverage. Accordingly necessary amendments were brought about. The American National Commission on States Wrokman's Compensation Laws also had gone into the question to provide an adequate, prompt and equitable system of compensation. The Commission laid emphasis to settle the dispute out of court and other methods. Now the fact is that though general public are exposed to risks on streets and on public paths, some state Supreme Courts held that it does not change the character of the risk to workman. Accordingly compensation was awarded. Industralised nations E F like France, Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, Sweden, Britain and Yugoslavia adopted the most advantageous alternatives to workman's compensation system i.~. social insurance and social security system. In United G Kingdom Workman's Compensation Act was replaced by Social Security Schemes. · in Ha/sbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 33, para 490 at p.369 it is stated thus:- H A B c D E F SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R. "Accident travelling to and from work. The course of employment normally begins when the employee reaches his place of work. To extend it to the journey to and from work it must be shown that, in travelling by the particular method and route and at the particular time, the employee was fulfilling an express or implied term of his contract of service. One way of doing this is to establish that the home is the employee's base from which it is his duty to work and that he was travelling by direct route from his home to a place where he was required to work, but that is only one way of showing tbi!;; the real question at issue is whether on the particular journey he was travelling in the performance of a duty, or whether the journey was incidental to the performance of that duty and not merely preparatory to the performance of it. If the place where the accident occurs is a private road or on the employer's property, the accident is in the course of the employment because he is then at the scene of the accident by r~a:;on only of his employment and he has reached the sphere of his employment. The test is whether the employee was exposed to the particular risk by reason of his employment or whether he took the same risks· as those incurred by any member of the public using the highway. Thus as a general rule the employment does not begin until he has reached the place of work. The. ambit, scope or scene of his duty does not continue after he has left the place and the period of going and returning are excluded. When the workman was proceeding on a public road to his work pl