# RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD v. PRAVINBHAI JASBHAI PATEL AND ORS - **Citation:** [1997] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 636 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1997-08-29 - **Bench:** S.B. Majmudar, S. Saghir Ahmad - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/reliance-industries-ltd-v-pravinbhai-jasbhai-patel-and-ors-15785 - **Pages:** 26 ## Headnote Constitution of India-Articles 226 and 227-Filing of writ petitions-Review or w1it orders-Reviewing Bench differs on the question of law/fact-Held, Proper procedure, was to refer the matter to third Judge for C his opinion invoking clause 36 of the Letters Patent and not to dismiss the review petition under Order 47 Rule 6--Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Cowt Rules also does not lead to different conclusions for Section 98(2) of CPC and the proviso thereto is not applicable in such a case-However such inapplicability of Section 98(2) does not render Rule 186 otiose as Section 98(3) D would be applicable-Nature of the review jwisdiction is the same as the main judgement-High Courts-Clause 36 Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court-Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Court Rulei--Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 47 Rules 6 and 5 and Sections 4(1), 98(2), 98(3), 122 and 129. Some agriculturist in the State of Gujarat filed public interest E litigation before the High Court seeking di.rections against the industrial undertaking discharging polluted effiuents in a canal leading to river 'Khari' rendering the water of the river unsuitable for agriculture, making the agricultural lands infertile and the waters in wells impure. The said writ petition was allowed by the High Court. The appellants thereafter filed F a Special Leave Petition against the order of the High Court on the grounds that they have already installed an effluent treatment plant and that they were not covered by the order passed by the High Court. The appellant thereafter filed a review petition before the High Court in accordance with the direction of this Court in the said SLP. On a difference of opinion between the Judges of the Division Bench hearing the review G petition, in applying the procedure under Order 47 Rule 6, of the Code of Civil Procedure, the review petition of the appellant was dismissed. Hence this appeal against the order of the Division Bench of the High Court dismissing the review petition. H It was contended by the appellant that instead of dismissing the 636 • RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. v. P.J. PATEL 637 review petition on difference of opinion between the Judges, it ought to A have referred the matter to the third Judge under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay which was applicable to the High Court of Gujarat. The appellant further contended that even in view of Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Court Rules framed under clause 37 of the Letters Patent, the provisions of Section 98 CPC got attracted and either B under the proviso to Section 98(2) or under Section 98(3), the reference ought to have been made to a third Judge. The contention of the respondent was that that Section 98(2) CPC was not applicable as the Judges hearing the review petition did not disagree on the question of law but on the question of fact. It was further C contended that the respondent that resorting to section 98(3) CPC would render Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Court Rules otiose and that in case Section 98(3) CPC attracted Clause 36 of the Letters Patent, that clause could cover only those cases rendered by the High Court in its original jurisdi<;tion or appellate jurisdiction. D Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1 Admittedly the High Court of Gujarat is governed by the Letters Patent which earlier applied to its parent High Court of Bombay and the original writ petition moved in the High Court by way of public E interest litigation was under Article 226 of the Constitution of India invoking the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The review petition moved by the appellant-company stems from the aforesaid decision in the writ petition. The two Judges of the High Court comprising the Division Bench which was seized of the review petition, had to decide about the F apparent error, if any, discernible from the judgment_ of the earlier Division Bench passed in exercise of original jurisdiction of the High Court. Consequently, if any difference ## Text _Characters 0–39,047 of 66,657. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39047 for what follows._ A RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. v. PRAVINBHAI JASBHAI PATEL AND ORS. AUGUST 29, 1997 B [S.B. MAJMUDAR AND S. SAGHIR AHMAD, JJ.] Constitution of India-Articles 226 and 227-Filing of writ petitions-Review or w1it orders-Reviewing Bench differs on the question of law/fact-Held, Proper procedure, was to refer the matter to third Judge for C his opinion invoking clause 36 of the Letters Patent and not to dismiss the review petition under Order 47 Rule 6--Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Cowt Rules also does not lead to different conclusions for Section 98(2) of CPC and the proviso thereto is not applicable in such a case-However such inapplicability of Section 98(2) does not render Rule 186 otiose as Section 98(3) D would be applicable-Nature of the review jwisdiction is the same as the main judgement-High Courts-Clause 36 Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court-Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Court Rulei--Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 47 Rules 6 and 5 and Sections 4(1), 98(2), 98(3), 122 and 129. Some agriculturist in the State of Gujarat filed public interest E litigation before the High Court seeking di.rections against the industrial undertaking discharging polluted effiuents in a canal leading to river 'Khari' rendering the water of the river unsuitable for agriculture, making the agricultural lands infertile and the waters in wells impure. The said writ petition was allowed by the High Court. The appellants thereafter filed F a Special Leave Petition against the order of the High Court on the grounds that they have already installed an effluent treatment plant and that they were not covered by the order passed by the High Court. The appellant thereafter filed a review petition before the High Court in accordance with the direction of this Court in the said SLP. On a difference of opinion between the Judges of the Division Bench hearing the review G petition, in applying the procedure under Order 47 Rule 6, of the Code of Civil Procedure, the review petition of the appellant was dismissed. Hence this appeal against the order of the Division Bench of the High Court dismissing the review petition. H It was contended by the appellant that instead of dismissing the 636 • RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. v. P.J. PATEL 637 review petition on difference of opinion between the Judges, it ought to A have referred the matter to the third Judge under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay which was applicable to the High Court of Gujarat. The appellant further contended that even in view of Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Court Rules framed under clause 37 of the Letters Patent, the provisions of Section 98 CPC got attracted and either B under the proviso to Section 98(2) or under Section 98(3), the reference ought to have been made to a third Judge. The contention of the respondent was that that Section 98(2) CPC was not applicable as the Judges hearing the review petition did not disagree on the question of law but on the question of fact. It was further C contended that the respondent that resorting to section 98(3) CPC would render Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Court Rules otiose and that in case Section 98(3) CPC attracted Clause 36 of the Letters Patent, that clause could cover only those cases rendered by the High Court in its original jurisdi<;tion or appellate jurisdiction. D Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1 Admittedly the High Court of Gujarat is governed by the Letters Patent which earlier applied to its parent High Court of Bombay and the original writ petition moved in the High Court by way of public E interest litigation was under Article 226 of the Constitution of India invoking the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The review petition moved by the appellant-company stems from the aforesaid decision in the writ petition. The two Judges of the High Court comprising the Division Bench which was seized of the review petition, had to decide about the F apparent error, if any, discernible from the judgment_ of the earlier Division Bench passed in exercise of original jurisdiction of the High Court. Consequently, if any difference of opinion arose between the two Judges regarding the merit of the review petition, ex facie, clause 36 of the Letters Patent got attracted. It is not possible to uphold the respondents' G contention that even if clause 36 applied it could not cover review proceed· ings arising out of decisions in writ petitions under Article 226 invoking the original jurisdiction of the High Court. It is true that the aforesaid clause of Letters Patent deals with the decisions of Division Benches exercising original or appellate jurisdiction. The question of exercise· of appellate jurisdiction does not arise in the present case. However, in view H 638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A of Order 47 Rule 5, CPC in substance a review amounts to reconsideration of its own decision by the very same court. Review jurisdiction, therefore, cannot be said to be some independent jurisdiction sought to be exercised by the court dehors the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by it when the judgment sought to be reviewed was rendered by it. As the decision sought B to be reviewed in the present proceeding was rendered by the Division Bench in exercise of its original jurisdiction, the review proceeding emanating from the very same judgement would partake the character of the very same exercise of original jurisdiction subject of course to the - limitations of review power as enjoined by the well-settled fetters and parameters for exercise of such review jurisdiction. Therefore the fetters C of Order 47 Rule 6 CPC would not get attracted to the said review proceedings as the wide sweep of the provisions of clause 36 of the Letters Patent being the paramount charter applicable to the High Court of Gujarat could not be whittled down by the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure if they were in any way inconsistent with clause 36 of the Letters D Patent. (647-D-G, 648-D-H, 649-A] 1.2. Moreover, Letters Patent as applicable to the High Court of Gujarat is a special law in force which confers special jurisdiction or power and lays down special form of procedure prescribed therein for governing the cases where the two Judges forming the Division Bench of the High E Court differed on a question of law or fact. In view of the provisions of Section 4(1) of CPC, clause 36 of the Letters Patent laying down the Special Procedure for meeting such a contingency was required to be followed without in any way being impeded or restricted or being cut across by the procedural requirements laid down by Order 47 Rule 6 CPC. [649-C-D] F 1.3. It is true that in exercise of the powers vested in the High Court under clause 37 of the Letters Patent, rules have been framed by the High Court for governing the procedure in matters dealt with by the High Court in exercise of its diverse jurisdictions. The said rule-making power also flows from the provisions of Sections 122 and 129 of CPC. However a mere G look at Section 129 CPC shows that the rules framed by the High Court cannot be inconsistent with the Letters Patent. Keeping in view this statutory scheme, a conjoint reading of Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Court Rules for deciding as to how the decisions of a Bench of two or more Judges disposing of the writ petitions covered by the sweep of these provisions H have to be processed. Section 98(1) does not conflict with any provisions RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. v. P J. PATEL . 639 of the Letters Patent. By its very language, Section 98(2), CPC also would A remain out of picture in such cases. Under these circumstances there would remain only the residuary provision of Section 98(3), CPC which clearly enjoins that nothing in the said section shall be deemed to alter or otherwise affect any provision of Letters Patent of any High Court. This , would necessarily need to a back reference to clause 36 of the Letters B Patent which would remain the solitary provision applicable in the field for resolving the procedural controversy in such a case. In shor_t when an application to get reviewed the decision of a Division Bench of the High Court rendered in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction in a petition under Article 226 is moved in the High Court and if there is conflict of decisions between the two Judges constituting the Review Bench, it is only C clause 36 of the Letters Patent which would govern the same controversy. Neither Order 47 Rule 6 CPC nor Section 98(2) CPC would apply to such eventualities arising in these review proceedings. [650-D, G, 651-H, 652-A, E-H] Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Guiab, AIR (1921) PC 6, referred to. D 1.4. For the applicability of Section 98(2) CPC, the basic requirement is that the Bench of the High Court consisting of two or more Judges must be dealing with a case where there ·is a decision of the lower court which is placed for consideration of the Division Bench of the High Court. E Consequently, Rule 186 which is of general nature cannot get attracted so far as original proceedings under Article 226 are concerned but this would not render the said rule otiose as it would still require Section 98(3) CPC to be followed in such a case and that in its turn would attract clause 36 of the Letters Patent. Thus for petition under Article 226, Section 98(1) and (3), CPC can be pressed into service in given contingencies. This apart, F Rule 186 will operate in its own vigour so far as decisions of Division Benches of the High Courts dealing with petitions under Articles 227 and 228 are concerned. But even that apart, the mandate of Rule 186 itself contemplates applicability of procedure of Section 98 CPC which enables invocation of the procedure of clause 36 of the Letters Patent via Section G 98(3) CPC itself in cases where Section 98(2) does not apply as in the present case. [656-D-F, 657-C-D] 2. The questions arising for decision in the review proceedings on which the two Judges either differed in their opinions or did not concur will have to be referred for the opinion of the third Judge of the High Court H 640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A as per Clause 36 of the Letters patent. For that purpose the remanded review petition will have to be placed before two Judges to enable them to state the points of their difference as per Clause 36 of the Letters Patent for being placed for consideration of the third Judge. The Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to assign the review petition to the appropriate B Bench and thereafter to -the third Judge for deciding these remanded ' proceedings as per Clause 36 of the Letters Patent at the earliest. It is obvious that the third Judge will be entitled to consider all the questions arising out of the difference of opinion between the two Judges, whether they are questions of fact or questions of law, and the review petition ultimately will be decided in the light of the decision of the third Judge, as C per the procedure laid down by Clause 36 of the Letters Patent. It is obvious that if the ultimate decision in the review proceedings, as remanded as per the order of this Court, goes against the appellant, it will be open to the appellant to challenge the said final decision in accordance with law. [658-B-E] D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 5891-92 of 1997. From the Judgment and Order dated 5/7.8.95, 24.10.96 and 25.10.96 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. No. 770/95, M.C.A. No. 1939/95 in E CA. No. 770/95. T.R. Andhyarujina, Solicitor General, Soli J. Sorabjee, Kapil Sibal, Harish N. Salve, Dushyant A. Dave, R. Sasiprabhu, R. Sanjanwala, Ravi Gandhi, Shyam Devan, Anees Ahmad, Anil Kumar Singh, M. Raval, Ms. H. Wahl, Ms. S. Hazarika, H.S. Parihar, Gopal Jain, Kuldeep S. Parihar, F Vijay Panjwani, Anip Sachthey & H. Munshi for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. Leave granted in Special Leave Petitions G challenging the judgment and order dated 24th and 25th October 1996 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Miscellaneous (Civil) Application No. 1939 of 1995. · By consent of learned advocates of parties the appeals were taken up for final hearing. In these appeals by special leave the appellant-comH pany has brought in challenge the judgment and order dated 24th and 25th RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. v. P.J.PATEL(S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.] 641 October 1996 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat A in Miscellanceous Civil Application No. 1939 of 1995 arising from Special Civil Application No. 770 of 1995. Apart from the merits of the controversy raised by the appellant-company against the aforesaid judgment, it is necessary to note at the outset one important procedural question which arises for consideration in these appeals. It runs as under : B "When in review proceedings arising out of the decision of the Division Bench of two learned Judges of the High Court rendered in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is in the nature of original proceedings, the two learned Judges deciding the review petition differ on questions of fact or C law, whether a reference to a third learned Judge is required to be made for disposal of the review petition as per the minority opinion of the three learned Judges or whether on difference of opinion between them on these questions, the petition is required to be dismissed under Order XLVII Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC' for short), keeping the order sought to be D reviewed untouched." As the aforesaid question goes to the root of the matter we thought it fit to hear the learned counsel for the respective parties· on this question at the outset. E Before coming to the grips of the said question it is necessary to note a few introductory facts leading to the present proceedings. A public interest litigation petition was moved in the High Court of Gujarat by the two writ petitioners who were agriculturists having agricul-' F tural lands in Kheda district of Gujarat State. Said petition was moved under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was alleged that the industries which had been set up in the industrial estates at Naroda, Vatva and Odhav on the periphery of Ahmedabad city, were discharging their polluted effluents into Kharicut canal which, in turn, leads to Khari river. G It was further alleged that there are about 11 villages in Kheda district whose only source of water for the purpose of agriculture is from Khari river. Due to the water pollution caused by the said industries the water in the Khari river was no longer suitable for agriculture. In addition thereto the agricultural lands in these villages had lost their fertility and the water drawn from the wells was having reddish colour even when it was from the H 642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A depth of about 300 ft. Various other allegations were made in the writ petition which tried to cover in its sweep of attack about 756 industrial units situated in the industrial estates of Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, situated at Naroda, Vatva and Odhav and also some of the textiles units and processing units situated in or nearby Ahinedabad. In the B c said writ petition the present appellant was also one of the contesting respondents. After hearing the parties concerned the Division Bench consisting of B.N. Kirpal, CJ. (as he then was), and H.L. Gokhale, J., by its order dated 5th/7th August 1995 allowed the writ petition and issued various directions against the polluting industries concerned as detailed in the same judgment. It is not in dispute between the parties that some of the industries covered by the said judgment came to this Court by way of Special Leave Petitions which were dismissed by this Court. So far as the · appellant is concerned it also challenged the very same judgment of the High Court by filing Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24916of1995. A Bench of two learned Judges of this Court consisting of Hon'ble K. Ramaswamy D and B.L. Hansaria, JJ. passed the following order on 17th November 1995 in the Special Leave Petition of the appellant : E F "The petitioner's specific case set up in this Court is that it has already set up the affluent treatment plant as early as in 1985 at a cost of Rs. 1.5 crore and that its case was mixed up with other cases. It is not discharging any affluent polluted waters into the canal. If that be so, it would be open to the petitioner to make an application in the High Court for appropriate review of the order concerning the petitioner only. Counsel for the petitioner seeks for and granted two months time." Pursuant to the aforesaid order of this Court the appellant moved a review· petition being Miscellaneous (Civil) Application No. 1939 of 1995 in the Gujarat High Court seeking to get reviewed the main decision in the Special Civil Application No. 770 of 1995 on the grounds raised in the review petition. This review petition was heard by another Division Bench G of the High Court consisting of H.L. Gokhale and M.S. Shah, JJ., as in the meantime B.N. Kirpal, CJ., was elevated as Judge of this Court. The said review petition was heard on merits by the aforesaid Division Bench of the High Court. During the pendency of the review petition additional evidence was also considered by the Bench as tendered by the contesting H respondents. Ultimately by an order dated 24th October 1996 Gokhale, J., ' •, RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. v. PJ. PATEL[S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.] 643 came to the conclusion that the review petition was required to be allowed A as the appellant-company was not covered by the impugned directions contained in the judgment in the writ petition. Said decision was rendered by Gokhale, J. on various reasons mentioned therein. So far as the other learned Judge M.S. Shah, J., was concerned, he took a contrary view and passed an order of even date and came to the conclusion that the review B petition was liable to be . dismissed on various grounds which appealed to the learned Judge and as mentioned in his differing judgment. Then arose the moot procedural question as to whether on difference of opinion between the two learned Judges constituting the Review Bench reference was required to be made to the third learned Judge for resolving the conflict or whether the review petition was liable to be dismissed under 0. C XL VII R.6, CPC. By their order dated 25th October 1996 both the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench came to the conclusion that once their was difference of opinion between the two learned Judges constituting the Review Bench the only course open to them was to dismiss the review petition as provided in O.XLVII R.6, CPC. As noted earlier, the aforesaid D decision in the review petition resulted in Special Leave Petitions moved by the appellant-company which have culminated into these appeals. It may be noted at this stage that after the aforesaid decision in the review petition the appellant sought to withdraw the Special Leave Petition filed by it earlier challenging the main order in the Special Civil Applica- E tion No. 770 of 1995 decided on 5th/7th Augnst 1995. Consequently the Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24916 of 1995 challenging the said order was permitted to be withdrawn by this Court on 20th December 1996. In view of the aforesaid development, therefore, the main controversy which survives in these appeals centers round the legality of the order of F the Division Bench of the High Court which dismissed the Miscellaneous (Civil) Application No. 1939 of 1995. These appeals, therefore, will have to be decided only with reference to the controversy centering round the decision in the review petition moved by the appellant before the High Court. G So far as the challenge to the impugned decision in the review petition is concerned it consists of two questions : 1. Whether the Division Bench of the High Court on a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges was jus- H 644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A tified in dismissing the review petition under O.XL VII R.6, CPC. B 2. If yes, whether on merits the review petition was required to be allowed. It is obvious that if it is held that on a difference of opinion between the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench reference to third learned Judge was required to be made then the second question would not survive for our consideration at this stage. That would survive only if it is held that the review petition was liable to be dismissed under O.XL VII R.6, CPC as C has been done by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. We, therefore, now address ourselves to the consideration of the aforesaid procedural question. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant D submitted that when the hearing of the review petition resulted in difference of opinion between the two learned Judges constituting the Review Bench, reference to third learned Judge should have been made as per Clause 36 of the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court of Gujarat. 1 In this connection it was also submitted that even though rules were framed by the High Court of Gujarat as per Clause 37 of Letters Patent the said E rules especially Rule 186 thereof did not contra-indicate the said procedural position. In this connection he submitted that as per Rule 186 of the Rules framed by the High Court, the procedure of Section 98 of the CPC got attracted for resolving this controversy. But even in such a case looking at the conflicting decisions rendered by the two learned Judges in the F review petition proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 98, CPC required reference of the question of law, on which there was difference of opinion, for decision of the third learned Judge. It was alternatively contended by Shri Sibal that in any case all questions of law and fact flowing from the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges are required to be referred to the third learned Judge for resolution of said difference of G opinion as per Section 98 sub-Section (3) of the CPC read with Clause 36 of the Letters Patent. That in no case the Division Bench was justified in dismissing the review Petition despite this conflict of opinions between the two learned Judges, following the provisions of O.XL VII R.6, CPC. It was, therefore, contended that the ultimate decision rendered by the Division H Bench of the High Court on 24th and 25th October 1996 dismissing the RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. v. PJ. PA1EL[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.) 645 review petition is required to be set aside and the controversy, centering A round the questions on which the two learned Judges had difference of opinion, is required to be resolved by reference to third learned Judge for being decided as per the majority decision in the light of the opinion of the third learned Judge. B On the other hand learned Solicitor General Shri T.R. Andhyarujina, appearing for respondent no. 4, Gujarat Pollution Control Board and Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent no. 6, Commissioner of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation contended that the procedure adopted by the Division Bench dismissing the review petition was the correct procedure as proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 98, CPC C could not be pressed in service on the facts of the present case for the simple reason that both the learned Judges had not disagreed on question of law but had disagreed purely on question of fact, namely, whether the appellant-industry was covered by the sweep of the main decision in Special Civil Application No. 770 of 1995 or not and whether the appellant D was a polluting industry or not. It was next contended that sub-Section (3) of Section 98, CPC cannot apply to the facts of the present case as Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Court Rules clearly indicated the procedure to be followed in such an eventuality and as that procedure was provided by Section 98 sub-Section (2), CPC which was a complete Code in itself, the said question could not be resolved by recourse to sub-Section (3) of E Section 98, CPC as that would render the operation' of Rule 186 of the Gujarat High Court Rules otios. It was next contended that even assuming Section 98 sub-Section (3), CPC applied to the facts of the present case, and consequently Clause 36 of the Letters Patent got attracted even then the said clause on its own terminology could not cover the facts of the F present case as the decision rendered in the review proceedings by the Division Bench could not be said to be decision rendered in exercise of original jurisdiction of the High Court and it was admittedly not a decision rendered in exercise of appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. That Clause 36 only covered those decisions which were rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court either in exercise of original jurisdiction G or in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. That review jurisdiction is an independent jurisdiction which is different from the aforesaid two jurisdictions and consequently such a decision was not at all covered by the sweep of Clause 36 of the Letters Patent and even on that ground only Section 98 sub-Section (2), CPC applied and as the proviso to the said sub-Section H 646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A {2) CPC applied and as the proviso to the said sub-Section (2) could not be invoked for resolving the factual controversy which has resulted in two divergent opinions of two learned Judges of the Division Bench, hearing the review petition, the only course open to the High Court was to dismiss the review petition as enjoined by OXLVII R.6, CPC. Consequently no B fault could be found with the decision of the High Court following the said course. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions we now proceed to consider this moot question posed for our consideration. It is not in dispute between the parties that the High Court of Gujarat is governed by the C Letters Patent which earlier applied to the parent High Court of Bombay and on bifurcation on 1st May 1960 the said Letters Patent continued to apply to the Gujarat High Court as a successor High Court to the erstwhile High Court of Bombay. Letters Patent, therefore, are the charter which would govern the proceedings in the High Court and the procedure to be D followed by it for deciding matters falling within its jurisdiction. It is also not in dispute between the parties that the original writ petition moved in the High Court by way of public interest litigation was under Article 226 of the Constitution of India invoking original jurisdiction of the High Court. It is that writ petition which got disposed of by the order dated 5th and E 7th August 1995 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The review petition moved by the appellant- company stems from the aforesaid decision in the writ petition. This review petition was placed for final disposal before a Bench of two learned Judges consisting of H.L. Gokhale and M.S. Shah, JJ., as noted earlier. These two learned Judges of the High Court were, therefore, constituting a Division Bench which was entrusted F with the task of deciding about apparent error, if any, discernible from the judgment of the earlier Division Bench passed in exercise of original jurisdiction of the High-Court. Consequently if any difference of opinion arose between the two learned Judges regarding the merit of the review petition, ex facie, Clauses 36 of the Letters Patent got attracted. The said G clause reads as under : "36. Single Judges and Divisional Courts. - And we do hereby declare that any function, which is hereby directed to be performed by the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay in the exercise of H its original or appellate jurisdiction, may be performed by any RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. v. P J. PATEL [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 647 Judge or any Division Court thereof, appointed or constituted for A such purpose, in pursuance of section One hundred and eight of the Government of India Act, 1915, and if such Division Court is composed of two or more Judges, and the Judges are divided in opinion as to the decision to be given on any point, such point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Judges, B if there shall be a majority, but if the Judges should be equally divided they shall state the point upon which they differ and the case shall then be heard upon that point by one or more of the other Judges and the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Judges, who have heard the case including those first heard it." C It is not possible to agree with the contention of learned senior counsel Shri Sorabjee for respondent no. 6 that even if Clause 36 applied it could not cover review proceedings arising out of decisions in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India invoking original jurisdiction of the D High Court. It is true that the aforesaid clause of Letters Patent deals with the decisions of Division Benches exercising original or appellate jurisdiction. Question of exercise of appellate jurisdiction does not arise in the present case. Therefore, the short question is whether the decision rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 770 of 19~5 allowing it as a public interest litigation petition in E exercise of original jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not lend colour of the very same original jurisdiction to review proceedings arising out of that very judgment? It has to be kept in view, that review petitions are not by way of appeals before the superior Court but they are by way of requests to the same C