# Renuka Prasad v. The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 657
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-05-09
- **Bench:** Sudhanshu Dhulia, K. Vinod Chandran
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/renuka-prasad-v-the-state-represented-by-assistant-superintendent-of-police-38955
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and
convicting the accused persons based on the testimony of the
IOs which was founded only on s.161, CrPC statements of the
witnesses; whether present was a case of two probable views, in
which case the one favourable to the accused ought to be taken.
Headnotes†
Appeal against acquittal - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
s.161 - Penal Code, 1860 - s.302 r/w s.120B - Murder - 71
out of the total 87 witnesses including eye-witnesses turned
hostile - Trial Court acquitted the accused persons - High
Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused relying
on the testimony of the IOs based only on the statements of
the witnesses recorded u/s.161, CrPC - Sustainability:
Held: Unsustainable - High Court erred in relying on the statements
made by the witnesses u/s.161, CrPC as affirmed by the IO, in
violation of s.162, CrPC - What is revealed in the investigation to
the IO has to be clearly established before Court by oral testimony
or other evidence, failing which the Court cannot base a conviction
on the predilection of the IO that a particular circumstance was
revealed in the investigation - Statements made by the IOs
regarding the motive, conspiracy and preparation comes out as
the prosecution story, as discernible from the s.161 statements
of various witnesses who were questioned by the police during
investigation; which statements are wholly inadmissible u/s.162,
CrPC - Merely because the IOs spoke of such statements having
been made by the witnesses during investigation, does not give
* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
161
Renuka Prasad v.
The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police
them any credibility, enabling acceptance, unless the witnesses
themselves spoke of such motive or acts of commission or
omission or instances from which conspiracy could be inferred
as also the preparation, established beyond reasonable doubt -
High Court reversed the order of acquittal of the Trial Court on
mere surmises and conjectures relying wholly on the testimony
of the IOs, who merely regurgitated the statements recorded
u/s.161 and the voluntary statements of the accused - Prosecution
failed to prove the allegations raised and charged against each
accused - Judgment of the High Court reversed, accused acquitted.
[Paras 14, 19, 26, 48, 49]
Appeal against acquittal - Murder - Hostile witnesses - Trial
Court acquitted the accused persons - High Court reversed
the acquittal - Whether present was a case of two probable
views, in which case the one favourable to the accused ought
to be taken:
Held: No - In the present case, there are no two views coming
forth from the evidence - The only view that comes forth is that
the prosecution failed to prove the allegations raised and charged
against each of the accused, more by reason of all the witnesses
turning hostile for reasons unknown - Whatever be the reason
behind such hostility, it cannot result in a conviction, based on
the testimony of the IOs which is founded only on s.161, CrPC
statements and voluntary statements of accused; the former
violative of s.162, CrPC and the latter in breach of ss.25, 26,
Evidence Act - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.161, 162 -
Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.25-27. [Para 48]
Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.25-27, 30 - Confession u/s.27 not
relied upon:
Held: Confessions allegedly made by A1 regarding the sites where
the conspiracy was hatched and the money transacted does not lead
to any discovery of fact - The narration about the conspiracy and the
money transactions are not admissible and the mere pointing out of
two sites does not lead to any discovery of fact, when the narration
is eschewed - The clothes and machetes allegedly, worn by A5 &
A6 and used by them to commit the crime, were recovered on the
confession statement of A3, the alleged conspirator - However,
162
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
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neither the clothes nor machetes are connected to A5 & A6 who
were alleged to have committed th

## Text

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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 160 : 2025 INSC 657
Renuka Prasad
v.
The State Represented by
Assistant Superintendent of Police
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 3189-3190 of 2023)
09 May 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and
convicting the accused persons based on the testimony of the
IOs which was founded only on s.161, CrPC statements of the
witnesses; whether present was a case of two probable views, in
which case the one favourable to the accused ought to be taken.
Headnotes†
Appeal against acquittal - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
s.161 - Penal Code, 1860 - s.302 r/w s.120B - Murder - 71
out of the total 87 witnesses including eye-witnesses turned
hostile - Trial Court acquitted the accused persons - High
Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused relying
on the testimony of the IOs based only on the statements of
the witnesses recorded u/s.161, CrPC - Sustainability:
Held: Unsustainable - High Court erred in relying on the statements
made by the witnesses u/s.161, CrPC as affirmed by the IO, in
violation of s.162, CrPC - What is revealed in the investigation to
the IO has to be clearly established before Court by oral testimony
or other evidence, failing which the Court cannot base a conviction
on the predilection of the IO that a particular circumstance was
revealed in the investigation - Statements made by the IOs
regarding the motive, conspiracy and preparation comes out as
the prosecution story, as discernible from the s.161 statements
of various witnesses who were questioned by the police during
investigation; which statements are wholly inadmissible u/s.162,
CrPC - Merely because the IOs spoke of such statements having
been made by the witnesses during investigation, does not give
* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
161
Renuka Prasad v.
The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police
them any credibility, enabling acceptance, unless the witnesses
themselves spoke of such motive or acts of commission or
omission or instances from which conspiracy could be inferred
as also the preparation, established beyond reasonable doubt -
High Court reversed the order of acquittal of the Trial Court on
mere surmises and conjectures relying wholly on the testimony
of the IOs, who merely regurgitated the statements recorded
u/s.161 and the voluntary statements of the accused - Prosecution
failed to prove the allegations raised and charged against each
accused - Judgment of the High Court reversed, accused acquitted.
[Paras 14, 19, 26, 48, 49]
Appeal against acquittal - Murder - Hostile witnesses - Trial
Court acquitted the accused persons - High Court reversed
the acquittal - Whether present was a case of two probable
views, in which case the one favourable to the accused ought
to be taken:
Held: No - In the present case, there are no two views coming
forth from the evidence - The only view that comes forth is that
the prosecution failed to prove the allegations raised and charged
against each of the accused, more by reason of all the witnesses
turning hostile for reasons unknown - Whatever be the reason
behind such hostility, it cannot result in a conviction, based on
the testimony of the IOs which is founded only on s.161, CrPC
statements and voluntary statements of accused; the former
violative of s.162, CrPC and the latter in breach of ss.25, 26,
Evidence Act - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.161, 162 -
Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.25-27. [Para 48]
Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.25-27, 30 - Confession u/s.27 not
relied upon:
Held: Confessions allegedly made by A1 regarding the sites where
the conspiracy was hatched and the money transacted does not lead
to any discovery of fact - The narration about the conspiracy and the
money transactions are not admissible and the mere pointing out of
two sites does not lead to any discovery of fact, when the narration
is eschewed - The clothes and machetes allegedly, worn by A5 &
A6 and used by them to commit the crime, were recovered on the
confession statement of A3, the alleged conspirator - However,
162
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
neither the clothes nor machetes are connected to A5 & A6 who
were alleged to have committed the crime nor is A3, an alleged
conspirator even accused of having been involved in the crime
proper, that is the murder of the deceased - Confession u/s.27
cannot be relied upon and no aid can be drawn from it to implicate
the other accused - The sites pointed out by A1, did not lead to
any discovery of a fact and it is hit by ss.25 and 26 . [Paras 39, 45]
Case Law Cited
Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil [2000] Supp. 5 SCR 144 : (2001)
1 SCC 652; Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh [2020] 7 SCR
546 : (2020) 9 SCC 627 - distinguished.
Ramesh v. State of Haryana [2016] 8 SCR 936 : (2017) 1 SCC
529; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [2007] 2 SCR 630 : (2007)
4 SCC 415; State, State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar [2018] 2 SCR
656 : (2018) 13 SCC 808; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad
[1962] 3 SCR 10; Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. [2002] Supp. 2
SCR 31 : (2002) 7 SCC 334; Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan
[2015] 10 SCR 553 : (2016) 14 SCC 640; Kali Ram v. State of
H.P. [1974] 1 SCR 722 : (1973) 2 SCC 808; R. Shaji v. State of
Kerala [2013] 3 SCR 1172 : (2013) 14 SCC 266; Rajendra Singh v.
State of U.P. [2007] 8 SCR 834 : (2007) 7 SCC 378; State (NCT
of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2005) 11
SCC 600; H.P. Admn. v. Om Prakash [1972] 2 SCR 765 : (1972)
1 SCC 249; State of Maharashtra v. Damu [2000] 3 SCR 880 :
(2000) 6 SCC 269; Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam [2013] 3
SCR 801 : (2013) 7 SCC 417; Raja v. State of Haryana [2015]
3 SCR 947 : (2015) 11 SCC 43; Pandurang Kalu Patil v. State
of Maharashtra [2002] 1 SCR 338 : (2002) 2 SCC 490; John
Pandian v. State [2010] 15 SCR 1012 : (2010) 14 SCC 129;
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] 1 SCR 526 :
(1952) 1 SCC 275; Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar [1964] 6
SCR 623; State v. Chhaganlal Gangaram Lavar, 1954 SCC OnLine
Bom 69 - referred to.
Athappa Goundan, In re, 1937 SCC OnLine Mad 76; Naresh
Chandra Das v. King-Emperor, 1941 SCC OnLine Cal 178 -
referred to.
Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 - referred to.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
163
Renuka Prasad v.
The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Criminal Procedure Code,
1973.
List of Keywords
Appeal against acquittal; Testimony of the Investigating Officers
(IOs); Testimony of IO founded only on Section 161, CrPC
statements of the witnesses; Conviction based on the testimony of
the IOs based only on Section 161, CrPC statements; Statements
made by the witnesses under Section 161, CrPC; Witnesses
turning hostile; Hostility of witnesses at trial; Eye-witnesses turned
hostile; Sibling rivalry; Section 27, Evidence Act, 1872; Failed to
identify the assailants; Homicidal death; Conspiracy; Confession;
Motive; Preparation; Two reasonable views possible; No two views;
Presumption of innocence of the accused until proved guilty;
Voluntary statements of accused; Discovery of a fact; Recovery
of the machetes, the weapons used in the offence; Recovery of
the clothes; Seizure of currency; Test identification parade (TIP);
Seizures and recoveries; Prosecution failed to prove the allegations
raised and charged.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
3189-3190 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2023 and 05.10.2023 of
the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLA No. 870 of 2017
With
Criminal Appeal No(s). 3399 and 85-86 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ratnakar Dash, Siddharth Luthra, Sr. Advs., G.Sivabalamurugan,
Selvaraj Mahendran, C.adhikesavan, Ms. Ratan Priya Pradhan,
Harikrishnan P.v, C.kavin Ananth, Mrs. Vaijayanthi Girish, Girish
Ananthamurthy, Ayush Kaushik, Sougat Pati.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Aman Panwar, A.A.G., V. N. Raghupathy, Shrey Brahmbhatt.
164
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
K. Vinod Chandran, J.
1.
Prevaricating witnesses, turning hostile in Court and overzealous
investigations, done in total ignorance of basic tenets of criminal law,
often reduces prosecution to a mockery. Witnesses mount the box
to disown prior statements, deny recoveries made, feign ignorance
of aggravating circumstances spoken of during investigation and
eye witnesses turn blind. Here is a classic case of 71 of the total
87 witnesses including eye-witnesses, turning hostile, leaving the
prosecution to stand on the testimony of the police and official
witnesses. Even a young boy, the crucial eyewitness, who saw his
father being hacked to death, failed to identify the assailants.
2.
The prosecution alleged that due to differences arising from sharing of
assets of the father; an entrepreneur who set up several educational
institutions, A1 and his brother, PW4, were at loggerheads. The
deceased an employee of one of the institutions, later allotted to
the share of A1, resigned to join an institution managed by PW4,
after the division of assets. The enmity of A1 arises, according to
the prosecution, due to the active involvement of the deceased in
the sibling rivalry, aligning himself with PW4, to the hilt. A1 along
with his employees A2 to A4 engaged A5 and A6, through A7, an
Advocate, to murder the deceased. A5 and A6 is said to have carried
out the brutal murder, hacking the deceased to death, in front of his
son, PW8, at 07:45 pm on 28.04.2011. PW8, immediately contacted
his relatives and the deceased was rushed to the hospital where he
breathed his last at 08:40 pm on the same day.
3.
The first information statement (FIS) was lodged by PW8, leading to
the registration of the crime and the resultant investigation. As was
said, 87 witnesses were led in trial to speak about the homicide, the
motive, the meeting of minds leading to the conspiracy, the preparation,
what transpired after the incident and the arrest, recovery, chemical
analysis and so on and so forth; all in vain for most turned hostile,
especially the ones who were relevant. The Trial Court acquitted the
accused finding no support for the prosecution case from the large
number of witnesses arrayed to prove the various aspects leading to
the murder, all of whom, except the official witnesses, turned hostile.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
165
Renuka Prasad v.
The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police
The Division Bench of the High Court reversed the acquittal and
convicted A1 to A6 under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The acquittal of A7 by the Trial Court
was affirmed by the High Court.
4.
A1 has filed one of the appeals in which Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned
Senior Counsel, appeared for the accused/appellant. Mr. Ratnakar
Dash, learned Senior Counsel appeared in the other appeals filed
by A2 to A6. Mr. Aman Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General
appeared for the State. Heard both the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellants and the learned Additional Advocate
General and perused the records.
5.
The Division Bench at the outset, dealt with the judgment in
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka1 wherein this Court had set
out the general principles regarding powers of the Appellate Court
in dealing with an appeal from an acquittal. The principles are trite;
extract having been made in the impugned judgment, we would not
repeat. We are tasked to find out whether the principles have been
followed scrupulously by the Division Bench in setting aside the order
of acquittal. Whether, while exercising the full power conferred in an
appeal to review, reappreciate and consider the evidence led in the
case, the Division Bench has been circumspect, keeping in mind
the trite fundamental principle that the presumption of innocence
available to the accused, under the general law, stands fortified and
strengthened by reason of the order of acquittal. Whether, the Trial
Court has been absolutely unreasonable in taking a view that there
was insufficient evidence to bring home a conviction in the case and
whether it was a case of two probable views, in which case the one
favourable to the accused ought to be taken.
6.
PW8 is the eyewitness who spoke of the incident but failed to
identify the assailants or the weapons recovered, despite the FIS
having categorically stated his ability to identify them, who suddenly
came out of the bushes; when he and his father were taking a stroll,
brutally hacked his father and fled on their foot. While MO6 and
MO7, spectacles and mobile of the deceased seized by the police
from the scene of occurrence, was identified, the witness could
neither identify either of the appellants; A5 and A6. The weapons
1
(2007) 4 SCC 415
166
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
were not even confronted to PW8, since he expressed his inability
to identify them. PW8's knowledge of the motive, spoken of in the
statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, was denied. PW 1 &
PW9 were the persons who came to the scene of occurrence, as per
the prosecution case, immediately after the incident, who also saw
two persons running away. PW1 completely denied his presence at
the scene of occurrence, while PW9 spoke only of having seen one
person running away. PW9 deposed of seeing the injured and his
son, the latter of whom was advised to call relatives. He called the
Police and summoned an ambulance, but even before its arrival, the
injured was taken to the hospital in a pick-up van. The statement
made by PW1 and PW9, under Section 161, regarding their ability to
identify the persons who were running away and their awareness of
the motive; being residents of the locality and the conspiracy having
been hatched by reason of the sibling rivalry of prominent persons
of the locality, were all denied.
7.
PW2, the brother of the deceased, PW3, his uncle and PW10, his
wife, were examined to prove the inquest and also the motive. All of
them saw the injured at the hospital, spoke of the injuries numbering
twenty-five, admitted of the inquest and identified the dress and
other personal effects of the deceased, seized by the police from
the body. PW2, though spoke of his brother's employment with A1
and subsequent resignation due to a disagreement, did not support
the prosecution case of an active enmity between the deceased
and A1 by reason of the allegiance to PW4, the brother of A1; a
departure from his Section 161 statement. Curiously, the wife of
the deceased also denied her statement to the police that A1 had
insulted and threatened the deceased. PW3 was the uncle of the
deceased who along with PW2 and PW10 saw the deceased at the
hospital. There were a number of witnesses examined to prove the
motive, the conspiracy and the incidental circumstances, leading
eventually to the murder of the deceased, all of whom turned hostile.
The Appellate Court though accepted that all these witnesses turned
hostile, looked at the story projected by the prosecution as spoken of
in the Section 161 statements of the witnesses, which the witnesses
did not accept, in the box, at the trial before Court.
8.
PW4, the brother of A1, to whom was aligned the deceased, and
a star witness to speak on the motive, admitted the division of
the properties between the brothers but denied any long-standing
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
167
Renuka Prasad v.
The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police
enmity between them. He also denied that he wrote a letter to his
father complaining about the actions of A1. A photocopy of the said
letter confronted to him, at the trial, was denied, though he admitted
that the signature seen therein was similar to his. The effort of the
prosecution to prove the various aspects leading to the crime and
what happened afterwards; (i) of the conspiracy; hatched through
the meetings carried out by the accused, purportedly to prove the
meeting of minds, the inquiries made to find out the contract killers,
persons approached for owning up the crime; (ii) preparation; like,
the purchase of machetes, procurement of fake number plates to
be affixed in a motorbike and pick up van, used to escape from
the crime scene and reach the hide out; and the (iii) motive itself;
through employees of the Medical College, PW57 to PW62 & PW72,
including the Administrative Superintendent and the Principal of the
College, to establish the enmity between A1 and PW4, all of which
collapsed like a pack of cards, when all of these witnesses turned
hostile. The motive, conspiracy, preparation made before, and what
transpired after the crime, as projected by the prosecution remained
a mere scripted story as discernible from the Section 161 statements;
not established in the trial.
9.
Surprisingly, all the panch witnesses who attested the various
recoveries, like cash seized from A2 to A5, the weapons used, and
the clothes worn by the accused, when the crime was committed,
also turned hostile. We will deal with Exhibit P49, recovery of the
machetes, the weapons used in the offence and Exhibit P50, recovery
of the clothes worn by A5 and A6 at the time of the crime, a little
later, which has to be considered along with the FSL report and
the result of analysis coming forth. We also notice that there were
two Mahazars produced as Annexure P51 and P54, wherein A1
allegedly confessed and pointed out the place where the conspiracy
was carried out and the money transfer occurred. This, however,
is not a confession under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, since there was no tangible object recovered from the two
sites pointed out, leading to the discovery of a fact. The confession
statement regarding the conspiracy, of course cannot at all be relied
upon, being hit by Sections 25 & 26 of the Evidence Act. The other
witnesses examined to prove the aggravating circumstances also
turned hostile in which event the Court turned to the evidence of the
Investigating Officers, PW's 83, 84 and 87.
168
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10. Commencing the analysis of evidence the High Court first held that
undisputedly Ramkrishna met with a homicidal death, which is also
the conclusion of the Trial Court from which there is no reason for
us to differ. The evidence of PW8, who was an eye witness and
PW9, who saw the hacked body of the deceased immediately after
the incident, coupled with the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 10, brother,
uncle and wife, who saw the body of the deceased at the hospital and
spoke of the injuries sustained, clearly established the brutal attack
on the deceased. The post-mortem report and the cause of death
as spoken of by the Doctor, PW74, also established the homicidal
death caused by the cutting wounds inflicted on the deceased, which
were also ante-mortem. We need not further deal with the issue and
fully agree with the Trial Court and the High Court that the deceased
was brutally murdered.
11. The High Court having found that all the witnesses except the
official witnesses turned hostile looked at the evidence of the official
witnesses especially the Investigating Officers and the recoveries
made in the course of investigation. The High Court also relied on
two decisions of this Court, State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil2
and Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh3 to find that the courts
need not always feed on a distrust of police officers. We have to
emphasize that the proposition coming out of the said decisions were
in the context of recoveries made under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act or the seizures effected on search or interception.
12. In Sunil and another2, the recovery of a blood-stained knickers
was eschewed by the High Court since there were no independent
witnesses. A distinction was drawn from a case of recovery, under
information supplied by the accused and a discovery made on a
search, where there is an insistence on having independent witnesses,
under Chapter VII of the Code. It was held that it is fallacious to hold
that every recovery under Section 27 must necessarily be attested by
independent witnesses and it is for the Police Officer to have such
witnesses present to provide further veracity to the recovery. But there
could be circumstances in which there were no witnesses present or
none had agreed to affix his signature on the mahazar, which cannot
always lead to the evidence of recovery being eschewed, especially
2
(2001) 1 SCC 652
3
(2020) 9 SCC 627
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
169
Renuka Prasad v.
The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police
when the testimony of the Police Officer is not shown to be tainted
in any manner and is also found to be credible. It was held that it
is archaic and a colonial hangover that actions of the Police Officer
should be approached with primal distrust, always. Rizwan Khan3
was a three Judge Bench decision which affirmed Sunil & another2
to hold that if the police witnesses are found to be reliable and trust
worthy, no error can be attributed to the conviction entered relying
upon such testimony. Therein, it was a case of recovery of a narcotic
substance from a motor-cycle in which the accused were travelling,
search having been conducted on interception of the vehicle. The
panchnama witnesses turned hostile but the evidence of the Police
Officers, found to be trust worthy was relied upon.
13. State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar4, again was a case in which
there were no independent witnesses to attest the recovery of the
contraband, since none were available due to the severe cold on
that day. The conviction was based on the testimony of seizure of
contraband from the accused, as testified by the Police Officers.
We cannot digress from the above proposition as laid-down by this
Court but only raise a caution, insofar the recovery made under
Section 27, in the context of the findings of the High Court, in the
instant case, having to be necessarily connected to the crime and
the accused, failing which the recovery is of no consequence. We
also have to observe that the confession can only be with respect
to the discovery of a fact leading to the recovery of a material object
and cannot be with respect to any confession as to the actual crime
as has been held in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor5.
14. The High Court having stated the principle, went on to examine the
evidence of PW's 83, 84 and 87. PW83 commenced the investigation,
to whom was handed over the letter, MO40, allegedly written by PW4
to his father; which however, was denied by PW4 in his testimony.
The High Court discussing PW83's evidence specifically referred
to the Section 161 statements made by PWs 1, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 26
and 51, which were affirmed to have been made by them before the
Police as spoken of by PW83. Observing that in cross-examination of
PW83 but for general suggestions, which were denied by him there
was nothing to discredit him and hence the testimony of PW83 is
4
(2018) 13 SCC 808
5
AIR 1947 PC 67
170
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
not affected, the Division Bench held there is no reason to discard
it. We are afraid that the High Court seriously erred in relying on the
statements made by the witnesses under Section 161, as affirmed
by the Investigating Officer, clearly in violation of Section 162 and
the specific use to which Section 161 statements can be put to,
as we will further elaborate, a little later. It's also pertinent that the
conspiracy angle spoken of by PW83, is what has been stated to
him by A7, clearly inadmissible in evidence.
15. The evidence of PW84 with respect to seizure of currency worth
Rs.8,50,000/- and two mobile phones respectively from the staff
quarters of A5 and the person of A6, on information, the source of
which has not been disclosed was emphasised. The arrest of A3,
the seizure of Rs.2,00,000/- and a mobile phone from A3 were also
relied on. The Trial Court had placed no reliance on these recoveries
finding it to be not admissible under Section 27; which the High Court
was not impressed with and found it to be permissible under Section
102 of Cr.P.C. Seizure under Section 102, unless it is linked to the
crime cannot be relied on to convict the accused for murder on the
conspiracy alleged. But more relevant is the fact that only the bundles
of the money recovered were identified in Court, by PW78, an ASI
who accompanied PW84 at the time of seizure and PW84, since
there was no proper inventory taken of the cash recovered. Further
though PW84 spoke of the cash recovered being in bundles with
slips showing the name of the banks, no attempt was made to find
out its source from the Banks. The money hence was not connected
to the crime and the Call Data Records of the mobile phones were
not proved in the trial.
16. Now we come to the IO, who concluded the investigation and filed
charge-sheet, PW87, before whom A3, A5 and A6 were produced
by PW84, after which the investigation was carried out by PW87. It
was PW87's testimony that the voluntary statements of A3 led to A2,
from whose staff quarters Rs.2,58,000/- and two mobile phones were
recovered. A1 was also arrested, who is said to have given statements
about his enmity with PW4 and also the deceased. These voluntary
statements and the confession statements of A3, under Section
27 also led PW87 to Amarajyothi Farms, from where the weapons
(MO 10 & MO 11) and a motorcycle (MO 49) were recovered as per
Ex.P49 Mahazar and MO12 to MO15 clothes worn by A5 & A6 were
recovered as per Ex.P113, Mahazar. PW87's testimony also spoke
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171
Renuka Prasad v.
The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police
about PW5 who was close to the deceased having spoken of the
enmity between A1 and PW4; denied in Court by PW5. A reading
of PW87's statement would reveal that she has just spoken of the
voluntary statements made by the various accused and there is no
investigation worthy of reliance spoken of by the witness. We are
reminded of the extract in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad6,
an eleven Judge Bench, of a quote attributed to Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen, the principal draftsman of the Evidence Act:
"If it is permissible in law to obtain evidence from the
accused person by compulsion, why tread the hard path
of laborious investigation and prolonged examination of
other men, materials and documents? It has been well said
that an abolition of this privilege would be an incentive for
those in charge of enforcement of law "to sit comfortably
in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes
rather than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence".
(Stephen, History of Criminal Law, p. 442)
17. The High Court has placed heavy reliance on the testimonies of PW's
83, 84 and 87, the IOs, with the assertion that they were unshaken
in cross-examination and reliance was placed on the affirmation of
the statements made by the witnesses under Section 161, which
the witnesses did not speak themselves in the box, at the trial. We
cannot but observe that, though reliance is said to be placed on
the testimony of the IOs' this would in fact be a reliance placed on
Section 161 statements as spoken of by the IOs which is egregiously
wrong. The High Court in paragraph 85 speaks of the affirmation of
statements given by witnesses examined by PW87 and records that
though these were denied by the witnesses, a reading of the crossexamination of PW87 indicates that she had not been discredited
and the suggestions made to her in cross were denied. The reliance
placed on the so called voluntary statements of the accused and the
statements made under Section 161 as recorded by PW87, based
on the decisions afore-cited cannot be countenanced.
18. As we noticed, the decisions cited by the High Court regarding the
testimony of the Police Officers before Court not liable to be treated
6
(1962) 3 SCR 10
172
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with distrust, was specifically with respect to recoveries made
under Section 27 and the seizures of contraband. Seizure often is
on surprise interception or on information received, which principle
cannot be imported to the affirmation of the statements made by
the witnesses during investigation under Section 161; if they do not
subscribe to it at trial. Merely for the IO having spoken about such
a statement having been made, it cannot be treated as gospel truth.
Nor can the voluntary statements of the accused relied on except
to the extent of the discovery of fact, on information supplied, which
would be a strong implicating circumstance if, and only if, there is
a link established to the crime.
19. In this context, we also have to specifically notice paragraph 86
where some of the responses by PW87 were discussed to add
further credibility to her testimony; which in fact runs counter
to the prosecution case. The test identification parade had not
given any result, which was stated to be not an argument against
the prosecution. We perfectly agree, since even if there was an
identification at the stage of investigation, as per the precedents, it
only aids the investigation and cannot lead to a conviction, unless
the accused are identified in the box at the time of trial, in Court,
which in the present case has not occurred. PW87 admitted to a
suggestion that when she interrogated the family members of the
deceased, none talked about the existing differences between the
deceased and A1. The said admission was rubbished on the ground
that, to another suggestion in the same vein, PW87 firmly denied
it and this was because her investigation revealed involvement of
A1; a presumptuous finding without any legal basis. What has been
revealed in the investigation, to the IO, has to be clearly established
before Court by oral testimony or other evidence, failing which the
Court cannot base a conviction on the predilection of the IO that a
particular circumstance was revealed in the investigation.
20. The discrepancy regarding the statements made by her with respect
to the clothes of A5 and A6 was attempted to be explained away.
We would not dwell on the discrepancy since nothing comes out of
the recovery made under Section 27. The recovery was made on a
confession statement by A3 and not A5 or A6. Further, the statement
attributed to A3 as spoken of by PW 87 marked as exhibit P 113
is "The machetes used in this murder is kept in a gunny bag in the
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
173
Renuka Prasad v.
The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police
last room of the first floor of the farmhouse of Renuka Prasad at
Ajjavara-Addangaya-Mavinapalla. The blood-stain clothes which
were worn by Sharan and Bhavani Shankar during the offence and
the Kannada number plate which was affixed to the Hero Honda
Splendour bike during the offence are kept near the water pump in
a plastic cover; and if you come with me, I will show them to you."
(sic) The reference to murder and offence has to be completely
eschewed and the fact discovered is only the concealment of the
weapons and the dress which information supplied is by A3 who even
according to the prosecution, was not involved in the crime proper, of
murder. Further, while recording the Mahazar for recovery, the shirt
and pants recovered were said to be of A5 and a shirt and jeans
of A6. Nothing was done to verify whether MO12 - MO15 items of
dress would fit A5 & A6. PW87 in fact admits that she did not ask A5
and A6 to wear it nor was it verified from a tailor as to whether the
dress recovered would fit A5 & A6. There is no statement made by
A3 regarding the handing over of the weapons & dress, by A5 & A6
to A3, which in any event would have to be proved independently.
The identification of A5 & A6, of their dress at the time of recovery
also is inadmissible. The mere recovery of dress under Section 27,
that also through a confession statement of an alleged conspirator,
does not implicate A5 or A6 who were alleged to be the assailants
who killed the deceased. Pertinently the site or farm from which the
recoveries were made was not proved to be owned by A1.
21. Insofar as the crime is concerned, the eye witness PW8 and the
persons who reached the occurrence immediately thereafter, PW1
and PW9, admittedly did not identify the accused. PW8 being a
young boy of 15 at the time of incident, the Division Bench was of
the opinion that it was quite natural that he was not able to identify
the accused. It was also observed from his statement that, it was
the police who informed him about A5 & A6 having committed the
murder. As far as PW1 is concerned looking at the evidence of
PW9, it has been found that PW1 had stated a deliberate falsehood
before Court; which again, would not enable the Court to look at
his Section 161 statement. PW9 also did not identify the accused
and he spoke only of seeing one person running away. Obviously
since no reliance could be placed on the evidence of PW8, PW1 &
9, to pin the crime on A5 & A6, the Division Bench went on to look
at the circumstances attempted to be established at the trial; being
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the motive, the conspiracy, the preparation, seizure of incriminating
materials and the FSL report. Before leaving the eye-witnesses
testimony, we cannot but notice that the prosecution never attempted
to confront PW8 with the clothes recovered as MO12 to MO15, said
to have been worn by A5 & A6, at the time when the crime was
committed. Neither was it shown to PW9, who at least spoke of
having seen one person running away from the scene.
22. On the question of motive, the Division Bench examined the evidence
of PW4, the brother of A1, PW10, the wife of the deceased and
PWs 6, wife of PW4, PW7, their son & PWs 11 to 13, relatives of A1
& PW4, all of whom turned hostile. The employees in the institutions
of PW4 & A1 also denied their former statements of enmity between
the brothers and the alleged ill will of A1 against the deceased.
PW4 denied the letter which was produced as MO40 before Court.
However, the Division Bench has relied on MO40 and its contents
on the ground that PW83 had stated that PW4 came to the Police
Station and handed over the xerox copy of a 14-page letter. We
are unable to accept the reasoning of the Division Bench especially
since MO40 was confronted to PW4, when he was examined and
he denied having written such a letter. The letter hence was not
proved, though marked through the IO. Merely because PW83, the
IO, submitted that it was handed over to him by PW4 at the time of
investigation, that cannot be a reason to place reliance on MO40
or to look into its contents to find enmity existing between A1 and
PW4 and threats having been levelled against the deceased, by A1.
23. The High Court further places reliance on PW10's testimony or rather
the statements made by her in the Section 161 statement on the
reasoning that the wife will definitely be aware of the reasons behind
the murder. She cannot be believed, if it is deposed that she is not
aware of anything, was the finding. A statement made by PW10 that,
she knew about A1 having insulted and levelled threats against the
deceased; confronted to PW10 but denied, was relied upon, finding
that it was affirmed by PW83. PW4 was also found to have resiled
from his earlier statement under Section 161 because the sister of
PW4 and A1 had filed a suit against them which was being jointly
contested by them; a mere surmise to place heavy reliance on the
Section 161 statements made by PW4. According to us the motive
insofar as A1 having inimical feelings against the deceased, for having
meddled in the affairs of the institutions and the division of assets,
does not stand proved. PW4 only admitted to certain differences
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
175
Renuka Prasad v.
The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police
between the brothers with reference to the running of a mess in
the college and there was no reference to the deceased in so far
as the specific dispute spoken of. We find absolutely no reason to
find the motive established.
24. The next aspect dealt with by the High Court was on the conspiracy
and preparation for the crime. Rightly reliance was placed on Mohd.
Khalid v. State of W.B.7 wherein it was opined that conspiracies
are not hatched in the open and when done in secrecy, it is very
difficult for direct evidence to be produced relating to the conspiracy
and the Court would have to fall back upon circumstantial evidence,
which also has to be based on inferences made from the various
circumstances proved from the acts and omissions of the accused.
The Division Bench while referring to the various witnesses who
were produced to prove the conspiracy first looked at the evidence
of PW71, a Director of one of the institutions, also the wife of A1
and PW72, who was an employee in the same institution. PW71
though denied the various documents alleged to have been produced
before Court, the Division Bench presumed that her testimony was
a deliberate falsehood intended to save her husband. PW72 had
produced the salary certificate of A2 issued by him in the capacity
of in-charge Principal of the Dental College. The aforesaid evidence
was relied on to find close acquaintance of A1 with A2 to A4, the
former being the employer of the latter three persons. Insofar as the
conspiracy hatched, the Court relied on the voluntary statements
made by A3, A5 and A6 before PW87 and relied on Mehboob Ali v.
State of Rajasthan8. The testimony of PW87 regarding the sites,
where discussions were held and money changed hands, pointed
out through the voluntary statements made by A1, was relied on by
the Division Bench. In addition, Section 161 statements of PW61 to
PW64 who had resiled from their statements in the testimony before
Court regarding A3 having been seen with A5 and A6 in a hotel on
28.04.2011, was also relied upon. As far as the preparation made,
since the witnesses examined for proving the same also turned
hostile, the evidence of the police officers were reckoned and the
story as spoken of by the IOs were elaborately discussed, which in
effect is based on the Section 161 Statements made by the various
witnesses, before the police.
7
(2002) 7 SCC 334
8
(2016) 14 SCC 640
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25. Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was dealt with
in Kali Ram v. State of H.P. 9 to hold that the provision makes it
plain that 'the statement made by any person to a police officer
in the course of an investigation cannot be used for any purpose
except for the purpose of contradicting a witness, as mentioned
in the proviso to sub-section (1) or for the purposes mentioned
in sub-section (2)' (sic para-17). The said principle was reiterated
with reference to Section 162 under the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 in R. Shaji v. State of Kerala10. It was held by this Court that
'statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. can be used only for the
purpose of contradiction and statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
can be used for both corroboration and contradiction' (sic para-25).
It was further held that though the object of the statement of witness
recorded under Section 164 is two-fold, there is no proposition that
if the statement of a witness is recorded under Section 164 before
a Magistrate, the evidence of such witness in Court should be
discarded. Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P. 11 was a case in which
the High Court, as in the present case, relied upon the statements
of six witnesses, recorded by the IO under Section 161 Cr.P.C., to
enter a finding that the respondent could not have been present at
the scene of crime, as he was present in the meeting of the Nagar
Nigam at Allahabad. It was unequivocally held that 'a statement
under Section 161 Cr.P.C.