# REV. FR. K. C. ALEXANDER v. STATE OF KERALA

- **Citation:** [1974] 1 S.C.R. 399
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-08-16
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 744 of 1967
- **Bench:** P. 11\Ganmohan Reddy, S. N. Dwivedi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rev-fr-k-c-alexander-v-state-of-kerala-5986
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

399
Travancbre l:...a11d Conservancy 4.ct (4 of 1916), s. 9-'0ther product raised
011 /a11d' if iflcludes trees.
'
Trespasser-Ri'ght to compensation for trees planted on a11'1ther's_ land.
There was a dispute regarding the ownership of certain land between a
1enmi family and the State Government, and the Jenmi family filed a '$uit
for declaration of its title.
While the dispute was pending, the appellant •pplied to the Conservator of Forests for registration of the lands in his name
under the Travancore Land Conservancy Act, 1916, bu~ the
applic~tion was
rejected.
After the suit filed by the Jenmi family \Vas dismissed, the ~pellant
who was in possession of the land, was dispossessed. The appellan
there·
after. filed a suit for the value of improvements affected by him on t .e )and
by planting trees and constructing a building.
The trial Court decreed the suit for the value of the building but rejected"
the rest of claim. The High Court dismissed his appeal.
D
In appeal to this Court. it was contended that : (I) there was no order
of forfeiture of improvements as requited under s. 9 of the Act; (2) the
appellant was ·entitled to compensation under
general
law:
and
(3)
the
appellant was· not served with a notice to quit as required by s. 9 of the
Act to enable 'him to cut and remove the trees.
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Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : ( l) Section 9 provides for two
notices to .be
given :
(a), one
notice to be given to the person fn unauthorised occupatio.n of governn1ent
land to vacate within a reasonable time, and (b) another for forfeiture of any
crop or other product raised on the land or to remove any building or other
structure within a reasonable time.
The "'·ords ';aised on the land'
qualify
hath the 'crop' and 'other product', and so, the words 'other proJuct' have to
be read in the oontext of the word 'crop'.
So read. trees would not be included within the meaning of 'other product raised on the land in s. 9 of
the Act, and therefor:e. there is no obligation on the respondent to give notice
of forfeiture. [405D-'-H; 406E]
Clark and Another v. Gaskarth. 8 Taunt 431, app1ied.
(2) (a) The trial court and High Court found on the evidence that the
appellant's possessior. commenced only after his application fo'r registration
was rejected, and that t.he improvements, if any, were
effected by him
only
thereafter, with full knowledge that the ti'le to the
lands
\VJ.s
in
disi:ute.
Therefore, he could not be said to be a bona fide trespasser. It ·~ould not ·also
be C"Jntended that nevertheless he v,ras a bona fide tresrasser en~itleJ. to compensation on the basis that he entered upon the land with a bona fide intention
of improving the land.
Such a contention would give validity to a dangercus
principle which will condone all acts of deliberate and wrongful trespass, because, any person desparate enough to trespass on other man's land without any
claim of title can always plead that he had a bona fide .intention of improving·
the land whether or not the owner of the land wanted the imprCvement.
The
maxim of English law quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit ( v,rhatever is affixed
to the soil belongs to the soil) is not applicable to India. but that h not to say
that wrongful trespasser can plant trees on som:one else's land and claim a
right to those trees after he is evicted. [406E-H; 407A]
Vall!lbdas Narainji v. Development Officer, Bandra, A.I.R.
1929 P.C.
163, applied.
400
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1974 j 1 s.C.R.
(b) In any case. the position of a trespasser cannot be better than that of
a lawful tenant, who, havi:i,g lost bis possession cannot claim compensation
or damages for anything_ erected on the land or any improvements made
therein. [407HJ
·
A
(3) There are ~ clear allegations in the plaint that the appellant was
evicted \vithout notice.
No issue had been framed regarding L~ notice of
eviction not being giYen and no application for framing such an issue v.·as
Il
filed in ihe trial court, or the High Court or this Court. T

## Text

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REV. FR. K. C. ALEXANDER
v.
STATE OF KERALA
August 16, 1973
[P. 11\GANMOHAN REDDY AND S. N. DWIVEDI, JJ.]
399
Travancbre l:...a11d Conservancy 4.ct (4 of 1916), s. 9-'0ther product raised
011 /a11d' if iflcludes trees.
'
Trespasser-Ri'ght to compensation for trees planted on a11'1ther's_ land.
There was a dispute regarding the ownership of certain land between a
1enmi family and the State Government, and the Jenmi family filed a '$uit
for declaration of its title.
While the dispute was pending, the appellant •pplied to the Conservator of Forests for registration of the lands in his name
under the Travancore Land Conservancy Act, 1916, bu~ the
applic~tion was
rejected.
After the suit filed by the Jenmi family \Vas dismissed, the ~pellant
who was in possession of the land, was dispossessed. The appellan
there·
after. filed a suit for the value of improvements affected by him on t .e )and
by planting trees and constructing a building.
The trial Court decreed the suit for the value of the building but rejected"
the rest of claim. The High Court dismissed his appeal.
D
In appeal to this Court. it was contended that : (I) there was no order
of forfeiture of improvements as requited under s. 9 of the Act; (2) the
appellant was ·entitled to compensation under
general
law:
and
(3)
the
appellant was· not served with a notice to quit as required by s. 9 of the
Act to enable 'him to cut and remove the trees.
E
F
G
H
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : ( l) Section 9 provides for two
notices to .be
given :
(a), one
notice to be given to the person fn unauthorised occupatio.n of governn1ent
land to vacate within a reasonable time, and (b) another for forfeiture of any
crop or other product raised on the land or to remove any building or other
structure within a reasonable time.
The "'·ords ';aised on the land'
qualify
hath the 'crop' and 'other product', and so, the words 'other proJuct' have to
be read in the oontext of the word 'crop'.
So read. trees would not be included within the meaning of 'other product raised on the land in s. 9 of
the Act, and therefor:e. there is no obligation on the respondent to give notice
of forfeiture. [405D-'-H; 406E]
Clark and Another v. Gaskarth. 8 Taunt 431, app1ied.
(2) (a) The trial court and High Court found on the evidence that the
appellant's possessior. commenced only after his application fo'r registration
was rejected, and that t.he improvements, if any, were
effected by him
only
thereafter, with full knowledge that the ti'le to the
lands
\VJ.s
in
disi:ute.
Therefore, he could not be said to be a bona fide trespasser. It ·~ould not ·also
be C"Jntended that nevertheless he v,ras a bona fide tresrasser en~itleJ. to compensation on the basis that he entered upon the land with a bona fide intention
of improving the land.
Such a contention would give validity to a dangercus
principle which will condone all acts of deliberate and wrongful trespass, because, any person desparate enough to trespass on other man's land without any
claim of title can always plead that he had a bona fide .intention of improving·
the land whether or not the owner of the land wanted the imprCvement.
The
maxim of English law quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit ( v,rhatever is affixed
to the soil belongs to the soil) is not applicable to India. but that h not to say
that wrongful trespasser can plant trees on som:one else's land and claim a
right to those trees after he is evicted. [406E-H; 407A]
Vall!lbdas Narainji v. Development Officer, Bandra, A.I.R.
1929 P.C.
163, applied.
400
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1974 j 1 s.C.R.
(b) In any case. the position of a trespasser cannot be better than that of
a lawful tenant, who, havi:i,g lost bis possession cannot claim compensation
or damages for anything_ erected on the land or any improvements made
therein. [407HJ
·
A
(3) There are ~ clear allegations in the plaint that the appellant was
evicted \vithout notice.
No issue had been framed regarding L~ notice of
eviction not being giYen and no application for framing such an issue v.·as
Il
filed in ihe trial court, or the High Court or this Court. Therefore, the appel~
!ant, who was not a mere tresp_asser but a:ie who had deliberately entered
upon the land knowing fully well that he had no right, claim or title to the
land,_ or any manner of right to enter the land. and who had been rightly
evicted as a trespasser, should not be permitted to raise such a contention in
this Court. [408H-409BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 744 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave froJ!l the judgment and decree dated the 2nd
March 1965, of the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam, in A. S. No. 216
of 1961.
!. Krislmamoortlzy Iyer, Annamma A//exander, S. K. Mehta, K. R.
Nagaraja, Qamaruddin and Vinod Dlzawan, for the appellant.
A. R. Somnath Iyer and M. R. K. Pillai, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-This appeal is by special leave against the
judgment and decree of the High Court of Kerala which dismissed
an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Court
of Havelikkara.
The appellant had filed a suit on October 24, 1942,
for the recovery of Rs .. 2 lakhs and interest thereon from the date of
suit and· for costs· originally against the State of Travancore now the
State of Kerala-the respondent-and three others who however were
not made parties in the appeal before the High Court. It has alleged
in the plaint that the plaintiff (appellant) was wrongfully disposses·
scd from 160 acres of la_nd along with the improvements which had
boen effected by him and as the State had appropriated those improve·
ments without any right or title thereto he claimed the value of those
improvements. It was the appellant's case that he had been in occupation of the said 160 acre,; of Cherikkal land (unregistered dry !ands
in hilly tracts) about which and the adjoining lands there was a dis·
pute as to whether the same belonged to a jenmi family known as
Koodalvalli Ulom-hereinafter called 'the Illom'--0r to the Government . of the erstwhile Travancore State. The appellant's father and
the appellant had occupied these lands, made improvement thereon
by planting coconut trees, arecanut palms, peppervines, rubber-trees,
jack trees, other trees, and by constructing bungalo"-, huts, wells etc.
in the bona fide belief that the lands belonged to the Illom. It was
. stated that according to the practice prevailing in the erstwhile State
of Travancore the cultivators could ·enter into unoccupied waste lands
belonging to the janmies with the object of c ultivating and improving
_them, and as they held the lands under them by paying rent, the consent of the Jemies to such occupation was implied. This practice it seems,.-
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K. c. ALEXANDER v. KERALA (laganmohan Reddy, /.)
401
was also current in respect of lands belonging to the Government be·
fore the Travancore Land Conservancy Act 4 of 1091 (24·7-1916)
(hereinafter called 'the Act') . It is the case of the appellant that e".en
after the Act was passed, unauthorised occupants of land belongmg
to the Government who had made improvements therein had, under the
rules made both under the Act and the Land Assignment Act a preferential claim over others for getting kuthakapattom or assignment
of the property in their possession.
It may be mentioned that in respect of the 160 acres of land of
the Illom which were occupied
by the appellant's father
and
the appellant, there was a dispute between the Illom and the Travancore State from abont 1848.
While this dispute was pending it
appears the appellant applied to the Conservator of Forests for re·
gistration of the lands in his name, but the application was rejected
on June 14, 1919 stating that the land applied for cannot be registered
(Ext. A). While the application for registration was pending, the
dispute between the Illom and the State of Travancore had reached
a stage when the Illom had to institute a suit O.S. No. No. 126 of
1096 (January 1918) in the District C-mrrt at Quilon for a declaration of its title to. those propertjes. . In that suit the appellant, after
his application for registration was rejected, sought to get himself
impleaded, but that application also was
rejected.
Thereafter
the
suit filed by the Illom was dismissed on 28-6-1109 (February 10,
1934). An appeal against it was dismissed on September 27, 1943. It
may here be mentioned that while the suit of the Illom i.e. O.S. No.
126 of I 096 M.E. was pending in the District Court, Quilon, the
Government of Travancore had initiated proceedings in
ejectment
against the appellant by L. C. Case No. 112 o~ 1100 {1925 A.D.).
As the suit of the Illom had been finally disposed of and the title of
the. Illom to the lands was not established, the appellant apprehending that he might be ejected in the above L.C. Case filed a suit No.
0.S. 156 of 1103 M.E. (1927-28 A.D.) in the District Court at
Quilon against the respondent to establish his right and title to the
said 160 acres and in the adjoining Cherikkal lands in his possession.
In that suit an injunction was prayed for in respect of 100 acres of the·
property involved in the suit, but the prayer was re.iected.
Against
that order a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 206 of 1110 M.E. ( 193435 A. D.) was filed in the High Court of Travancore. The High Court
issued a commission for inspecting the properties and the Commissionec in his report part 13 of Ext. CC set out •he improvements·
made by the appellant on the lands which comprised of a bungalow
in which the appellant was residing, a number of small houses. a rubber·
estate, and a large number of other valuable trees like jack trees,
mango trees, coconut trees etc. It appears that as there was no ;n;1•nction restraining his dispossession in L.C. Case No. 112 of 1100 M.E.
an order was passed for dispossessing the appellant on July 24. 1939,.
Ext. VJ. The appellant, pursuant to this order, was dispossessed from
the lands and possession of these lands was given to the second defen·
dant Nair Service Society Ltd. in August 1939. Thereafter the suit
out of wh;ch this appeal arises was filed against the Government orr
October 24, 1942.
-402
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 4] 1 s.c.R.·
'
The respondent-State contended that the appellant encroached on
the suit lands, that proceedings were taken against him in L.C. Case
No. 112 of 1100 M.E. and he was evicted in due course, that the
trespass by the appellant was of recent origiti, that the allegation that
;the entry was made in the belief that the land belonged to the IUom
was false, that the Revenue and Forest Departments did not harass
the appellant but they took steps for dispossessing him only in accordance with the law, that the Commissioner's report was not cor·
rect in that all the improvements noted by the Commissioner were
not made by the appellant but by· other independent squatters, that
.aiter due notice an order of forfeiture had been passed in L. C. Case
No. 112 of 1100 M.E. and the appellant was therefore not entitled
to claim any value for improvements as it was his duty to remove any
building before he was evicted. The respondent also averred that
it had not taken possession of any crops or movables as stated· in the
plaint and that the movables found in the building were attached for
the realisation of arrears of fine etc.
There were other allegations
.also but it is unecessary for purposes of this appeal to refer to them.
Several issues were framed, but it is not necessary to refer to
them except to say that the suit was decreed only for Rs. 3000/-
being the value of the appellant's bungalow taken possession of by
the respondent. The rest of the claim .w~s dismissed. It was
ob·
served by the Trial Court that though there is no specific evidence to
show when exactly the possession of the appellant had commenced,
the evidence however indicated that it must have started close to
the year 1100 M.E. and that in any case the claim of the appellant
that possession was from 1030 M.E. was not true inasmuch as from
the year 1067 M.E. when the Act was passed possession without per·
mission was penal and it could not be imagined that the appellant
was left in peace for all these long years. The Trial Court also held
that all through these long years there had been a dispute as to the
title between the Illom and the State and after the suit of the Illom was
dismissed and th~ Illom's title was not sustained, the allegation that
the improvements were effected cannot be stated to be bona fide.
It
pointed out that the plaintifI (appellant) had applied to get himself
impleaded on O.S. No. 126 of.1096 M.E. but his application was
rejected, and after that suit was dismissed the appellant again applied
for registry, but thaL was also rejected.
All this, according to the
Trial Court, wonld show that the appellant was aware that he was
remaining on Government lands without title.
It was further held that
the greater part of the improvements were effected by the appellant
after the proceedings in the L.C. Case No. 112 of 1100 M.E. were
stayed, as such it cannot be said that these improvements could hav!'
been effected in good faith.
With respect to the allegation that an
.. order of forfeiture was not served on the appellant under s. 9 of the
Act, the Court observed that though the State had in its \\Titten statement contended that such an order had been passed, no order was
produced in evidence and consequently it was conceded by the Government Pleader that no such order was passe4. In the· circumstances
the question that had to be considered was wheher without an order
of forfeiture being passed, the '.respondent could forfeit the improveA·
B.
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I!
K. c. ALEXANDER v. KERALA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
403
A
ments. On this issue it was held that no notice of forfeiture of trees;
need be given under s. 9 of the Act and, therefore no compensation or
damages were payable in respect thereof.
B
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The High Court accepted the finding of the Trial Court on this.
issue. - It observed that the e'idence in the case indicated that the
possession of the father of the appellant must have commenced close
to the year 1100 M. E. and consequently the claim of the appellant
that he was in possession from 1030 ~.E. cannot be true. It then
said: "lf the possession commenced only about the year
1100, it
certainly cannot be under any bona fide claim of title for even on
12·6· 1094, tl\e petitioner knew that the land was Government land
and had then applied for assignment of the land." Accordingly the
High Court found that at no time the occupation of the laad by the
appellant was under a bona fide claim of title.
1be contention of the appellant that the trees which are the subject-matter of the appeal should have been forfeitecj
by an
order
passed under s. 9 of the Act and in the absence of such an order
his right to the value of those trees had to be adjudged and paid
to him was also negatived, as the Court held that the words "any crop
or other product raised on the land" occuring in s. 9 of the Act
would not include trees. In its view these words take in what is
familiarly known in law as 'emblements' which according to Black's
Law Dicticnary mean "Such products of the soil as are annually planted, ~erved and saved by manual labour, as cereals, vegetables Grass
maturing for harvest or harvested, etc., but not grass on !ands used
for pasturage." In this view it held that compensation for
trees.
which are to be dealt with under the general Jaw cannot be decreed
in favour of a mere trespasser who had no rights therein. It was also
ot the view that the claim for compensation for trees which has to be
dealt with under the general law under which a _mere trespasser
would have no rights to the payment of oompensation nor could be
appellant be allowed to remove them after his dispossession.
Another reason for disallowing the compensation for trees given by
the High Court was that the position of a trespasser-whether he be a
mere trespasser or a μ:espasser under a bona fide claim of title--cannot
be better than that of a tenant, and that if this is correct, then the appeal
has to be dismissed on the short ground that there is no priniple of
Jaw or equity which requires the payment of compensation in respect
of trees, the ownership of which was all along, or at any rate from the
da'e of the trespasser's dispossession, vested in the State.
The learned advocate for the appellant has reiterated the submissions
made before the Trial Court and the High Court and contends that
there is no order forfeiting the improvements as required· under s. 9 of
the Act, and if s. 9 does not apply and there is no right of forfeiture
as contemplated under s. 9, then the appellant is entitled to compensation under the general Jaw.
Apart from this contention, towards the
end of his argument, the learned advocate for the appellant sought to
make out a fresh case, namely, that as the appellant was not served with
a notice to quit as required under s. 9 of the Act but was forcibly
evicted without giving him an opportunity of cutting and taking away
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 j 1 S.C.R.
the trees etc. from the lands from which he was evicted, he would be
entitled to claim compensation for the improvements made by him.
It may be stated that the finding that the possession of the appellant
,commenced after his application for registrauon was rejected in 1919,
and the improvements, if any must have been effected only thereafter
with full knowledge that the title to the lands was in dispute between the
111om and the Government, is unassailable. We have earlier adverted to
Ext. A and also to the fact that after the application for registration was
rejected the appellant tried to get himself impleaded in the suit filed by
the Illom against the State which application was also rejected and so
the claim that his possession was bona fide or that he was a bona fide
trespasser has no validity.
This finding is fortified by s. 5 of the Act
which provides that from and after the commencement of the Act it
shall not be lawful for any person to occupy land which is the property
of the Government whether Poramboke or not without the permission
from the Government or such officer of the Government as may be
empowered in that behalf. In view of this specific provision the contravention of which is punishable under s. 6 thereof; his cond,1ct in
applying for registration and for getting himself impleaded in the suit of
the Illom against the Government, would show that he knew that the
land was Government land or land in which the Government had a
claim. In these circumstances he cannot be said to be a bona fide trespasser particularly after he had applied to the Government for obtaining
a registration in his name on the basis that it was Government land.
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It is however urged before us that the High Court was in error in
thinking that the appellant did not occupy the lands as a trespasser with
·a bona fide claim of title because it was his case that he trespassed upon
E
the land with a bona fide intention to improve the land, and as such he
can still be considered as a bona fide trespasser entitled to improvements
under the general law.
Before dealing with this aspect, we will first consider ·the question
whether trees are included within the meaning of s. 9, so a' to entitle
the appellant to a notice of forfeiture thereunder. Section 9 of the Act
F
is in the following terms :
"Any person unauthorisedly occupying any land for which
he is liable to pay a fine under section 6 and an assessment or
prohibitory assessment under section 7, may be summarily
evicted by the Division Peishkar, _and any cro12 or other product raised on the land shall be !table to forfeiture and any
buildincr or other structure erected or anything
deposited
G
thereon° shall also, if not .removed by him after such written
notice as the Division Peishkar may deem reasonable, be
liable to forfeiture. Forfeiture under this section shall be disposed of as the Division Peishkar may direct.
An eviction under this section shall be made in the following manner, namely:-
H
By serving a notic~ ~m a perso!l r_eported ~o be in occup~-
tion or his agent, requmng him, w1thm such time as the Dmsion Peishkar may deem reasonable after receipt of the said
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K. c. ALEXANDER v. KERALA (Jaganmohan Reddy, /.)
405
notice to vacate the land, and if such notice is not obeyed, by
removing or deputing a subordinate to remove any person who
may refuse to vacate the same, and, if the officer removing any
such person shall be resisted or obstructed by any person, the
D1vis10n Peishkar shall bold a summary enquiry in<G the tacts
of the case and, if satisfied that the resistance or obstruction
still continues, may issue a warrant for the arrest of the said
person, and on his appearance may send him with a warrant in
the form of the Schedule for imprisonment in the Civil Jail of
the District for such period no< exceeding 30 days as may be
necessary to prevent the continuance of such obstruction or
resistance :
Provided that no person so committed or imprisoned
under this section shall be liable to be prosecuted under sec·
tions 176, 179 and 181 of the Travancore Penal Code rn respect of the same facts."
This section provides for two notices to be given : one notice is to be
given to the person who is in unauthorised occupation of Government
land to vacate the land within a reasonable time and the other notice is
to forfeit any crop or other product raised on the land or to remove any
building or other structure erected or anything deposited therein within
a reasonable time as may be stated in the notice. It was conceded before
the Trial Court and no attempt was made to establish anything to the
contrary before the High Court that no notice of forfeiture as required
under s. 9 was given to the appellant. In these circumstances, the question that would arise for determination is whether the trees come within
the description of "other product raised on the land".
It is state<! before us that at the time when the appellant was evicted the Transfer of
Property Act was not in force.
But this is not relevant as what has to
be considered is whether trees can be said to be "other product raised
on the land". The words "raised on the land" qualify both the 'crop'
and 'other product', so the words "other produd' have to be read in the
context of the word 'crop' which precedes it.
It was pointed out by the learned advocate that the High Court Was
in error in equating other product raised on the land with emblements
because the definition of crop in Black's Law Dictionary docs include
emblements, as such the words 'other product' cannot also be treated as
emblements and must therefore he given a different meaning which
according to him would include trees.
No doubt one of the meanings
given in the Black's Law Dictionary does say that in a more restricted
sense the word is synonymous with 'fructus industriales'.
But the
meaning to be ascribed to that word is that it connotes in its larger
signification, products of the soil that are grown and raisrd yearly and
are gathered during a single season. In this sense the term includes
"fructus indus•riales" and having regard to the etymology of the word
it has been held to mean only products after they have been severed
from the soil. The same di'ctionary gives the meaning of the word
"product" as follows :
"Product.
With reference to property, proceeds; yield;
income; receipts; return.
. .......... .
406
SUPREMF <:;OURT REPORTS
( 1974 J 1 S.C.R.
The "products" of a farm may include the increase ol
cattle on the premises.
. ............. "
Even under this definition "product" cannot mean anything which
is attached to the land like trees.
It may, however, include the fruit of
the trees.
This view .of ours is supported by the case of Clark and
Another v. Gaskarth(l).
That was a case of a trespass for breaking
A
and entering the closes of the plaintiffs and tearing up, digging up, cuttB
ing down, and carrying away the plaintiff's trees, plants, roots and seeds,
growing on the closes.
Notice of this trespass was given to the defendant.
At the time of the distress the sum of £ 281.6 s. was due from
the plaintiffs to the defepdant for rent in respect of the nursery grmmd.
The question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover against the defendant damages caused to them by cutting down
and carrying away the planitiffs' trees.
It was contended_that the defenC
dant's action was justified under the statute 11 G. 2, C. 19, s. 8, which
after enumerating certain crop3, empowered the landlord to seize as a
distress any "other product whatsoever which shall be growing on any
part of the estate demised" and, therefore, the _!fees and shrubs in question came within that dcscrip:ion.
The Court rejected the contention
that the trees and shrubs could be distrained and held that the word
"product' in the eighth section of the statute did not extend to trees and
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shrubs growing in a nurseryman's ground, but that it was confined to
products of a similar nature with those specified in that section, to all of
wbich the process of becoming ripe, and of being cut, gathered, made,
and laid up when ripe, was incidental. In our view,. therefore, trees are
not included within the meaning of 'other products raised on the land'
in s. 9 of the Act and there is, therefore, no obligation on the Government to give notice of forfeitnre under that section.
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It is then contended that even if trees are not included in s. 9 and
no notice of forfeiture is necessary, under the general law even a trespasser on the land, whether bona fide or not, is entitled to compensation or damages for the improvements made by him on the land We
have already agreed with the Trial Court and the High Court that the
appellant was not a bona fide trespasser. But the learned advocate for
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the appellant submits that it was not bis case nor is it under the general
law necessary for a person who trespassed on the land to trespass with a
claim of bona fide title. According to bis submission a person is never·
theless a bona fide trespasser if he enters upon the land with a bona fide
intention of improving the land.
No authority has been cited for this
novel proposition, and if accepted, it would give validity to a dangerous
principle which will condone all acts of deliberate and wrongful tresG
pass becanse any persop desparate enough to trespass on other mans'
land without any claim of title can always plead that he bad a bona fide
intention of improving the land whether the owner of that land wants
that improvement or not. This vicarious and altruistic exhibition of good
intention may even· canse damage to the land of an owner wbo may not
want improvements of snch a kind as tree plantation. It is true that the
maxim of the English law "quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit" i.e.
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whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil, is not applicable in
(!) 8 Taunt 431,
K. c. ALEXANDER v. J::ERALA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
407
A
India but that is not to say that a wrongful trespasser can plant trees on
some one else's land and claim a right to those trees after he is evicted.
The case of Vallabdas Narainji v. Development Officer, Bandral·),
which was cited by the learned counsel for the appellant does not assist
him, for the Privy Council did not think' it necessary to give a decision
on what it termed to 'be a far-reaching contention.
That was a case in
which the Government had taken possession of the lands and had erectB
cd certain building on the land be.ore a Jec;ara.10n under s. 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act was made as to the appellant's property and it
was contended that the appellant should be a1lowed the value of the land
in the state in which it then was i.e. with buildings on it. It appears that
the Government had resolved to acquire the land in question and other
lands and by arrangement with certain of the sutidars it took possession
of such land, including a portion which was in the occupation of the
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appellant. Upon such land, including a portion in the possession of the
appellant they proceeded to erect buildings without the necessary.. notifi·
cation under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act which was not served
until November 4, ~920. On these findings it was observed that the
Government were in a position, by law at any rate, to regularize their
possession by such a notification-a fact which becomes material when
it has to be considered what the nature of the trespass is.
B;ith the
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Assistant Judge an<\ the High Court negatived the claim of the appellant.
Before the Privy Council it was contended on behalf of the appellant
that in the various cases relied upon, there was at least some genuine
claim or belief in the party erecting the buildings that he had a title to
do so, even though he was eventually held to be a trespasser; and it was
urged that no such claim or belief existed in that case, in which it was,
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said the Government without any pretence tJf a right, tortiously invaded
the appellant's property and proceeded tc. deal with it as their own . .It
is in this context that the respondent's contention that even if the appellants were considered to be mere trespassers they would still be entitled
to the value of the improvements and contest the claim of the appellant
was described, as already stated, as a far-reaching contention. The
Board, however, agreed with what was apparently the view of both
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Courts in India that under the circumstances of this case, as already set
forth, by the law of India, whioh they appear to have correctly interpreted, the Government officials were in possession "not as mere trespassers" but under such a colour of title that the buildings erected by
them on the land ought not to be included in the valuation as having
become the property of the landowner. This case does not support the
contention that a mere trespasser who has deliberately and wrongfully,
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contrary to the provisions of .s. 5 of the Act, entered upon another's
land which makes such an act even punishable under s. 6 thereof is
entitled to compensation for ·the trees planted by him on the land. '
In any case, as the High Court rightly observed, the position of a
trespasser cannot be better than that of a lawful tenant who having lost
his possession cannot claim compensation or damages for anything
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e~ted on the land o~ anv improvements made therein. The appellant's
cl~ after he. was eVIcted cannot, on the same parity of reasoning, be
held to be vill1d. Once the appellant'S counsel was confronted with this
(I) A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 163.
373 SupCI/74
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1974] 1 S.C.R.
. proposition, he tried to raise an entirely new point, namely, that no
notice of eviction was given to the appellant, and if such a notice had
been given to him under s. 9, he would have cut the trees and taken
them away within the time allowed for him to vacate the lands. Jn
support of this contention he has referred us to the leadings contained
in paragi aph-3 of the plaint in which it is stated :
"The improvements elfected by the plamtiff have a value
ot Rs. :l lak:hs as per the accounts shown bt:Jow.
1n his helplessne.s the plamtif! had even applied to Government to &J.VC
him the land in which he had effected improvemeqts, · !>n
kuthakapatwm.
But out of the said land 160 acres were
taken out of my possession and given to the 2nd defenuant
even without giving me the opportunity to remove the movable lmprovements, such as cultivation, cattle, machines, utensils, houses, stocked crops, ripe crops etc., belonging to me."
These averments in the above paragraph do not clearly allege that he
was evicted without notice, nor has any allegation been made that he·
was forcibly evicted from the lands with the help of the police etc. as 1t
has now been contended before us.
On the other hand what the plaintiff (appellant) stated shows that no opportunity was given to hlffi to
remove the movable improvements, such as cultivation, cattle, machines,
utensils, houses, stocked crops, npe crops etc. which belonged to !Jim.
There is nothing stated by him that he had no opportunity to cut trees
and take them away.
liven in paragraph-4 of the plaint where he complains that no notice of forfeiture was given to him, he mentions only
the items referred to in paragraph-3. It is in this connection, he says,
that no legal procedure had been followed by Government for taking
them into possession, which only implies tliat it is in respect of the
items mentioned in paragraph-3. It is again stated in paragraph-4 •hat
"It was irregular on the part of Government to· take possession of the
above items".
The respondent did not understand the averments in the
plaint as alleging that no notice to quit was given to him is evident from
the written statement of the respondent in paragraph, where it is stated
thus:
"This defendant submits that after due notice an order of
forfeiture has been passed in Poramboke Case 112 of 1100
and the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to claim any value of
improvements or value of any building."
The issues that had been famed by the Trial Court also do not refer to
this aspect.
No doubt in the evidence of the plaintiff P.W. 1 states that
he was evicted from the lands without giving him an opportunity to remove the improvements, and in cross-examination he was asked whether
he was not given any notice prior to the dispossession and he said that
certainly no notice was received. P.W. 4 the Manager was asked in
cross-examination whether he had been given any prior inforniat1on or
notice about eviction and this witness also said that there was no prior
information or notice.
While these passages might show that no notice
of eviction was given, even at that stage there was no application for an
issue being framed, nor has such an applfcatian been made in the appeal
before the High Court, nor even before this Court. When it has been
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·K. c. ALEXANDER v. KERALA (laganmohan Reddy, !.)
409
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held that the appellant was not a mere trespasser and had deliberately
~tered upon the lands knowing fully well that he had no right, claim or
title to the lands or had in any manner a right to enter the land and has
been rightly evicted as a trespasser, he cannot now be permitted to raise
this conteation before us.
In the view we have takell, the appeal has no substance and is
ll accordin_gly dismissed with no order as to costs, but the court fee will be
recovered from the appellant.
V.P.S.·
Appeal dismissed.