# REVATHINNAL BALAGOPALA VARMA v. H.H.SRI PADMANABHADASA, BALA RAMA VARMA

- **Citation:** [1991] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 30
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1991-11-28
- **Bench:** S. Ranganathan, M. Fatiiima Beevi, N.D. Ojha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/revathinnal-balagopala-varma-v-h-h-sri-padmanabhadasa-bala-rama-varma-11352
- **Pages:** 65

## Headnote

.
-
J/indu Law : llindu undivided fami/y-Coparceners-Rights of-Whether
available to members of a Royal: Family in respect of personal properties of a
sovereign ruler.
·
·
,
.
Burden of proof-Relevancy: Claim that properties belonged to /oint
famiiY-:.When evidence has been led, question of onus of proving that' suit
properties were imparti/)le or otherwise renWins not-of much. importance:
Cow:t has to decide on consideration of evidence and materials.
:
·Royal family of Travancore----'-Properties held.by sovereign ruler..:....Succession-Devolution of properties on successive rulerS-:-Joint family nucleus
to the.properties not established surrender of sovereigniy and State properties .·
to Government of lndi~etention of certain properties by Maharajah as his
personal properties--Suitfor partition-Maintainability of' Whether the properties can be said to be of the family to which the sovereign belonged. ' ·
'
.
.
Joint fami/Y"-f'artition-Presumptio~Whethe_r partition is full and
complete.
"Sthanam"-lmportant characteristics explained.
Sovereign ruler-:Succession and powers-Explained.
State and public properties and Private properties of a sovereign ruler-·
Whether are distinct.
Travancore Kshatriya Regulation, 1108: J/indu Succession Act, 1956,
section 7:Kerala Joint llindu Family System (Abolition) Act,1975,s.4
G - whether applicable to members of Royal Family ofTravancorefor purposes
of partition of properties held by Maharajah of Travancore as his personal
properties at the time of surrender of his sovereignty and State properties to
the Government of India.
H
-fi:'ai:tice· and Procedure :
Plea not raised in trial court-Whether can be entertained at appellate
stage.
30
.
'
>-----
,_
BALAGOPALA VARMA v. BALARAMA VARMA
31
--+
"*'
...
·
.,.,
Respondent· no~ 1 in Civil Appeal No. 534/83, till the integration of A
i.
. ><.
.,,,_
the States of Travancore and Cochin on 1.7.1949, was the SO".ereign ruler
of the erstwhile State of Travan~ore and in that capacity he held several
items Qf properties which had been inherited by him from his predecessor
Maharajahs. He also acquired some properties after he had become the
Maharajah. The cost of the properties so acquired had been met from the
State coffers, there being no distinction until 1949 between the funds
B
belonging to a Ruler in his individual capacity and those beionging to the
· Sfate. At the time of surrender of his sovereignty and the State properties
to the Government oflndia, in pursuance of the Covenant dat_ed 27.5.1949,
he retained certain properties as his personal properties.
The appellant instituted a suit for 'partition and rendition of accounts alleging that he and respondents no. l to 34 (defendants no. 1to34
in the suit respectively) were members of the Travancore Royal Fainily
which was an undivided 'Maruinakkathaya~Tarwad', knoWn as V~likot
taram, governed by Marumakkathayam law as modified by custont and .
usage in respect of succession, inheritance etc., and respondent no. 1 as the
Karnavan had been managing the tarwad properties which were Hable to
.
.
-
..
be partitioned among the appellant and respondents no. 1 to 34 on per
c
D
capita basis and the appellant was entitled to a 1/~th share therein; that
the proceeds received by way of alienation of some of th~ pr:operties made
by respondent no. 1 be divided amongst the members of the tarwad. He
also prayed for a decree with regard to his share in the. income of the
tarwad properties received by respondent no. 1 as its Karnavan.
·E
Before the institution of the partition suit, respondent no. 1 filed
return in respect of the suit properties before the ceiling authorities, and
the Kerala Land Board, accepting the_properties to be of respondent no.
1, declared some of them as surplus. The appellant challenged that order
in revision before the High Court contending that since the properties
were tarwad properties, they were to be treated as belonging to different
families which constituted independent units in the

## Text

_Characters 0–39,581 of 177,380. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39581 for what follows._

A.
B
c
D
E
F
REVATHINNAL BALAGOPALA VARMA
v.
H.H.SRI PADMANABHADASA, BALA RAMA VARMA
(SINCE DECEASED) AND ORS.
NOVEMBER 28, 1991
[S. RANGANATHAN, M. FATIIIMA BEEVI AND N.D. OJHA, JJ.]
.
-
J/indu Law : llindu undivided fami/y-Coparceners-Rights of-Whether
available to members of a Royal: Family in respect of personal properties of a
sovereign ruler.
·
·
,
.
Burden of proof-Relevancy: Claim that properties belonged to /oint
famiiY-:.When evidence has been led, question of onus of proving that' suit
properties were imparti/)le or otherwise renWins not-of much. importance:
Cow:t has to decide on consideration of evidence and materials.
:
·Royal family of Travancore----'-Properties held.by sovereign ruler..:....Succession-Devolution of properties on successive rulerS-:-Joint family nucleus
to the.properties not established surrender of sovereigniy and State properties .·
to Government of lndi~etention of certain properties by Maharajah as his
personal properties--Suitfor partition-Maintainability of' Whether the properties can be said to be of the family to which the sovereign belonged. ' ·
'
.
.
Joint fami/Y"-f'artition-Presumptio~Whethe_r partition is full and
complete.
"Sthanam"-lmportant characteristics explained.
Sovereign ruler-:Succession and powers-Explained.
State and public properties and Private properties of a sovereign ruler-·
Whether are distinct.
Travancore Kshatriya Regulation, 1108: J/indu Succession Act, 1956,
section 7:Kerala Joint llindu Family System (Abolition) Act,1975,s.4
G - whether applicable to members of Royal Family ofTravancorefor purposes
of partition of properties held by Maharajah of Travancore as his personal
properties at the time of surrender of his sovereignty and State properties to
the Government of India.
H
-fi:'ai:tice· and Procedure :
Plea not raised in trial court-Whether can be entertained at appellate
stage.
30
.
'
>-----
,_
BALAGOPALA VARMA v. BALARAMA VARMA
31
--+
"*'
...
·
.,.,
Respondent· no~ 1 in Civil Appeal No. 534/83, till the integration of A
i.
. ><.
.,,,_
the States of Travancore and Cochin on 1.7.1949, was the SO".ereign ruler
of the erstwhile State of Travan~ore and in that capacity he held several
items Qf properties which had been inherited by him from his predecessor
Maharajahs. He also acquired some properties after he had become the
Maharajah. The cost of the properties so acquired had been met from the
State coffers, there being no distinction until 1949 between the funds
B
belonging to a Ruler in his individual capacity and those beionging to the
· Sfate. At the time of surrender of his sovereignty and the State properties
to the Government oflndia, in pursuance of the Covenant dat_ed 27.5.1949,
he retained certain properties as his personal properties.
The appellant instituted a suit for 'partition and rendition of accounts alleging that he and respondents no. l to 34 (defendants no. 1to34
in the suit respectively) were members of the Travancore Royal Fainily
which was an undivided 'Maruinakkathaya~Tarwad', knoWn as V~likot
taram, governed by Marumakkathayam law as modified by custont and .
usage in respect of succession, inheritance etc., and respondent no. 1 as the
Karnavan had been managing the tarwad properties which were Hable to
.
.
-
..
be partitioned among the appellant and respondents no. 1 to 34 on per
c
D
capita basis and the appellant was entitled to a 1/~th share therein; that
the proceeds received by way of alienation of some of th~ pr:operties made
by respondent no. 1 be divided amongst the members of the tarwad. He
also prayed for a decree with regard to his share in the. income of the
tarwad properties received by respondent no. 1 as its Karnavan.
·E
Before the institution of the partition suit, respondent no. 1 filed
return in respect of the suit properties before the ceiling authorities, and
the Kerala Land Board, accepting the_properties to be of respondent no.
1, declared some of them as surplus. The appellant challenged that order
in revision before the High Court contending that since the properties
were tarwad properties, they were to be treated as belonging to different
families which constituted independent units in the tarwad, and could not
b~. taken as surplus with respondent no. 1. The revision was dismissed by
the _High Court as belated. The appellant thereafter filed an application
under section 85(9) of the Kerala Land R~forms Act, 1963 which was
dismissed by the Kerala Land Board and the revision thereupon was
disposed of by the High Cou.rt reserving Uberty to the appellant to move: -
for relief ~oder settion 85(9) of the Act subject to the decision in the appeal
arising out of the partition suit which was pen.ding before the High Court.
F
G
Respondent no.1 contested the suit stating that though the appellant H
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991) SUPP. 3 S. C.R.
A and respondents no. 1 to 34 were. members of a family, they were not
. m.embers of an undivided Marumakkathayam tarwad nor was he the
Karnavan thereof. His case was that defendants no. 3 and 12, who were the
two.senior female members in the family and were junior and senior
'Maharanis ofTravancore respectively, along with their descendants formed
a tarwad named Sreepadom and known as the Royal Family of Travan-
. B
con~; th~t Sreepadom tarwad had its own properties which were divided
per .strips on 13.7.1971 in two equal halv~s between the descendants of
defendants no. 3 and 12 a'nd thereafter there ceased to be any undivided
tarwad; that the properties in suit were held by him as sovereign as his
own, an·d 'retained by him absolutely for hiJ_Dself when he surrendered the
sovereignty of the State; that he was competent to deal with them in any
C manner and his action was beyond challenge. It was also contended that
the suit was not maintainable inasmuch as no memb_er could ask for a
compulsory partition of the properties of a family governed by Marumakkathayam Jaw; and that the Royal Family of Travancore even
though governed by M·arumakkathayam Law, was not governed by any
'
.
.
'
D
E
F
statute.
.. Defendant· no. 12 also filed a written state~ent claiming her right
over a certain item of property on the basis of a grant from an earlier
ruler, and defendants no. 32 _to J4 fil~d yet another written statement
silpportin'g the, claim of t~e appeilant except that defendant no. 32 took a
further _plea that she having marri'ed on 14.5.1952 under the special
Marriage A~t, 1872, became divided in status from the rest of the members
of the tarwad and at that time there being in all six female members in tbe
. tarwad she wa~ entitled to l/6th share in the properties. _
~
The trial court dismissed the suit holding that neither th.e appellant
and respondents no. 1to34 belonged to any undivided 'Marmukkathayam
tarwad, rior was respondent'no. 1 the :Karnavan of any such tarwad nor
were the properties in suit the tarwad properties. It recorded a categorical
finding that the plaintiff-appeliant failed to prove the source of acquisition
of. the suit properties whereas defendant-respondent no. 1 produced
documentary evidence indicating that the suit properties belonged to the
G · Sirkar ,or State an~ that maintenance of the palace buildings was 1>eing
done by· the State with the funds of the State Exchequer. With regard to
.,the ·~ecurities and shares in the name ofrespo~dent no. 1 and the items of
H
· j~weilery in his ~ustOcly, the Trial Court held that there was nothing on
ret:Ord'to,show that they'had been acquired with tarwad funds or that the
tarwad had any interest in 'the same.
·
·
·
r
K•
·'
.,
1
1
•
.
\
'!
\ ,.,
,,
'
·,
'·
I
~·
... ~
I
i j
J
-~
I ;
I
j
'
BALAGOPALA VARMA v. BALARAMA VARMA
Against the judgment of the trial Court, the appellant filed an appeai
A
whereas defendants no. 12 and 32 to 34 filed two cross petitions, which
were dismissed by the High Court. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the
appeal (Civil. Appeal No. 534/83) anci defendants no. 32-34 preferred the
connected appeal by special leave to th.is Court. Another appeal (C.A. No.
536/83) filed by defendant no.12 abated as she died during the pendency
of the appeal and no consequential steps were taken.
. B
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that respondent no. 1
owned the properties in suit not as sole owner but only in his capacity as
the holder of an impartible estatet. the Karna van of ail· undivided Marumakkathayam tarwad, or a Sthanee, and· that in· any one of these
situations the properties became partible; and when respondent no. 1
ceased to be the sovereign ruler, the properties, being no longer needed to
maintain the status and dignity of the holder on the basis of cessanle
ratione legis, cessat ipse lex doctrine, became the properties of the fami"Jy
or tarwad . to which the ruler belonged and thus became partible on
17~6;1956 when section 7(1) of the Hindu Succession Act came into force
and; af any rate on 1.12.1976 when the Kerala joint Hindu Family System
(Abolition) Act,· 1975 came into force and that the Covenant dated
27.5.1949 could not confer any right in favour of respondent no. 1 which
he did not otherwise possess nor could it take away the rights of the
members of the joint Hindu family by accepting the properties to be of
respondent no. 1.
·
·
On the question whether the family of the appellant and respondents
no. 1 to 34 was an undivided 'Marumakkathayam tarwad' known as
Valikott.aram governed, by Marumakkathayam law as modified by custom
and usage in respect of succession, inheritance etc. and the properties in
suit belOnged to this tarwad and respondent no. 1 had been managing the
same as its Karnavan, or, whether these properties were held by respondent no. 1 as his personal properties carved out by him as such in his
capacity as the sovereign ruler of Travancore and were retained by him
c
D
E
F
as his personal properties even after he surrendered his sovereignty, as
indicated in the inventory furnished to and acc~pted by the Government
oflndia in pursuance of the Covenant dated 27.5.1949, dismissing the ap- - G
peals, the Court,
HELD: (by the Court) ; (i) The suit properties were not shown to be
properties belonging to an undivided family or marumakkathayam tar- ·
wad and hence partible. On the other hand, they 'were, and were also
treated as, the personal properties of the Ruler. [ 54B; 93FG;94B]
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] SUPP. 3 S. C.R.
~
A
(il) The properties in suit having passed on from one sovereign to the
otber ca.me to be ultimately held by respondent no. 1 in that, capacity and
~'re-~partible. lt was not established that, in the properties of the State,
··he-ldJ~y th~ sovereign, an interest was created or came into being in favour
·.of Oie family to which the sovereign belonged, or that the personal
pr(;)perties of respondent no. 1 could get transformed into joint Hindu
B
family properties wherein the appellant could acquire an interest.
[ 82A,B.; 84F,G]
(iii) Th·e properties in suit were not joint family properties, but had
been· earmarked by respondent D.Q. 1 as his personal properties which he
was ·oompetent to do as. a sovereign atid the Government of India by
C accepting or approving the list 1JF properties sub-mitted by him as his
personal . properties did ·not purport on its own to create any :right in
favour of r.espomlent no. i in such pt4)J>~rties.f4:6 A,B; 94E-G)
Per -Ranganazhan, .J:
D
-t.t The devoJati:On or the suit properties was from one monarch to
hi.S0silcressor. (who is not a son or a lineal de~endant) and1he successor
wouid be as absolutely -entitled to them as his predecessor and cannot
become a timited holder;{ 49-FGJ
·
1~2 The doctrine of Hindu Law that property inherited by a son from
E
his father would be ance.'itral property in his hands cannot be applicable
in the context of the above succession to the rulershfp. [49F]
F
1.3 Under the general Mitakshara Law applicable to Hindus there is
no presumption that the properties acquired by any member of the family,
even the Karta, are joint family properties unless there is, in his hands, a
nucleus of joint family property which could have been utilised for
acquiring such properties or the properties are shown to have been ac·
quired by him as Karta for and on behalf of the family. [SOB]
Even if there is such a presumption in the case of an ordinary tarwad,
no such presumption can operate where the Karnavan, being a sovereign
G ruler, acquires properties in exercise of his sovereign rights. Neither the
family nor any member of the family could dream ~f putting up a claim,
so Jong as he is the ruler, that as the properties had be.en acquired by a
member of the family they belong to the family. It cannot be said that they
have such a right but it remains dormant so long as the ruler is a sovereign
and will revive on the·ruler ceasing to be a sovereign. The acquisitions by
H a sovereign ruler cannot be claimed to be joint family property.
[ 51B-E]
\
.... !
'(
..
BALAGOPALA VARMA v. BALARAMA VARMA
35
~
Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Oth~rs, A
...,,
[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1 & Meramwa/a Bhavala v. Ba Shri Amarba Jethsurbh4i,
I.L.~. 19.§8-9 Guj. 966, relied on
Achuthan v. Chinnamn, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 454; Tipperah case ,12 MIR
'523 , ref erred to.
1.4. All the properties held by a monarch or ruler devolve by the rule
B
of primogeniture, there being no distinction in this regard between his
personal properties and those held by him as ruler. But this need not
necessarily be lineal primogeniture. It could be general primogeniture, the
succe~or to the rulership being determined according to some prevalent
custom. The properties will devolve on the successor so decided upon. The
fact that the successor is determined on the basis of Marumakkathayam c
Law no doubt causes the properties to devolve on the next Karnavan who
succeeds to the rulership. But this does not necessarily lead to the
inference that the properties held by. the Ruler are the properties of a
Tarwad. The devolution is by succe~ion from ruler to ruler and not one by
way of . survivorship under the Marumakkathayam Law due to one
Karnavan taking the place of a deceased predecessor. This circumstance D
does not, therefore, establish the appellant's claim. 149 C·E]
1.5 The Travancore Royal Family, being excluded from the purview
,of the Travancore. Kshatriya Regulation, 1108, was not a tarwad or
tavazhi governed by that Regulation and would not therefore come within
the inclusive part of the definition of a 'joint family' in the K~rala Joint E
Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975. However, the first part of the
definition is wide enough to include all Hindu joint families except the
:-,.,·-
Cochin Royal Family. But the Act put an end to all Joint Hindu Families
, '
in Kerala with effect from 1.12.1976 and therefore on that date the family
came to· an end and the family members became tenants-in-common in
respect of the family property. However, the suit properties did not belong F
to a Hindu undivided family or a marumakkathayam tarwad. [ S9D-F]
Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo v. Lalu Mahashanuj Pratap Deo and Ors.,
_..,.
(1982) 1 SCR 417; Sundari v. Lakshmi, [1980] 1 SCR 404; Pratapsir.ihjiN.
Desaiv. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1983] 139 I.T.R. 77; C.I.T. v.Mahara-
.. ..,
jah Chintamani Saran Nath Sah Deo, (1986) 157 I.T.R. 358; CJ.T. v. U.C .
Mahatab, Maharaja o/Burdwan, (1981) 130 ITR 223 Calcutta.; Rama Verma
G
Bharathana Thampuran v. State of Kera/a and Ors., [1980] 1 SCR 136 and
Palace Administration Board v. Rama Verma Bharathan Thampuran & Ors.,
[1983] 3 SCR 187, referred to.
2.1 Construed .in a very literal sense, the position of every king or
Ruler -Md, indeed, of every Corporation sole or office holder can be H
36 ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991) SUPP. 3 S. C.R.
A approximated to that of a Slhanandar but these two sets of expression are
n9tinterchangeable.[47 EFJ
. 2.2 Merely because the properties held by a person devolve by a rule
of succession related to the position held by him, it does not follow that
·such person is a Sthani within the meaning· of section 7(3) of the Hindu
. B . Succe8sion Act. {47 FG] ·
2.3 ThreeJmportantincidents characterise a Sthanam and its prop~.
:erti_e~the powers of a. Sthani to alienate the corpus of the Sthanam
· properties or to bind his _successors· by. his debts are limited; when a
Sthatiam·was created by opulent and influential families the members of
. the tarwad agreed to set aside for the Karnavan cer~ain properties in order .
C that he might keep up his sodalposition arid influence, such properties
descended to the next head of the family and the other members of the
tarwad had no rights therein except reversionnry rights in case the Sthanain ceased to exist; and in the case of a Sthanam; the Sihani ceases to
have any interest in the other properties of his tarwaci ·because the tarwad
_,
has already allotted properties belonging to it to meet the needs of the
D
Sthani. [47 GB; 48 AC]
.
.
In the instant case the analogy of a Sthani must fail inasmuch as all
the three above incidents Were absent..:...the powers of respondent no. l as
the sovereign ruler in respect of the properties were unlimited; there was
nothing ori record to show that any property of any tarwad to which the
E
Rt!lers belonged had at tlie inception of the lfolership been set apart for
the· benefit of the Ruler, or that the Ruler had no interest in the other
J>roperties of the tarwad to which he belonged. [47H; 48 A-C]
·
V enkateswara lyan v. Shekhari Verma, [ 1884} ILR3 .Mad 384; Kochunni
. v. Kuttanunni, ILR 1948 Mad ~72; Kevalappara K. Kochuni v. State of
MadraS, [1960] 3 SCR 887, M:K.•Balakrishnan Menon v. ACED., [1972] 1
p,
.
S.C.R. 961; Inspecting Ass·u. Commissioner, A.G.I.T. v. Ramunni Panik/car,
G
[1972] l S.C.R. 935 and Manavikraman Raja v. C.E.D., (1957) 32 I.T.R.
(~.D.) 1, referred -to.
·
·Mu/la's Hindu Law. 15th Edn. p. 940, referred to.
3.1 Even assuming that in a Marumakkathayam family there is a
· presumption that the properties acquired by theKarnavan would be joint
family properties, that a Ruler is in no better position than an ordinary
Karnavan and that a nucleus of joint famiJy properties was there, the
. presumption that the properties in suit were joint family properties stands
m<>fa: than r~butted by the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the
H · partieS whith are clinchingly against the possibility of there being any ·
'
. -. ·. . ,-··
~ ... - ..
v
•
r·
-
·~.
BALAGOPALA VARMA v. BALARAMA VARMA
37
tarwad properties : The properties in suit were alleged to belong .to a A : .
tarwad known. as Valiakottaram which could not beidentical to Sreepadom tarwad; and the properties of Sreepadom tarwad were p~rtitioned by
the deed ·dated 13.7.1971. [51 F·H; 52 A]
When there is a partition of~ jointfamily three is a presumption that
. the partition is full and co~plete. There is no room for thinking that any
of the joint family properties had been left out o(the..partition.[52A]
B
3.2:It cannot be s~id .. that atthe ·time or partition tile other rnem bers
or the tarwad were unaware of the existence of the properties in suit, or
tbatt due to- some oversight, such extensive properties had been left out
from inclusion in the partition. The· non-inclusion of these properties or
even a. mention thereof in the partition deed ·is·significant.[si~C;E}
C ·· ·
3~3Though tar.wads were impartiMe under customary law,they were.
made.:partible by,a.single·or two"thirds majority of their adult members ·
·'by the ,Marumakkathayam Act; .1933 and .. completely partible at the
instance of any- in.dividuat·membtr by the Marumakkathayam (Amend·
ment) Act;: 1958. [52 FGJ
D
3A Ev.e.n assuming tbat the Royal family ofTravancore was outside
the scope of these legislations, because of Travancore Kshatriya Regulation, the b1dividual members having challenged the alienations by the
erstwhile Ruler, took no further steps in the matter nor· did they get
incorporated in the deed. of 1971 some reference to the other tarwad E
properties or at least that only some of the tarwad properties, partition .of
.which was acceptable to the first respondent, were being partitioned by
that document, in case their claims were serious. [52 GH; 53A]
Before the ceiling authorities while respondent no. l claimed_ all the
properties belonging to him· individualty, defendants no. 3 and 13 and F
some others unsuccessfully claimed a share in the tanvad properties
controlled by the Maharajah.[53 BJ
If the properties had been ·family properties and had been acknowledged by the Ruler to be as such, the-entries in the revenue records would
have been in the name of the tarwad or the senior Rani. Although the G
entries as made cannot be attached conclusive weight, as they only
·represent entries made at the instance of respondent no. 1, yet they lend
some support to the claim that the ruler did not recognise the properties
as the properties of the family and considered them to be his own.
[53 GH; 54A]
· 4.1 A sovereign Ruler has an absolute right to dispose of, at his will, H
38
SUPREME COURT _REPORTS
[1991) SUPP. 3 S. C.R.
A even properties which may actually belong to the State and he also has a
right to take it back from the donee at his pleasure. It is of course patent
that he could not exercise either of these powers after he ceases to be a
sovereign ruler.[ 56 GH; 57 A]
B
c
Mahant Hardial Singh v. Ajmer Singh & Ors., (C.A. 226/65) decided on
20.11.68 & Vishnu Pratap Singh v. State of M.P. [1990] Supp. S.C.C. 43,
relied on.
4.2 It cannot be said that there were any limitations on the sovereignty of the Ruler ofTravancore so long as he was the Ruler, nor can one
import, in the State of absolute monarchy that prevailed then, the doctrine
that the Ruler could not take away the property belonging to any subject
without payment of compensation or that he could not be an absolute
despot if he chose to and deal with the properties of his citizens as he liked.
[54 H; 55 A]
Visweshwar Rao v. State of M.P., [1952] 3 S.C.R. 1020; Jagannath
Behera v. Raja Harihar Singh, [1958] S.C.R. 1067; Sudhansu Shekhar Singh 4
D
Deo v. State of Orissa, {1961] 1 S.C.R. 779 and Kunwar Shri Rajendra Singh
-v. Union, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 631, held inapplicable.
E
F
G
State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh, [1952] S.C.R.
889; Virendra Singh v. State of U.P., [1955] 1 SCR 415, referred to.
4.3 If the properties, though family properties, had been treated by
the Rulers as their personal properties, the family and its members cannot
get over that situation and challenge what was done by the erstwhile Ruler
in the exercise of his sovereign power. [56 E]
State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 461 Rajkumar
Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo v. State of Orissa, [1964] 7 S.C.R. 112, State of
M.P. v. Lal Rampa/ Singh, [1966] 2 S.C.R. 53; State of M.P. v. Lal Bhargavendra Singh, (1966] 2 S.C.R. 56 and Maharaj Dhiraj Himmatsinghji v. State
of Rajasthan, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 52, referred on.
Mahant /-lardial Singh v. Ajmer Singh & Ors., (C.A. 226/65) decided on
20.11.68 and Vishnu Pratap Singh v. State of M.P., (1990] Supp. S.C.C. 43,
relied on.
4.4 In the instant case, the Ruler's absolute powers disappeared
when re~pondent no. 1 ceased to be a Ruler. If some properties did n_ot
belong to him immediately before the appointed date, he could not, by a
f-
\
BALAGOPALA VARMA v. BALARAMA VARMA
39
mere declaration under the covenant, make it his personal individual A
property. However the properties in suit were the personal properties of
the Ruler as on the appointed day. [57 AB]
5. The Covenant· dated 27 .5.1949 settled the issue as between the
ruler and the Government of India and allowed the suit properties
(covered under the covenant) to be retained by the ruler. It did not,
hmvever, affect or prejudice the rights, if any, of third parties in the said
.. properties.It created no title in the ruler to any properties other or higher
than what belonged to him immediately before the appointed day. It did not
affect in any way the nature of property in his hands or the claims if any
which others might have had against the ruler qua those properties.
[45 GH; 46 AC]
Visweswar Rao v. State of M;P., {1952} 3 SCR 1020; Dalmia Dadri
Cement Co.Ltd. v. CIT {19591 SCR 729 mid Rajendra Singh v. Union of India,
'[1970] 2 SCR 63'1, relied on. ·
·
.
Per Ojha, J.
1.1 Respondent nD. 1 was a sovere~gn and the properties in dispute
·as held by the sovereign rulers from time to time were impartible.
[82 A,B; 84FGJ
. 1.2 Unlike the joint family properties, in a sovereign estate there
B
c
D
can be no interest by birth or adoption and therefore the rights of E
partnership, maintenance, sur:vivor.ship and restraining alienation by
head of fa.milies ri~ept for necessity, which are the necessary consequence of comnt'tltdty of inte:i'esf.cannotiitist. The Chief of a sovereign
estatt wau'ld hold th.e estate ·as full and <:omplete owner by virtue of his
sovereign pow.er and' not by v.irtue of munkipal law and no one else can
claim an interest in the ~t.ate. {78 FH; 79A8]
F
D.S. Meramwala Bhayala v. Ba Shri.Amarba Jethsurbhai, 1968 ILR 9
Gujarat p. 966, 'ap.proved •
...,
1.3 One incidence Uf property held by a sovereign was that there was
really no dl'ltinction between the public or State properties on the one G
hand and private properties of the sovereign on the other. The other
incidence was that no one could be a co-owner with the sovereign in the
properties held by him; As regards the property of an absolute sovereign,
there-is no pretence of drawing a distinction, the whole of it belongs to him
as sovereign and he niay dispose of it for his public or private purposes in
whatever manner he may think proper, [81 GH; 82 Al
H
·.·· ...
40
SUPREME COURl' REPORTS.
!1991] SUPP. 3 S. C.R.
A
· Mahant Hardia/Singh v: Ajmer Singh & Ors; '(C.A~ No~ 226/65; decided: ..
on 20.11.1968); Tilkoyat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The. State of Rajast/Um
& Ors., (1964) 1SCR561; Mango/Singh & OrS. v~ The Legal Remembrancer,·
Punjab & Ors., (C.A. No. 242/55, decided on 23.2~1960); Madheorao Phalke
v. The State of Madhya Bharat, {1961) 1SCR957; Director of Endowments;
Government of Hyderabad & Ors. v.AkramAli, AIR 1956 SC 60 and.Ameer.-
B un-Nissa Begum & Ors. v. Mahboob Begum & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 352, relied
on.
1.4 The mode of succession of a sovereign ruler and the .powers of
such a ruler are two different-concepts. Mode. of succession regulates the
process whereby one sover.eign ruler is succeeded ·by the other .. It may ;be
C governed by the rule of general primogeniture or lineal.primogeniture or
any other established rule_g9verning succession. The~ process- ends with .
one sovereign succeeding another. Thereafter what.powers: privileges and
prerogatives are to be exercised by the sovereign is a question which :is. not·
relatable to the.process of succession but-relates to the legal incidents of
sovereignty.
D
1.5 Till the sovereignty,_or the MaJJarajah of Travancore bad ceased
he was entitled to treat and use the properties under his sovereignty.ill any
manner he liked and his will in this regard was supreme on. the prineiple
that a sovereign never dies and succession. to the next ruler takes place-·
E
without there being a .hiatus, there could :be no ,change in the legal stat.is
of the properties held by one ruler and his successor. ·
F
Elphinstone v. BedreechundJ2 English Reports page 340, referred to.
Halsbury' s Laws of England, Fourth· Edition. Volume 8 paragraphs
851, 897 and 1076, referred to.
Baijnath Prasad Singh & Ors. v. Tej Bali Singh, AIR 1921 Privy
Council, page 62; Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kumari Debi & Ors:,
· AIR 1932 P.C. page 216 and Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, North
West Frontier and Delhi Provinces, Lahore v .Dewan Bahadur Dewan Krishna
G Kishore, Rais, Lahore, AIR 1941 P.C. page 120, held inapplicable.
Mirza Raja Shri Pushavathi Viziaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan
Bahadur and Or's. v. Shri PUshavathi Visweswar Gajapathi Raj & Ors., (1964)
2 SCR 403; Nagesh Bis(o Desai etc. etc. v. Khando Tirmal Desai .etc. etc.
(1982) 3 SCR 341; Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil &
:H Ors., (1989] Supp.1 SCC page 246; Anant Kibe & Ors., v. PurushottamRao
BALAGOPALAVARMAv. BALARAMA VARMA
41
& Ors .• l1984}'Supp. SCC 175; Tliakore Shri Vinayasinhji (Dead) by Lrs. v.
Kumar. ShriNatwarsinhji. & Ors .• (1988] Supp. SCC 133; Bhaiya Ramanuj
Pratap Deo v.Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo & Ors., [1982] 1SCR417and,
Chinntithayi alias Veeralakshmi v. Kulasekara Pandiya Naicker & Anr .•
(1952] SCR 251, referred to.
A
2.1 If someone asserts that to a particular prop~rty held by a
sovereign the legal incidents of sovereignty do not apply,. it will have to· be, B. ·
pleaded and established by him th}lt the said property was.held by the
so'Vereign·not as a sovereign but in some other.capacity. cs2· E]
. In the instant case,· apart from.asserting that the properties in suit
:belonged· to a joint family and respondent no. 1 even though a sov~reign · C
ruler, held them as the head ot'thefamily to which the property bel~nged; .
. the appellant has neither specifically pleaded nor produced any com:incing evidence·.in support of his assertion~ [82 EFl ·
· 2.2 The plea· of the appellant that the prop~rties in -suit. constituted .
"Sthanani'' and· respondent no. 1 was a Sthani thereof and therefore
1 D
section 7(3) of-the Hindu Succes.sion Act, 1956rwould be applicable to the
pr0perties in ·suit, wanightJY·repelled by the High Court, inasmuch as in
the .pleadings of the parties,there was no reference to the office of the Ru.ler
being that of a Sthani. No amount ofevidence can be looked into upon a
plea which was never·put forward. In his grounds-of appeal before the
High Court t:te appellant took a categorical stand .that the Court b~low E
should.have found that Ext. A. 3 did not create a Sthanam in respect of' the
plaint Schedule properties and that defendant was not a Sthani thereof.
[71C-G;73 CDJ
2.3 There was nothing on record to show that respondent no. 1 went
to trial with knowledge that the question of there being a Sthanam and he F .
being a Sthani thereof was in issue a"id that any evidence.on the basis of
such knowledge was produced on his behalf. [72 C]
In the absence of any pleading or issue on the point the·-rippellant
could not be perm_itted to raise the question on the footing that it was a
pure question of Law. [73B]
G
Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt Saran, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 57; Nagubai
Ammal & Ors; v.B. ShamaRao & Ors., AI~.1956 sc; p. 593 andMordnMar
Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Ayira & Ors., AIR 1959 SC p. 31,
relied on.
·
H
42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] SUPP. 3 S. C.R.
A
Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh, [1963) 2 SCR 733,
referred to.
Treatise on Malabar and Aliasanthana Law (1922 Edn.) by P.R.
Sundra Ayar, referred to.
B
3.1 All the properties belonging to the joint· family in which the
appellant could have a share or interest Were covertd by the ~deed: or
partition dated 13.7.1971 arid the properties in suit did not form part of
the said deed. [86 DE]
·
Keeping in view .the extent and nature or the properties in dispute,
C the meticulous care taken to describe the properties to be partitioned by
the said deed and the pres~med knowledgeability of the persons who wete
parties to the deed with regard to the family properties the only conclusion
which can be drawn is that at the time of the execution of the deed of
partition the parties thereto were fully conscious of the fact that the ~
properties in dispute were not joint family properties. [86 EG; 87BC]
D
E
3.2 In the ceiling proceedings only respondent no. 1 had filed a
return under section 85 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 and that too
in his capacity as an individual. Non-filing of a return by the appellant or
any other member of the family as contemplated by either section 85(2) or
section SSA is indicative of the fact that they did notconsider the suit lands
to belong to the joint family. [87 F; 88 BC]
4.1 Since the properties in suit were not joint family properties but
were the personal properties of respondent rio. 1, it need not be considered
whether the nature of properties was impartible or its nature of partible
F
joint Hindu family properties would get revived on the commeocement of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the Kerala Joint Hindu Family
System (Abolition) Act, 1975. [94 AB]
4.2 Even if the personal properties held by respondent no. 1 continued to retain the character of impartibility and they became partible
G subsequently, it would, in no way, advance the case of the appellant
inasmuch as it was not shown that the appellant would be an heir of
respondent no. 1 with regard to his personal properties. Apparently, such
properties would on his demise be governed either by testamentary
disposition or would devolve on his persotial heirs.[94CDJ
H
4.3 When both parties have adduced evidence, the question of
...... _
t l
BALAGOPALA VARMAv. BALARAMA VARMA
43
burden of proving that the suit properties were impartible or otherwise is
A
not of very great importance and the Court has to come to a decision on
the consideration of all materials. [74 A]
Narayan Bhagwantarao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi &
Ors., AIR 1960 S.C. page 100, relied on.
Martand Rao v. Malhar. Rao, AIR 1928 Privy Council page 10,
referred to.
5. The properties in suit had been earmarked by respondent no.1 as
his personal properties which he was competent to do as a sovereign and
B
the Government by accepting or approving the list of properties submitted C
by him as his personal properties in pursuance of the covenant did not
purport on its own to create any right in favour of respondent no. 1 in such
properties. The Government could have disputed the list submitted by
respondent no. 1 but it chose not to do so and the ascertion of respondent
no. 1 that the properties in suit were his personal properties was accepted.
[94 E-G]
D
Vishnu Pratap Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [1990] Supp.
sec. 43, relied on.
Kera/a District Gazatteers, Trivandrum by A. Sreedhara Menon (pp.
190-192), referred to.
White Paper on Indian States (published by Government of India,
Ministry of States) Part VII pp. 156-157, refeired to.
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 534~35 of F
1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.10.82 of the Kerala High Court in
A.S. No. 210 of 1979.
K. Bhaskaran Nambiar, IMA Chary, K.V. Mohan, S. Natarajan, C.S.
Vaidyanathan, K.R. Nambiar and P.K. Dhillon for the Appellants.
G
G. Viswanatha Iyer, TSK Iyer, Pal1av Sudhodia, VJ. Francis, Raju
Ramachandran, S. Murlidhar, T.V.S. Narasimhachari, A.S. Rao, P.K. Pillai
and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
44
· SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991) SUPP. 3 S. C. R.
A
RANGANATHAN, J.-Shri Padmanabha Dasa Bala Rama Varma
(hereinafter referred to as 'thefirst respondent') was the erstwhile Maharaja of
Travancore, the sovereign ruler of that part of the territory of India which was
formerly known as the State of Travancore. The State ceased to be a sovereign
princely State and the first respondent ceased to be its sovereign ruler with
effect from 1.7.1949. On this date, the State was integrated w~th the erstwhile
B . Cochin State to form the United State of-Travancore and Cochin of which
respondent no. 1 became .. the Rajpramukh. With effect from. l.1L1956-, ·the
territories of the integrated State got merged with the rest of the territories-Qf
.the Union.of India tooonstitute, after certain_rnOdifjcations, the:pt~ent:State·
ofKerala. As.the Mahaiaja of Travancore, the first respondent.held sev~~
iteμis of immovable properties consisting of ho.uses, palace~ and lands. Most,
C ·if not all, the properties held by· 'him had been· inherited by. him· from his
predecessor .:-Mahara jahas .. He may also· have acquired some proi)erties ~fter he
became the Ruler but no details are available. It is, however,-coinmon,.ground
that the cost of properties acquired by the first respondent or his predecessors
had 'been met from the State coffers, there being nothing until 1949 to.
distinguish between the funds ·belonging. to a .Ruler in his individual capacity
D and the funds belonging to the State. They, were also disposing ofthe properties
held by the1D from time. to. time .at their sweet will and pleasure and ji; is.
common ground that even respondent no. 1 had disposed or several items of
properties at various points of time and these alienations-even those made
~ter 1.7.1949-i;emained unchallenged.
F
G
In the context of the political developments referred to earlier, it became·
necessary to make certain provisions regarding the properties which were ·
formerly .held by the Princely Rulers. On 27.5.1949, a covenant Ex. A-2 (the:
terms of which have been extracted in the ordet of my .learned brother Ojha, ~
J.) was entered into between the Rulers of the States ofTravancore and Cochin.
It is common ground that, under the terms of the said covenant and the
connected document (Ex. A-3), the properties we are here concerned with were
declared by the first respondent to be his private properties and not State
properties liable to be taken over by the Govemmen.t of India and that the
Government of India have not contested the correctness of this declaration-at
any stage.
In the present appeals, arising out of a partition suit filed by the appellant
. (inspired possibly by proceedings taken under the Keiala Land Reforms Act
which resultedjn 191.23 acres out of the 309.25 acres of land held by the first
respondent being declared surplus over the permissible ceiling on .the basis that
they were the absolute properties of the first respondent), the appellant claims
H
that the suit properties are divisible among himself and the 34 defendants to the
-
BALAGOPALA VARMAv.BALARAMA VARMA[RANGANATHAN,J.]
45
suit in equal shares and that the first respondent was entitled only .to am onethirty fifth share therein.
Sri Bhaskaran Narnbiar, who argued the case elaborately and meticulously, attempted to convince us that the first respondent owned these proper-.
ties, not as sole owner, but only in his capacity as the holder of an impartible
estate, the karnavan of an undivided marumakkathayam tarwad or a slhanee
and that, in any one of the three situations, these properties have bt",eome
partible under_ the provisions of recent legislations. The argument was that, if
the properties . were those comprised in an impartible estate, the rule of
primogenitm:e _could be lost (i) by renunciati~n. (ii) by statutory abolition or
(iii) by the properties being no longer needed to maintain the status and dignity
of the holder on the basis of the "cessante ratione legis, cessat ip!;a lex"
doctrine. In this case, it is said situation (iii) developed when, on 1.7.49, th~
first respondent ceased to be a ruler. The properties thereupon became the
properties of the family or tarwad to which the Ruler .belonged and became.
partible OQJ 7.6.56 when section 7(1) of the Hindu Succession Act came into
force and, at any rate, on 1.12.76 when the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System
(Abolition) Act, 1975 came into force. If the properties were merely those of
a tarwad or Hindu family, they became partible under the above enactments.
If the analogy of a sthanam applied, section 7(3) of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 rendered them partible. Sri Nambiar invited us to decide the issues before
us on the basis of these picturesque analogies, which appear, at first blush, quit
plausible and attractive.