# ·Rlllnclumdra Rambu v. Clunnpabal

- **Citation:** [1964] 6 S.C.R. 826
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 37-40 of 1963
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rlllnclumdra-rambu-v-clunnpabal-3222
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Income-tax-Proceedings
under
s.
34(1A}-Applicability
of
other
relevant provisions of the Act-Slction 34( 1.A.) whether contravenu
Art. 14 of the Constitution-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of
1922), rs. 34(1), 34(1A)-Constitution of India, Art. 14.
The validity of s. 34(1A) of the Income-tax Act was challenged
by the assessees as contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was
contended, that th'e remedy by way of appeals and revisions availablo
in cases under s. 34( 1) was denied to the assessees against whom
proceedings were taken under s. 34(1A), and that while under
s. 34(1)(a), as it then stood, the assessing authority could not act
beyond 8 years, this protection was not available to assessees against
·whom action was taken under s. 34(1A).
..
-
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Held: Section 34(1A) was valid and did not contravene Art. 14 of
the Constitution.
It could not have been the intention of the legislature when it
enacted s. 34( IA) that the procedure prescribed by the relevant
provisions of the Act beginning with s. 22 sho11ld not be applicable to
proceedings taken under s. 34(1A), and that the procedure to be
followed in the said proceedings and the powers to be exercised by
the Income·tax Officers dealing with them should be, what is vaguely
described as "the inherent or incidental powers" of such officers. The
words "thereupon" and "accordingly" in s. 34(1A) seems to emphasise
the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Act to the proceedings
taken under s. 34(1A).
·
The object of the legislature being to catch income
which
had
escaped assessment, it would be legitimate for the legislature to deal
with the class of assessees in whose cases the income which had escaped
assessment was much larger, because that would be a basis for rational
classification which has an intelligible connection with the object intended
to be achieved by the statute.
Jai Kishan Srivastava v. ·lncOme~l(u Officer, Kanpur, l.L.R. [1959]
II All. 451, approved.
Sura; Mull Mohta v. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448
and Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.. Madurai v. Sri A. V. Yiswanatha
Sastri, [1955]1 S.C.R. 787 referred to.

## Text

•
1961
·Rlllnclumdra
Rambu
v.
Clunnpabal
Mudholkar J.
1961
,Fcbr1111TY 19.
826
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
allowed Sitabai to remain in possession of Ramdhan's
movables.
At least, he would have obtained from her a
document containing the list and description of the movables
and also an admission to the effect that she was entrusted
with them by the appellant and that she had no right in them.
Had she refused to execute such a document, one would have
naturally expected the appellant to institute a suit for their
possession
immediately. There is no explanation for the
absence of such a document, and thus this is also a circumstance which militates against the genuineness of the will.
In the circumstances, we hold that the High Court was
right in rejecting the evidence of the attesting witnesses and
the scribe as well as of the appellant with regard to the execution of the will by Ram4han.
·
We accordingly uphold the judgment of the High Court,
and dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
K. S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND
OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS
GUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
Income-tax-Proceedings
under
s.
34(1A}-Applicability
of
other
relevant provisions of the Act-Slction 34( 1.A.) whether contravenu
Art. 14 of the Constitution-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of
1922), rs. 34(1), 34(1A)-Constitution of India, Art. 14.
The validity of s. 34(1A) of the Income-tax Act was challenged
by the assessees as contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was
contended, that th'e remedy by way of appeals and revisions availablo
in cases under s. 34( 1) was denied to the assessees against whom
proceedings were taken under s. 34(1A), and that while under
s. 34(1)(a), as it then stood, the assessing authority could not act
beyond 8 years, this protection was not available to assessees against
·whom action was taken under s. 34(1A).
..
-
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Held: Section 34(1A) was valid and did not contravene Art. 14 of
the Constitution.
It could not have been the intention of the legislature when it
enacted s. 34( IA) that the procedure prescribed by the relevant
provisions of the Act beginning with s. 22 sho11ld not be applicable to
proceedings taken under s. 34(1A), and that the procedure to be
followed in the said proceedings and the powers to be exercised by
the Income·tax Officers dealing with them should be, what is vaguely
described as "the inherent or incidental powers" of such officers. The
words "thereupon" and "accordingly" in s. 34(1A) seems to emphasise
the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Act to the proceedings
taken under s. 34(1A).
·
The object of the legislature being to catch income
which
had
escaped assessment, it would be legitimate for the legislature to deal
with the class of assessees in whose cases the income which had escaped
assessment was much larger, because that would be a basis for rational
classification which has an intelligible connection with the object intended
to be achieved by the statute.
Jai Kishan Srivastava v. ·lncOme~l(u Officer, Kanpur, l.L.R. [1959]
II All. 451, approved.
Sura; Mull Mohta v. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448
and Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.. Madurai v. Sri A. V. Yiswanatha
Sastri, [1955]1 S.C.R. 787 referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.
37-40 of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated August 13,
11, 1259 .. of. the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ
Petitions Nos. 870 to 873 and 349 of 1956 respectively.
WITH
Petitions Nos. 335 to 345 of 1960.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
G. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.
Vohra, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 37-40 of 1963).
-- M. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and
P. L. Vchra, for the aq:>pellant (in C.A. No. 589/63).
('. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N. Rajagopa/
Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the
apPeals and petitions).
1964
K. S. Rasl!U
v.
CJ.T.
1961
K. S. Rashid
v.
C.J.T.
Gaiendragadkar
c. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
F"ebruary 19, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.-These civil appeals and wn;
petitions !wvc been placed before us for hearing in a group,
because all of them raise a common question of law about
the validity of section 34(TA) of the Income-tax Act
(No. XI of 1922) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). M/s. K. S.
Rashid & Son, and its partner, Rashid Ahmad, arc the
appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 37 to 40/1963, and
petitioners in W.Ps. Nos. 335-345 /1960. The appeals
arise out of the four writ petitions (Nos. 870-873 of 1956)
filed by the firm and its partner in the High Court of
Allahabad challenging the validity of the notices served
upon them under s. 34 (IA) of the Act in respect of their
income for the years 1941-42 to 1946-47. These writ
petitions have been dismissed by the said High Court and
it is with the certificate issued by it that the firm and its
partner have come to this Court in appeal. The writ
petitions Nos. 335-345/1960 have been filed by the same
parties in this Court under Art. 32 of ti ' Constitution in
respect of the notices served on them on tile 19th March.
1956 and the order of excess profit tax k·icd on them. In
these petitions, the same point is urged b} the parties; and
that is that the notices are invalid, becau.;e s. 34(IA) is
itself ultra vires. The respondents to the appeals are : the
Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.. Lucknow, and the
Income-tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Delhi. The respondents to the writ petitions are : the Income-tax Officer,
Central Circle IV, New Delhi, the Income-tax Officer,
'A' Ward, Meerut, the Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.,
Lucknow, and the Central Board of Revenue, New Delhi.
Civil Appeal No. 589 of 1963 has bee.n brought to this
Court in similar circumstances by the appellant, M/s.
Bhawani Prasad Girdharlal. The appellant had challenged
the validity of the notices issued to it on the 16th
August, 1955 under s. 34(1A) of the Act. The writ petition
filed by the appellant has been dismissed bv th~ Allahabad
High Court and it is with the certificate issued by the said
High Court that the present appeal has been brought to
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
this Court. That is how the only question which arises for
our decision in this group of matters relates to the validity
of s. 34(IA) of the Act.
The argument urged in support of the challenge to the
validity of the impugned section is that it suffers from the
vice of contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is urged
that whereas under s. 34 (1) which deals with similar cases
of assessees, the remedy by way of appeals and revisions
under the relevant provisions of the Act is available to the
assessees, that remedy is denied to the assessees against
whom proceedings are taken under the impugned section.
Section 34 ( 1) thus gives a preferential treatment to the
assessees who are similarly placed with the assessees dealt
with under s. 34(1A); and that amounts to unconstitutional
discrimination. It is also urged that in regard to cases falling
under s. 34(1) (a) as it stood at the relevant time, a period
of limitation of 8 years had been prescribed beyond which
the assessing authority could not act, and this protection of
the prescribed period of limitation is not available to the
assessees against whom action is taken under the impugned
section.
It is on these two grounds that the validity of
s. 34 (IA) is challenged before us.
Section 34 deals with income which has escaped assess01ent. Section 34(1) (a) deals with cases where income has,
inter alia, escaped assessment, owing to the omission or
failure on the part of the assessee to make a return of his
income under s. 22 for any year, or to disclose fully and
truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that
year, whereas s. 34( 1 )(b) refers to cases where income
has escaped assessment notwithstanding that there bas been
no omission of failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the
part of the assessee. In respect of the first category of cases,
s. 34 ( 1) had provided at the relevant time that the Incometax Officer may, in cases falling under cl. (a) at any time
within eight years, and in cases falling under clause (b) at
any time within four years of the end of that year, serve
on the assessee "a notice containing all or any of the
requirements which may be included in the notice under subsection (2) of s. 22, and may proceed to assess or re-assess
such income, profits or gains, or recompute the loss or
1961
K. S. Riuh/4
v.
C.1.T.
Gaj•ndragadkar
c. J.
1964
J[. s. Rmhid
. v.
CJ.T.
Gaiendragadk111
c. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall,
so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were
a notice issued under that sub-section" .
Let us now read the relevant portion of s. 34 (1 A). This
provision lays down, inter alia, that if, in any case of an
assc,see. the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe:
(i) that income has escaped assessment for any year
in respect of which the relevant previous yea1
falls wholly or partly within the period beginning on the 1st day of September, 1939, and
ending on the 31st day of March, 1946; and
(ii) that the said income amounts, or is likely to
amount, to Rs. 1 lakh or more, he may, notwithstanding that the period of eight years or.
as the case may be, four years specified in subsection ( 1) has expired, in respect thereof,
serve on the assessee, or, if the assessee is a
company, on the ;principal officer thereof, a
notice containing all or any of the requirements
which may be included in a notice under
sub-section (2) of section 22, and may proceed
to assess or reassess the income, profits or gains
of the assessee for all or any of the years
referred to in clause (i), and thereupon the
provisions of this Act [excepting those contained in clauses ( i) and (iii) of the proviso
to sub-section (1) and in sub-sections (2) and
(3)' of this section J shall, so far as may be,
apply accordingly :
Provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue
a notice under this sub-section unless he bas
recorded bis reasons for doing so, and the
Central Board of Revenue is satisfied on such
reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue
of such notice :
Provided further that no such notice shall be issued
after the 31st day of March, 1956.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
It is urged that whereas in cases falling under s. 34(1),
the Income-tax Officer has to deal with the matter on the
footing that the notice issued against the assessee is a notice
under s. 22 ( 2), that obligation is not imposed on the
Income-tax Officer while he deals with cases falling under
s. 34(IA), because the words "as if the notice were a
notice issued under that sub-section" which are found in
s. 34(1) are omitted in s. 34(IA). It is not seriously disputed that if the notice issued under s. 34 (IA) is not deemed
to be a notice under s. 22(2), the remedies by way of
appeals and revisions which are prescribed by sections 30,
31, 32, 33, 33A and 33B of the Act would not be available
to the assessee, and so, the main basis for the attack against
the validity of s. 34{IA) rests on the hypothesis that the
omission of the relevant words in s. 34 (IA) in substance
deprives the assessee of the said remedies prescribed by the
relevant provisions of the Act. If the assumption on which
this challenge proceeds is well-founded, s. 34 (IA) may
suffer from the infirmity that it contravenes Art. 14. Though,
as we will later point out, there is a rational classification
between the assessees fallin11: under s. 34 ( 1), and those
falling under s. 34(IA), thit rational classification would
not justify the denial of the right of appeal to the persons
included in s. 34(IA). The question thus presented is one
of construction.
Before dealing with the construction of s. 34 (IA), it
would be necessary to refer very briefly to the background
of the enaotment of the said section. This section was
introduced by an amendment in the Act on the 17th July,
1954, and that was because s. 5 ( 4) of the Taxation on
Income (Investigation Commission) Act (No. 30 of 1947)
was struck down by this Court as unconstitutional on May
28, 1954, in Suraj Mall Mohta and Another v. A. V.
Viswanatha Sastri and Another(1 ). In that case, while
examining the validity of s. 5 ( 4) of the Investigation
Commission Act. this Court held that the persons brought
within the mischief of the said section belong to the same
class of persons who fall within the ambit of s. 34 of the
Act and are dealt with by s. 34 ( 1 ) , and in view of the·
(I) [19SS) I S. C. R. 448.
1961
K. S. Radl4
.v.
CJ.T.
Gaf•ndragadl:ar
c. 1.
1961
JC,. s. Rashid
v.
c.i.r.
Ga/endragadkar
c. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
fact that tlle procedure prescribed by S; 5 ( 4) of the Jnvesiigation Commission Act was very much less favourable to
the assessees than the one available to them if action was
taken against them under s. 34 (1), the conclusion reached
was that the impugned s. 5 ( 4) was unconstitutional. It is
unnecessary to refer to the several grounds mentioned by
Mahajan C.J. who spoke for the Court in striking down the
impugned section.
After this judgment was pronounced, the legislature
intervened and enacted s. 34 (IA). That, however, was not
the end of the matter.
When s. 34(1A) was introduced
in the Act, there remained two statutory provisions dealing
with substantially the same subject-matter, section 5 (1) of
the Investigation Commission Act and s. 34 (1) of the Act.
In Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. Sri A. V.
Viswanatha Sastri and Another('), a point was raised before
this Court as to whether it was open to the Income-tax
Department to invoke s. 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission Act after s. 34 (IA) of the Act was enacted, and
this Court held that it was not, because on comparing the
two relevant provisions, s. 5 ( 1), according to the decision
of this Court, contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. That
is bow, s. 5 ( 1) became a dead letter and the Investigation
Commission, in consequence, ceased to function. The cases
which bad been referred to that Commission and which
had not been completed had, therefore, to be taken up under
s. 34(1A) of the Act.
Thus. it would be noticed that the
present controversy bas bad a somewhat chequered career.
The first challenge was to s. 5 ( 4) of the Investigation
Commission Act; when the challenge succeeded and the
said section was struck down in the case of Suraj Mall
l\1ohta(2) the legislature intervened and s. 34(IA) was
added in the Act.
Nevertheless, the cases pending before
the Investigation Commission were sought to be continued
before the said Commission under s. 5 ( 1) and this section
was struck down in the case of Shree Meenakshi Mills
Ltd.('); and, now, that proceedings against the same class
of assessees are sought to be continued under s. 34(1A),
it is urged thats. 34(1A) of the Act itself is invalid. It is in
(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 787.
(2) [1955) I. S.C.R. 441.
'
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the light of this background that the controversy between
the parties in the present proceedings has to be judged.
Reverting then to the question of construction, the
narrow point which needs to be examined is, what is the
effect of the omission to include in s. 34(IA) the clause
"as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section"
which is to be found in s. 34 (1)?
In dealing with this
question, we think it would not be unreasonable to bear in
mind that when the legislature enacted s. 34(IA), it must
have desired to remove the infirmities which had rendered
s. 5 ( 4) of the Investigation Commission Act invalid.
In
other words, the legislature must have presumably wanted
to afford to the assessees in respect of whom s. 34(IA) was
intended to be invoked, the same remedies that were available to .the assessees covered by s. 34 (1). Though the
importance or significance of this consideration cannot be
unduly emphasised, it cannot be said that •this consideration
is altogether irrelevant.
We have already read the relevant portion of s. 34(IA)
and. we have seen that it requires that a notice containing
all or any of the requirements which may be included in
the notice under s. 22, sub-section (2) has to be issued. In
other word~. the notice which is required to be issueA. is,
in terms, in a sense referable to s. 22(2), because· the
legislature has provided that it must contain all or any of
the requirements which would be included in such a notice.
Then, s. 34(JA) provides that after issuing the notice on
the r.ssessee in the manlier prescribed by it, the Income-tax
Officer may proceed to assess or reassess the income, profits
or gains of the assessee for the relevant years. In the
context, it would, we think, be reasonable to hold that the
assessment or reassessment which has to follow the issue of
the notice, must be assessment or reassessment in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Act, and this is made
very clear by the clause that follows, because the said clause
begins with the word "thereupon" which indicates that when
the process of assessment or reassessment commences, the
clause beginning with the word "thereupon" comes into
operation and this clause requires that the nrovisions of the
134-159 S.C.-53
1961
K. s. Ra11dtl
..
CJ.T.
Gaiendra1adw
c. I.
1961
/C. 8. l!Juhld
v.
CJ.T.
Gof*ndragadkar
c. /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly.
The word
"accordingly" like the word "thereupon" seems to emphasise
the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Act to
the proceedings taken under s. 34(IA); otherwise there is
no particular reason which would have justified the further
provision in the section excepting certain provisions of the
Act which are held to be inapplicable to the proceedings
under s. 34(IA).
It is true that s. 34( I) uses the clause "as if the notice
were a notice issued under that sub-section" and s. 34(IA)
does not; but the two provisions were not inserted in the
Act at the same time; s. 34( I) in the present form was
enacted in 1948, whereas s. 34(IA) was enacted in 1954.
It is quite likely that the draftsman who drafted s. 34(IA)
took the view that the last clause in question which occurred
in s. 34 (1) was really superfluous and that may account
for its omission in s. 34(IA).
In our opinion, therefore.
construing the relevant words in s. 34(IA), it would be
difficult to accede to the argument that the said omission
was deliberate and significant, and its consequence is that
the provisions of s. 22 and all other provisions consequent
upon the application of s. 22 become irrelevant in dealing
with cases under s. 34(IA).
If s. 22 is held to be inapplicable to proceedings under
s. 34(IA), fue consequence would be entirely irrational and
fantastic. The powers conferred on th~ Income-tax Officer
under s. 23 (2) to take evidence would then not be available
to him, and, indeed, all the powers prescribed and the
procedure laid down by s. 23 would become irrelevant.
Likewise, the provisions in regard to appeals and revisions
contained in sections 30, 31, 33, 33A and 33B would also
be inapplicable. As we have already seen, the inapplicability
of these provisions is ,the main foundation of the attack
against the validity of s. 34(IA).
It is, however, urged
that though the specific powers conferred by s. 23 may not
be available to the Income-tax Officer, be may, nevertheless,
exercise similar powers, because the authority to assess must
itself include such powers as incidental to assessment. The
best judgment assessment which is authorised by s. 23 ( 4)
may, it is suggested, be made even in cases falling under
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1. 34(IA) under the inherent authority of the Income-tax
Officer.
In our opinion, this approach is wholly misconceived.
We are satisfied that it could not have been the
intention of the legislature when it enacted s. 34(IA) that
the procedure prescribed by the relevant provisions of the
Act beginning with s. 22 should not be applicable to proceedings taken under s. 34(1A), and that the procedure
to be followed in the said proceedings and the powers to
be exercised by the Income-tax Officers dealing with th'.llil
should be what is vaguely described as 'the inherent or
incidental powers' of such officers. Therefore, we have no
hesitation in holding that the challenge made to the validity
of s. 34 (IA) on the ground that the remedy by way of
appeals or revisions which is ayailable to the assessees
against whom proceedings are taken under s. 34(1) is not
available to the assessees who are covered by s. 34(IA),
cannot be sustained.
The other contention raised against the validity of
s. 34(1A) is based on the fact that at the relevant time,
s. 34(1 )(a) dealt with cases similar to those falling under
1. 34(1A), and yet. whereas in the former category of cases
a period of limitation was prescribed as eight years there
is no such limitation in regard to the latter, and that, it is
urged, means unconstitutional discrimination. We are not
impressed by this argument. It is true that in a broad sense
both s. 34(1 )(a) and s. 34(IA) deal with cases of income
which has escaped assessment. and in that sense, the
assessees against whom steps are taken in respect of their
income which has escaped assessment can be said to form
a similar class; but the similarity between the two categories
disappears when we remember that s. 34(1A) is intended
to deal with assessees whose income has escaped assessment
during a specified period between 1st of September, 1939
and the 31st of March. 1946.
It is well-known that that
is the period in which as a result of the War, huge profits
were made in business and industry.
The second point which is very important is that in
regard to the cases falling under s. 34(IA), action can be
taken only where the income which has escaped assessment
is likely to amount to Rs. 1 lakh or more. In other worcb.
1961
1:. s. &u~
••
CJ.T.
Gajendragadklu
c. J.
lfllf
.t. If. Ro.JtiJ
v.
CJ.T.
Oa/tndratadkar
C. I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
it is only in regard to cases where the escaped income is
of a high. magnitude that the restriction of the period of
limitation has been removed.
It is difficult to accept the
argument that the legislature was not justified in treating
this smaller class of assessees differently on the ground that
the profits made by this class were higher and the income
which had escaped assessment was correspondingly of a
much larger magnitude. The object of the legislature being
to catch income which had escaped assessment, it would be
legitimate for the legislature to deal with the class of
assessees in whose cases the income which had escaped
assessment was much larger, because that would be a basis
for rational classification which has an intelligible connection
with the object intended to be achieved by the statute.
It was suggested that as a result of the provisions contained in s. 34(l)(a) and s. 34(1A) one year would
overlap; and that may be true. But the argument of overlapping has no significance because it makes no difference
whether action is taken under s. 34( 1), or s. 34(1A) in
respect of that year. Once the notice is served under
s. 34(1) or s. 34(1A), the rest of khe procedure is just
the same and all the remedies available to the assessees are
also just the same. Therefore, we see no substance in the
argument that the absence of the restriction as to period of
limitation under s. 34(1A) introduces any infirmity in the
said provision. In the result, we must hold that s. 34(1A)
is valid and has not contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution.
That is the effect of the majority view taken by the Allahabad
High Court in Jai Kishan Srivastava v. lncome-tax Officer,
Kanpur and Another(').
There is one minor additional point which has been
argued before us by 'Mr. Setalvad in Civil Appeal No. 589
of 1963, and that point is based upon tbe requirement
prescribed by the proviso ,to s. 34(1A) that the Income-tax
Officer shall not issue a notice unless he has recorded his
reasons for doing so, and the Central Board of Revenue
is satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for
the issue of such notice. The argument is that the require-
( I) I. L. R. (19591 Il All. 451.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ment prescribed by the proviso constitutes a condition
precedent for the exercise of the authority conferred on the
Income-tax Officer by s. 34(1A) and since that requirement
is not shown to have been satisfied in his case, the appellant
in C.A. No. 589 of 1963 must succeed even if s. 34(1A)
is held 'to be valid.
We are not impressed by this argument.
What was urged before the High Court by the appellant was
not that no reasons had been recorded by the Income-ta1
Officer as required by the proviso; the argument was that
the appellant had not been given a copy of the said reasons
and it appears to have been urged that the appellant wa'
entitled to have such a copy.
This latter part of the case
has not been pressed before us by Mr. Setalvad, and rightly.
Now, when we look at the pleadings of the parties, it is
clear that it was assumed by the appellant that reasons had
been recorded and in fact, it was positively affirmed by the
respondent that they had been so recorded; the controversy
being, if the reasons are recorded, is the assessee entitled
to have a copy of those reasons? Therefore, we do not sec
how Mr. Setalvad can suggest that no reasons had in fact
been recorded, and so, the condition rprecedent prescribed
by the proviso had not been complied with.
The result is, all the Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions
in this group fail and are dismissed.
There would be no
order as to costs.
Appeals and Writ Petitioru diJmisud.
MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB
v.
DEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND
OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS
GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)
~vacuee Property-Money deposited wlth an Indian by u ptr~on wi'lo
migrated to Pakistan-Liability to pay that amount to tM Cllltl>'
dia-Admlniltration of E•ocw•
Pro~1f1 Act,
1950 (31
al
1951
J:., I. Railil
...
C./.T.
Gai•ndragodklir
c. J.
ltlH