# Rowjee v. State of Andhra Pradesh - **Citation:** [1964] 6 S.C.R. 368 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964-01-27 - **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 1056 and 1057 of 1963 - **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. Mudholkar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rowjee-v-state-of-andhra-pradesh-3200 - **Pages:** 44 ## Headnote Constitution of //idia, 1950, Arr. 166-1/ mandatory-List I Entry 66-- Scope of-Viva Voce test for admission in college-If violation of Art. 14--Article 15(4)-Classification of backward classes-Yali· tlity. 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS Tho Government of Mysore by an order defined backward classes and directed tbat 30 per cent of tbo aoata in professional and technical colleges 1964 Chitraltkhn v. and institutions shall be reserved for them and 18 per cent to tbe ScheR. dule castes and Scheduled Tribes. It was laid down tbat classification of aocially and educationally backward classes should be made on tho basil Stat• of M1-• of economic condition and occupation. By a letter the Government in .. formed tbe Director of Technical Education tbat it had been decided that 253 of the maximum marks for tbe examination in optional subjects shall be fixed as interview marks. The selection will be conducted by a committee composed of Heads of Technical Institutions aod in allottins marks for interview factors like general knowledge, personality and extracurricular activities of the candidates should be taken into consideration. On the basis of the above criteria selections were made for admission to Engineering and Medical Colleges. Thereupon some of the candidates whose applications for admission were rejected filed writ petitions before tbe High Court of Mysore for quashing the orders issued by tbe Government and for directing that they shall be admitted in tho colleges strictly in tbe order of merit. The High Court rejected tbe contention• raised on points of law but found that the selection committee has abused its power and directed that the petitioners be interviewed afresh aild admissions be made in accordance with tbe Government Order and letter which were declared valid. Before this Court it was contended that the Government Jetter was invalid inasmuch as it did not comply with tbe provisions of Art. 166 of tbe Constitution. The next contention was that the Government had no power .to appoint a selection committee for admitting students to colleges on the basis of higher or different qualifications than tbose pres- :ribed by the University. Another contention was that selection by viva voce examination was illegal by reason of the fact that it enables tho interviewers to act arbitrarily and therefore it contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution. Lastly it was contended that unless the observation of the High Court that the classification was not perfect since tbe Government has not applied the caste test as well as the economic test ii corrected it will mislead the Government. Held: (Per B. P. Sinha, C.J., Subba Rao, P.aghubar Dayal and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) (i) Ibe provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory and, if they are not complied with, it can be established as a question of fact tbat the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor. In the present case the impugned order !bough it does not conform to tbe provisions of Art. 166 ex facie says that an order to the effect mentioned therein was issued by the GovcrnmCnt and it is not denied by the appellants tbat the order was made by the Government and neither it iJ denied that it was communicated to the selection committeee. Therefore it iJ valid. 134-159 S.C.-24 370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1964 Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay [1952] S.C.R. . 612, State of Bombay, v. Purushottam log Naik;-[1952] S.C.R. 74, Ghaio R. Chitralekha Mall & sons v. State of Delhi, (1959] S.C.A. 1424 and Bachillar Singh v. State ;; Mysor. Stat• of Punjab, (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713, referred to. (ii) If the impact of the State law providing for standards of education on entry 66 of List I is so heavy and devastating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge the Central field it may be ;truck down. But that i1 a question of fact to be ascertained in each case. . If a State Jaw Prescribes higher percen!!J.ge _ _of. mark-s ## Text _Characters 0–39,999 of 98,343. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39999 for what follows._ 1964 C. S. Rowjee v. State of Andhra Pradesh Ayyangar J. 1964 January, 29 368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS in case the appeals succeed, the State will compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period that the appeals were pending in this Court by reason of the fact that they were not allowed to ply their buses on the routes under the respective permits granted to them. The learned AdvocateGeneral further undertakes that this amount of compensation will be determined in the present proceedings themselves. No order as to costs." The learned Coun'sel requested us that we should give some directions in terms of this undertaking. In view of the above we would add the following at the end of the judgment which was pronounced on January 27, 1964: "In view of the order r,iassed by this Court on June 10, 1963, when the in1erim order of stay was vacated at the instance of the respondent, recording the undertaking on the part of the State that it would compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period when the appeals were pending in this Court. there· will be a declaration to that effect, and the High Court will determine the amount so payable and pass suitable directions for the payment thereof." R. CIDTRALEKHA & ANR. v. ST A TE OF MYSORE & ORS. (B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.) Constitution of //idia, 1950, Arr. 166-1/ mandatory-List I Entry 66-- Scope of-Viva Voce test for admission in college-If violation of Art. 14--Article 15(4)-Classification of backward classes-Yali· tlity. 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS Tho Government of Mysore by an order defined backward classes and directed tbat 30 per cent of tbo aoata in professional and technical colleges 1964 Chitraltkhn v. and institutions shall be reserved for them and 18 per cent to tbe ScheR. dule castes and Scheduled Tribes. It was laid down tbat classification of aocially and educationally backward classes should be made on tho basil Stat• of M1-• of economic condition and occupation. By a letter the Government in .. formed tbe Director of Technical Education tbat it had been decided that 253 of the maximum marks for tbe examination in optional subjects shall be fixed as interview marks. The selection will be conducted by a committee composed of Heads of Technical Institutions aod in allottins marks for interview factors like general knowledge, personality and extracurricular activities of the candidates should be taken into consideration. On the basis of the above criteria selections were made for admission to Engineering and Medical Colleges. Thereupon some of the candidates whose applications for admission were rejected filed writ petitions before tbe High Court of Mysore for quashing the orders issued by tbe Government and for directing that they shall be admitted in tho colleges strictly in tbe order of merit. The High Court rejected tbe contention• raised on points of law but found that the selection committee has abused its power and directed that the petitioners be interviewed afresh aild admissions be made in accordance with tbe Government Order and letter which were declared valid. Before this Court it was contended that the Government Jetter was invalid inasmuch as it did not comply with tbe provisions of Art. 166 of tbe Constitution. The next contention was that the Government had no power .to appoint a selection committee for admitting students to colleges on the basis of higher or different qualifications than tbose pres- :ribed by the University. Another contention was that selection by viva voce examination was illegal by reason of the fact that it enables tho interviewers to act arbitrarily and therefore it contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution. Lastly it was contended that unless the observation of the High Court that the classification was not perfect since tbe Government has not applied the caste test as well as the economic test ii corrected it will mislead the Government. Held: (Per B. P. Sinha, C.J., Subba Rao, P.aghubar Dayal and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) (i) Ibe provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory and, if they are not complied with, it can be established as a question of fact tbat the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor. In the present case the impugned order !bough it does not conform to tbe provisions of Art. 166 ex facie says that an order to the effect mentioned therein was issued by the GovcrnmCnt and it is not denied by the appellants tbat the order was made by the Government and neither it iJ denied that it was communicated to the selection committeee. Therefore it iJ valid. 134-159 S.C.-24 370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1964 Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay [1952] S.C.R. . 612, State of Bombay, v. Purushottam log Naik;-[1952] S.C.R. 74, Ghaio R. Chitralekha Mall & sons v. State of Delhi, (1959] S.C.A. 1424 and Bachillar Singh v. State ;; Mysor. Stat• of Punjab, (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713, referred to. (ii) If the impact of the State law providing for standards of education on entry 66 of List I is so heavy and devastating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge the Central field it may be ;truck down. But that i1 a question of fact to be ascertained in each case. . If a State Jaw Prescribes higher percen!!J.ge _ _of. mark-s··fot -extra-curricular activities in the matter of admission to colleges it cannot be said that it would be directly encroaching on the field covered by entry 66 of List I. The Government Orders do not contravene the mini111uJn qualification prescribed by the Mysore University; what the Government did was to appoint a selection committee and prescribe for selection of students who have the minimum qualifications prescribed by the University. Since they cannot admit all the students who have secured the minimum marks pre.scribed by the University they had necessarily to select the applicants on some reasonable basis. The State Government is therefore entitled to prescribe a machinery and also the criteria for admission of qualified students to medical and enginee1ing colleges run by the Government and with the consent of the management of the Government aided colleges, to the said colleges also. Gujarat University v. Shri Krishna, [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 112, dis· tinguished. (iii) The selection by viva voce is one of the methods suggested by modern authorities on education in preference to written tests. It is not for the court to say which method should be adopted, it should be left to the authorities concerned. The fact that one particular method is capable of abuse is not sufficient ground for quashing it as being violative of Art. 14. If in a given case the selection committee abuses its powers in violation of Art. 14 the selection will be held invalid and will be set aside as the High Court has done in the present case. (iv) A classification of backward classes based on economi• conditions and occupation is not bad and does not offend Art. I 5 ( 4). The caste of a group of citizens may be a relevant circumstance in ascertaining their social b8ckWardness and though it is a relevant factor to determine social backwardness of a class, it cannot be the sole or dominent test in that behalf. If in a given selection caste is excluded in ascertaining a class within the meaning of .Art. 1 S ( 4) it does not vitiate the classification if it satisfied other tests. The inference to the contrary which may be drawn from the observation of the High Court in the impugned judgment will not be correct in law or a correct reading of the observations of this Court in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 s.c.R. 439. (v) Various provisions of the Constitution like Arts. 151 29, 46, 341 and 342 which recognise the factual existence of backward classes in our 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 371 .. country and which make a sincere attempt to promote the welfare of the weaker sections thereof should be construed to effectuate that policy and not to give weightage to progressive sections of the society under the false colour of caste to which they happen to belong. Under no circumstances a "class" can be equated to a "caste" though the caste of an individual or group of individuals may be a relevant factor in putting him in a particular class. If in a given situation caste is excluded in ascertaining a class within the meaning of Art. J 5 ( 4) it would not violate the classification if it satisfied other tests. If an entire sub-caste by and large; is backward, it may be included in the Scheduled Castes by following the appropriate procedure laid down by the Constitution. Per Mudholkar, J. (dissenting): (i) The decisions of this Court dealing with Art. 166 of the Constitution have definitely held that where the existence of a Government Order itself is challenged by a person who is affected by it the burden is upon the Government to establish that an l·rdcr was in fact made by the Governor in the manner provided for in the rules of business framed by the Governor under cl. (3) of Art. 166. (ii) It is not correct to say, in this case, that the appellants have not denied the existence of the order. Right from the beginning they have been saying that there was no "Government Order" in so far as admission to the Medical College was concerned. Since both the appellants. were concerned only with the admission to a Medical College they had no necessity to deny the existence of the Government Order regarding ad .. mission to an Engineering College. The document which is relied on by the State to establish that there was a Government Order is nothing but a communication from the Secretary to Government of Mysore addressed to the selection committee and Deans Medical College Mysore. It is thus not. an order of the kind contemplated by Art. 166. Except a statement in that communication that the Under Secretary is ''directed to state" that the Government has taken a decision there is no evidence or averment that the Governor has made an order providing for interview. In no case has this Court held that such a document can be treated as the Governor's Order or even evidence of the existence of the Governor's Order. (iii) The decision of this Court in Guiarat Univtrsity v. Shri Krishna, [1963] Supp. J S.C.R. 112, establishes that the power to provide for coordination and determination of standards in certain institutions like the medical colleges is vested in the Parliament and even though Parliament may not have exercised that power the State Legislature cannot step in and provide for the determination and coordination of standards by requiring that marks on the basis of interviews be awarded to the applicants for admission of candidates to such institutions as is done in the present case. It constitutes an interference with the standards of admission laid down by the University. (iv) The executive power of the State which is co-extensive with legislative power under Art. 162 of the Constitution cannnt be exercised where such exercise is contrary to law or where it has been assipied to 1964 R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysoro 372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1964 other authorities or bodies. Section 23 of the Mysore University Act, R. Chltraltkha provides that the Acadamic Council shall have power to prescribe the v. conditions of admission to the University and therefore the executive Slate of Mysort cannot encroach on this power. Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, [1955) 2 S.C.R. 225 and Motl/a/ v. Government of State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1951 All 259 (F.B.). (v) It would not be in aecor'dance with cl. (!) of Art. IS or cl. (2) of Art. 29 to require the consideration of the caste of persons to be home in mind for determining what are socially and educationally backward classes. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1056 and 1057 of 1963. Appeals by special !eave from the judgment and order dated September 30, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1592 and 1522 of 1963. S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants (in both the appeals) . c. K .. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. A char, for the respondents (in both the appeals). Jaruary 29, 1964. The Judgment of B. P. Sinha, C.J., K. Sobba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Raghubar Dayal JJ. was delivered by Sobba Rao J. Mudholkar J. delivered a dissenting opinion. $ubba Rao I. SUB BA RAo J .-These two appeJls raise the question of the validity of the orders made by the Government of Mysore in respect of admissions to Engineering and Medical Colleges in the State of Mysore. The facts may be briefly stated: In the Statei of Mysore there are a number of Engineering and Medical Colleges-most of them are Government Colleges and a few of them are Government aided Colleges. The State Government appointed a common selection committee for settling admissions to the Engineering Colleges and another common selection committee for settling admissions to Medical Colleges. The Government by an order dated July 26, 1963, marked as Ex. C in the 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT'. 373 High Court, defined backward classes and directed that 30 per cent of the seats in professional and technical colleges and institutions shall be reserved for them and 18 per cent. to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. On July 6, 1963, the Government sent a letter to the Director of Technical Education in Mysore, Bangalore, informing him that it had been decided that 25 per cent of the maximum marks for the examination in the optional subjects taken into account for making the selection of candidates for admission to Engineering Colleges shall be fixed as interview marks; it also laid down the criteria for allotting marks in the interview. It appears that a similar order was issued in respect of Medical C9lleges. The selection committee converted the total of the marks in the optional subjects to a maximum of 300 marks and fixed the maximum marks for interview at 75. On the basis of the marks obtained by the candidates in the eXamination and those obtained in the interview, selections were made for admission to Engineering and Medical Colleges. Some of the candidates whose applications for admission to the said colleges were rejected filed petition> under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Mysore for quashing the orders issued by the Government in the matter of admissions to the said Colleges and for a direction that they shall be admitted in the Colleges strictly in the order of merit. The High Court, after considering the various contentions raised by the petitioners, held that the orders defining backwardness were valid and that the criteria laid down for interview of student~ were good; but it held that the selection committee had abused the powers conferred upon it and on that finding set aside the interviews held and directed that the applicants shall be interviewed afresh in accordance with the s.cheme laid down by the Government in Exs. C and D and in Annexure IV, subject to the directions given by it. Two ,of the petitioners have filed the present appeals against the said order of the High Court. We shall now proceed _to deal with .the various conten· tions raised by learned counsel for the appellants. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the Government did not issue any order to the selection com1964 R. Chitraltkha v. State of My1oro Subba Rao /. 374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 1964 mittee in charge of admissions to Medical Colleges prescribR. Chitralekha ing the marks for interview or .fixing the criteria for allotting v. the said marks. Annexure IV daited July 6, 1963, relates Sldte of Mysore to award of marks for the interview of candidates seeking Subba R"" I. admission to Epgineering Colleges and Technical Institutions. It was a letter written by the Secretary to the Government of Mysore, Education Department, to the Director of Technical Education in Mysore, Bangalore. Therein the Government fixed the percentage of marks to be allotted nt the interview. The selection committee was authorised to ,allot marks to the candidates, having regard to the following factors: (1) General Knowledge. (2) Aptitude and personality. (3) Previous academic career, including special distinctions, etc. (4) N.C.C., A.C.C., etc. ( 5) Extra curricular activities including sports, social service, debating, dramatics, etc. But at the time of arguments no letter written by the Government in respect of admissions to Medical Colleges was pl!lced before _us. There is no definite allegation in either of the two affidavits filed by the appellants that no such order was issued by the Government in respect of Medical Colleges. But, in the petition filed by Chitralekha in pa•: 22 the following statement ~s found: "As the order empowering them to award 75 marks as interview marks has so far remained secret in that it has not been made available, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to send for the same, as the order falls to be quashed." This averment assumes that such an order was made. In the counter-affidavit filed by Dr. Dharmaraj, Dean, Medical College, and Chairman of the selection committee for admission to Medical Colleges, it is stated that -the Government by its letter directed that the said selection committee shall interview candidates and allot marks the maximum of which shall be 25 per cent of the maximum marks for the optional subjects and laid down the criteria for allotting 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 375 marks in the interview. In the paper-book as typed the description of the letter is omitted. But the learned Attorney-General stated thaf in the original the description is given and that is, PLM 531 MNC 63 dated 12th July, 1963. In the counter-affidavit filed by B. R. Verma, Deputy Secretary to .the Government of Mysore, Education Department, Bangalore, after referring to Annexure IV, it is stated that a similar letter was sent by the Government to the Selection Committee for admission to Medical Colleges. It does not appear from the judgment of the High Court that learned counsel for the appellants denied the existence of such a communication in respect of Medical Colleges, but nroceeded with his argument on the basis that a communication similar to Annexure IV issued in connection with admissions to Engineering Colleges existed in the case of Medical Colleges also. But before us the learned counsel for the appellants heavily relied upon the fact that the said order was not filed in the court and was not willing to accept the assurance given by the Attorney-General on instructions that such an order existed. In the circumstances we directed the Attorney-General to file the said order. A copy of th¢ letter written by the Government bas since been filed and it clearly shows that the relevant instructions were issued in respect of admission to Medical Colleges also. We, therefore, hold that the Government sent a letter similar in terms to annexure rv' to the selection committee for admission to Medical Colleges. The next contention advanced is that Annexure IV was invalid as it did not conform to the requirements of Art. 166 of the Constitution. As the argument turns upon the for::: of the said annexure it will be convenient to read the material part thereof. usir, Sub : Award of marks for ·the "interview" of the candidates seeking admission ~o Engineering Colleges and Technical Institutions. With reference to your letter No. AAS. 4.ADW I 63/2491, dated the 25th June, 1963, on the subject 196' R. Chitraltklut v. State of My1or Subba Rao J. 376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [r¢4] l964 mentioned above, I am directed to state that Government R. c1111roltkha have decided that 2S per cent of the maximum marks ...... v. SI.,, of M710N .fu6611 Rao I. Yours faithfully, Sd/- S. NARASAPPA, Under Secretary to Government, Education Department." Ex facie tJ:iis letter shows that it was a communication of the order issued by the Government under the signature of the Under Secretary to the Government, Education Department. Under Art. 166 of the Constitution all executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in th.e name of the· Governor, and that orders made in the name-Of the Governor shall be authenticated in such , manner as mlly be specified in rules to be made by the Governor and the validity of an order , which is so au~enticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. If the conditions laid down in this Article are complied with, the order cannot be called in question on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. It is contended that as the order in question was not issued in the name of the Governor the order was void and no interviews could be held pursuant to that order. The law on the subject is well-settled. In Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The State of Bombay (1) Das 1., as he then was, observed: "Strict compliance with the requirements of article 166 gives an immunity to the order in that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. If, therefore, the requirements of that article are not complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be claimed by the State. This. however, does not vitiate the order itself .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Article 166 directs al! executive action to be expressed and authenticated in the manner therein laid down but an (') [1952] S.C.R. 612, 625. ·, 1 r, S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 377 omission to comply with those provisions does not render the executive action a nullity. Therefore, all that the procedure established ·-by law requires is that the appropriate Government must take a decision as to whether the detention order should be confirmed or not under section 11 (I ) . " The same view was reiterated by this Court in The State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog Naik('), where it was pointed out that though the order in question then was defective in form it was open to the State Government to prove by other means that such an order had been validly made. This view has been reaffi:/med by this Court in subsequent decisions: see Ghaio ,.!all and Sons v. The State of Delhi( 2 ), ~nd it is, therefore, settled law that provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory in character and, if they are not complied with, it can be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor. The judgment of this Court in Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Pun;ab( 8 ) does not help the appellants, for in that case the order signed by the Revenue Minister was not communicated to the party and, therefore, it was held that there was no effective order. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, let us look at the facts of this case. Though Annexure IV does not conform to the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution, it ex facie says that an order to the effect mentioned therein was issued by the Government and it is not denied that it was communicated to the selection committee. In neither of the affidavits filed by the 39pellants there was any specific averment that no such order was issued by the_ Government. In the counter-affidavit filed by B. R. Varma, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Mysore, Education Department, there is a clear averment that the Government gave the direction contained in Annexure IV and a similar letter was (1) (1952) S. C.R. 674. (') f •9591 S. C. R. 1424. (') 1962) Supp, 3 S. C.R. 713. 1964 R. Chitraltkha v. State of Myio,. Subba Rao I. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1964 issued to the selection committee for admissions to Medical R. Chitralekha Colleges and this averment was not denied by the appelState 0/· Mysore !ants by filing any affidavit. In the circumstances when - there are no allegations at all in the affidavit that the order Suhba Rao J. was not made by the Government, we have no reason to reject the averment made by the Deputy Secretary to the Government that the order was issued by the Government. There are no merits in this contention. It is then contended that the Government has no power to appoint a selection commi~tee for admitting students to colleges on the basis of higher or different qualifications than those prescribed by the University and, therefore, the orders made by the Government in respect of admission were illegal. The first argument is that co-ordination and determination of standards of a university is a Union subject and, therefore, the State Legislature has no constitutional competency to make a law for maintaining the standards of university education. As the State Government's executive power extends to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws, the argument proceeds, the Government of the State cannot make - an order or issue directions for maintaining the standards of the University. The further argument is that prescribing higher marks for ~dmission to a College is for the purpose of maintaining the standards of University education and therefore the State Government is not empowered to do so. In support of_this contention reliance is placed upon the judgment of t~Court in Gujarat University v. Shri Krishna('). · There, one of the questions raised related to alleged conflict between entry 1 l. of List II and entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. By item No. 11 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State Legislature has power to legislate in respect of education including Universities subject to the provisions of items 1, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and 25 of List III. By item 66 power is entrusted to Parliament to legislate on co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific ind technical institutions. (1) [1963) Supp. I S. C.R. 112. 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 379 1964 Chitralekha v. The question was whether medium of instruction wa> comprehended by either of those entries or whether it fell R. under both. In that context it was observed at p. 715-716: State of Mysor~ "The State has the power to prescribe the \ yllabi ana courses of study in the institutions named m entry 66 (but not falling within entries 63 to 65) and as an incident thereof it has the power to indicate the medium in which instruction should be imparted. But the Union Parliament has an overriding legislative ipower to ensure that the syllabi and courses of study prescribed and the medium selected do not impair standards of education or render the co-ordination of such standards either on an All India or other basis impossible or even difficult." This and similar other passages indicate that if the law made by the State by virtue of entry l l of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution makes impossible or difficult the exercise of the legi:;iativ0 power of the Parliament under the entry "Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions" reserved to the Union, the State law may be bad. This cannot obviously be decided on speculative and hypothetical reasoning. If the impact of the State !aw providing for such standards on entrv 66 of List I is so heavy or deva1tating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge the central field, it may be struck down. But that is a question of fact to be ascertained in each case. It is not possible to hold that if a Staite legislature made a law prescribing a higher percentage of marks for extra-curricular activities in the matter of admission to colleges, 1t would be directly encroaching on the field covered by entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. If