# S.A.VENKATARAMAN v. THE STATE

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1040
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955-05-12
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, J. L. Kapur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-a-venkataraman-v-the-state-1392
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Criminal trial-Public servant accused of criminal misconduct-Dismissal from service before taking of cognizance by Court-Sanction to prosecute, if necessary-Interpretation-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947),
SS. 5(2), 6.
The appellant who was a public servant was dismissed
from service after departmental inquiry. Thereafter he was
charged with having committed the offence of criminal
misconduct under s. 5 (2), Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 and was convicted. No sanction under s. 6 of the Act
was produced before the trial Court. It was contended that
the Court could not take cognizance of the offence without
there being a proper sanction to prosecute :
·Held, that no sanction under s. 6 of the Act was necessary for the prosecution of the appellant as he was not a
public servant at the time of the taking of cognizance of
the offence.
In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential
for a Court, in the first instance, to give effect to the
natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words
are clear enough. It is only in the case of any ambiguity
that a Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the
legislature. Where a general power to take cognizance of
an offence is vested in a Court, any prohibition to the
exercise of that power, by any provision of law, must be
confined to the terms of the prohibition. The words in
s. 6 (I) of the Act are clear enough and must be given
effect to. The more important words in cl. (c) of s. 6 (I)
are "of the authority competent to remove him from his
office". A public servant who has ceased to be a public
servant is not a person removable from any office by co;.npetent authority. The conclusion is inevitable that at the
time a Court is asked to take cognizance not only must the
offence have been committed by a public servant but the
person accused must still be a public servant removable
from his office by a competent authority before the provisions of s. 6 can apply.

## Text

1957
December, 3.
1040
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.A.VENKATARAMAN
v.
THE STATE
(and connected appeal)
[1958]
(B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)
Criminal trial-Public servant accused of criminal misconduct-Dismissal from service before taking of cognizance by Court-Sanction to prosecute, if necessary-Interpretation-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947),
SS. 5(2), 6.
The appellant who was a public servant was dismissed
from service after departmental inquiry. Thereafter he was
charged with having committed the offence of criminal
misconduct under s. 5 (2), Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 and was convicted. No sanction under s. 6 of the Act
was produced before the trial Court. It was contended that
the Court could not take cognizance of the offence without
there being a proper sanction to prosecute :
·Held, that no sanction under s. 6 of the Act was necessary for the prosecution of the appellant as he was not a
public servant at the time of the taking of cognizance of
the offence.
In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential
for a Court, in the first instance, to give effect to the
natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words
are clear enough. It is only in the case of any ambiguity
that a Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the
legislature. Where a general power to take cognizance of
an offence is vested in a Court, any prohibition to the
exercise of that power, by any provision of law, must be
confined to the terms of the prohibition. The words in
s. 6 (I) of the Act are clear enough and must be given
effect to. The more important words in cl. (c) of s. 6 (I)
are "of the authority competent to remove him from his
office". A public servant who has ceased to be a public
servant is not a person removable from any office by co;.npetent authority. The conclusion is inevitable that at the
time a Court is asked to take cognizance not only must the
offence have been committed by a public servant but the
person accused must still be a public servant removable
from his office by a competent authority before the provisions of s. 6 can apply.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated May 12, 1955, of the Punjab High Court
in Criminal Appeal No. 52-D of 1954, arising out of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1041
the judgment and order dated December 6, 1954, of
the Court of the Special Judge at Delhi in Corruption
Case No. I of 1954.
N. C. Chatterjee and C. V. L. Narayan, for the appellant in Cr. A. No. 130 of 56.
Jai Gopal Sethi and Naunit Lal, for the appellant
in Cr. A. No. 25 of 56.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A.M.
Chatterjee, H. R. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent in both the appeals.
1957. December 3. The following Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
IMAM J.-A question of law, common to these appeals by special leave, requires determination; hence
they were heard together. Special leave in Criminal
Appeal No. 130 of 1956 was limited to the question
whether the trial court had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offence for want of sanction uncfer
s. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II of
1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Criminal
Appeal No. 25 of 1956 was not so limited and additional points were· raised for our consideration, to
which reference will be made when that appeal is
specifically dealt with.
The question of law, common in both these appeals,
is whether there was any necessity for a sanction
under s. 6 of the Act before a court could take cognizance of an offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal
Code or s. 5(2) of the Act or both, alleged to have
been committed by a person who at the time the
court was asked to take cognizance was not a public
servant but was so at the time of the commission of
the offence.
In Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956, the appellant
was convicted under s. 5(2) of the Act and sentenced
to six months' simple imprisonment by the Special
Judge, Delhi. He appealE:d against his conviction and
sentence to the Punjab High Court. That Court while
admitting the appeal iRsue<l notice upon the appellant
to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced. The High Court ultimately dismissed his appeal
1957
S. A. Venkataraman
v.
The State
Imam J.
1957
S. A.
Venkara~
roman
v.
The State
bnam J.
1042
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958 I
and enhanced the sentence of six months' imprisonment to two years' rigorous imprisonment. As in this
appeal special leave has been granted limited to the
question already stated, it is unnecessary to set out
the prosecution case against the appellant.
In Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1956 the appellant
had applied to the Allahabad High Court under s.
561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashing of the proceedings pending against him before the
Special Judge. The application was dismissed. It is
against the order dismissing his application that this
appeal has been filed by the appellant.
It is admitted that at the time the Special Judges
concerned purported to take cognizance the appellants
were not public servant.s and that no order of sanction
under s. 6 of the Act by a eompetent authority was
on the record. At th~ time that the appellants are
al'leged to have committed the offence they were
public servants.
Section 6 of the Act states :
"6. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution :
( 1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under section 161 or section 164 or section
165 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), or
under sub-section (2) of section 5 of this Act, alleged
to have been committed by a public servant, except
with the previous sanction,
(a) in the case of a person who is employed in
connection with the affairs of the Umon and is not
removable from his office save by or with the sanction
of the Central Government, of the Central Government,
(b) in the case of 'a person who is employed in
connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction
of the State Government, of the State Government.
( c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.
(2) Where for any re<.son whatsoever any doubt
arises whether the previous sanction as required under
sub-section (1) should be given by the Central or State
S;C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1043
Government or any other authority, such sanction
shall be given by that Government or authority which
would have been competent to remove the public
servant from his office at the time when the offence
was alleged to have been committed."
There is no dispute that if at the time when a court
purports to take cognizance of offences punishable
under s. 161, 164 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code
or s. 5(2) of the Act committed by a public servant
and that person is a public servant, cognizance cannot
be taken by a court unless a sanction by the competent
authority has been previously accorded. The real
controversy in these appeals is whether such a sanction is required before a court can take cognizance in
the case of a person who is not a public servant at the
time the court is asked to take cognizance, although
the offence alleged against him was committed by
him as a public servant. To determine this question
s. 6 of the Act requires to be interpreted.
In substance, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that on a proper interpretation of s. 6 of the
Act the status of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence alleged against him was the
essence of the matter and not his status at the time
the court was asked to take cognizance of the offence,
in which case a sanction under s. 6 of the Act was
necessary before a court could take cognizance although at that stage the accused had ceased to be a
public servant.
On the other hand, the Solicitor-General contended
that on a proper interpretation of the provisions of
s. 6 of the Act not only an offence mentioned therein
must be committed by a public servant but that that
person is still a public servant removable from his
office by a competent authority at the time a court
was asked to take cognizance of the offence.
Before we proceed to construe the provisions of s.
6 of the Act it is necessary to refer to some of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellants. It was said that in construing the provisions of
1957
S. A. Venkaturoman
v.
The State
Imam J.
1957
S. A. Venkataroman
v.
The State
l!nan1 J.
1044
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
a statute a court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the legislature and it must do thi_s not only
from the language of the statute, but also from the
consideration of the social conditions which gave rise
to it, and of the mischief which it was intended to
remedy. It must supplement the written word so as
to give force and life to the intention of the legislature.
Reliance was also placed upon certain decisions construing the provisions of s. 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Reference was also made to Art. 361 of
the Constitution and s. 197 A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in aid of the construction which the learned
Counsel contended for with reference to the words
used in s. 6 of the Act.
In construing the provisions of a statute it is
essential for a court, in the first instance, to give effect
to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if
those words are clear enough. It is only in the case of
any ambiguity that a court is entitle.9 to ascertain the
intention of the legislature by consttuing the provisions of the statute as a whole and taking into consideration other matters and the circumstances which
led to the enactment of the statute. Observations of
Denning L. J. as he then was, in the case of Seaford
Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (') were relied upon by
Mr. Chatterjee. It is, however, clear that the observations of the learned Judge were made with reference
to the provision of a statute which was ambiguous.
We cannot construe the observations to mean that
where the language of a statute was free from ambiguity a duty was cast upon the court to do anything
more than to give effect to the words used. Although
reference was made to Art. 361 of the Constitution
ands. 197A of the Code by Mr. Sethi, we are unable
to see how the words used therein assist us in construing the provisions of s. 6 of the Act.
Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Nagpur
High Court in the case of S. Y. Patil v. Vyankatswami
(2)and the decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind in the case of Suganchand v. Seth
(I) (1949) 2 K.B. 481, 498.
(2) I.L.R. (1939) Nag. 419.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1045
Naraindas (1) , in support of the submission that even
if a person had ceased to be a public servant before
the prosecution started, such a person was protected
by the provisions of s. 197 of the Code and a sanction
was necessary before a court could take cog:ra.izance.
It is true that so far as s. 197 of the Code is concerned
these two decisions do lend support to the submission
made by the learned Counsel for the appellants. It
is, however, to be noticed that the decision of the
Nagpur High Court, which was of a single Judge, was
overruled by a Division Bench of that Court in the
case of The State v. Hifzul Rahman (2), where it was
held that.the person accused must be a public servant
at the time of the accusation and s. 197 of the Code
afforded no protection to a public servant if he had
ceased to hold office. In the case of Prasad Chandra
Banerji v. Emperor (3), the Calcutta High Court lielti
that the protection given by s. 197 of the Code applied
only to a person who is ·still a public servant at the
time the prosecution is launched and does not !?Xtend
to a person who is no longer a public servant at that
time but was in office when the offence charged was
alleged to have been committed. Accordingly, no
sanction under s. 197 of the Code was necessary in
order to prosecute a person who had ceased to be a
public servant at the time of the launching of the pro- ·
secution. A similar view was taken by the Bombay
High Court in the case of Imperator v. Joshi {4), and
by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the
case of Emperor v. Suraj Narain Chaube ( s). It would
thus appear that the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad and Nagpur are agreed that s. 197 of
the Code affords no protection to a person who is not
a public servant at the time he is ac~used of an offence
before a court although at the time he committed the
the offence he was a public servant. The decision of
the Punjab High Court in the case of The State v.
Gurcharan Singh (6 ) , was brought to our notice
(I) A.I.R. (1932) Sind. 177.
(3) I.L.R. (1944) 1 Cal. 113.
(S) I.L.R. (1938) Ali. 776.
(2) I.L.R. (1951) Nag. 764.
(4) I.L.R. (1947) Bom. 706.
(6) A.I.R. (1952) Pun. 89.
1957
S. A. Yenkat•
raman
v.
The State
Imam I.
1957
S. A. Venkataran1an
"1>
The State
ln1an1 J,
1046
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958J
wherein it was held that in view of the form of wording in the two sections, namely s. 197 of the Code and
s. 6 of the Act, the same principles would apply to
them, having regard to the decisions of the Calcutta
and Bombay High Courts and the protection afforded
by s. 197 of the Code was available to a person who was
a public servant while still in office but was not available to him when he had already been discharged
from service before he was prosecuted. These cases
may render assistance in understanding the reason
-why a public servant, while he is a public servant,
cannot be prosecuted without a previous sanction for
offences committed by him as a public servant and
thus may be of some indirect help in construing the
words used in s. 6 of the Act. Section 6, however,
must be construed with reference to the words used
therein independent of any construction which may
have been placed by these decisions on the words
used in s. 197 of the Code. '
.
Before ari attempt is ~adi! to construe the words
contained in s. 6 of the ·Act some reference may be
made to the power vested in a court to take cognizance of an.offence. Section 190 of tire Code of Criminal Procedure confers a general power on a criminal court to take cognizance of offences, but the exercise of such power in certain cases is prohibited by
the provisions of ss. 195 to 199 of the Code unless the
conditions mentioned therein are complied with.
Under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952
(XLVI of 1952), Special Judges are appointed to try
offences under s. 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 or s. 165A
of the Indian Penal Code ors. 5(2) of the Act. They
are authorized to take cognizance of these offences
without the accused person being committed to them
for trial. The exercise of this general power to take
cognizance by them is prohibited with respect to offences committed under s. 161, 164 or s. 165 of Indian
Penal Code or under s .. 5(2) of the Act by a public
servant without the previous sanction of a competent
authority. In our .opinion, if a general power to take
cognizance of an offence is vested in a court, any pro-
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1047
hibition to the exercise '°f that power, by any provi-
~ion of law, must be cop.finE!d to the terms· of the pr~
hibition. In enacting a ·law prohibiting the taking of
cognizance of an offence by a court, unless certain conditions were complied with, the legislature did not
purport to condone the offence. It was primarily concerned to see that ·prosecution for offences in cases
covered by the prohibition shall not comtnence without complying with the conditions contained therein,
such as a previous sanction of a competent authority
in the case of a public servant, and in other cases with
the consent of the authority or the party interested
in the grosecution or
0aggrieved by the offence. There
can be little doubt that in the case of a public servant
the Central Government or the State Government or
the authority competent to remove him from service
is vitally interested in the matter of his prosecution.
Such authority is directly concern~d in the matter as
it has to decide whether to accord or not to accord its
sanction for the prosecution of one of its servants.
The authority concerned may refuse to accord such
sanction on the ground that the prosecution is frivolous or vexatious or on the ground that in the public
interest it would be inexpedient to do so. Without
some safeguard of this kind a public servant may find
it impossible to carry on his official duties efficiently.
The object of the Act was to suppress bribery and
corruption. Its provisions are severe. Certain presumptiqns of guilt of off~ces ~ommitted under ss. 161
and 165A of the Indian.~enal Code were enjoined by
s. 4 of the A.ct uriless tile contrary was proved by the
accused. Section 5 of the .Act created the offence of
criminal miscopd~ct on the part of a public servant,
an offence unknown to any 9f the provisions of the
Indian Penal Code dealing.with bribery or corruption.
Sub-section (2) inade such an offence punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to a term of 7 years,
or with fine, or with both. Under sub-s. (3) a court
shall presume that the accused was guilty of misconduct if it was proved that he or any other person on
his behalf was in possession, for which the accused
1957
S. A. Venkataraman
v.
The State
Imam J.
1957
S. A. Vcnkataraman
v.
The State
/rnant J.
1048
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958!
person could not satisfactorily account, of pecuniary
resources or property disproportionate to his known
sources of income. These provisions of the Act indicate that ·it was the intention of the legislature to
treat more severely than hitherto corruption on the
part of a public servant and not to condone it in any
manner whatsoever. If s. 6 had not found a place in
the Act it is clear that cognizance of an offence under
s. 161, 164 ors. 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under
s. 5(2) of the Act committed by a public servant could
be taken by a court even if he had ceased to be a public
servant. The mere fact that he had ceased to be a
public servant after the commission of the offence
would not absolve him from his crime.
Section 6
certainly does prohibit the taking of cognizance of his
offence, without a previous sanction, while he is still a
public servant but does that prohibition continue after
he has ceased to be a public servant? It is to determine that question which requires us to examine and
construe the provisions of s. 6 of the Act and to express our opinion thereon.
When the provisions of s. 6 of the Act are examined
it is manifest that two conditions must be fulfilled
before its provisions become applicable. One is that
the offences mentioned therein must be committed by
a public servant and the other is that that person is
employed in connection with the affairs of the Union
or a State and is not removable from his office save by
or with the sanction of the Central Government or the
State Government or is a public servant who is removable from his office by any other competent authority. Both these conditions must be present to prevent a court from taking cognizance of an offence mentioned in the section without the previous sanction of
the Central Government or the State Government or
the authority comp~tent to remove the public servant
from his office. If either of these conditions is lacking,
the essential requirements of the section are wanting
and the provisions of the section do not stand in the
way of a court taking cognizance without a previous
sanction. An offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1049
Code can be committed by a public servant or by a
person expecting to be a public servant, but s. 6 of the
Act refers only to an offence committed by a public
servant under that section. If, therefore, at the time
a court was asked to take cognizance of an offence
under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code, the accused is
a public servant but was not so at the time that the
offence was committed, but at which time he was
merely expecting to be a public servant, a previous
sanction would be unnecessary before a court could
take cognizance, as the provisions of the section would
be inapplicable. Conversely, if an offence under s. 161
of the Indian Penal Code was committed by a public
servant, but, at the time a court was asked to take
cognizance of the offence, that person had ceased to be
a public servant one of the two requirements to make
s. 6 of the AGt applicable would be lacking and a previous sanction would be unnecessary. The words in
s. 6(1) of the Act are clear enough and they must be
given effect to. There is nothing in the words used in
s.6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction
was necessary before a court could take cognizance of
the offences mentioned therein in the case of a person
who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the
court was asked 'to take cognizance, although he had
been such a person at the time the offence was committed. It was suggested that cl. (c) ins. 6(1) refers to
persons other than those mentioned in els. (a) and (b).
The words "is employed" are absent in this claμse
which would, therefore, apply to a person who had
ceased to be a public servant though he was so at the
time of the commission of the offence. Clause ( c) cannot be construed in this way. The expressions "in
the case of a person" and "in the case of any other
person" must refer to a public servant having regard
to the first paragraph of the sub-section. Clauses (a)
and (b), therefore, would cover the case of a public
servant who is emplt>yed in connection with the affairs
oi the Union or a State and is not removable from his
office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government and cl. ( c) would
1957
S. A. Venkataroman
v.
The State
Imam J.
1957
S. A. Venkataraman
v.
The State
Imam J.
1050
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
cover the case of any other public servant whom a
competent authority could remove from his office.
The more important words in cl. (c) are "of the authority competent to remove him from his office';. A public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is
not a person removable from any office by a competent authority. Section 2 of the Act states that a public servant, for the purpose of the Act, means a public servant as defined in s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code.
Under cl.(c), therefore, any one who is a public servant at the time a court was asked to take cognizance,
but does not come within the description of a public
servant under els. (a) and (b), is accused of an off-·
ence cemmitted by him as a public servant as specified in s. 6 would be entitled to rely on the provisions
of that section and object to the taking of cognizance
without a pervious sanction. To read cl. (c) in-the
way suggested on behalf of the appellants, would be to
give a meaning to this clause which is not justified by
the words employed therein. It was further suggested that the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 6 indicate that
it was the status of the accused at the time of -the
commission of the offence which was relevant rather
than his status at the time a court was asked to take
cognizance.
This sub-section was inserted into the
Act by the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, and it purported to finally settle any
doubts which may arise as to which authority should
grant the sanction in the case of a public servant who
had committed an offence mentioned in s. 6(1) and
who at the time the court was asked to take cognizance is still a public servant. For example, it is not
difficult to imagine cases where a public servant employed by a State Government is subsequently employed by the Central Government and a question
arises as to which of the two Governments is to grant
the sanction for his prosecuiton. Th1s sub-section resolves the difficulty by directing that where a doubt
arises, the authority which was to grant the sanction
was the one which was competent to remove him from
his office at the time of the commission of the offence.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1051
cognizance of the off(!nce under s. 161 of the Indian Penal
Code and
under
s.
5(2) of the Act without
a previous sanction. The withdra.wal of the case at that 'stage
meant no more than this that the appellant was discharged.
A withdrawal of a case resulting merely in a discharge does
not prevent the prosecution being recommenced on a fresh
complaint. On February 11, 1954, when the fresh complaint
was filed the appellant was not a public servant and therefore the court could take cognizance without a previous
sanction.
It is unnecessary for us to say whether once a sanction
is positively refused a fresh sanction cannot be granted,
because we are satisfied, on the materials before US, that,
in fact, there was no positive refusal to sanction the prosecution of the appellant.
We are satisfied that the circumstances do not establish
that there had been any abuse of -the process of the court
and the provisions of s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply.
As the points urged in these appeals have failed, the
apppellant must, accordingly, be dismissed. ,
Appeals dismissed.
LJP(D)3SCI-2(a)
1957
S. A. Venl:alaraman
v.
TIM State
lmamJ.