# S. AMARJIT SINGH KALRA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS v. SMT. PRAMOD GUPTA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2002] Supp. 5 S.C.R. 350
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2002
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 10271028 of 1992
- **Bench:** G.B. Pattanaik, M.B. Shah, Doraiswamy Raju, S.N. Variava, D.M. Dharmadhikari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-amarjit-singh-kalra-dead-by-lrs-and-ors-v-smt-pramod-gupta-dead-by-lrs-and-ors-18854
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder 22-Death of some of the several
C claimants in a joint appeal against a decree-Dismissal of the appeal in toto
even in respect of surviving appellants on the ground of abatement-Held,
whenever p{aintiffs/appellantslpetitioners found to have distinct, separate and
independent rights of their own and for purpose of convenience or otherwise
joined together in a single litigation, decree passed thereon would not be
inseparable, but in substance is a mere combination of several decrees-In
D order to determine as to whether a decree is joint and inseverable or it is joint
and severable for the purpose of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal
as not properly constituted or rendered incompetent for further proceeding, it
is to be seen whether the decree vis-a-vis the remaining parties would suffer
the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees-A decree can be said to be
E contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees
are incapable of enforcement or are mutually self destructive or the enforcement
of one would negate the enforcement of another-land Acquisition Act, 1894Sections 4,6,11,18,30 and 31.
F
law of Procedure:
Purpose of-Field, such laws are meant to regulate effectively, assist
and aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose
an adjudication even on merits of substantial rights-Provisions contained in
Order 22 C.P.C not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle, but as a
G flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice-Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908-0rder 22.
In land acquisition proceedings, there arose disputes regarding the
claims for compensation among the claimants i.e. proprietors, respondent
No. 27-Bhumidhar, Gaon Sabha and Union of India. Though claims made
H by claimants were for their respective shares, Land Acquisition Collector,·
350
S. AMARJIT SINGH KALRA v. PRAMOD GUPTA
351
granted lump sum compensation, and made reference under Sections 30 A
and 31(2) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the Court of District Judge
for apportionment of the compensation in view of the disputed nature of
competing claims.
District Judge awarded the compensation to the bhumidhar and
transferors from her to the exclusion of the proprietors, Gaon Sabha and B
Union of India. Against the award, 63 proprietors jointly filed one appeal
and IO proprietors filed another appeal before High Court. However 37
of the claimants did not file any appeal and they were also not made party
in the appeals of other claimants. During pendency of the appeals, five of
the 63 appellants died. High Court dismissed the appeal filed by 63 C
claimants including 58 surviving claimants, in toto as having abated and
the appeal filed by IO claimants were dismissed holding that they were
not properly constituted and incompetent for the reason that connected
appeals having abated, other appeals involving questions of fact and law
could not be proceeded with, resulting in conflicting, inconsistent and
contradictory decrees. Applications filed by legal representatives of the D
deceased for bringing them on record were also dismissed as barred by
limitation.
In appeal to this Court, appellants contended that dismissal of all
the appeals in toto, merely because 5 of the appellants died, was not
justified because even in absence of those legal representatives the claims E
of other 58 appellants survived since each one of them was seeking relief
on the basis of his own independent cause of action.
Respondents contended that dismissal of all the appeals in toto was
justified since the disputes centered around one lump sum compensation F
in respect of undivided and common land and since the litigation was on
the same nature of title, the decree passed would be joint and indivisible.
Allowing the appeals and remitting the case to High Court for
disposal, this Court
HELD: 1.1. Wherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are
found to have distinct, s

## Text

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A
S. AMARJIT SINGH KALRA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.
B
V.
SMT. PRAMOD GUPTA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.
DECEMBER I 7, 2002
[G.B. PATTANAIK, CJ., M.B. SHAH, DORAISWAMY RAJU,
S.N. VARIAVA AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder 22-Death of some of the several
C claimants in a joint appeal against a decree-Dismissal of the appeal in toto
even in respect of surviving appellants on the ground of abatement-Held,
whenever p{aintiffs/appellantslpetitioners found to have distinct, separate and
independent rights of their own and for purpose of convenience or otherwise
joined together in a single litigation, decree passed thereon would not be
inseparable, but in substance is a mere combination of several decrees-In
D order to determine as to whether a decree is joint and inseverable or it is joint
and severable for the purpose of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal
as not properly constituted or rendered incompetent for further proceeding, it
is to be seen whether the decree vis-a-vis the remaining parties would suffer
the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees-A decree can be said to be
E contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees
are incapable of enforcement or are mutually self destructive or the enforcement
of one would negate the enforcement of another-land Acquisition Act, 1894Sections 4,6,11,18,30 and 31.
F
law of Procedure:
Purpose of-Field, such laws are meant to regulate effectively, assist
and aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose
an adjudication even on merits of substantial rights-Provisions contained in
Order 22 C.P.C not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle, but as a
G flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice-Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908-0rder 22.
In land acquisition proceedings, there arose disputes regarding the
claims for compensation among the claimants i.e. proprietors, respondent
No. 27-Bhumidhar, Gaon Sabha and Union of India. Though claims made
H by claimants were for their respective shares, Land Acquisition Collector,·
350
S. AMARJIT SINGH KALRA v. PRAMOD GUPTA
351
granted lump sum compensation, and made reference under Sections 30 A
and 31(2) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the Court of District Judge
for apportionment of the compensation in view of the disputed nature of
competing claims.
District Judge awarded the compensation to the bhumidhar and
transferors from her to the exclusion of the proprietors, Gaon Sabha and B
Union of India. Against the award, 63 proprietors jointly filed one appeal
and IO proprietors filed another appeal before High Court. However 37
of the claimants did not file any appeal and they were also not made party
in the appeals of other claimants. During pendency of the appeals, five of
the 63 appellants died. High Court dismissed the appeal filed by 63 C
claimants including 58 surviving claimants, in toto as having abated and
the appeal filed by IO claimants were dismissed holding that they were
not properly constituted and incompetent for the reason that connected
appeals having abated, other appeals involving questions of fact and law
could not be proceeded with, resulting in conflicting, inconsistent and
contradictory decrees. Applications filed by legal representatives of the D
deceased for bringing them on record were also dismissed as barred by
limitation.
In appeal to this Court, appellants contended that dismissal of all
the appeals in toto, merely because 5 of the appellants died, was not
justified because even in absence of those legal representatives the claims E
of other 58 appellants survived since each one of them was seeking relief
on the basis of his own independent cause of action.
Respondents contended that dismissal of all the appeals in toto was
justified since the disputes centered around one lump sum compensation F
in respect of undivided and common land and since the litigation was on
the same nature of title, the decree passed would be joint and indivisible.
Allowing the appeals and remitting the case to High Court for
disposal, this Court
HELD: 1.1. Wherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are
found to have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own and
for purpose of convenience or otherwise, joined together in a single
litigation to vindicate their rights, the decree passed by the Court thereon
is to be viewed in substance as the combination of several decrees in favour
G
of one or the other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree. The H
352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having
similar rights contesting the claims against them. (384-F-GI
1.2. Whenever different and distinct claims of more than one are
sought to be vindicated in one single proceeding, under the Land
Acquisition Act or in similar nature of proceedings and/or claims in
B assertion of individual rights of parties are clubbed, consolidated and dealt
with together by the Courts concerned and a single judgment or decree
has been passed, it should be treated as a mere combination of several
decrees in favour of or against one or more of the parties and not as joint
and inseparable decrees. (384-G-H; 385-A, BJ
c
D
1.3. The mere fact that the claims or rights asserted or sought to be
vindicated by more than one are similar or identical in nature or by joining
together of more than one of such claimants of a particular nature, by
itself would not be sufficient in law to treat them as joint claims, so as to
render the judgment or decree passed thereon a joint and inseverable onP.
(385-8-C(
1.4. The Award/decrees, which were the subject-matter of challenge
before the High Court, in these cases, were not joint and inseparable decree
but in substance a mere combination of several decrees depending upon
the number of claimants before the Court and, therefore, joint and several
E or separable vis-a-vis the individuals or their claims concerned.
Consequently, even the abatement of the appeal in the High Court in
respect of one or other of the appellants cannot by itself result in the
abatement of the appeal in its entirety or render it liable to be dismissed
as not duly or properly constituted or not possible to be proceeded with.
p
(385-F-GI
2.1. The question as to whether in a given case the decree is joint
and inseverable or joint and severable or separable has to be decided, for
the purpose of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal as not being
properly and duly constituted or rendered incompetent for being further
G proceeded with, requires to be determined only with reference to the fact
as to whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-a-vis the
remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent
decrees. For that reason, a decree can be said to be contradictory or
inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees are incapable
of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and that the
H enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement
S. AMARJIT SINGH KALRA v. PRAM OD GUPTA
353
of the other.
A
2.2. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances that each
of the claimants-appellants have their own distinct, separate and
independent rights, the appeals even dehors the claims of the deceased and
others who have not chosen to approach the High Court or this Court,
were neither rendered incapable of consideration nor impossible of B
according any relief or could be held difficult to enforce the decree that
may be passed, in favour of the remaining appellants without suffering
the vice of incflnsistency. Even if it is likely to result in two different sets
of judgments of va·rying content, purport or reason, as long as the
enforcement of the decrees passed therein are not rendered impossible due C
to mutual contradiction in terms of self-destructive nature, there is no
justification whatsoever to assume them to be inconsistent or contradictory
decrees, at all. The mere fact that in a set of similar or identical nature of
cases two different nature or type of decrees was necessitated is no reason
to treat them to be inconsistent or contradictory decrees, so long as both
can be executed and enforced without either of them being destructive of D
the other. 1383-E-Hl
2.3. Even assuming that the decree appealed against or challenged·
before the Higher forum is joint and several but deal with the rights of
more than one recognized in law to belong to each one of them on their
own and unrelated to. the others, and the proceedings abate in respect of E
one or more of either of the parties, the Courts are not disabled in any
manner to proceed with the proceedings so far as the remaining parties
and part of the appeal is concerned .. As and when it is found necessary to
interfere with the judgment and decree challenged before it, the Court
can always declare the legal position in general and restrict the ultimate F
relief to be granted, by confining it to those before the Court only rather
than denying the relief to one and all on account of a procedural lapse or
action or inaction of one of the parties before it. The only exception to
this course of action should be where the relief granted and the decree
ultimately passed would become totally unenforceable and mutually selfdestructive and unworkable vis-a-vis the other part, which had become G
final. As far as possible Courts must always aim to preserve and protect
the rights of parties and extend help to enforce them rather than deny
relief and thereby render the rights themselves otiose, 'ubi )us ibi remedium'
(where there is a right, there is a remedy) being a basic principle of
jurisprudence. Such a course would be more conducive and better conform H
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A to a fair, reasonable and proper administration of justice. (384-B-El
3.1. Laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist 2nd
aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose
even an adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under
personal, property and other laws. Procedure has always been viewed as
B the handmaid of justice and not meant to hamper the cause of justice or
sanctify miscarriage of justice. The provisions contained in Order 22 CPC
are not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle but must ever be
viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice.
(376-F-Hj
C
3.2. The rejection by the High Court of the applications to set aside
abatement, condonation and bringing on record the legal representatives
does n,ot appear, on the peculiar nature of the case, to be a just or
reasonable exercise of the Court's power or in conformity with the avowed
object of Court to do real, effective and substantial justice. Viewed in the
D light of the fact that each one of the appellants had an independent und
distinct right of his own not inter-dependent upon the one or the other of
the appellants, the dismissal of the appeals by the High Court in their
entirety does not constitute a sound, reasonable or just and proper exercise
of its powers. Even if it has to be viewed that they had a common interest,
then the.interests of justice would require the remaining other appellants
E being allowed to pursue the appeals for the benefit of those others, who
are not before the Court also and not stultify the proceedings as a whole
and non-suit the others, as well. (377-C-EI
4. The fact that about 37 out of the total number of interested
persons, like the appellants, were not parties before the High Court or
F this Court, docs not, in any manner, affect or deprive the appellants to
have their claims, duly and properly considered and adjudicated in
accordance with law, on merits. 1376-EI
Ram Sarup v. Munshi and Ors., ( 1964 ( 3 SCR 858; The State of Punjab,
v. Nathu Ram, (19621 2 SCR 636 and Jhanda Singh v. Gurmukh Singh and
G Ors., distinguished.
Harihar Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Ba/miki Prasad Singh and Ors.,
(19751 2 SCR 932 and Indian Oxygen ltd. v. Ram Adhar Singh and Ors.,
(C.A. No. 1444/1966) decided by Supreme Court on 24.9.1966, relied on.
H
Harihar Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Balmiki Prasad Sin1;!i and Ors.,
S.AMARJITSINGHKALRA v. PRAMODGUPTA[RA.IU, J.]
355
119751 2 SCR 932; Saquia Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate A
Tribunal, MP. Gwalior and Ors., 119871 I SCC 5; Renen Roy v. Prakash
Mitra, 119881 9 SCC 689; Kanakrathnamma/ v. VS. Loganatha Mudaliar
and Anr., 1196416 SCR 1; Jahar Roy (dead though lrs.) and Anr. v. Premji
Bhimji Mansata and Anr., 119781 I SCR 770 and Krishan Singh and Ors.
v. Nidhan Singh and Ors., ( C.A. No.563 of 1962) decided by Supreme B
Court on 14.12.64, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal Nos. 10271028 of 1992.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.2.1991 of the Delhi High C
Court in R.F.A. No. 309 and 310/80 and 356-357/80.
Dr. K.S. Siddhu, K. Parasaran, K. Rama Moorthy, R.T. Andyarujina,
LR. Gupta, Ms. Maldeep Siddhu, Brij Bhushan, V.B. Saharya, P.P. Juneja,
Devender Verma, Ms. Minakshi Vij, Ashok Mathur, Manish Vashisht,
Ms. Shobha Nagarajan, A.K. Srivastava, Ms. Pragati Nikhra, Arun Srivastava, D
R.S. Suri, A.C. Mishra and M. Sardana for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D. RAJU, J. Special leave granted in S.L.P. [C) Nos.11914-11915 of
1991.
On 14.8.2002, this Court allowed the applications filed in
C.A.Nos. l 029-1030 of 1992 and Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C)
Nos.11914-11915 of 1991 for substitution and condonation of delay in filing
E
the applications for substitution in respect of some of the respondents, who
died during the pendency of these appeals. In the light of the above, all other F
applications filed for substitution and condonation of delay of one or the
other parties in the above matters by the respective counsel for the appellants
are also allowed. After the hearing was completed and orders have been
reserved, it appears that the heirs of one Late Sultan Singh alias lshwar Singh
claiming to be interested in the compensation but admittedly was not a party
(the late Sultan Singh himself) either before the Reference Cou1t or the High G
Court, have filed applications to be impleaded as necessary parties. Since, the
predecessor-in-interest of the applicants was himself not a party at any stage
of the proceedings before the Courts below, we see no justification to entertain
their claim for coming on record at this stage of the proceedings. These
unnumbered applications filed by Col. Mohinder Singh Malik and three others H
356
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A are, therefore, rejected. Having regard to the orders passed already, and the
fact that the necessary legal representatives of all parties, who died during the
pendency of the matters in this Court, have come on record, the benefit of
the same will enure to the appellants in C.A.Nos. l 027-1028 of 1992. The fact
that the applications filed therein, earlier were not pressed and disposed of as
B such, will not come in the way of those appeals also being heard on merits
and disposed of in accordance with law, along with the other appeals.
An extent of about 5500 bighas of land described as 'gair mumkin
Pahar' (uncultivable mountainous area) situated at Masudpur Village within
the Union Territory of Delhi was acquired by the Government for planned
C development of Delhi. Notifications were issued (I) on 24.10.1961 for
acquisition of 720 bighas and 4 biswas out of 4307 bighas and 18 biswas
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
the 'Act'). It may be stated at this stage itself that an e>.1ent of 390 bighas
of land notified on 24. l 0.1961 ana acquired by passing the award in Award
No.1944 does not form the subject matter of these proceedings. Declarations
D under Section 6 of the Act were issued on 6.8.1966. In the courst; of the
Award enquiry claims were filed before the Land Acquisition Collector by
three categories of claimants as hereunder: -
(i) Claims by the Union of India and Gaon Sabha that the lands
E
acquired stood vested with the Gaon Sabha they being 'waste
land' under Section 7 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. This
claim proceeded on the basis that not only it was 'waste land'
but also the Bhumidari Certificate issued in favour of Smt. Guiab
Sundari was invalid and nones! in law.
(ii) The other class of claims were from the Proprietors/Co-owners,
F
on the basis that the acquired land was not 'land' as defined
under Section 3( 13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, since they
were being used for non-agricultural purposes and therefore, they
neither could be said to be 'waste land' nor could be held to
have vested in the Gaon Sabha, for either of them to claim any
G
title to the lands in question and, therefore, they continued to be
proprietors of the soil and as such entitled to the compensation
for themselves; and
(iii) Yet another claim was from Smt. Guiab Sundari and her
transferees of portions of the rights over the land on the ground
H
that she was the Bhumidar of the land measuring about 4307
•
S. AMARJIT SINGH KALRA v. PRAMOD GUPTA [RAJU, J.]
357
bighas and 18 biswas and those lands were part Qf her Bhumidari A
holding out which she also claimed to have transferred rights in
an extent of 3500 bighas of undivided holding in favour of the
other private respondents/claimants.
By another Notification dated 23 .1.1965 under Section 4 of the Act, an
extent of 3224 bighas and 24 biswas out of the total extent of 4307 bighas B
and 18 biswas was notified for acquisition, followed by the issue of a
Declaration under Section 6. Jn respect of these acquired lands also, the
above three categories of claims came to be made. It may also be stated that
the individual claims made by persons other than the Union of India and
Gaon Sabha were in respect of specified shares, though over the total extent C
involved.
Award No.2040 dated 1.12.1967 came to be passed in respect of lands
covered by the Notification dated 24.10.1961 measuring about 720 bighas
and 4 biswas. Since competing claims, though in respect of only their respective
shares were made by them to the exclusion of others as far as their shares are D
concerned, the Land Acquisition Collector while awarding a compensation of
Rs.5,79,932.10, made a reference under Sections 30 and 31(2) of the Act for
apportionment of the same to the Court of District Judge. Likewise, in respect
of lands acquired under Notification dated 23.1.1965 measuring about 3224
bighas and 2 biswas, Award No.2225 dated 26.3.1969 came to be passed for
a sum of Rs.22,27,867.69 and a similar reference under Sections 30 and E
31(2) also came to !Je made, having regard to the disputed nature of competing
clai1"tJs. Smt. Guiab Sundari, claiming exclusive Bhumidar rights in respect of
the entire area, moved applications under Order I Rule 10, CPC, for getting
impleaded to the proceedings on the plea that she had not sold any part of
her rights to any one, that she had been defrauded to sign those documents, F
which are not valid or binding on her and she alone was entitled to the entire
compensation as Bhumidar to the exclusion of all including those who sought
to assert claims as Vendees from her. The Gaon Sabha of the Village also
filed applications claiming the entire compensation on the ground that the
land as per the entries in the Jamabandi vested in the Gaon Sabha as per the
provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act. All such claims, made by different G
class and category of claimants, came to be combined and consolidated and
taken up for consideration. The learned Additional District Judge (Shri P.L.
Sinlga), who tried the references together, on a consideration of the materials
placed on record, held as follows: -
(a) The lands in question were 'land' within the meaning of Section H
A
B
c
D
E
F
358
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
3(13) of the Land Reforms Act;
(b) The Bhumidari Certificate/Declaration granted in favour of Smt.
Guiab Sundari was valid, legal and within jurisdiction and the .
transfers made by her in favour of some of the other respondents
are also valid;
(c) The Owners/Proprietors were legally barred from challenging or
disputing the Bhumidari Certificate issued in favour ofSmt. Guiab
Sundari;
(d) Since the Proprietors were not 'Khudkhast' of the land in question,
their proprietary/ownership rights stood abolished under the Land,
Reforms Act;
(e) That the Bhumidari Certificate issued in favour of Smt. Guiab
Sundari stood immune from challenge in view of Section 4 o(
the Delhi Land Rt:lorms (Amendment) Act I of 1996, which Act
having also been placed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution
of India;
(f) The rights and claims made by the Proprietors were also barred
by limitation;
(g) The lands were not 'waste land' and, therefore, did not vest in
them as claimed by the Union of India and the Gaon Sabha and,
therefore, they have no rights or interest in the lands in question;
and
(h) The claims of Union of India and Gaon Sabha are also barred by
res judicata. Consequently, the compensation was awarded to the
Bhumidar and the transferees from Bhumidar, to the exclusion
of the Proprietors, Gaon Sabha and the Union of India.
Thereupon, about 63 Proprietors joined together and filed RF A No. 309
of 1980 (arising out of the reference made in respect of Award No.2040) and
RFA No.310of1980 (arising out of reference in respect of Award No.2225)
G before_the Delhi High Court. Another set of 10 Proprietors seem to have filed
RFA No.356 of 1980 (in respect of claims arising out of Award No.2040)
and RFA No.357of1980 (in respect of claims arising out of Award No.2225)
before the Delhi High Court. The Gaon Sabha and Union of India seem to
have filed RFA No.340 of 1980 and RF A No.341 of 1980, likewise. It is
stated that about 37 Proprietors, who filed claims before the Reference Court,
H did not pursue their claims by filing any appeals before the High Court and
>
S. AMARJIT SINGH KALRA v. PRAMOD GUPTA [RAJU, J.)
359
these persons were not parties to the proceedings before the High Court in A
any other capacity also.
It appears that during the pendency of these appeals, about 5 appellants
in RFA No.309 of 1980 and RFA No.310 of 1980 died on different dates and
there was no attempt to take any steps within time for bringing on.record the
legal representatives of those five deceased appellants either at the instance B
of the remaining appellants or the legal heirs of the deceased appellants. On
8.12.1986, the respondents herein seem to have filed applications in RFA
Nos.309 of 1980 and 310 of 1980 seeking for the dismissal of those appeals,
as having been abated due to failure in bringing on record the legal
representatives of the five deceased appellants and also further seeking for C
the dismissal of RFA Nos.356 of 1980 and 357 of 1980 on the ground that
they are not properly constituted and incompetent for the reason that the
connected appeals RFA Nos.309 and 310 of 1980 having abated, the other
appeals involving common questions of fact .and law cannot be proceeded
with, resulting into any conflicting, inconsistent or contradictory decrees. At
that stage, on or about 2.3.1987 applications seem to have been filed by the D
heirs of the deceased parties themselves for bringing them on record as the
legal representatives of the deceased appellants.
The three sets of appeals, numbering about six in all, were taken up for
final hearing, as also those applications along with the appeals. The applications
for condonation of the delay in seeking to set aside the abatement were
rejected, and it is claimed that even the counsel for the appellants conceded
that there was no sufficient cause for the same. The plea on behalf of the
appellants before the High Court that th~ appeals merely partially abated qua
E
the deceased appellants only and not in toto did not meet acceptance with the
Court. On the view that in such circumstances the appeals were incon~pet~nt p
and not validly constituted the entirety of the appeals RFA Nos.309 and 310
of 1980 were held to abate in toto and rejected the same. Since common and
same questions were raised in the other appeals, RFA Nos.356 and 357 of
1980 were also dismissed, likewise. The appeals filed by the Gaon Sabha and
Union of India were dismissed on the ground that they were barred by res
judicata. Hence, the above appeals.
G
One of the respondents by name Bhim Singh had died on 8.10.1988,
even when the appeals were pending before the High Court. One Ahsan
Ullah another respondent/co-bhumidar was also said to have died even during
the pendency of the Reference proceedings. Smt. Guiab Sundari, one of the H
360
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A respondents, died on 12.5.1995; another resrr>ndent-K.K. Kochar died on
12.10.1992 and one Mohanlal also died duri11 15 the pendency of these
proceedings. As noticed supra, applications for bringing on their legal
representatives and connected applications were already allowed.
A brief reference to the history of the lands and the role of the parties
B concerned with them would be necessary to highlight the nature of the claims
and the need for an effective and objective consideration and determination
of the same on merits, in accordance with law. The lands in question, in
which the various Proprietors in the village held distinct, separate and
independent shares, were leased out on 15.11.1939 by the Proprietors under
C a Registered Lease Deed in favour of Delhi Pottery Works for a period of
twenty years for exploiting minerals. The lands were said to be otherwise not
fit or capable of any cultivation. The said lessees seem to have sublet the
same on 23.5.1942 in favour of a partnership firm of Kota in Rajasthan,
known as "Dewan Bahadur Seth Kesari Singh Budh Singh'', for the remaining
period of seventeen years from 18.4.1942 to 17.4.1959. On 10.5.1951, one
D Smt. Guiab Sundari claimed to have been inducted as the third partner in the
sub-lessee firm and thereafter on 17.10.1951, an alleged dissolution of the
partnership was said to have taken place as evidenced by a supplementary
deed of dissolution said to have been executed on 27.8.1953 (unregistered)
allotting the rights of the partnership finn under the Mining sub-lease dated
E 23.5.1942, to Smt. Guiab Sundari. Claiming to have secured a Bhumidari
Certificate under the Land Reforms Act, she seems to have filed a Civil Suit
No.174 of 1959 seeking for cancellation of the proceedings vesting the lands
in the Gaon Sabha, on the basis that she continued to be Bhumidar. The said
suit seems to have been decreed on 12.12.1966 and the appeals preferred by
the Gaon Sabha and the Union of India were also said to have been dismissed,
F though the question as to whether the proceedings in which she claimed to
have been accorded Bhumidar rights is illegal or legal was actually left open
undecided and as irrelevant for the said litigation. Taking advantage of the
above alone, the said Guiab Sundari seems to have got impleaded as a claimant
in the proceedings before the Reference Court, for apportionment of the
G compensation awarded, among herself and her alienees. She also seems to
have initially questioned the alienations made by her as being vitiated due to
undue influence and fraud alleged to have been practised on her. But,
subsequently on 27.7.1969, such alienees and Mrs. Guiab Sundari appear to
have entered into a compromise and the same was also said to have been
filed before the Reference Court on 31.7.1969, resulting in those persons also·
H making their claims before the Court. On 17.10.1969, Guiab Sundari seems
S. AMARJITSINGH KALRA v. PRAMODGUPTA [RA.JU, J.]
361
to have filed a fresh claim statement claiming 3/16th share of the compensation A
leaving the remaining I 3/l 6th share in favour of those sixteen persons.
It may be stated that the Additional District Judge, Delhi, decided the
references on 20.5.1980 and the appeals before the High Court were filed
against the said decision. During the pendency of the appeals before the High
Court, the following appellants in RFA Nos.309 and 310 of 1980 were said B
to have died, as noticed below: -
S.No. Name of the appellant & rank
date of death
I.
Shri Mukhtiar Singh (A. No.19)
24.06.1982
2.
Shri Chandgi Ram (A. N o.31)
01.04.1981
3.
Shri Amichand (A. No.55)
21.02.1984
4.
Shri Chhelu (A. No.56)
28.04.1983
5.
Shri Balbir (A. No.57)
14.11.1985
Applications for impleading their legal representatives were said to have
been filed on 2.3.1987. These applications were rejected as belated and that
no sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of the delay. The plea
of partial abatement, if at all, of appeals qua only those deceased appellants
c
D
was not accepted by the High Court and on the view that the decree was joint E
based upon common right and interest, the appeals were rejected in toto, as
noticed supra.
The proceedings, since had their origin under the Land Acquisition
Act. 1894, it is appropriate to notice the nature and purport of the same for
a better appreciation of the nature of cause of action. After a firm decision F
has been taken to acquire the land by issuing a Declaration under Section 6
of the Act, the Land Acquisition Collector, empowered for the purpose, proceed
to conduct an enquiry to pass an Award as to (i) the true area of the land
covered by the Award; (ii) the total compensation to be allowed for the land
and (iii) the apportionment of that compensation among all the persons
interested in the land, whether they have appeared before him or not. This G
Award, in law, is considered to be a mere offer made by the Government to
the claimants whose property is acquired. If the same is accepted without
protest, the right to compensation will not survive any longer, but if it is not
accepted or accepted under protest and a reference is sought under Section
I 8, the right to receive compensation survive and kept live for being prosecuted H
362
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A before the Civil Court, to which a reference will be made, when sought in
terms of Section 18. Against the Award that ma, be 'Jassed by the Reference
Court, the parties thereto can pursue their remedies for determination of a
proper amount of compensation before the High Cou11 and this Court, as
well. So much, about the determination of the compensation. Where several
B persons are interested in the compensation and if such persons agree in the
apportionment of the compensation, the apportionment will be specified in
the Award itself by the Land Acquisition Collector and the same shall be
conclusive evidence of the correctness of the apportionment. But, when the
amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute
arise as to the apportionment of the same or any pa11 thereof or as to the
C persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, Section 30 envisages
the Collector to refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. Section 31
stipulates that on making an Award under Section 11, the Collector shall
tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested
entitled thereto according to the Award, unless prevented by one or the other
D
of the contingencies envisaged therein, viz., if they shall not consent to
receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there
be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the
appo11ionment of it, the Collector is obligated to deposit the amount of the
compensation in the Court to which a reference under Section 18 wou Id
normally be submitted Thus, before further proceeding to take possession, if
E not already taken as envisaged under Section 17, the Collector has to pay or
deposit the amount awarded, in the manner noticed above, and the parties
then will be at liberty to litigate in the ordinary way to determine what their
rights and title to the property and the compensation may be.
Therefore, it becomes necessary for the Reference Court dealing with
F a reference made to it under Sections 30 and 31(2) and the Appellate Court
dealing with appeals arising out of such decision rendered by the Reference
Court, to decide as to who among the claimants, or whether anyone of them
at all are entitled to receive the compensation or any portion of it and if so,
in what propo11ion or that any other than those already before the Court is
G entitled to the same. So far as the cases on hand are concerned, having regard
to the ramification of the Land Reforms Act on the legality, propriety and the
tenability of the various claims, it becomes obligatory to consider each of
such claims distinctly. The rejection of any one cannot by itself be a
justification for sustaining the claim of the other and if none of the private
claimants are found to be legally entitled to the same, the Government or for
H that matter the Local Authority concerned may even be the residual beneficiary,
S.AMAR.JITSINGHKALRA v. PRAMODGUPTA[RA.JU, J.)
363
entitled to it. The consideration, therefore, cannot be confined to the claimants A
before Court but the Court is obliged to find out who really would be entitled
to the same, whether a party before it or not. The Reference Court does not
seem to have been alive to its onerous responsibilities in these cases and the
High Court having rejected the appeals as having abated had no occasion to
advert to the question as to whether the adjudication by the Reference Court B
was in keeping with the requirements of its obligations and the ultimate
decision was in conformity with law. This aspect is noticed only to highlight
the serious nature of the various issues involved but omitted to be properly
and effectively decided and not to express any opinion on any such claims
or questions.
Dr. K.S. Sidhu, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the
appellants, vehemently contended that the High Court ought not to have
dismissed the appeals in toto merely because about five of the appellants died
and the belated attempt to bring on record their legal representatives did not
fructify and even in the absence of those legal representatives the. claims of
c
the other 5 8 surviving appellants in RF A Nos. 309 and 310 of 1980 ought D
to have been dealt with and disposed of in accordance with law on merits,
since each one of them were seeking relief on the basis of his own independent
ca.use of action, grievance, right to claim relief arising out of his distinct and
specified share in the lands acquired under the Act, as recorded in the
Jamabandi. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of this court reported E
in Harihar Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Balmiki Prasad Singh and Ors., (1975]
2 SCR 932, and the decisions on which the respondents sought to place
strong reliance were sought to be distinguished on the basis of the nature of
claims involved in those cases. Argued the learned.counsel further that merely
because the Reference Court before whom separate claims, individually were
made in respect of their own distinct and independent shares, has chosen to
combine and consolidate all such claims for consideration in common does
F
not have the effect of rendering the decree passed therein to be "one and
indivisible" and that therefore grave injustice has been meted out to the
appellants in dismissing the appeals in entirety without adjudicating on the
merits of the respective claims due to the abatement caused in respect of the G
five appellants who died and whose legal representatives could not be brought
on record, in time. For the same reasons, according to the learned counsel,
the death of some of the parties to the proceedings during the pendency of
the appeals in this court would not attract the application of the principle
justifying dismissal of the appeals in toto even in respect of others.
H
364
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A
Sarvashri P.P. Juneja and Saharya while adopting generally the
submissions of the senior counsel on behalf of the other appellants, also
contended that the provisions of Order 22 strike a discordant note with the
specific mandate contained in Section 1 l(l)(iii) and Section 30/31 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which obligates an adjudication on the right as
B well as the proportion in which the compensation is to be awarded according
to his share or entitlement to a person interested, whether or not such person
appeared before the authority concerned, and therefore, the rejection of the
appeals and that too in toto, cannot be justified in law. All the learned counsel,
appearing for all the appellants have high I ighted the merits of the case and
the necessity to determine the claims on merits in the teeth of the alleged
C nebulous and insufficient basis of the claim of the so called Bhumidar and
her transferees, particularly when according to the appellants there was no
effective adjudication of the same and more so when in the earlier proceedings
such an issue was specifically left open. We do not propose to advert to them
in greater details, in as much as the High Court has not gone into them and,
D if at all, the judgment of the High Court calls for interference, the matters
have to be relegated back to the High Cou1t for deciding the same on merits.
Sarvashri K. Parasaran, Senior Advocate, supported and supplemented
by T.R. Andhyarujina, K. Ramamoo11hy, L.R. Gupta, were heard on behalf
of the respondents, claiming the entire compensation as Bhumidar's. While
E justifying the conclusions arrived at by the High Court, it was strenuously
contended that the disputes centred around one lump sum of compensation
to be shared and divided among the sharers, in respect of an undivided and
common land, that the competing claims were at the instance of one class on
the basis that they are Proprietors and the other on the basis that they are
entitled to Bhumidari rights and consequently, having regard to the unity of
F possession of the land and the fact that the litigation is on the same nature
of title, the decree passed would be a joint and indivisible one, either way
and to which the principle laid down in The State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram,
[ 1962] 2 SCR 636, subsequently followed and applied in several other cases,
squarely applied and no exception could be taken to the judgment rendered
G by the High Court. It was also urged that once the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure 1908, applied the other things inevitably followed and the
doctrine of representation also did not apply to the case on hand. Even dehors
the question of abatement under Order 22 Rules 3 & 9, the appeals, according
to the respondents, were rightly rejected as not duly and properly constituted,
failing which there was every possibility of any such decision on merits
H
S. AMARJIT SINGH KALRA v. PRAMOD GUPTA [RAJU, J.]
365
resulting in contradictory decrees in the same cause or subject matter.
A
On behalf of the respondents, it was also pointed out that the serious
lapses and absence of sufficient cause, as conceded by the counsel for the
appellants before the High Court itself, for the delay in bringing on record
the legal representatives of the deceased 5 appellants of the same village,
despite the knowledge of their death, justified their rejection and no challenge B
could be made of it, at this stage. It was also urged that even these appeals
before this Court also have abated on account of the death of Smt. Guiab
Sundari (R-27), Shri K.K. Kochar (R-12) and Bhim Singh (R-23), since the
applications to bring on record their legal representatives were dismissed as
"not having been pressed" by the order dated 22.11.200 I passed by the C
Constitution Bench.