# S,arjoo Prasad v. P. Gyagi, D. P. Gupt.a. and

- **Citation:** [1963] 2 S.C.R. 152
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkab, K. N. Wanchoo, N . .ltAJAGOPALA AYYANGAB, T. L. Venkat'Abam• Aiyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-arjoo-prasad-v-p-gyagi-d-p-gupt-a-and-2662
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Mo/tJr Vehicla-Objection to Schem•-Power of OJ!jur
!tearing objection-Pennit mad< intJ!ectire /or 011<r lapping
rot1te-l/ dt•criminatory-Motor l'ehtclu A.ct, 1939 (4 of 11139),
"· 68 C, 68D, 68G-Von.titt.tion of India, Art. 14.
The Rajas<han State Roadways, "hich is a State Transport Undertaking, published five schemes under s. 68C of
the Motor Vehicles Act. The State Government appointed
the Legal Remembrancer to hear objections filed, amongst
others, by the appellants who were plying their bulOI on
three of those· five routes. The schemes relating to those
three routes· were approved with slight modifications, The
objectors in respect of the other two schemes, unlike the
appellants, wanted the schemes to be entirely rejected and to
adduce evidence. The Legal Remei:nbranccr relying on a
decision of the High Court held that he had no power to
reject a scheme in its entirely or to take evidence.
One of
the objectors filed " writ petition in the High Court but it
was rejected. He came up in appeal to tlus Court. This
Court overruled the decuion of the Rajasthan High Court in
Chandra Bhan v. Stale of Raja.than and held that it was open
to the Legal Remembrancer to reject the draft scheme a.nd
to take evidence if necessary (vide Malik Ram v. State of
RajCJ&than,
(195~] I S. C.R. 978). The result was that a
lar8e number ol writ petitions were filed in the ffigh Court
and that court dismissed those relating to the three routes,
with which the present appeals were concerned; on the
ground that the appellants had neither wanted a total rejection of the schemes nor to adduce evidence and had, thcrcfOI e, no concern with the decision in Chandra Bhan'• C<U<.
It was not the case of appellants in the High Court, that
tliey had wanted to adduce any evidence that had been shut
out by legal Remembrancer nor did they indicate·in this
Court what evidence they wanted to produce in support of
the objections raised by them.
Held, that the ai-prllants could not be allowed to take
advantage of the decision of.this- Court in Malik Ram.'• case.
i
..
•
~-'
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REl OltTS
153
It was clear that their objections could be and ~ere offe.ctively dealt with by the Lrgal Ren embrancer wHhout gomg
into evidence and the order passed by.him .approving· the
schemes under s. 68D of the. Motor Vehicles Act was not'in
any way vitiated by. his· wrong.approach with regard to the
other objections.
MMik Ram v. Stau oj'f;ajasthan [1962], I S •. C. R. 978,
referred to.
I't was· permissible· under s. 68C of the Acl'to frame a
scheme in partial' exclusion of private operators and making
the permit ineffective· for the overlapping part of the route
was no: more. than, !lartial. exclusion and was,
thercfOJ"e,
justified under s. 68G of the Act.
Although• a petmit holder whose·permit wuthus made
ineffective
could not claim compensation under s. 68G,
whereas one, whose permit was cancelled for the overlapping
pitrt, could, there. could be no discrimination within the
meaning of Art. 14 of the Constitution. unle>S it could be
shown that· the· advantage· to the·former by being allowed to
pick up passengers· on· tll<: overlapping pa1t of the route for
destination. beyond. was unequal to the compensation which
he would have got by having.his permit.cancelled for the
overlapping part.
Discrimination under A"rt. 14 is censcious discrimination
and not accidental discrimination· that arise. from oversight
which the Statds ready to rectify.
CrvIL APPELLATE JuBISDIOTION : Civil Appeal
Nos. 142.--146 of 1962.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
\
~a:y 3, 1.961, of the· Rajasthan High Court in D. B.
J
Civil Writs,Nos. 40, a9, 45; 46.and 77 of 1961.
S,arjoo Prasad, V. P. Gyagi, D. P. Gupt.a. and
H. P. M akeahwari,, for. *he appellants.
•
0. K. Daphttlry, Bolioitor General of India,
Kansingh, B. R. Kapur and. P. D; M~non. for- the
'7
respondents.
"'1
1962.
April 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
JS6'
L·mnalh Vtttn'l
v.
S'~'e t.f Rajoa,hJ r.
v.
154
SUPREME

## Text

Ap1i/ ]'/,
152
bUPREMll: COURT REl'ORTS (H163J
RAMNATH VER.MA
"·
STATE OF RAJASTHAN
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAB, K. N.
WANCHOO, N . .ltAJAGOPALA AYYANGAB and
T. L. VENKAT'ABAM• AIYAR, JJ.)
Mo/tJr Vehicla-Objection to Schem•-Power of OJ!jur
!tearing objection-Pennit mad< intJ!ectire /or 011<r lapping
rot1te-l/ dt•criminatory-Motor l'ehtclu A.ct, 1939 (4 of 11139),
"· 68 C, 68D, 68G-Von.titt.tion of India, Art. 14.
The Rajas<han State Roadways, "hich is a State Transport Undertaking, published five schemes under s. 68C of
the Motor Vehicles Act. The State Government appointed
the Legal Remembrancer to hear objections filed, amongst
others, by the appellants who were plying their bulOI on
three of those· five routes. The schemes relating to those
three routes· were approved with slight modifications, The
objectors in respect of the other two schemes, unlike the
appellants, wanted the schemes to be entirely rejected and to
adduce evidence. The Legal Remei:nbranccr relying on a
decision of the High Court held that he had no power to
reject a scheme in its entirely or to take evidence.
One of
the objectors filed " writ petition in the High Court but it
was rejected. He came up in appeal to tlus Court. This
Court overruled the decuion of the Rajasthan High Court in
Chandra Bhan v. Stale of Raja.than and held that it was open
to the Legal Remembrancer to reject the draft scheme a.nd
to take evidence if necessary (vide Malik Ram v. State of
RajCJ&than,
(195~] I S. C.R. 978). The result was that a
lar8e number ol writ petitions were filed in the ffigh Court
and that court dismissed those relating to the three routes,
with which the present appeals were concerned; on the
ground that the appellants had neither wanted a total rejection of the schemes nor to adduce evidence and had, thcrcfOI e, no concern with the decision in Chandra Bhan'• C<U<.
It was not the case of appellants in the High Court, that
tliey had wanted to adduce any evidence that had been shut
out by legal Remembrancer nor did they indicate·in this
Court what evidence they wanted to produce in support of
the objections raised by them.
Held, that the ai-prllants could not be allowed to take
advantage of the decision of.this- Court in Malik Ram.'• case.
i
..
•
~-'
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REl OltTS
153
It was clear that their objections could be and ~ere offe.ctively dealt with by the Lrgal Ren embrancer wHhout gomg
into evidence and the order passed by.him .approving· the
schemes under s. 68D of the. Motor Vehicles Act was not'in
any way vitiated by. his· wrong.approach with regard to the
other objections.
MMik Ram v. Stau oj'f;ajasthan [1962], I S •. C. R. 978,
referred to.
I't was· permissible· under s. 68C of the Acl'to frame a
scheme in partial' exclusion of private operators and making
the permit ineffective· for the overlapping part of the route
was no: more. than, !lartial. exclusion and was,
thercfOJ"e,
justified under s. 68G of the Act.
Although• a petmit holder whose·permit wuthus made
ineffective
could not claim compensation under s. 68G,
whereas one, whose permit was cancelled for the overlapping
pitrt, could, there. could be no discrimination within the
meaning of Art. 14 of the Constitution. unle>S it could be
shown that· the· advantage· to the·former by being allowed to
pick up passengers· on· tll<: overlapping pa1t of the route for
destination. beyond. was unequal to the compensation which
he would have got by having.his permit.cancelled for the
overlapping part.
Discrimination under A"rt. 14 is censcious discrimination
and not accidental discrimination· that arise. from oversight
which the Statds ready to rectify.
CrvIL APPELLATE JuBISDIOTION : Civil Appeal
Nos. 142.--146 of 1962.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
\
~a:y 3, 1.961, of the· Rajasthan High Court in D. B.
J
Civil Writs,Nos. 40, a9, 45; 46.and 77 of 1961.
S,arjoo Prasad, V. P. Gyagi, D. P. Gupt.a. and
H. P. M akeahwari,, for. *he appellants.
•
0. K. Daphttlry, Bolioitor General of India,
Kansingh, B. R. Kapur and. P. D; M~non. for- the
'7
respondents.
"'1
1962.
April 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
JS6'
L·mnalh Vtttn'l
v.
S'~'e t.f Rajoa,hJ r.
v.
154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [163)
WANcaoo, J.-These five appe•le on oortili.catee granted by the Rajaethan High Court raise
common questions and will be dea.lt with together.
Appeals Noe. 142, 144 and 145 are with respect to
Jaipur-Bharatpur route appeal No. 143 with respect
to Jairur-Shahpur·Alwar-Himkathana route, and
appeal No. 146 with respect to Ajmer-Kotah route ..
It appears that the Rajasthan State Roadways,
which is a State Transport Undertaking, pub!ibhed
five schemes in pursuance of e. 68 C of the Motor
Vehicles Act, No. 4 of 1939 (hereinafter called the
Act). Later, the Government of Rajasth•n appointed the Legal Remembrancer to oonsider objections
to these five draft schemes. Objections were filed
by the Stage carriage permit-holders who were plying on these five routes. The objections with
reference to the three routes with which these
appeals are concerned werll heard un December 7
and 14, 1960 and the draft schemes were approved
by the Legal Remembrancer on December 14 and
15, 1000, with slight modifications.
It appears further that the objectors relating
to Jaipur·Ajmer and Jaipur-Kotah routes, which
were among the five schemes, published as above,
objected to these two schemes on varioll1' grounds
and prayed that they should be given an opportunity to show that the two draft·schemes did not
provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport aervice and should
therefore ho not approved and also prayed that
evidence might be taken in support of their contentions. One of the permit holders on the JaipurAjmer route waa Malik Ram who had contended
that the draft-scheme should be rejected in itll
entirety and had deaired to lead evidence for that
purpose.
'fbe Legal
Remembrancer, however,
hAltl on the basis of an earlier decision of the
I
' •
\
• 't
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 155
Rajastb.an High Court in Okandar Bhan v. The State
of Rajasthari (>) that it was not open to him to reject
tbe scheme in its entirety. and he could only either
approve of lt or•modify it.. He further held that
he could take no evidence while .considering objections to the scheme and aJl that he had to do was
to hear arguments on either side. Malik Ram then
moved the ~ajasthan High Court by a writ petition
which was dismissed. He then came to this Court
by special leave challenging the view taken by the
Legal Remembrancer on thl' two points. above.
This Court allowed Malik Ram's af'peal and held
that it was open to the Legal ltemt>mbra.noer to
reject the draft scheme or to take evidence, if neces·
sary, though it was pointed out that it wo'uld be
within the discretion .of the. State Government or
the officer appointed by it to hear .. objections to
decide whether. the ·evidence intended to be produ·
·ced was necessary and relevant to the inquiry, and
if so to gi.ve a reasonable opportunity to the party
desiring to lead evidevce to do' so within reason,
and that the State Government or the officer eoncerned would· have all the powers of controlling
the giving and recording of evidence that any court
has. This decision was given on April 14, 1961
(aze Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan e>J,
In the meantime a large numbel' of writ petit·
ions were 'filed in the R&jaathan High Court cha.II·
enging the approved SQhemes with respect· to the
three routes with which we a.re concerned in the
present appeals and · also with tespect •to. the
three routes with whloh we are concerned in the
present appeals and also with respe!lt tQ the
other two routes. These petitions came to be heard
after the decision of this Court.in Malik Ram' a ca.se(1)
So far as the petitions relating to Jaipur Ajmer
route were concerned, they were not pressed in view
., of the decision- of this Court quashing the suheme
(I) (19(il) llaj, Law Weeki•••
(2) (l!/62) I, s. c. R. 978.
1951
R11mna'h Ve1mo
v.
St••te o] Bojasllui•
-~
1M62
Romrioth Verm2
V.
St4re o/ R 1jaa'han
Wan<lwo J.
156
SUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1963]
with respect to that route a.nd directing tho Legal
Remembrancer to hear the objections over a.gain.
I
With respect to Ajmer~Kotah route, the High LCourt
t
allowed the objections on the basis of the decision
of this Court in Malik Ram's case(') as the objector
in those cases ha.d wanted to lead evidence on the
question of rejection of the draft scheme in its entirety, a.nd they had not been given a.n opportunity
to do so.
But with respect to the three routes
with which the present a.ppea.ls are concerned, the "
High Court
dismissed the writ petitions on the
•
ground that there was nothing to indicate tha.t the
appellant.a desired to lea.d evidence in eupport of
their case that the draft-schemes should oo totally
rejoeted. It was contended before the High Court
that it was usele~s for the appellants to make any
application for the taking of evidence because it
would in an,Y case ha.'l'e been rejected 111 the Legal
Remembrancer ha.d a.lrea.dy ta.ken. tho view that
he could no1; reject the scheme as.a. whole.
The
High Court was however not impr6886d· with this
,.....>i
argument md held tha.t thti order of the .Lt>ga.l
Remembrar.cer did not show tha.t he thought tha.t
the draft scheme should be totally rejected but felt
unable to do so because of the deci&ion. of the High
Court in Gliander Bhan's oa.se (n. On the other
hand, the High Court was of the view tha.t the Legal
Remembrancer considered the objections raised before him in detail and bi& order showed tha.t he only
)'
thought tha.r, the schemes should be modified in pa.rt
~
and were otherwise fit for approval. The a.ppell-
·.
a.nts then applied to the High Court for oertifiCa.tea
which were granted; a.nd tha.t i& how the matter ha.a
come up before us.
·
The main contentions. of the a.ppella.nts before
us a.re the same whiab they raised .before·the Hiah
Court. They urge that they did not get a. proper
hearing before the Legal Remembranoer beoauae •
(1)(1962) 1 s.c.R.>78.
(2) (1961) Raj Law Wa:tl7 f),
•
•
2 S. C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
157
of his view that it was not open to him to reject
the schemes in their entirety and that they were
not given an opportunity to lead evidence to conv·
ince the Legal Remembrancer that the schemes
should bo rejected in their entiret.y. It is not in
dispute that the appellants never applied before the
Leg.ii Remembranoer that they wanted to lead
evidence on any point in support of their objections.
Only in one writ petition (see C. A. 144 of 1962)
it was averred that the Legal Remembrancer did
not allow the appellants to lead evidence but that
in our. opinion is not correct, because the Legal
Remembrancer has filed an affidavit to the effect
that no such oral reqmist was ma.de to him by the
objeoto1s on the three routes with which these
apprials are concerned. The High Court therefore
was right in saying that it could not be said
in
these oases
that the
Legal
Remembrancer
had
shut
out
evidence
relating
to
the inquiry before ·him which tho objectors
desired to produce. But it is urged on behalf of
the appellants that as the Legal Remembrancer·
had alrei~dy ta.ken one view in the case of JaipurAjmer route it was useless for them to make nn
application to him for leading evidence for that
would have inevitably been rejected in view of the
earlier , judgment of the Hajasthan High Court
referred to above. E·ren though, this may be so,
it fo remarkable that did
not that prevent the
objectors on the Jaipur-Ajmer and Jaipur-Kotah
routes from making applications to the Legal
l<emembrancer that the draft-schemes should be
tiotally rejected and they should be given an
opportunity to ]earl evidence to show this. We
fail to see why the appellants could not have been
taken the same course if they really desired to lead
any evidence in order to make out their ease for
total rejection of the schemes with which they
' were concerneu.
It seems to us clear therefore
that at the stage when objections were being heard
J961
Ramnath V 1rm~
V,
St(jte of R.1jas1hJn
1962
R.mn~th J.'uma
••
Stott of Roja.·ih"n
\\'om1100J.
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
by the Legal Remembrancer there was no desire
on the part of the appellants to lead any evidence
in support of their objections. Nor docs it appear
that when the writ petitions wern filed in the High
Court the appellauts claimed that they had desired
to lead evidence and had been shut out by the Legal
Remembrancer. It was only after the decision in
Malik Ram's case (1) that applications were filed
taking advantage of that decision and pointing out
thBt the wrong approach of the Legal Remembrancer in holding that it was not open to him to reject
the draft.scheme in itB entirety had resulted in the
appellant's not getting an effective hearing. But
it does not seem to have been suggested even at
that (except in one case) that the appellants had
desired to lead eddence before the Legal Hememh.
rnncer and he had abut them out.
Nor was it
&hown at that stage what evidence the appellants
could produce in E<Upport of their objectir·ns if an
opportunity had been given to them.
Lastly even
this Court the appellants have not indicated what
evidence they could produce in support of the
objections raieed by them. It seems to us therefore
that th~ appellants never really desired to produce
evidence in order to establish that tho schemes SA a
whole should be rejected and that they put forward
the contention that they would have proriuced
. evidence if given an opportunity to do so, merely
taking advantage of 1 he decision of this Court in
Malik Ram's case (1).
Further it seems to us on
looking at one of the objec1ions filed before the
Legal RemPmbrancer in C.A. 142 of 19()2 as a
sample that thero wM nothing in the objections.
which
really required the giving of cvidenc!'
and which would show that there could be any
d11sire on the part of the objectors to lead evidence.
The objections were of a genera.I nature nnd all
that was desired was that "the State Go;ernment
must weigh the objections of the undersigned with
reference to the actual conditions obtaining on the
said route,
by such method aB holdiog public
inquiry on site, by looking into the past records of
I)
( 1962) I S.C.R. 973.
I
•
•
•
-4'
;
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
service provided by the objector, by inspecting the
vehicle of the objector and by comparing' the actual
facilities provided by the objector." In s .vrt, a
perusal of the objections shows that WJ
was
being contended before the Legal Remembrancer
was not so much that the draft.schemes were not
efficient, adequate, economical , and properly coordinate but that tho objectors were
providing
transport service which was more, efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated than
the service proposed to be provided in the draft.
schemes. That however is hardly a r9ason
for
rejecting the draft-schemes in their entirety.
Further, a perusal of the , o,rder of the LegBl
Remembrancer summe,risinJ? the objections which
a.re relevant under s. G8D shows that the objection
were of such a nature as to require the productions
of evidence in support of them for the question of
fa.ct raised there were not in dispute. Therefore, there
could' be an effective hearing b 0 fore the J..egal
Rem em bra.ncer if o bjec:tors were given a chance to
put forward their arguments in support of the
objections even withnut any evidence.
We are
therefore of opinion that the appellants cannot . in
the circumstances take advent.a"e of the di,cision
in Malik Ram's case ( 1), and on the facts· and
circumstr.nces in the present appeals there iq no
doubt tl1at they had an effective hearing and the
order of the Legal Kemembrancer approving the
schemes is not in any way vitiated by the wrong
view taken by him that he had no. power: to reject
the draft-schemes in their entirety. It seems that
he considered the .draft-schemes' on merits as
required by ss. 680 and 68D and hel:l that it was
in accordance with the requirements of s, 680.
The facts that in some cases the number of buses
might have· been reduced , or. the fares have been
, ·
raised or some of the direct services-hi¥:1 to be out
~ down where their routes ()verlapped with the routes
in the three draft-schemes would not necessarily
{1)'(1962] 1 S.C.R.978.
R~un.1,th Vernit
v.
Stott 0JR .. ja.eti1an
w.ndlOO J.
lf1mre.th Verm'
y.
Srot• of Raj111r1 • .,n
160
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
lead to the conclusion that the drafwchemee were
not in conformity with the requirements of e. 680.
The contention therefore baaed on the judgment
of this Court in Malik Ram'a caae (')must on the
facts and circumstances of these appeals be rejected.
(
\
•
Besides this ma.in objeotion, three subsidiary
points have been raised on behalf of the appellants. It appears that in some ca.see the objectors
served routes which overlapped the three routes
which have been taken over. In these oases what
·· a
has been done is that in some oases the permits of
...
the object.ors have been oanoelled with reepeot to
the overlapping pa.rt of the routes while in other
oases the objectors are allowed to ply even on the
overlapping pa.rt but they have been forbidden to
pick up pa.seenl!ers on the overlapping pa.rt for
destinations within the overlapping pa.rt.
This
latter method is called ma.king
the permit.a
ineffeotive for the overlapping part.
Now the
grievance of those whose permita have thus been
rendered ineffective for the overlapping part u
--! '
two.fold.
In the first place, it is ea.id that this
cannot be done and in the second place, it ie ea.id
that even if this can be done, the result is that
those whose permits have been made ineffective
for the overlapping part will not be entitled to
compenaation under B. 68G read with e. 68F(2).
So far as the first contention is concerned, we are
of opinion that there is no force in it. Under
s. 680, it is open to frame a. 11cheme in which there
~
is a partial exo lusion of private operators. Ma.king
the permits ineffective for the overlapping pa.rt
only a.mounts to partial exclusion of the private
operators from that route. In the circumstances
an order ma.king the permit ineffective for the
overlapping pa.rt would be justified under s. 680.
As to the second point, there is no doubt that
where the permit is ma.de ineffective the permitholder not be entitled to any compensation under
(I) [1962] I $,C.R. 97&
'), 1
,r . '
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
161
e. 68G. It is said that this amounts to discrimination
between those whose permits have been cancelled
for the overlapping part and who would get c;impeneation and those whose permits have been made
ineffective and who would therefore not get compensation, Now we should have though that the making of the permit ineffective for the overlapping part
of the route and allowing the permit-holder to pick up
passengers on the overlapping route for destinations
beyond that portion of the route would be to the
advantage of the permit-holder. In any case, if any
permit-holder feels that he would rather have hie
permit cancelled for the overlapping route and get
compensation it is for him to raise that objection
before the State Government or the officer bearing
objections.
If he does not do so, he· cannot be
heard to say that there is discrimination because
his permit· has been rendered ineffective and he
gets no compensation, for it may very well be that
he is still better off than the person whose permit
has been cancelled for the overlapping part of the
route. In any oase unless facts are brought on the
record which would show that in spite of the
advantage which the permit ·holder, whqse permit
has been made ineffective for the ove~lapping part
of the route, gets by picking up passengers on the
overlapping route for destinations beyond that
part is not equal to the compensation which he
would get in case his permit is cancelled for the
OTerlapping part of the route, there would be no
case for discrimination under Art. 14 of the
Constitution. In the present appeals no such case
has been made out on the facts and therefore
we
must
reject this
argument based upon
discrimination.
Secondly, it is urged that in the case of some
persons, the permits have neither been cancelled
nor made ineffective over the overlapping route
and this amounts to discrimination. The reply of
1902
Ramnath Y erma.
v.
State of Raja a than
Wanchao 1.
IHI
.11..,.llA Vnm12
••
S.., of R•j•U...
162
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
the State to this contention is that it was by
oversight that permits of certain permit-holders on
the overlapping routes have not been cancelled or
made ineffective and it is further said that the
State would have corrected this oversight but
for the stay order obtained from this Court.
Discrimination
envisaged
under
Art..
14
is
oonecious
discrimination and
a
discl'imin:i.tion
arising out
of oversight is no discrimination
at all. In the present case
the
discrimination
has
resulted because of an
overt1ight
which
the State is prepared to rectify. It is not tho case
of the appellants that these fow permit-holdera
a.re being favoured deliberately f9r ulterior reasons.
We therefore accept the reply of the State that a.
few permit-holders on the overlapping route ha..-e
been left out by oversight and that their permits
will be dealt with in the same manner as of the
appellants, as soon as the stay order passed
by this Court comes to an end. There is thereI
'·
fore no force
in this contention also l\nd it is
hereby rejected.
r .f
Lastly, it· is urged that the permits on the
Ajmer-Kotah route have been cancelled or rendered
ineffective between Deoli and Ajmer only and
therefore the permit-holders are entitled to ply
between Deoli and Kotah. It appears however
that Deoli-Kotah part of the Ajmer-Kota.h route
is common to Ja.ipur-Kotah route from Deoli to
Kotah and the necessary orders for exclusion of
permit-holders have been paesed in connection with
the Jaipur-Kotah route. The scheme with respect
to that route was quashed by the High Court and
the matter sent back for re-hearinc the objectors in
accordance with the decision of this Court in
Malick Ram' 8 case ('). Ther1·fore, the
question
whether the permit,.holders can ply on the Deoli·
Kota.h portion of the Ajmer-Rotah route will.
.~
•
(I) (1962) I s .. c.R. 978-
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
163
depend on the decision of the Jaipur:Kotah scheme.
If that scheme is upheld, on re-hearm~, the exclusion will continue. But if that scheme 1s not upheld,
the position may have to be reviewed in connection
with. this portion of the Ajmer-Kotah route. In the
circumstances no relief can be granted to the appellants of the Ajmer-Kotah route at this stage ..
The appeals 1're hereby dismissed with costsone set of hearing costs.
Appeals dismissed.
M/S. SURAJMULL NAGARMULL
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
(S. Jr. DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. O. SHAH, JJ.)
Arbitration-Arbitrator appointed und.r the Defence o/
India Act, if a court-Righl to appeal against the award, if and
when, exercisable-Defence of India Act, 1939 (35 of 1939),
"· 19(1), 19(1)(!) a7;Zd (g), J9(3)(c)-Defence of India Rules,
1939, rr. 75A, 19, second proviso.
'
The appellants were tenants of three warehouses and
vacant land, which were used for storage of jute belonging
to the appellants. By an order issued under r. i5A of the
Rules framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939, the
warehouses were requisitioned
by the Governme11t. An
arbitrator was appointed unders. 19(1)(b) of the Defence of
India Act to fix the amount of compensation payable to the
owner. The claim of the appellants to compensation for
loss of earning, and for "loss of business" was rejected by
the arbitrator. An appeal filed by the appellants against
the arbitrator was dismissed by the High Court at Calcutta
as not maintainable.
'
Held, that the arbitrator appointed under s. 19 of the
Defence of India Act is not a court, nor is a tribunal subject
f
lo to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. By the Act
, a right to appeal against the award of the arbitrator is
R,:rwat/, Vtrmn
·-
State of Rajast'i:mi
Wanelloo J.
/96J
April 17