# S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT

- **Citation:** [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 772
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1988-08-31
- **Bench:** K.N. Singh, M.H. Kania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-b-mathur-v-chief-justice-of-delhi-high-court-10024
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

Delhi High Court Establishment (Appointment and conditions of
service) Rules, 1972-Delhi High Court Staff (SeniOrity) Rules 1971Superintendents of Delhi High Court challenging the treatment of posts
of Superintendents, Court Masters or Readers and Private Secretaries to
Judges as equal status posts, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and challenging joint seniority list of Superiniendents, Court
Masters and PriV<•te Secretaries for purposes of promotion" to the post of
As.m1a11t Registrars and claiming better rights of promotion.
D
· .. The Superintendents of the Delhi High Court by writ petition
claimed better rights of promotion, objected to their being treated as on
par with the Private Secretaries to Judges and Court Masters; and
being included in a joint seniority list alongwith them, particularly as
far as the promotion to the next higher post of Assistant Registrar was
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concerned_
'
The petitioners contended inter-alia that there was a violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution In treating the posts of Superintendents,
Court Masters or readers and Private Secretaries to Judges as equal ·
status p_osts; that the sources of recruitment to these posts were not
identical and so also the qualifications required for appointments to
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these posts; that the duties of the incumbents of these posts were different; that in treating these posts as equal status posts, unequals had
been treated equally and the rule of ~quality had been violated.
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Dismissing the petition, the Court,
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HELD: \Vhere an employer h3s a large number or employees9
;· __ performing diverse duties, he must enjoy some di.Scretion in treating
different categories of his employees as holding equal status post~r
equated posts, as questions of promotion or transfer of empIOyees inter
se will necessarily arise for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of
the organisation- [781C-D]
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772
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT
773
There is nothing mherently wrong in an employer treating certain
posts as equated posts or equal status posts, provided that in doing so he
exercises his discretion reasonably and does not violate the principles of
equality enshrined inArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [781D-E]
For treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts, it
is not necessary that the holders of these posts must perform the identical functions or that the sources of recruitment to the posts must be the
same, nor is it essential that the qualifications for appointments to the
posts must be identical. But, there must not be such difference.in the
pay-scales or qualifications of the incumbents of the posts or in their
duties or responsibilities or regarding any other relevant factor that it
would be unjust fo treat the posts alike and posts having substantially
higher pay-scales or status in service or carrying substantially heavier
responsibilities and duties or otherwise distinctly superior, cannot be
equated with the posts carrying much lower pay-scales or substantially
lower responsibilities and duties or enjoying much lower status in
service. [7lHE-G]
The petitioners could not challenge the aforesaid posts being
treated as equal status posts as that had been done in accordance
with the Seniority Rules of 1971 the vires of which had not been
challenged. [782B]
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Neither the combined seniority list nor the treating of the said
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posts as equal status posts could be said to be arbitrary in the absence of
any material, particularly in view of the fact that the Chief Justice and
the Judges of the High Court had taken the view that it was necessary in
order to provide adequate promotional opportunities to the various
sections of the employees. [784D]
The challenge to the said posts being treated as equal status posts
had come too late in 1970 to be entertained in a writ petition, after the
seniority Rules of 1971 became effective. This challenge could be
negatived on the ground of delay or latches apart from oth

## Text

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S.B. MATHUR AND OTHERS.
v .. :1
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT,:
"AND OTHERS
AUGUST 31, 1988
·'
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[K.N. SINGH AND M.H. KANIA, JJ.J
Delhi High Court Establishment (Appointment and conditions of
service) Rules, 1972-Delhi High Court Staff (SeniOrity) Rules 1971Superintendents of Delhi High Court challenging the treatment of posts
of Superintendents, Court Masters or Readers and Private Secretaries to
Judges as equal status posts, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and challenging joint seniority list of Superiniendents, Court
Masters and PriV<•te Secretaries for purposes of promotion" to the post of
As.m1a11t Registrars and claiming better rights of promotion.
D
· .. The Superintendents of the Delhi High Court by writ petition
claimed better rights of promotion, objected to their being treated as on
par with the Private Secretaries to Judges and Court Masters; and
being included in a joint seniority list alongwith them, particularly as
far as the promotion to the next higher post of Assistant Registrar was
E
concerned_
'
The petitioners contended inter-alia that there was a violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution In treating the posts of Superintendents,
Court Masters or readers and Private Secretaries to Judges as equal ·
status p_osts; that the sources of recruitment to these posts were not
identical and so also the qualifications required for appointments to
F
these posts; that the duties of the incumbents of these posts were different; that in treating these posts as equal status posts, unequals had
been treated equally and the rule of ~quality had been violated.
(
Dismissing the petition, the Court,
G
HELD: \Vhere an employer h3s a large number or employees9
;· __ performing diverse duties, he must enjoy some di.Scretion in treating
different categories of his employees as holding equal status post~r
equated posts, as questions of promotion or transfer of empIOyees inter
se will necessarily arise for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of
the organisation- [781C-D]
H
772
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT
773
There is nothing mherently wrong in an employer treating certain
posts as equated posts or equal status posts, provided that in doing so he
exercises his discretion reasonably and does not violate the principles of
equality enshrined inArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [781D-E]
For treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts, it
is not necessary that the holders of these posts must perform the identical functions or that the sources of recruitment to the posts must be the
same, nor is it essential that the qualifications for appointments to the
posts must be identical. But, there must not be such difference.in the
pay-scales or qualifications of the incumbents of the posts or in their
duties or responsibilities or regarding any other relevant factor that it
would be unjust fo treat the posts alike and posts having substantially
higher pay-scales or status in service or carrying substantially heavier
responsibilities and duties or otherwise distinctly superior, cannot be
equated with the posts carrying much lower pay-scales or substantially
lower responsibilities and duties or enjoying much lower status in
service. [7lHE-G]
The petitioners could not challenge the aforesaid posts being
treated as equal status posts as that had been done in accordance
with the Seniority Rules of 1971 the vires of which had not been
challenged. [782B]
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Neither the combined seniority list nor the treating of the said
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posts as equal status posts could be said to be arbitrary in the absence of
any material, particularly in view of the fact that the Chief Justice and
the Judges of the High Court had taken the view that it was necessary in
order to provide adequate promotional opportunities to the various
sections of the employees. [784D]
The challenge to the said posts being treated as equal status posts
had come too late in 1970 to be entertained in a writ petition, after the
seniority Rules of 1971 became effective. This challenge could be
negatived on the ground of delay or latches apart from other considerations. [784E-G]
There was nothing unreasonable in the restriction that out of the
total number of candidates who satisfied the eligibility requirement, the
zone of consideration would be limited to a multiple of 3 to 5 times the
number of vacancies or in determining the persons to be considered on
the basis of their seniority in the combined seniority list. It was open to
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the High Court to restrict the zone of consideration in any reasonable
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
· A manner, and limiting the zone of consideration to a multiple· of the
number of vacancies and basing it on seniority according to the combined seniority list cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious or
ma la fide, nor can it<lle'said that such a restriction violates the, principle
of selection on because even experience in service is a relevant consiB deration in assessing merit. [791C-E]
It is not as if either Rule 7 of the Establishment Rules of 1972 or
Rule 5 of the seniority Rules of 1971 which provides for a combined
seniority list negatives tbe chance of promotion to the posts of Assistant
Registrars being granted to the Superintendents. [794A-B]
C
So far as ·the zone of consideration is limited by the competent
authority in a manner not inconsistent with the Rules or in a manner
not arbitrary or capricious or mala fide, the validity of the decision
to limit the zone of consideration cannot be called in question on the
ground that the manner ·in which the zone was limited was not
0
uniform. [795D-E]
V. T. Khanzode & Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr., [1982] 3
S.C.R. 411; Guman Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., [1971) Suppl.
S.C.R. 900; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Anr., [1968] l
S.C.R. 111; Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal & Ors., [1977] 1
E S.C.R. 377; Ashok Kumar Yadav & Ors., etc. v. State of Haryana &
Ors., etc., [1985] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 657; VJ. Thomas and Ors. v. Union
of India & Ors., [1985] Suppl. S.C.C. 7; Madan Mohan Saran & Anr.
v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice and Ors., [1975] 2 S.L.R. 889 and Mahesh
Prasad Srivastava v. Abdul Khair, [1971] I S.C.R. 157, referred to.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 263 of
1979
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
D.D. Thakur, A. Minocha, Mrs. Veena Minocha, G.S.
Vashisht, T.R. Arti and B.S. Bali for the Petitioners.
Kuldeep Singh, Additional Solicitor General, C.M. Nayar and
C.V. Subba Rao for Respondent Nos. 1and2.
Kuldeep Singh, Additional Solicitor General, Ashok Srivasiava
and Ms. A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 3.
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT [KANIA, J.]
775
·Ms. A. Subhashini Advocate for the Respondent N6. 11.
A.K. Ganguli, A. Mariarputha and Mrs. Aruna Mathur for the
Respondents Nos. 6, 7, 9 and 10.
The.Judgment of the Court was·delivered by
KANIA, J. This Writ Petition owes its origin to a dispute between different groups of employees of the Delhi High Court, claiming
better rights of promotion for themselves, a type of dispute too common in services these days. The present Writ Petition has been filed by
some Superintendents in the Delhi High Court objecting to their being
treated on a par with the Private Secretaries to learned Judges and
Court Masters and being included in a joint seniority list along with
them, particularly as far as the promotion to the next higher post of
Assistant Registrar is concerned. In order to appreciate the controversy before us, it is necessary to keep in mind the background in
which the dispute has originated.
Prior to the Constitution of the Delhi High Court in 1966, there
was a Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court sitting at Delhi. By Act
26 of 1966, Parliament established an independent High Court for the
Union Territory of Delhi. By an order dated October 31, 1966;-effective from October 31, 1966, the Government of India created a staff
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for the said High Court. The letter of the Government of India, which
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is Annexure-A to the Petition, sholvs that the President of India sanctioned the creation of certain posts for the Delhi High Court with
effect from October 31, 1966 or from the date of setting up· of the High
Court, whichever was later, upto February 28, 1967. Amongst these
posts, there was a post of an Assistant Registrar having a pay-scale of
Rs.500-30-800 plus (scales of pay and dearness allowance as admissible
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in Punjab). Among the other posts created were six posts of Private
Secretaries to Hon 'ble Judges of the High Court in the pay-scale of
Rs.350-20-450-25-475, six posts of Readers. and seven posts of
Superintendents. The pay-scale of all these posts was the same,
namely, Rs.350-20-450-25-475. The Delhi High Court started functioning with effect from October 31, 1966. The staff of the Punjab &
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Haryana High Court working in Delhi was, for the· time being, treated
as on deputation to the Delhi High Court till they were permanently
absorbed.in the Delhi High Court. From the time of its formation till
1971, the Delhi High Court had no rules of its own regarding condi- ·
tions of service or regarding the salary or seniority in respect of its
staff. Section 7 of the Delhi High Court Act,· 1966 (Act 26 of 1966), in
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
brief, provided that, subject to the provisions of the said Act, the law
in force immediately before the Appointed Day (31.10.1966) with
respect to practice and procedure in the High Court of Punjab shall,
with the necessary modificat:;);;S, apply in relation to the Delhi High
Court and conferred powers on the High Court of Delhi to make rules
and orders with respect to its practice and procedure, such powers
being the same as exerciseable by the High Court of Punjab
immediately before the Appointed Day. There was a proviso which
was to the effect that any rules or orders which were in force
immediately before the Appointed Day with respect to practice and
procedure in the High Court of Punjab shall, until varied or revoked
by rules or orders made by the High Court of Delhi, apply with the
necessary modifications in relation to practice and procedure in the
High Court of Delhi as if made by that High Court. The Delhi High
Court started in 1966 with four Hon'ble Judges including the Chief
Justice and among its staff inter alia were four Superintendents, four
Readers and three Private Secretaries ~gains! the sanctioned strength.
Under the powers conferred by Article 229 of the Constitution, the
Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court framed the Delhi High Court
Officers and Servants (Salaries, Leave, Allowances and Pension)
Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as "the Salary Rules of 1970") and
the Delhi High Court Staff (Seniority) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Seniority Rules of 1971"). Under the Salary Rules of
1970, the scale of pay for Superintendents, Readers and Private
Secretaries was the same, namely, Rs.350-20-475. With the increase of
work and the extension of the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High
Court, there was an increase in the number of Judges as well as staff of
the Court. According to the Petitioners, by March 1979, there were 21
Private Secretaries, 21 Readers and 13 Superintendents in the Delhi
High. Court. It appears that because of the increase in the number of
Jμdges, the increase in the post of Private Secretaries and Readers was
at a somewhat higher rate than that in the posts of Superintendents.
We are informed that in March 1988, the position was that there were
27 Private Secretaries, 30 Readers and 24 Superintendents in the same
pay scale. We may mention that Readers are now called Court Masters.
We may at this stage consider the Seniority Rules of 1971. Rule 3
of the said Rules provides that inter se seniority of confirmed
employees in any category of the High Court staff shall be determined
on the basis of the date of confirmation. Rule 5 of the said rules runs as
follows:
"Joint inter se seniority of confirmed employees in cate-
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEFJUSTICEOFDELHIHIGHCOURT[KANIA,J.]
777
gories of equal status posts shall be determined according
to their dates of confirmation in any of those categories."
Rule 9, with which we are not directly concerned, provides that certain
credit for purposes of seniority shall be given to an employee who
before his appointment as Assistant in the High Court was working on
any of the posts mentioned in Clause IV of Schedule II. Rule 2 contains certain definitions for phrposes of the said Rules. Rule 2(ii) runs
as follows:
" 'Equated post' means any of the posts shown as equated
posts, from time to time, in Schedule I to these rules".
Clause (iii) of the said R11le runs as follows:
" 'Equal status posts' rrians the posts shown to be ofequal
s.tatus, from time to time, in Schedule II to these rules".
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.
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Item (ii) of Schedule I under Rule 2 runs as follows:
"Equated Posts:
(i) x
x
x
x
x
x
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(ii) Judgment writers/Personal Assistant to Judges of
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Punjab & Haryana High Court (from 7.11.1964) and
Private Secretaries to Judges."
The relevant portion Of S~hedule II (See Rule 2) runs thus:
"Equal Status Posts:
(i) x
x
x
x
(ii) Superintendents, Court Masters, Private Secretaries
to Jugdes ..... ".
x
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(iii) x
(iv) x
(v) x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x G
x"
In exercise of the powers vested in the Chief Justice of the Delhi
High Court, he framed certain rules which were notified on 15th
September, 1972, called Delhi High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) .Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
as "Establishment Rules of 1972"). Rule 7 of the said Rules runs as follows:
"7. Mode of Appointment.
Except for appointment on officiating, temporary or
ad hoc basis, the mode of and qualifications for appointment to the posts specified in Schedule II to these rules
shall be as stated therein."
The material portion of Schedule II runs as follows:
Schedule-II (See Rule 7)
S. No. Category
of post
"J
x
1a
x
2
x
3
Assistant Registrar
(Selection post)
x
x
x
Minimum qualifi- Mode of appointment
cations prescribed
for appointment to
the posts
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
By selection on merit
from confirmed officers of categories 5,
6 & 7 of Class II
mentioned in
Schedule I.
x
x"
We may mention that Schedule ,I framed under Rule 4 mentions
the various categories of posts. Category 4 comprises Assistant
Registrars, Categories 5, 6 and 7 of Class II are Superintendents,
Court Masters and Private Secretaries to Judges, respectively.
The above provisions make it clear that certain posts were
treated as equated posts under Schedule I and certain posts were
treated as equal status posts under Schedule II to the said Seniority
Rules of 1971. It is clear that these provisions were made with a view to
provide transferability among persons holding these posts and to provide for channels of promotion to certain categories of employees who
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did not en joy a chance for promotion earlier with the result that there
was stagnation and frustration in the categories concerned. It may be
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICEOFDELHIHIGHCOURT[KANIA,J.]
779
noticed here that the posts of Judgment Writers, Personal Assistants
to Judges and Private Secretaries to Judges have been treated as
equated posts and the posts of Superintendents, Court Masters and
Private Secretaries to Judges have been treated as equal status posts.
Rule 5 of the Seniority Rules of 1971 set out by us earlier provides for a
joint seniority list of confirmed employees in categories of equal status
posts presumably with the same object as aforestated.
It may be noticed that prior to October 31, 1966 the position
relating to pay-scales was as follows:
1. Superintindent
350-20-500-30-650
Gazetted Post
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B
2. Reader
250-20-450
3. P. S. (Private Secretary) 150-10-300
Non-Gazetted Post
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Non-Gazetted Post.
Later on, there was a revision of scales of pay of these posts. It is not
necessary to consider all these revisions, but it may be noticed that at
the relevant time and thereafter under the Salary Rules of 1970 the o
Scales of Pay of the said three posts are the same, namely, Rs.350-25575. The said Rules have been framed as early as 1970 and the same
have not been challenged before us. It was under the Seniority Rules
of 1971 that the said posts were treated as equal status posts and Mr.
Thakur, learned Counsel for the Petitioners made it clear that he wa;
not challenging this portion of the Rules. In fact, in his opening he
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made it clear that he would not challenge any of the aforesaid Rules set
out earlier. However, we must mention that in the rejoinder an
attempt was made to challenge the joint seniority. list which would
imply a challenge to Rule 5 of the said Seniority Rules of 1971.
A joint seniority list of Superintendents, Readers and Private
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Secretaries was framed on May 8, 1972 but it was quashed on February
24th, 1975 when the seniority list of Readers was challenged. The
seniority list of Readers was quashed on October 10, 1975. A direction
was given in both the cases when the said joint seniority list was
quashed that a fresh list should be prepared in accordance with the
observations made in the judgment whereby the said list was quashed.
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Accordingly, fresh lists were made after hearing objections thereto
and were finalized in December, 1976. Occasions then arose for
temporary appointments to the posts of Assistant Registrars. That the ·
appointments to be made were temporary is not of much consequence
as later the confirmations were made in that very order. Under Rule 7
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of the Establishment Rules of 1972 appointments to the post of
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[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
Assistant Registrar are to be made by selection on merit from the three
categories, Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries. It
appears that it was felt that it would not be feasible to consider all the
incumbents of the posts in the said three categories because a proper
selection among such a large group would be impracticable and
extremely difficult. This appears to be the basis underlying the decision of the Administrative Judges at Annexure XVI to the Petition.
For delimiting the zone of consideration or field of choice in making,
the appointments which had to be made by selection on merits, after
considering various modes for delimiting the zones of consideration, it
was decided at the meeting of the Administrative Committee of the
Judges of the Delhi High Court held on February 3, 1977 that the zone
of consideration or field of choice should be limited to the first five
names in the finalized joint seniority list of Superintendents, Readers
and Private Secretaries, that is, for each post of Assistant Registrar to
be filled in by selection on merits, five persons from the finalized joint
seniority list had to be considered in order of seniority, and the selection between tlrem made on merits. In other words, if appointments
were to be made to two posts of Assistant Registrars, the first ten
employees in the joint seniority list would be included in the zone of
consideration. It was further decided that no written test or interview
was to be held for the purposes of selection. We are not referring here
to any individual promotion made on this basis because the grievance
made is against this mode of selection itself and not against any
particular promotion. We may mention here that, as set out earlier,
when the Delhi . High Court Started functioning, the authorised
strength in the relevant categories was six Private Secretaries to the
Judges, six Readers (same as Court Masters) and seven Superintendents. With the passage of time the number of posts in three categories
has risen fairly sharply. As aforestated by March 1979, according to
the Petitioners, there were 21 Private Secretaries, 21 Readers and 13
Superintendents and by March 1988 there were 27 Private Secretaries
to Judges, 30 Readers or Court Masters and 24 Superintendents.
Although there is a little controversy regarding these figures, it is not
of any consequence irl the case before us. All that need be noticed is
that the increase in the number of Readers and Private Secretaries has
been higher percentagewise than that in the case of Superintendents
because with increasing work and increase in the number of Judges,
the number of Private Secretaries and Readers had necessarily to rise
in proportion whereas the number of Superintendents had not gone up·
quite in the same proportion. It may be mentioned that there was some
grievance made regarding differences in the method of selection
employed on different occasions when vacancies arose of requiring
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S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICEOFDELHIHIGH COURT [KANIA, J.J
781
temporary appointments to the posts of Assistant Registrars. There is, A
however, not much substance in that grievance as we shall point out
later.
The first submission of Mr .. - Thakur, learned Counsel for the
petitioners is that there is a vioiation of Article 14 of the Constitution
in treating the posts of Superintendents, Court Masters or Readers B
and Private Secretaries \o the Judges as equal status posts. It was
urged by him that the sources of recruitment to these posts were not
identical and so also the qualifications required for appointments to
these posts. He also pointed out that the duties of the incumbents of
these posts were different. It was submitted by him that in treating
these posts as equal status posts unequals were treated equally and
hence the rule .of equality was violated. In appreciating this submisC
sion, it must be borne in mind that it is an accepted principle that
where there is an employer who has a large number of employees in his
service performing diverse duties, he must en joy a certain measure of
discretion in treating different categories of his employees as holding
equal status posts or equated posts, as questions of promotion or transD
fer of employees inter se will necessarily arise for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of the organisation .. There is, therefore, nothing
inherently wrong in an employer treating certain posts as equated
posts or equal status posts provided that, in doing so, he exercises his
discretion reasonably and does· not violate the principles of equality
enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also clear that E
for treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts, it is not
necessary that the holders of these posts must perform completely the
same functions or that the sources of recruitment to the posts must be
the same nor is it essential that qualifications for appointments to the
posts must be identical. All that is reasonably required is that there
must not be such difference in the pay-scales or qualifications of the F
incumbents of the posts concerned or in their duties or responsibilities
· or regarding any other relevant factor that it would be unjust t~ treat
the posts alike or, in other words, that posts having substantially
higher pay-scales or status in service or carrying substantially heavier
responsibilities and duties or otherwise distinctly superior are not
equated with posts carrying much lower pay-scales or substantially
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lower .responsibilities and,duties or enjoying much lower status in
service.
As far as the case before us is concerned, although Mr. Thakur,
learned Counsel for the Petitioners has urged that aforesaid posts,
namely, Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers could not
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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be treated as equated posts or equal status posts, he was unable to
point out to us specifically any such difference in respect of the requisite qualifications of the holders of different categories of these
posts or regarding the duties and responsibilities carried by these posts
as were so marked or significant that it would be unfair or violative of
the rule of equality to treat these posts as equal status posis. In fact, it
may be mentioned that at one stage in his opening, Mr. Thakur specifically stated that he did not challenge the vires of any of the said
Seniority Rules of 1971. If that is so, we fail to see how he can
challenge the aforesaid posts being treated as equal status posts as that
has been done under the said Seniority Rules of 1971 which have been
framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers conferred upon
him under Article 229 of the Constitution of Ihdia. Even if one is to
examine the contention on merits, we are afraid, it must fail. A perusal
of items 5, 6 and 7 of Schedule I to the said Salary Rules of 1970 shows
that under the said Rules which were framed as early as 1970, the
salary scale of Superintendents, Court Masters (Readers) and Private
Secretaries is the same, viz., Rs.350-25-575. There is, therefore, no
D difference in the scales of salary. As far as the qualifications for
appointment are concerned, under rule 7 it is provided that these
qualifications are as specified in Schedule II. Items 4, 5 and 6 of the
said Schedule inter alia provide for the qualifications for appointments
to the said posts and it is undoubtedly true that the qualifications
required for appointment to these posts are not identical. In the case
E of Superintendents, it appears, very briefly stated, that appointments
to 25 per cent of these posts are to be made on the basis of senioritycum-suitability from the joint seniority list of categories 9, 10, 11, 13,
14 and 16 of Class III mentioned in Schedule I and 75 per cent of the
posts are to be filled by selection on merit from the same categories.
The categories of posts from whieh promotions or selections can be
made to the posts of Court Masters are substantially the same. As far
as the Private Secretaries are concerned, the mode of appointment is
by selection and the qualifications prescribed are that a graduate
degree is reqnired for appointment of the said post and a further
requirement is a speed of not less than 120 words per minute in
G
shorthand and 45 words per minute in typewriting. A perusal of the
said provisions shows that the.qualifications required for appointment
to the post of a Private Secretary are certainly higher than the qualifications required for appointment to the post of a Superintendent or a
Court Master although for the latter two categories, probably, more
experience would be required. Thus, one fails to see how any grievance can be made by the Superintendents on this score. As far as the
duties these posts carry. are concerned, undoubtedly they are not the
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHIHIGH COURT [KANIA, J.)
783
same, But Rule 8(c) of the Establishment Rules of 1972 provides that
. any person appointed to the post in one category may be transferred to
a post of equal status in any other category. The validity of this Rule
has not been challenged before us. This would show that even if the
duties and responsibilities attached to these posts are not the same,
they were not so materially different as to render it inequitable that
these posts should be treated on the same footing for the purposes of
promotion and transfer. It may be that because of the requirement that
a Court Master must be a graduate and having a certain typing speed,
Superintendents could not be generally transferred to the posts of
Private Secretaries. But one fails to see how any grievance can be
made on that score by the Superint~ndents.
The view which we have taken, as set out earlier, finds support
from the decision of this Court in V. T. Khanzode & Ors. v. Reserve
Bank of India & Anr., [1982] 3 S.C.R. 411 rendered by a Bench
comprising three learned Judges of this Court. In that case, by
Administrative Circular No. 8 dated January 7, 1978 the Reserve Bank
of India stated that it had decided to combine the seniority list of all
officers on the basis of their total length of service (including officiating service) in Group I (Se.ction A), Group II and Group III. The
seniority of all officers in each of the tb.ree Groups was to be combined
with effect from May 22, 1974 on the basis of their total length of
service, including officiating service, in the grade in which they were
then posted on a regular basis. The Circular introduced combined
seniority with retrospective effect from May 22, 1974 (the date of an
earlier Administrative Circular No. 15) as it was "fair and equitable to
the officers as a class". The effect of this decision was that the
groupwise system of seniority which was in existence in the bank for
more than 27 years stood substituted by a combined seniority for officers in the aforesaid grades with retrospective effect. This adversely
affected the existing seniority of many officers, particularly those in
Group I. The validity of this Administrative Circular was challenged.
This Court held that ihe said Administrative Circular N,,, 'l and the
draft combined seniority list prepared pursuant to it did not 'iolate the
rights of the petitioners under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Whether there should be a combined seniority in different cadres or
groups is a matter of policy which does not attract the applicability of
the equality clause. The Court pointed out that the past events showed
that the various Departments of the Reserve Bank of India were
grouped and regrouped from time to time. Such adjustments in the
administrative affairs of the Bank were a necessary sequel to the growing demands of new situations which are bound to arise in any developA
B
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8
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784
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988J Supp. 2 s.c.R.
ing economy. The Court pointed out further that no scheme governing
service matters can be fool-proof and some section or the other of
employees is bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectations
being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled. Arbitrariness, irrationality,
perversity and ma/a [ides will of course render any scheme unconstitutional but the fact that the scheme does not satisfy the expectations of
every employees is not evidence of these. This decision clearly leads to
a conclusion that grouping and regrouping of differrent categories of
employees is inevitable in a large organisation with a view of meeting
changing situations and needs of a live organisation. Merely because
the chances of promotion of some employees are adversely affected by
such grouping or regrouping, that does not lead to a conclusion that it
is against the law. We may point out that in the case before us, there is
no contention urged before us that the equating of posts or the combined seniority list was promoted by any malafides. We fail to see how
the combined seniority list or the treating of the said posts as equal
status posts can be said to be arbitrary in the absence of any material
and, particularly, in view of the fact that the learned Chief Justice and
D the learned Judges of the Delhi High Court considered the facts and
took the view that it was necessary in order to provide for transfers
from one department to another and to provide adequate promotional
opportunities to various sections of the employees of the Delhi High
Court.
E
Apart from this, it must be observed that the challenge to the
said posts being treated as equal status posts comes much too late to
the entertained in the writ petition. These posts were treated as equal
status posts under Rule 2 read with the Schedules to the said Seniority
Rules of 1971 and certain promotions have also been made under the
said Rules. These Rules became effective in 1971 and it is much too
fl
late to seek to challenge them in 1979, long after the Rules have been
given effect to. It may be mentioned that, although they did make
representations, the petitioners chose to file the Writ Petition only as
late as in 1979. In our view, the challenge to the Rules providing for
the said posts being treated as equated posts or equal status posts can
be negatived on the ground of delay or latches apart from other
d considerations.
The next submission of learned Counsel, Mr. Thakur, which he
stated was his main submission, is that under the relevant Rules an
appointment to the post of Assistant Registrar has to be made ·by
selection from Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers or
H Court Masters and hence all employees holding these posts in a perma-
•.
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OFDELHIHIGH COURT [KANIA,J.]
785
nent capacity must be considered to be eligible and within the zone of
consideration f~r selection to these posts. It was not open to the
learned 'Chief Justice, Respondent no. 1 herein, to limit that zone of
consideration in any manner. He drew our attention to the Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules of 1972 and in
particular Item No. 3 of Schedule II thereof framed under Rule 7 of
the said Rules. He pointed out that under the said item, the appointment to the post of Assistant Registrar, which is a selection post is to
be made by selection on merit from categories of officers of categories
A
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5, 6 & 7 of Class II mentioned in Schedule I, namely, Superintendents,
Court Masters (Readers) and Private Secretaries. It was submitted by
him that this Rule excluded any reference to seniority and even if it
was open to the appointing authority to limit or restrict the zone of
consideration it could not be. limited with reference to seniority.
C
It was urged by Mr. Thakur that the rule that the promotion was
to be made on the basis of selection on merit prescribed by the Chief
Justice in conscious exercise of his powers conferred under Article 229
of the Constitution the decision to restrict the zone of consideration to o,
four or five times the number of posts available on the basis of senio:
rity under the combined seniority list was a mere administrative
instruction or decision. It was submitted by him that the said
administrative instruction or decision is in conflict with the rules
prescribing the method of selection by merit and hence it is bad in law.
We propose to proceed on the assumption that Mr. Thakur may be
E
right in his contention that mere administrative instructions cannot
override rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 229 of the Constitution although the person issuing the administrative instruction may be the same person who prescribes the rules, as in
the case before us. Even then, it has to be considered whether the said
administrative instructions or decision in any way conflicts with the
F
rules. In this connection Mr. Thakur drew our attention to the decision
of this Court in the case of Guman Singh v. State of Rajas than and
Ors., [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 900. The few facts which need to be noticed
in connection with this case are that in 1965 the State of Rajasthan
decided to introduce the system of making promotions to the service
on the basis of merit alone in addition to the existing system of making G
promotions on the basis oJ seniority-cum-merit. On December 14,
1965, Rule 28B was incorporated into Rajasthan Administr.ative Sewice
Rules, i954, providing for appointment by promotion to posts in the
'service on the basis of merit and on the basis of seniority-cum-merit in
the proportion of 50:50 and prescribing that the· number of eligible
·candidates to be considered for promotion was to be 10 times the total
H
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786
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
number of vacancies to be filled up on the basis of merit as well as
seniority-cum-merit. Prior to August 26, 1966, Rule 2SB was amended
but we .are not concerned with such amendments .. On that date, Rule
28B was further amended by providing that the proportion of promotion to be made by selection on the basis of merit and seniority-cummerit was to be 1:2 instead of 50:50. On the same date, a proviso was
also added to sub-rule (2) of Rule 28B providing that only officers who
have been in service for not less than 6 years in the lower grade of the
cadre will be eligible for being considered for the first promotion in the
cadre. There was, however, a circular issued subsequently, that is,
after the said Rules were framed which provided that 50 marks were to
be given for the record of 5 years prior to the period of 5 years preceding the selection; and for the five years preceding the selection the
marking of 25 was to be given on the basis of confidential rolls. The
validity of this Circular was challenged on various grounds. This Court
took the view that from the Circular it was clear that an officer who has
rendered less than five years of service will not be eligible to get a
single mark out of 50 which is provided for the record for the period
D
preceding five years for the simple reason that he will have no such
record. An officer who has put in less than five years of service has
been straightaway denied 50 marks out of 75 marks and he has to
establish his worth within the small range of 25 marks on the basis of
his confidential rolls which will be available for a period of less than
five years. It was held that this formula which was prescribed in the
E
circular was opposed to Rule 28B and Rule 32 which ensured that
merit and merit alone was to form the basis of promotion as against the
quota fixed for merit, in contradistinction to seniority-cum-merit. It
may be pointed out that in that case the circular in question stated that
the instructions contained therein should be s,trictly kept in view when
•
persons are being considered for promotion. In view of this the CircuF
Jar was held to be invalid. In our view, this decision does not lend
support to the submission of learned Counsel, Mr. Thakur. This Court
pointed out that Rule 28B of the Rajasthan Administrative Service
Rules, 1954, in brief, provided for two methods of selection; one based
on merit and the other based on seniority-cum-merit. In other words,
the rule provides that the promotion based on merit for 50 per cent of
G the posts in contradistinction to that based on seniority-cum-merit
prescribed for the other 50 per cent of the posts and that the selection
on merit shall'be strictly on the basis of merit. Rule 32 was similar to
Rule 28B. It was pointed out that by this Court the word 'merit' is not
capable of easy definition, but it can be safely said that merit is the sum
total of various qualities and attributes of an employee such as his
H. academic qualifications, his distinction in the University, his charac-
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OFDELHIHIGHCOURT [KANIA, J.J
787
ter, integrity, dtvotion to duty and the mannerjn-whiCh he discharges
his duties. Allied to this may be othe;.matters or factors such as his A
punctuality in work, the quality and out-turn of work done by him and
the manner of his dealing with his superiors and subordinate officers
and .the general public and his rank in the service. Rule 32 in essence
adopts what is stated in Rule 28B. It was held that the restriction
contained in the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 28B. providing that B
before an officer in the junior scale could be considered fit for promotion to the senior scale, he should have worked on post in the service at
least for some period of time, was quite reasonable. The provisions contained in sub-rule (2) confining the selection to seniormost officers not
exceeding 10 times the number of total vacancies was also held to be
reasonable. Such a provision would encourage the members of the
service aspiring for promotion to make themselves eligible by increasC
ing their efficiency in the discharge of their duti.es.