# S. C. Pr(j/jhar, Income-tax Officer v. V"""ntaen D1DtJrlcadaa

- **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 137
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 509 of 1958
- **Bench:** S; K: Das, J. L. Kapur, A. K. Sarkar, M. IfIDAYATULLAH, Ragiiubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-c-pr-j-jhar-income-tax-officer-v-v-ntaen-d1dtjrlcadaa-2878
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Income-tax-Escaped income-Failure to submit retunl.-
- Kotice to
reasaess-Validity-Retro.,pective operation-Indian
Income-tax and Business Profits Taz (Amendment) Act, 1948
(48 of 1948), s. 8-Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953
(25of1953), s. 31-Indian Income-tax Act, 1~22 (11,,o/1922),
•· 34, as amended.·
. ,
·
.
-
- .. -
In th~ year of acrouut relevant to the aSl!essment year 194243, the assessee received Rs. 9,180{-, but submitted no return -of
her income. On July 25, 1949, the Income-tax Ofhcer, on
receipt of definite information that such income had escaped
assessment, issued a notice -to her under s. 34 of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended by the Indian Income-tax
and Business Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948. Thereafter,
she was assessed on the aforesaid income on October 24, 1949.
She challenged the validity of the proceedings under s, 34 initiated on July 25, 1949, on the grounds, that the right to revive
the assessment was governed by the provisions of s. 34, before
it was amended in 1948, under which the period of limitation -
prescribed was four years in the case of a failure to file a return
and that this period having expired on March 31, 1947, and
the Amending Act of 1948 having come into - force only
March 30, 1948, the eight years' period provided therein could
not be invoked .. For the Income-tax Authorities, the validity
of the notice was sought to be sustained by the additional
ground that; in any case, s.' 31 of the Indian Income-tax
(Amendment) Act, 1953, validated the notice.
·' -
\
\
Held (per 'Sarkar,. Hidayatullah and Reghubar Dayal,.U.,
Das and Kapur,.U., dissenting), thats. 34 of the Indian Incomctax and Business Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948, was applicable to the proceedings in the present case and that the notice
dated July 25, 1949, was valid.
,
1962
. D1cnn1'tr, 12 •
1961
~ofbt
__
,Mffllnl
y,
JtllldM MrJ..M
H"'uia Hotitll
.cm-I
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOIM
Per Das and Kapur, lJ.-The limitation of eight years
prescribed by s. 34 as amended by the Amending Act of J 948
did not apply to the present assesscc which was a ~
of failure
to submit the return, when the period of four ycan had expired
bcfo1e March 30, 1948, when the amendment Ins. 34 was made
by the Amending Act of 1948. Section 31 of the Amending
Act of 1953 did not enlarge the acopc of the amcnmd s. 34, and
did not valldate the notice dated July 25, 1949.
Per Sarkar, J.-By virtue of s. 31 of the Amending Act
of 1953, a notice isrued and an order of assessment made in
respect of a year ended before April I, 1948, where the proceedings were conuncnccd after September 8, 1948, were to be held
valid if the notice was issued in accordance with sub-a. (I) of
a. 34 as it stood after 1948 amendment and the assessment was
completed in pursuance of •uch notice within the time spcci6cd
in rub-s. (3). The notice and aascssment in the present caac
satisfied all th= conditions and, therefore, s. 34 as amended in
1948 was applicable. Such a noiice and an assc'9mcnt order
valid under s. 34 as amended In 1948 would be valid even If
the time prescribed in respect of them by a. 34 as it 1tood bcf.>re'
the 1948 amendment had expired.
Per Hidayatullah and Raghubar Dayal, .U .-The action
was taken after 1948 amendment by which income, profits and
gains which had escaped assessment by reason of the omi·
ssion or failure of the as9CSSCC to make a return of the income
could be brought to tax after serving a notice within eight yean
from the end of the relevant year. Hence the notice In 1949
was within eight years from 1942-43 and was validly isrucd.
S. C. Pr(j/jhar, Income-tax Officer v. V"""ntaen D1DtJrlcadaa,
(1964] Vol. I S.C.R. 29., relied on.

## Text

\ '
\
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
C...OMMISSIONER- OF INCOME.TAX,~·
.\'
MADRAS
JANABHA. l\1UHAMMAD HUSSAIN
NACHIAR Al\1MAL
(S; K: DAS,J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR,
M. IfIDAYATULLAH and RAGIIUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Income-tax-Escaped income-Failure to submit retunl.-
- Kotice to
reasaess-Validity-Retro.,pective operation-Indian
Income-tax and Business Profits Taz (Amendment) Act, 1948
(48 of 1948), s. 8-Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953
(25of1953), s. 31-Indian Income-tax Act, 1~22 (11,,o/1922),
•· 34, as amended.·
. ,
·
.
-
- .. -
In th~ year of acrouut relevant to the aSl!essment year 194243, the assessee received Rs. 9,180{-, but submitted no return -of
her income. On July 25, 1949, the Income-tax Ofhcer, on
receipt of definite information that such income had escaped
assessment, issued a notice -to her under s. 34 of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended by the Indian Income-tax
and Business Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948. Thereafter,
she was assessed on the aforesaid income on October 24, 1949.
She challenged the validity of the proceedings under s, 34 initiated on July 25, 1949, on the grounds, that the right to revive
the assessment was governed by the provisions of s. 34, before
it was amended in 1948, under which the period of limitation -
prescribed was four years in the case of a failure to file a return
and that this period having expired on March 31, 1947, and
the Amending Act of 1948 having come into - force only
March 30, 1948, the eight years' period provided therein could
not be invoked .. For the Income-tax Authorities, the validity
of the notice was sought to be sustained by the additional
ground that; in any case, s.' 31 of the Indian Income-tax
(Amendment) Act, 1953, validated the notice.
·' -
\
\
Held (per 'Sarkar,. Hidayatullah and Reghubar Dayal,.U.,
Das and Kapur,.U., dissenting), thats. 34 of the Indian Incomctax and Business Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948, was applicable to the proceedings in the present case and that the notice
dated July 25, 1949, was valid.
,
1962
. D1cnn1'tr, 12 •
1961
~ofbt
__
,Mffllnl
y,
JtllldM MrJ..M
H"'uia Hotitll
.cm-I
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOIM
Per Das and Kapur, lJ.-The limitation of eight years
prescribed by s. 34 as amended by the Amending Act of J 948
did not apply to the present assesscc which was a ~
of failure
to submit the return, when the period of four ycan had expired
bcfo1e March 30, 1948, when the amendment Ins. 34 was made
by the Amending Act of 1948. Section 31 of the Amending
Act of 1953 did not enlarge the acopc of the amcnmd s. 34, and
did not valldate the notice dated July 25, 1949.
Per Sarkar, J.-By virtue of s. 31 of the Amending Act
of 1953, a notice isrued and an order of assessment made in
respect of a year ended before April I, 1948, where the proceedings were conuncnccd after September 8, 1948, were to be held
valid if the notice was issued in accordance with sub-a. (I) of
a. 34 as it stood after 1948 amendment and the assessment was
completed in pursuance of •uch notice within the time spcci6cd
in rub-s. (3). The notice and aascssment in the present caac
satisfied all th= conditions and, therefore, s. 34 as amended in
1948 was applicable. Such a noiice and an assc'9mcnt order
valid under s. 34 as amended In 1948 would be valid even If
the time prescribed in respect of them by a. 34 as it 1tood bcf.>re'
the 1948 amendment had expired.
Per Hidayatullah and Raghubar Dayal, .U .-The action
was taken after 1948 amendment by which income, profits and
gains which had escaped assessment by reason of the omi·
ssion or failure of the as9CSSCC to make a return of the income
could be brought to tax after serving a notice within eight yean
from the end of the relevant year. Hence the notice In 1949
was within eight years from 1942-43 and was validly isrucd.
S. C. Pr(j/jhar, Income-tax Officer v. V"""ntaen D1DtJrlcadaa,
(1964] Vol. I S.C.R. 29., relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 509 of 1958.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
February 22, 1956, of the Madras High Court in
Case referred No. 66/52.
K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and P. D. Menon, for
appellant.
T. S. Venkataraman and M. K. Ramamurthi, for
respondents.
•
'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
1962. December 12.-The following judgments
were delivered. S. K. Das J., J. L. Kapur J., and
A. K. Sarkar, J., delivered separate judgments. The
judgment of M. Hidayatullah aud Raghubar Dayal,
JJ., was delivered by Hidayatullah, J.
1962
Cornm-issi"1rer of
lnu17U-tat) Madras
Y,
Janahha Muhammad
Hussain Nachiar
Ammal
S. K. DAs, J.-The facts of this appeal have
Das, 1.
been stated by my learned brother Kapur, J., and as
I am in agreement with him, I need not re-state
the facts.
The relevant assessment year was 1942-194:l.
The proceedings under s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax
Act, 1922, were initiated with the issue of a notice on
July 25, 1949. Th,e assessee's contention was that
the initiation of proceedings on July 25, 1949,
was
invalid
as
the
department's
right to
revive the assessment was governed by old s. 34
wh'ere the period of limitation prescribed was only
four years in the case of a failure to file a return and
this period having expired on March 31,1947, and
the Amending Act of 1948 (XLVIII of 1948) having
come into force on March 30, 194S, the eight years'
provided period therein could not be invoked.
The
High Court upheld this contention and said :
"In our opinion, the contention of the learned
counsel for the assessee is well founded, that
the new rule
of limitation of eight years
prescribed by the amended section 34 would
not apply to the case of the assessee before us,
whose was an instance of a failure to submit
a return, when the period of four years had
ran out long before 30th March 1948 when the
amended section 34 came into force as part of
the Income-tax Act with effect from that date,
30th March 1948.
The learned
counsel
for the Department
next referred to section 31 of Act XXV of 1953
1911
C.-iui- qf
1--1o,Modru
••
J..ulu.MrJo.,.,..d
llwm. Nacl#.1<
A...i
Da, J.
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
in support of his contention, that )he notice
issued on 25th July 1949 was valid.
The
learned counsel himself had to realise that
section 31 of Act XXV of 1953 did not enlarge
the scope of the amended section 34; nor did
it purport to amend it.
The validity of the
notice, dated 25th July 1949 will still have to
be decided with reference to the provisions of
the amended section 34.
Section
31 of Act
XXV of I 953 docs not therefore affect the
question at issue, whether the extended period
of limitation of eight years would apply to
the assessee
when the period· of limitation
applicable to the assessee had expired before
the amended section 34 came into force on
30th March 1948."
For the reasons given by me in S. C. Prashar,
bwome.tax Officer v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas (1) (C. A.
705/1957) in which Judgment has been delivered to·
day, I think that the High Court correctly answered
the question referred to it.
I would therefore dismiss the appeal with
costs.
KAPUR, J. -This is an appeal against the
judgment and order of the High Court of Madras.
The appellant is the Commissioner of Income·tax and
the respondent is the asse3See and the year of assess.
ment is 1942.43.
The respondent is the wife of one Sheikh Abdul
Khadar who was residing abroad in Bangkok from
September 1940 to July 1947. During that period he
remitted moneys in the name of his agent for payment
to the respondent.
In the account year the aggre·
gate amount so remitted was Rs. 9,180/·.
The
respondent submitted no return of her income as she
was bound to do and the amount became taxable
(I) [1964) Vul.18,C.R. 29.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
under s. 4 (2) of the Income-tax Act, hereinafter
referred to as the "Act''. In 1949 the Income-tax
Officer on receipt of definite information that such
income had escaped asse55ment issued a notice under
s. 34 of the Act as amended by the Amending Act of
1948 and an appeal was taken to the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner but the assessment was confirmed.
A further appeal to the Income-tax Appel·
late Tribunal Madras, was also unsuccessful.
The
reference was thereupon made to the High Court
and one of the questions referred was :-
"Whether the proceedings under section 34 of
the Indian Income-tax Act initiated on 25th
July, 1949 to assess the amount of Rs. 9,180/-
which escaped assessment during the year
1942-43 by failure to submit a voluntary
return are valid in law"?
It was held that the limitation of eight years prescribed
bys. 34 as amended by the Amending Act of 1948
did not apply
to the case of the assessee which
was a case of failure to submit the return and the
period of four years' had expired before March 30,
1948, when the amendment in s. 34 was made by
Amending Act of 1948. It was also held that s. 31
of the Amending Act of 1953 was not applicable and
the question was therefore answered in the negative.
Against that judgment and order the Commissioner
of Income-tax has come in appeal to this Court.
This case is governed by the decision in C. A.
No. 7 J5/57 (S. 0. Prashar, Income-tax Officer v.
Vasantsen Dwa.rkadas) (1) the judgment in which has
been delivered today. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
The appellant was granted the
certificate by the High Court expressly on the condition that he would pay the costs of this appeal in any
event to which he had agreed.
(I) (1964] Vol, I ~.C.R. 29.
1962
Commissiontr of
Income-tax, Madras
v.
J an<blui Muluimmdd
Hussain N acJiiar
Ammal
Kapur, J.
' .
.. -.--?-; ·,..---.-. -~ '
. ,....
'-.
~
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. -
, . ..!!!!__
SARKAR, J.-The respondent jn this appeal is -
Commis,;,.,,. ef
-the assessee. She is the wife _of ,one Sheikh Abdul
Incom.-iax, Mulras _ Khader who lived in Siam. _ In the year 19!1-42,
J cnalha M•hammad she received from her husband from Siam a sum of
Hus•;t;:.,:;chiar : Rs. 9,180/-• .. It is not disputed that this amount
- constituted,"income" in her hands withins. 4 (2) of
Sarkar, 1._
the Income-tax Act; 1922. , She. did not however
submit any return in respect of it. On July 25, 19-19,
- a notice· under s. 34 of the Act was issued to her
asking .her .. to file
a -return. Thereafter she . was
assessed on the aforesaid- income on -.October 24,
1949. She
appealed
from that order
but was
unsuccessful in having the assessment set aside.
At
her request, the 'Appellate Tribunal submitted the
·following question'to .the . High Court at 11adras for
its decision : -
: · · · · _
- - · · ·
-·
<
•
-
•
'
'
•
• •
-.-
•
-
•
' '•.-Whether 'the procee~i~gs under section 34 o
- the Indian lnc<inie-taX: Act· initiated on 25th
July 1949 ._to .assess the amount of Rs. 9,180/-
J.·,<': __ -which escaped assessment during the year 1942-
. 43 by failure to submit· a voluntary return
--
are valid in law ?'" ·
·
·
jjI
··.i ''--'
The Hlgh : Court answered the question in the
negative; . · The revenue. authorities have, therefore,
: come up, in appeal. . ·
-
--
SectiOn 3-1 contains· provisions _for_ assessment
. and re-assessment· in cases where income for. any
year· has not in the relevant assessment year been
fully assessed for the reasons mentioned in it. With
. , these reasons. it is· not' necessary to trouble ourselves
in this appeal. Sub:section (1) of s. 34 deals with
the period of time_ within which a notice calling for
a return of the .escaped income may be served and
_ sub-s. (3) deals with time within -which the assess-
' ment can be made. This section was amended by
the Income-tax and Business Profits Tax (Amendment)
Act,
19-18. ' This Act was . passed on.
'
/
J
{
I
:
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
143
September 8, 1948 but the section which amended
s. 34, of the Incqme-tax Act was brought into force
retrospectively from March 30, 1948. It is not in
dispute that under s. 34, as it stood before the
amendment, the time to issue the notice calling for a
return and to make the assessment in this case had
expired on March 31, 1947, that is, on the expiry of
four years after the year in which the escaped income
was first assessable, namely, 1942-43. It is not in
dispute either that under s. 34, as it stood after the
amendment in 1948, the notice could be served and
an assessment made within eight years from the end
of that year, that is, in this case, within March 31,
1951. The notice and the assessment order impugned
in this case have, therefore, to be held to be valid if
s. 3 ! after its amendment in 1946 was applicable.
It is the contention of the appellant that it was so
applicable.
The High Court held that the time
having already expired under the existing law, the
amended section 34 could not be given retrospective
operation to validate the notice and the order of
assessment.
Now, on May 24,
1953, was passed the
Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953, (XXV of 1953)
which was brought into force retrospectively from
April l, 1952. This Act contained a section, namely,
s. 31, which to my mind makes s. 34 as amended by
the 1948 amending Act, applicable to the proceedings
in this case.
I am unable to accept the High Court's
view to the contrary and regret my inability to
comprehend the reasons on which that view is based.
That section also amended sub-s. (3) of s. 34 so as to
include in it provisions regarding the time of the
issue of the notice but we will not be concerned with
this amendment in this appeal. Now, s. 31 is in these
terms :
Section 31.
"For the removal of doubts it is
hereby
declared
that
the
provisions
of
1961
Com11.irsionn of
Income-lax, Matlra1
v.
J.,..bha Muhammad
HwsaiG N ach~
.4.mmal
Sarw, J.
•
1962
CommissiOfltr of
l"omt·tax1 Mtzihas
••
JtJltdha Aluhamrnad
HUJSJJiJJ }{achi#
A mm al
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 34 of
the principal Act shall apply and shall be
deemed always to have applied to any assessment or re-assessment for any year ending
before the 1st day of April, I !l48, in any case
where proceedings in respect of such assessment
or
re.assessment were commenced
under
the
said
sub-sections
after
the 8th day
of September, 1948, and any notice issued
in accordance with sub-section (I) or any
assessment completed in pursuance of such
notice within the time specified in sub-section(3),
whether before or after the commencement of
the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953,
shall, notwithstanding any judgment or order
of any Court, Appellate Tribunal or Incometax authority to the contrary, be deemed to
have been validly issued or completed, as the
case may be, and no such notice, assessment or
re-assessment shall be called in question on the
ground merely that the provisions of section 34
did not apply or purport to apply in respect
of an assessment or re-assessment for any year
prior to the 1st day of April 1948."
No question as to sub-s. (2) of s. 34 mentioned in
this seclion arises in this appeal and that sub-section
may be left out of consideration.
It seems to me quite plain that s. 31 of the
1953 Act applies sub-ss. (I) and (3) of s. 34 of the
Income-tax Act, l!J22 (hereafter called the principal
Act), as it stood after the 194H amendment, to assessment proceedings in respect of years ending before
April l, I 948 where the proceedings commenced
after September 8, 19+8 and makes the validity of
the proceedings depend on that section as so amended.
Indeed, the contrary has not been contended
at the bar. It has to be remembered that the amending Act of 1948 was passed on September 8, 1948
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
but it was given retrospective effect from March 30,
I 948. It may be stated that the amending Act repealed
the existing s. 34 of the principal Act and substituted
for it a new section.
I think it is quite clear that
the pre-existing s. 34 which was repealed by theJ948
amendment could not have applied to proceedings
commenced after repeal. There was no question of
applying the pre-existing law to such proceedings.
But where the proceedings related to a period
when the per-existing law was in force,
there
might be some doubt as to which law was to apply.
Section 31 was enacted to remove that doubt and
to make s. 34 of the principal Act as it stood after
the l 948 amendment applica':>le to these proceedings.
That is why the words "shall always be deemed to
have applied" are used; they emphasise that the amen·
ded section is deemed always to have applied to
proceeding• even in respect of a period when the
amendment had not been made. The latter part of
s. 31 also makes this view equally clear. It says
that no notice or order of assessment shall be called
in question on the ground that s. 34 did not apply
in respect of assessment for a
year prior to
April 1, 1948. Section 34 here contemplated must
be the section as amended in 1948, for if it was not
so, then it would be the pre-existing section which
of course would have applied, if not repealed, to an
assessment for a year ending prior to April l, 1948
and no question of its not so applying would have
arisen.
I thus arrive at the conclusion that under
s. 31 of the 1953 Act, the provisions of sulrss. (1)
and (3)-I leave sub-s. (2) out a5 irrelevant-of s. 34
of the principal Act as amended in 1948 are to be
applied and deemed always to have applied to assessment proceedings in respect of a year ended before
April l, 1948 where the proceedings were commenced
after September 8, 1948,
A notice issued and an
order of assessment made in such proceedings are to
IJ61
CommisJW.,, of
ln&am1-ta, MWM
••
1.,.,,i,1ia M.Mmm.J
Hus1ain N•dail
bullllJ
Sar"'6, J.
•
1962
CommissiOfttr of
lf&COmt·tax, Madras
v.
J1·n~h"4 Mu!ramm,,d
Hussafri Nathiar
Arnmal
S<tlcn, J.
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
be held valid if the notice is issued "in accord~nce
with sub-section (l)" of s. 34 as it stood after the
1948 amendment and the assessment is "completed
in pursuance of such notice within the tim(' specified
in sub-section (3)" of the sames. 34. Now the notice
and assessment in the present case satisfy all these
conditions. To them, therefore, s. 34 as amended
in 1948 applies. Judged by that section, admittedly
the notice and assessment order are unexceptionable.
1 t is true that in the present case when the notice
was issued and the assessment made, the time to do
either under the law as it stood before the 1948
amendment had expired. It may be that that law
would have applied to it if the 1953 Act had not
been passed. It may also be, as was said in the
Calcutta Discount Co. (') case, that by itself, the
1948 amendment of s. 34 would not have permitted
assessment proceedings in respect of 1942-43 to be
commenced in 1949 when under the previous law the
time to issue a notice and to make an assessment for
that year had expired before the 1948 amendment
had come into force.
All this however is to no pur·
pose. No such question arises here. The legislature
had undoubtedly the power to makes. 34 as amended
in 1948 apply to an assessment for 1942-43 by giving
it a retrospective operation inspite of the time to issue
a notice and to make an assessment fixed by the pre·
existing law having expired before the amendment
came into effect.
The question really is one of interpretation, namely, whether the legislature had given
such retrospective operation.
Now it seems to me that s. 31 of the 1953 Act
clearly gives s. 34 of the principal Act as amended in
1948 such retrospective operation. It plainly makes
s. 34 as so amended applica hie to assessment~ for
years ended before the amendment came into force.
It does not 'say thats. 34 as amended is to apply
:; to assessments for these years only when the time to
(I) l.A.R. (1953) Col. ;2i.
·•
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS · 147
issue the notice or make the assessment in respect of
these years under the pre-existing law had not
expired. It applies the amended s. 34 "to any assess·
ment ..................... for any year ending before the
lst day of April, 1948 in an case where proceedings
. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . were commenced ..................... after
the 8th day of September 1948". Likewise
any
notice and any assessment in respect of any year ending before April 1, 1948 is to be held valid, if valid
under s. 34 as amended in 1948. I find no justification in view of the language used to interpret s. 31
as applying s. 34 as amended in 1948 only to cases
where the time to issue the notice and make the assessment had not expired while the pre-existing law waa
in force.
The latter part of s. 31 seems to lead
independently to the same conclusion. It makes
"any notice issued in accordance with sub-section (1)
or any ~sessment completed in pursuance of such
notice within the time specified in sub-section (3)"
valid. All that is ·necessary is that all notices and
assessment orders in · respect of years ending before
April 1, 1948 in
proceedings commenced after
April 8, 1948 shall comply with the provisions of
s. 34 as amended in 1948. So a notice and an assessment order valid under s. 34 as amended in 1948
would be valid even if the time prescribed in respect
of them by s. 34 as it stood before the 1948 amendment, had expired.
In my view, for these reasons, s. 34 of the
principal Act as amended in 1948 applies to the
notice issued and the assessment order made in this
case. Both of them are valid under s. 34 as so
amended. The High Court should have answered
the question framed in the affirmative.
In the result, I would allow the appeal and set
aside the order of the High Court.
The appellant
will however pay the respondent's costs of this appeal
as it had agreed to do so as appears from the certificate on which this appeal has been admitted.
1961
C.mmissioner of
/tuomt--lffx, Maira.J
v.
Janabha Muhammali
Hussain Nachiar
Ammal
Sarkar, J.
1962
CommiuiONr of
lneom1-1ax, Modrtir
Y.
J..,nbh2 Muliammad
H11sr .;., .,Varhiar
.1Jtm111l
Sa1kar, /,
1962
Dr(tmber, 12,
148 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
[For the Judgment
of Hidayatullah
and
Raghubar Dayal, JJ., see S. 0. Prashar, Jnwme.tax
Officer v. Vasantsen Dv.:arkadas, ante p. 29.]
BY CouRT : In accordance with the opinion of
the Omajority, the appeal is allowed. The appellant
will pay the costs of the respondent as was agreed to
by the parties.
..4. ppeal allowed.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX
"·
SARDAR LAKHMIR SINGH
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, A. K.
SARKAR,
M. HIDAYATULLAJI an:! RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
lncom<!·lax-Limitntion-A•aeumenl
made
after /OW'
year.•-IJ barred-Provi.1ion aat-ing assessment in rup<<ll of
aome persons-If di..criminatory-lndian lncom<!0 ta:r A<ll, 1922
(11 of 1922), 1. 31, 34(3)-lndi.an lncome-ta:r (A>nendment)
Act, 1953 (25 of 1953), ••· 18, 31-Conatitution of India,
Art. 14.
The asscssee and hi• father filed separate returns for the
year 1946.47 and the father al'° filed a return as Karta of the
Hindu undivided family in which the income was declared as
...
nil on the ground that the Hindu undivided family had ceased
1,
to exist. On March 15, 19jl, the Income-tax Officer amalgamated the incomes of the assessee and his father and assessed
them on the total income as the income of a Hindu undivided
family but he did not make any asscs1ment of the assessee as
an
individual.
On appeal by the
father
the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, on March 20, l9j3, held that
there v.'a'J no Hindu undivided family, set aside that assessment
and directed a
rea~sessrnent of the assessee and his father as
individuals.
Thcreuoon the
Income-tax Officer, by order
dJted ~ >vember 27, 1953, assessed the assessee as an individual.