# S.C.R. 1012 NARINDER SINGH & ORS v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR

- **Citation:** [2014] 4 S.C.R. 1012
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-03-27
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 686 of 2014
- **Bench:** K.S. Radhakrishnan, A.K. Sikri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-c-r-1012-narinder-singh-ors-v-state-of-punjab-anr-29817
- **Pages:** 35

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Criminal
proceedings -Settlement between the parties - Effect -
C Guidelines laid down to be kept in mind by the High Courts
to take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept
settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings
and under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so
- General discussion made in this behalf - Matter also
o examined in the context of offences uls. 307 /PC - Penal Code,
1860 - s. 307.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - FIR
registered u/ss. 30713241323134, /PC - Petition filed uls. 482
E
CrPC for quashing of the FIR on basis of compromise entered
into between accused-petitioners and respondent No. 2complainant - High Court however, refused to accept the
compr9mise and to quash the FIR and criminal proceedings
pending against the petitioners - Held: The sole reason which
F
weighed with the High Court in refusing to accept the
compromise I settlement was the nature of injuries suffered
by the complainant - However, other attendant and
inseparable circumstances also require consideration - The
FIR indicates that the complainant was attacked by the
accused persons because of some previous dispute between
G the parties - But since elders of the village, including
Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have not
only buried their hatchet but have decided to live peacefully
in future, this becomes an important consideration - Further,
H
the evidence is yet to be led in the Court - In view of
1012
NARINDER $1NGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1013
ANR.
compromise between parties, there is minimal chance of the
A
witnesses coming forward in support of the prosecution case
- Even though nature of injuries can still be established by
producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical
examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who
caused these injuries - The chances of conviction, therefore,
B
appear to be remote - It would, therefore, be unnecessary to
drag these proceedings - Taking all these factors into
consideration cumulatively, compromise between the parties
accepted and the criminal proceedings against the petitioners
quashed - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.30713241323134.
c
Petition under Section 482 CrPC was filed for
quashing of FIR registered und.er Sections 307/324/323/
34, IPC, on the basis of compromise entered into between
the accused-petitioners and
respondent No.2complainant. The High Court refused to exercise its
D
extraordinary discretion invoking the provisions of
Section 482 CrPC on the ground that four injuries were
suffered by the complainant and as per the opinion of the
Doctor, injury No.3 was serious in nature. The High Court,
thus, refused to accept the compromise entered into
E
between the parties.
The question which arose for consideration, in these
circumstances, was as to whether the Court should have
accepted the compromise arrived at between the parties
F
and quash the FIR as well as criminal proceedings
pending against the petitioners.
The counsel for the State supported the verdict of the
High Court arguing that since offence under Section 307
is non-compoundable, the accused could not be
G
acquitted only because of the reason that there was a
compromise/settlement between the parties.
The counsel for the appellant, on the other hand,
submitted that merely because an offence is nonH
1014
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
A compoundable under Section 320 CrPC would not mean
that the High Court is denuded of its power to quash the
proceedings in exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the CrPC. He argued that Section 320(9) CrPC
cannot limit or affect the power of the High Court under
B Section 482 CrPC; and further that having regard to the
circumstances in the present case where the fight had
occurred on the spot in the heat of the moment inasmuch
as both sides were verbally fighting when the petitioners
had struck the victim, this assault was more of a crime
c against the ind

## Text

_Characters 0–39,984 of 69,599. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39984 for what follows._

A
B
[20141 4 S.C.R. 1012
NARINDER SINGH & ORS.
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 686 of 2014)
MARCH 27, 2014
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Criminal
proceedings -Settlement between the parties - Effect -
C Guidelines laid down to be kept in mind by the High Courts
to take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept
settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings
and under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so
- General discussion made in this behalf - Matter also
o examined in the context of offences uls. 307 /PC - Penal Code,
1860 - s. 307.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - FIR
registered u/ss. 30713241323134, /PC - Petition filed uls. 482
E
CrPC for quashing of the FIR on basis of compromise entered
into between accused-petitioners and respondent No. 2complainant - High Court however, refused to accept the
compr9mise and to quash the FIR and criminal proceedings
pending against the petitioners - Held: The sole reason which
F
weighed with the High Court in refusing to accept the
compromise I settlement was the nature of injuries suffered
by the complainant - However, other attendant and
inseparable circumstances also require consideration - The
FIR indicates that the complainant was attacked by the
accused persons because of some previous dispute between
G the parties - But since elders of the village, including
Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have not
only buried their hatchet but have decided to live peacefully
in future, this becomes an important consideration - Further,
H
the evidence is yet to be led in the Court - In view of
1012
NARINDER $1NGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1013
ANR.
compromise between parties, there is minimal chance of the
A
witnesses coming forward in support of the prosecution case
- Even though nature of injuries can still be established by
producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical
examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who
caused these injuries - The chances of conviction, therefore,
B
appear to be remote - It would, therefore, be unnecessary to
drag these proceedings - Taking all these factors into
consideration cumulatively, compromise between the parties
accepted and the criminal proceedings against the petitioners
quashed - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.30713241323134.
c
Petition under Section 482 CrPC was filed for
quashing of FIR registered und.er Sections 307/324/323/
34, IPC, on the basis of compromise entered into between
the accused-petitioners and
respondent No.2complainant. The High Court refused to exercise its
D
extraordinary discretion invoking the provisions of
Section 482 CrPC on the ground that four injuries were
suffered by the complainant and as per the opinion of the
Doctor, injury No.3 was serious in nature. The High Court,
thus, refused to accept the compromise entered into
E
between the parties.
The question which arose for consideration, in these
circumstances, was as to whether the Court should have
accepted the compromise arrived at between the parties
F
and quash the FIR as well as criminal proceedings
pending against the petitioners.
The counsel for the State supported the verdict of the
High Court arguing that since offence under Section 307
is non-compoundable, the accused could not be
G
acquitted only because of the reason that there was a
compromise/settlement between the parties.
The counsel for the appellant, on the other hand,
submitted that merely because an offence is nonH
1014
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
A compoundable under Section 320 CrPC would not mean
that the High Court is denuded of its power to quash the
proceedings in exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the CrPC. He argued that Section 320(9) CrPC
cannot limit or affect the power of the High Court under
B Section 482 CrPC; and further that having regard to the
circumstances in the present case where the fight had
occurred on the spot in the heat of the moment inasmuch
as both sides were verbally fighting when the petitioners
had struck the victim, this assault was more of a crime
c against the individual than against the society at large.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, the two rival parties
have amicably settled the disputes between themselves
D and buried the hatchet. Not only this, they say that since
they are neighbours, they want to live like good
neighbours and that was the reason for restoring friendly
ties. In such a scenario, should the court give its
imprimatur to such a settlement. The answer depends on
E various incidental aspects which need serious
discourse. The Legislators has categorically recognized
that those offences which are covered by the provisions
of section 320 CrPC are concededly those not only do
not fall within the category of heinous crime but also
F which are personal between the parties. Therefore, this
provision recognizes where there is a compromise
between the parties the Court is to act at the said
compromise and quash the proceedings. However, even
in respect of such offences not covered within the four
G corners of Section 320 of the Code, High Court is given
power under Section 482 of the Code to accept the
compromise between the parties and quash the
proceedings. The guiding factor is as to whether the
ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, both
the ultimate consequences may be acquittal or dismissal
H
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1015
ANR.
of indictment. [Para 26] [1039-B-F]
1.2. An attempt to take the life of another person has
to be treated as a heinous crime and against the society.
However, at the same time the Court cannot be oblivious
A
B
to hard realities that many times whenever there is a
quarrel between the parties leading to physical
commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the
parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence
under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because
FIR/Charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section
C
307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the
petition under section 482 of the Code and refuse to
accept the settlement between the parties. While taking
a .call as to whether compromise in such cases should
be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature
of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the
injuries were inflicted (namely whether injuries are caused
at the vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of
weapons used etc. On that basis, if it is found that there
is a strong possibility of proving the charge under
Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led
and injuries proved, the Court should not accept
settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the
basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid
circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that
provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessary included
in the charge sheet, the Court can accept the plea of
compounding of the offence based on settlement
between the parties. [Paras 27, 28] [1040-C-G]
1.3. The timing of settlement would also play a crucial
role. If the settlement is arrived at immediately after the
alleged commission of offence when the matter is still
under investigation, the High Court may be somewhat
liberal in accepting the settlement and quashing the
proceedings/investigation. Of course, it would be after
D
E
F
G
H
1016
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
A looking into the attendant circumstances. Likewise, when
challan is submitted but the charge has not been framed,
the High Court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.
However, at this stage, since the report of the 1.0. under
Section 173, Cr.P.C. is also placed before the Court it
B would become the bounding duty of the Court to go into
the said report and the evidence collected, particularly the
medical evidence relating to injury etc. sustained by the
victim. This aspect, however, would be examined along
with another important consideration, namely, in view of
C settlement between the parties, whether it would be unfair
or contrary to interest of justice to continue with the
criminal proceedings and whether possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak. If the Court finds the
answer to this question in affirmative, then also such a
0 case would be a fit case for the High Court to give its
stamp of approval to the compromise arrived at between
the parties, inasmuch as in such cases no useful purpose
would be served in carrying out the criminal proceedings
which in all likelihood would end in acquittal, in any case.
E [Para 29] [1040-H; 1041-A-E]
Rajendra Harakchand Bhandari vs. State of Maharashtra
(2011) 13 SCC 311; Dimpey Gujral v. Union Territory through
Administrator 2012 AIR SCW 5333; B. S. Joshi vs. State of
Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 (2) SCR 1104; Gian Singh
F
vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 (8) SCR
753; Shiji VS. Radhika & Anr. (2011) 10 sec 705: 2011 (1)
SCR 135 and State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat & Ors.
2013 (14) SCALE 235 - referred to.
G
2. The principles by which the High Court would be
guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement
between the parties and exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement
and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the
settlement with direction to continue with the criminal
H
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1017
ANR.
.
proceedings, may be summed up and laid down as
A
follows:
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the
Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the
8
Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not
compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter
between themselves. However, this power is to be
C
exercised sparingly and with caution.
(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and
on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure:
D
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
E
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
(Ill) Such a power is not be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like
F
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by Public Servants while working in that G
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions
H
1018
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
A or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire .disputes among themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
8 examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
C category of heinous and serious offences and therefore
is to be generally treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
D framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
E purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries
suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.
F On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court
can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility
of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas
G in the later case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based
on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage,
the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
H harmony between them which may improve their future
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. SlATE OF PUNJAB & 1019
ANR.
relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of
settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the
settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting
the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/
investigation. It is because· of the reason that at this stage
A
B
the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has
not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge
C
is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence
is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after
prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material
mentioned above. On the other hand, where the
prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the
conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of
argument, normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as
in such cases the trial court would be in a position to
decide the case finally on merits and to come a
conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307
IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where
the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and
D
E
the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court,
F
mere compromise between the parties would not be a
ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the
offender who has already been convicted by the trial
court. [Para 31] (1041-H; 1042-A-H, 1043-A-H, 1044-A-F]
3.1. In the present case, FIR was registered under G
Section 307/324/323/34 IPC. Investigation was completed,
whereafter challan was presented in the court against the
petitioner herein. Charges have also been framed; the
case is at the stage of recording of evidence. At this
H
1020
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
.A juncture, parties entered into compromise on the basis
of which petition under Section 482 of the Code was filed
by the petitioners namely the accused persons for
quashing of the criminal proceedings under the said FIR.
As per the copy of the settlement which was annexed
8
along with the petition, the compromise took place
between the parties when respectable members of the
Gram Panchayat held a meeting under the Chairmanship
of Sarpan~h. It is stated that on the intervention of the
said persons/Panchayat, both the parties were agreed for
C compromise and have also decided to live with peace in
future with each other. [Para 33) [1044-G-H; 1045-A-C]
3.2. It is found from the impugned order that the sole
reason which weighed with the High Court in refusing to
accept the settlement between the parties was the nature
D of injuries. If one goes by that factor alone, normally one
would tend to agree with the High Court's approach.
However, some other attendant and inseparable
circumstances also need to be kept in mind which
compels this Court to take a different view. [Para 34)
E [1045-0-E]
3.3. The FIR gives an indication that the complainant
was attacked allegedly by the accused persons because
of some previous dispute between the parties, though
nature of dispute etc. is not stated in detail. However, a
F very pertinent statement appears on ·record viz.,
"respectable persons have been trying for a compromise
up till now, which could not be finalized". This becomes
an important aspect. It appears that there have been
some disputes which led to the aforesaid purported
G attack by the accused on the complainant. In this context
when one finds that the elders of the village, including
Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have
not only buried their hatchet but have decided to live
peacefully in future, this becomes an important
H consideration. The evidence is yet to be led in the Court.
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1021
ANR.
It has not even started. In view of compromise between
A
·parties, there is a minimal chance of the witnesses
coming forward in support of the prosecution case. Even
though nature of injuries can still be established by
producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical
examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who
B
caused these injuries. The chances of conviction,
therefore, appear to be remote. It would, therefore, be
unnecessary to drag these proceedings. Taking all these
factors into consideration cumulatively, this Court is of
the opinion that the compromise between the parties be c
accepted and the criminal proceedings against the
petitioners be quashed. [Para 35)[1045-F-H; 1046-A-D)
Case Law Reference:
(2011) 13 sec 311
referred to
Para 9
D
2012 AIR sew 5333
referred to
Para 10
2003 (2) SCR 1104
referred to
Para 11
2012 (8) SCR 753
referred to
Para 12
E
2011 (1) SCR 135
referred to
Para 22
2013 (14) SCALE 235 referred to
Para 23
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 686 of 2014.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2013 of the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM No.
27343 of 2013.
P.N. Puri for the Appellant.
' Kuldip Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
H
1022
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
A
A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. The present Special Leave Petition has
been preferred against the impugned judgment/final order
dated 8.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition
No.27343/2013. It was a petition under Section 482 of the
B Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the
"Code") for quashing of FIR No.121/14.7.2010 registered
under Sections 307/324/323/34,IPC, on the basis of
compromise dated 22.7.2013 entered into between the
petitioners (who are accused in the said FIR) and respondent
c No.2 (who is the complainant). The High Court has refused to
exercise its extraordinary discretion invoking the provisions of
Section 482 of the Code on the ground that four injuries were
suffered by the complainant and as per the opinion of the
Doctor, injury No.3 were serious in nature. The High Court, thus,
D refused to accept the compromise entered into between the
parties, the effect whereof would be that the petitioners would
face trial in the said FIR.
2. Leave granted.
E
3. We ha119 heard counsel for the parties at length.
4. It may be stated at the outset that the petitioners herein, ·
who are three in number, have been charged under various
provisions of the IPC including for committing offence
punishable under Section 307, IPC i.e. attempt to commit
F murder. FIR No.121/14.7.2010 was registered. In the aforesaid
FIR, the allegations against the petitioners are that on 9.7.2010
at 7.00 A.M. while respondent No.2 was going on his
motorcycle to bring diesel from village Lapoke, Jasbir Singh,
Narinder Singh both sons of Baldev Singh and Baldev Singh
G son of Lakha Singh attacked him and injured him. Respondent
No.2 was admitted in Shri Guru Nanak Dev Hospital, Amritsar.
After examination the doctor found four injuries on his person.
Injury No.1 to 3 are with sharp edged weapons and injury No.4
is simple. From the statement of injured and MLR's report, an
H FIR under sections 323/324/34 IPC was registered. After X-
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1023
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
ray report relating to injury No.3, section 307 IPC was added
in the FIR
5. After the completion of investigation, challan has been
presented in the Court against the petitioners and charges have
also been framed. Now the case is pending before the Ld.Trial
Court, Amritsar, for evidence.
A
8
6. During the pendency of trial proceedings, the matter has
been compromised between .the petitioners as well as tne
private respondent with the intervention of the Panchayat on
12.07 .2013. It is clear from the above that three years after the
C
incident. ~he parties compromised the matter with intervention
,of the Panchayat of the village.
D
7. It is on the basis of this compromise, the petitioners
moved aforesaid criminal petition under section 482 of the
Code for quashing of the said FIR. As per the petitioners, the
parties have settled the matter, as they have decided to keep
harmony between them to enable them to live with peace and
love. The compromise records that they have no grudge against
each other and the complainant has specifically agreed that he
has no objection if the FIR in question is quashed. Further, both. E
the parties ha.ve undertaken not to indulge in any litigation
against each other and withdraw all the complaints pending
between the parties before the court. As they do not intend to
proceed with any criminal case against each other, on that basis
F
the submission of the petitioners before the High Court was that
the continuance of the criminal proceedings in the aforesaid FIR
will be a futile exercise and mere wastage of precious time of
the court as well as investigating agencies.
8. The aforesaid submission, however, did not impress the
G
High Court as the medical report depicts the injuries to be of
grievous nature. The question for consideration, in these
circumstances, is as to whether the court should have accepted
the compromise arrived at between the parties and quash the
FIR as well as. criminal PfOCeedings pending against the
H
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
A petitioner.
9. The Id. GOunsel for the State has supported the
aforesaid verdict of the High Court arguing that since offence
under Section 307 is non-compoundable, the respondents
8 could not have been acquitted only because of the reason that
there was a compromise/settlement between the parties. In
support, the learned counsel for the respondent-State has relied
upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Rajendra
Harakchand Bhandari vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 13
SCC 311 wherein this Court held that since offence under
C Section 307 is not compoundable, even when the parties had
settled the matter, compounding of the offence was out of
question. Said settlement along with other extenuating ·
circumstances was only taken as the ground for reduction of
D
E
F
G
H
the sentence in the following manner:
"We must immediately state that the offence under
Section 307 is not compoundable in terms of Section
320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and,
therefore, compounding of the offence in the present case
is out of question. However, the circumstances.pointed out
by the learned Senior Counsel do persuade us for a lenient
view in regard to the sentence. The incident occurred on
17.5. 1991 and it is almost twenty years since then. The
appellants are agriculturists by occupation and have no
previous criminal background. There has been
reconciliation amongst parties; the relations between the
appellants and the victim have become cordial and prior
to the appellants' surrender, the parties have been living
peacefully in the village. The appellants have already
undergone the sentence of more than two-and-a half years.
Having regard to those circumstances, we are satisfied
that ends of justice will be met if the substantive sentence
awarded to the appellants is reduced to the period already
undergone while maintaining the, amount of fine.
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1025
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
Consequently, while confirming the conviction of the
A
appellants for the offences punishable under Section 307
read with Section 34, Section 332 read with Section 34
and Section 353 read with Section 34, the substantive
sentence awarded to them by the High Court is reduced
to the period already undergone. The fine amount and the
B
default stipulation remain as it is."
10. The learned counsel for the appellant, on the other
hand, submitted that merely because an offence is noncompoundable under Section 320 of the Code would not mean
C
that the High Court is denuded of its power to quash the
proceedings in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of
· the Cr.P.C. He argued that Section 320(9) of the Code cannot
limit or affect the power of the High Court under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. Such a power is recognized by the Supreme
Court in catena of judgments. He further submitted that having
D
regard to the circumstances in the present case where the fight
had occurred on the spot in the heat of the moment inasmuch
as both sides were verbally fighting when the petitioners had
struck the victim, this assault was more of a crime against the
individual than against the society at large. He further submitted
E
that this Court in Dimpey Gujral v. Union Territory through
Administrator 2012 AIR SCW 5333 had quashed the FIR
registered under sections 147,148,149,323,307,452 and 506
of the IPC.
F
11. We find that there are cases where the power of the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code to quash the
proceedings in those offences which are uncompoundable has
been recognized. The only difference is that under Section
320(1) of the Code, no permission is required from the Court
G
in those cases which are compoundable though the Court has
discretionary power to refuse to compound the offence.
However, compounding under Section 320(1) of the Code is
permissible only in minor offences or in non-serious offences.
Likewise, when the parties reach settlement in respect of
H
1026
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 4 S.C.R.
A offences enumerated in Section 320(2) of the Code,
compounding is permissible but it requires the approval of the
Court. In so far as serious offences are concerned, quashing
of criminal proceedings upon compromise is within the
discretionary powers of the High Court. In such cases, the
B power is exercised under Section 482 of the Code and
proceedings are quashed. Contours of these powers were
described by this Court in B.S.Joshi vs. State of Haryana
(2003) 4 sec 675 which has been followed and further
explained/elaborated in so many cases thereafter, which are
c taken note of in the discussion that follows hereinafter.
12. At the same time, one has to keep in mind the subtle
distinction between the power of compounding of offences
given to Court under Section 320 of the Code and quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its
D inherent jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 482 of the
Code. Once, it is found that compounding is permissible only
if a particular offence is covered by the provisions of Section
320 of the Code and the Court in such cases is guided solitary
and squarely by the compromise between the parties, in so far
E as power of quashing under Section 482 of the Code is
concerned, it is guided by the material on record as to whether
the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although
the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of
indictment. Such a distinction is lucidly explained by a threeF Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab
& Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303. Justice Lodha, speaking for the
Court, explained the difference between the two provisions in
the following manner:
G
H
"Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not
the same thing as compounding of offence. They are
different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the
power of compounding of offences given to a court under
Section 320 is materially dilferent from the quashing of
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1027
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its
A
inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of
a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions
contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and
squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of
opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence
B.
or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by
the material on record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate
consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji c
do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash
criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section
320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court
under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal
D
proceedings in B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma
and Shiji this Court has compounded the noncompoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so.
There does exist the distinction between compounding of
an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal
E
case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under
Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different
although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz.
acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment."
F
13. Apart from narrating the interplay of Section 320 and
Section 482 of the Code in the manner aforesaid, the Court
also described the extent of power under Section .482 of the
Code in quashing the criminal proceedings in those cases
where the parties had settled the matter although the offences
G
are not compoundable. In the first instance it was emphasized
that the power under Sec. 482 of the Code is not to be resorted
to, if there is specific provision in the Code for redressal of the
grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very
sparingly and should not be exercised as against the express
H
1028
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
A bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. The.
Court also highlighted that in different situations, the inherent
power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate
objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court before it
exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the
B twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court,
or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.
14. As to under what circumstances the criminal
proceedings in a non-compoundable case be quashed when
C there is a settlement between the parties, the Court provided
the following guidelines:
D
E
F
G
H
"Where the High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the facts that the dispute
between the offender and the viCtim has been settled
although the offences are not compoundable, it does so
as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will
be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands
that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and
peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the
ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which
have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing
that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of
the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only
because he and the victim have settled the dispute
amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation,
yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law,
with or without the permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. or other
offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral
turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity, the settlement
between the offender and the victim can have no legal
sanction at all. However, certain offences which
overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavor having
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1029
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial,
A
partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising
out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the
family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim
and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes
between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such
B
offences have not been made compoundable, the High
Court may within the framework of its inherent power,
quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR
if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there
is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and c
by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be
casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above
list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend
on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be
prescribed."
o
Thereafter, the Court summed up the legal position in the
following w0rds:
''The position that emerges from the above discussion can
be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in
E
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given fo a criminal court for compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plentitude with no statutory limitation but
it has to be exercised in accord with the guidelines
engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of
justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse f the process of any court.
F
In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and
G
the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
1030
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or
victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such .offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact 'on society. Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and the offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, or
the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But
the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominatingly civil flavor stand on a different footing for
the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
crim'inal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
other words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the
criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law
despite settlement and compromise between the victim
and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of
justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an
end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the
affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1031
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
15. The Court was categorical that in respect of serious
A
offences or other offences of mental depravity or offence of
merely dacoity under special statute, like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servant
while working in that capacity. The mere settlement between
the parties would not be a ground to quash the proceedings
B
by the High Court and inasmuch as settlement of such heinous
crime cannot have imprimatur of the Court.
16. The question is as to whether offence under Section
307 IPC falls within the aforesaid parameters. First limb of this c
question is to reflect on the nature of the offence. The charge
against the accused in such cases is that he had attempted to
take the life of another person (victim). On this touchstone,
should we treat it a crime of serious nature so as to fall in the
category of heinous crime, is ttie poser.
17. Finding an answer to this question becomes imperative
as the philosophy and jurisprudence of sentencing is based
thereupon. If it is heinous crime of serious nature then it has to
be treated as a crime against the society and not against the
individual alone. Then it becomes the soJemn duty of the State
to punish the crime doer. Even if there is a settlement/
compromise between the perpetrator of crime and the victim,
that is of no consequence. Law prohibits certain acts and/or
conduct and treats them as offences. Any person committing
those acts is subject to penal consequences which may be of
various kind. Mostly, punishment provided for committing
offences is either imprisonment or monetary fine or ·both.
Imprisonment can be rigorous or simple in nature. Why those
persons who commit offences are subjected to such penal
consequences? There are many philosophies behind such
sentencing justifying these penal consequences. The
philosophical/jurisprudential justification can be retribution,
incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence,
rehabilitation, or restoration. Any of the above or a combination
thereof can be the goal of sentencing. Whereas in various
D
E
F
G
H
1032
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 4 S.C.R.
A countries, sentencing guidelines are provided, statutorily or
otherwise, which may guide Judges for awarding specific
sentence, in India we do not have any such sentencing policy
till date. The prevalence of such guidelines may not only aim
at achieving consistencies in awarding sentences in different
B cases, such guidelines normally prescribe the sentencing policy
as well namely whether the purpose of awarding punishment
in a particular case is more of a deterrence or retribution or
rehabilitation etc.
18. In the absence of such guidelines in India, Courts go
C by their own perception about the philosophy behind the
prescription of certain specified penal consequences for
particular nature of crime. For some deterrence and/or
vengeance becomes more important whereas another Judge
may be more influenced by rehabilitation or restoration as the
D goal of sentencing. Sometimes, it would be a combination of
both which would weigh in the mind of the Court in awarding a
particular sentence.