# S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 'l'HE KIRLOSKAR OIL ENGINES LTD., KIRKEE, POONA v. THE WORKMEN AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 491
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-c-r-supreme-court-reports-l-he-kirloskar-oil-engines-ltd-kirkee-poona-v-the-2435
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

491
Industrial Dispute-Reference-Award-Clnrification of
award by Tribunal-Scope-Industrial Dispute;; Act, 1947(14 of
1947), s. 36A.
' Certain disputes between the appellant and its workmen
were referred to the industrial tribunal for adjudication by the
State Government under the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The award made by the tribunal provided, inter alia, ( 1) that if a workman had to work on a weekly
off or on a holiday he should be paid I: times his wages
and dearness allowance over and above a substituted holiday,
and (2) that all the workmen shall be granted 15 days privilege leave in a year which could be allowed to be accumulated up to 45 days. The appellant applied to the Government under s. 36A of the Act stating that the directions given
by the tribunal had to be clarified on the grounds, inter alia,
(I) that the reason for directing the additional payment for
working on a weekly off or on a holiday was that the workman
was deprived of an opportunity to spend his time in the company of his colleagues and refresh himself, but that there was
no basis for this since the whole factory worked on weekly off
or on a holiday, and (2) that the accumulation of privilege
leave of 45 days to all workmen was not justified. The tribunal made a clarification as regards privilege leave confining
it to only those workmen who had put in 240 days or more
of actual working during the previous calendar year so as to
be in conformity with the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948,
but as regards others matters it held that the directions given
were quite clear and that under the guise of, clarification the
appellant: could not !eek a modification of the award under
s. 36A.
Held, that 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was
intended to empower a tribunal to clarify the provisions of the
award passed by it where a difficulty or doubt arose about
their interpretation, and not to review or modify its own
order. Any question about the propriety, correctness or
validity of any provision of the award would be outside the
purview of the enquiry contemplated by that section.
1961
Nooember J 7.
lf!al
-,,, K11losl:ot Oil
Entt:JJ l..JJ.,
J;irktt, PoC111<J
v.
1 ht I Vor1nk u
/Jajt11d1agar!ka1 J.
492 SUPREME COURT REPORT3 [1962] SUPP.
C1v1L APPLELLATE JtJRJFllICTJOIS: Civil Ap1ieal
No. 587 of l 9ti0.
Appeal by opccial leave frcm the ~wi;rd dated
Dect'mbcr
Hi, l\J58, of the Jmlustrial Tribunal,
Bombay, iu Refo1<·nce (1. T.) No. 387of1958.
M. C. Sctulvad, Atl-Orney-Ge11cral of India and
I. N. Shroff, fort.he appellant.
K. R. Clwudkuri, for respondent No. I.
Naunit-Lal, fur respondent No. 2.
1961. N oYembcr 17. The Judgment of the
Court "as delivered Ly
GAJmWRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special
leave arises out of the prnoeedings taken at the
instance of the appellant, the Kirloskar Oil Engines
Ltd., Kirkee, Poona under s. 36A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, l 9n (14 of 1947) (hereafter called
the Act).
It appears that certain disputes pending
between the appellant and the respondents, its
workmen, were refened to the industrial tribunal
for its adjudication by the Government of Maharashtra.
The disputes in question related to seven
demands made hy the responclentl:! : two of these
were in regard to privilege leave and allownees.
The tribunal which tried the dispute ma.de its award
in two parts. Part I of the awe.rd which dealt
the demand of privilege leave and different kinds
of allowances was made on Jw1e 30, 1958, and pub·
Jished on July . 7, 1958. On August 2, 1958, the
appellant applied to the State Government for
reference of certain points to the tribunal for its
clarification under 1. 36A. Accordingly an order
of reference was made in reept>ct of the two itrnis
vrivilegc leave and allowa.ncce.
The tribunal has
made the necessary clarification in regard to its
direction as to privilege leave. It has, however,
held that the direction mado by it for the payment
to tho workmen under paragraph 14 of its award
needed no cla

## Text

I
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'l'HE KIRLOSKAR OIL ENGINES LTD.,
KIRKEE, POONA
v.
THE WORKMEN AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
491
Industrial Dispute-Reference-Award-Clnrification of
award by Tribunal-Scope-Industrial Dispute;; Act, 1947(14 of
1947), s. 36A.
' Certain disputes between the appellant and its workmen
were referred to the industrial tribunal for adjudication by the
State Government under the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The award made by the tribunal provided, inter alia, ( 1) that if a workman had to work on a weekly
off or on a holiday he should be paid I: times his wages
and dearness allowance over and above a substituted holiday,
and (2) that all the workmen shall be granted 15 days privilege leave in a year which could be allowed to be accumulated up to 45 days. The appellant applied to the Government under s. 36A of the Act stating that the directions given
by the tribunal had to be clarified on the grounds, inter alia,
(I) that the reason for directing the additional payment for
working on a weekly off or on a holiday was that the workman
was deprived of an opportunity to spend his time in the company of his colleagues and refresh himself, but that there was
no basis for this since the whole factory worked on weekly off
or on a holiday, and (2) that the accumulation of privilege
leave of 45 days to all workmen was not justified. The tribunal made a clarification as regards privilege leave confining
it to only those workmen who had put in 240 days or more
of actual working during the previous calendar year so as to
be in conformity with the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948,
but as regards others matters it held that the directions given
were quite clear and that under the guise of, clarification the
appellant: could not !eek a modification of the award under
s. 36A.
Held, that 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was
intended to empower a tribunal to clarify the provisions of the
award passed by it where a difficulty or doubt arose about
their interpretation, and not to review or modify its own
order. Any question about the propriety, correctness or
validity of any provision of the award would be outside the
purview of the enquiry contemplated by that section.
1961
Nooember J 7.
lf!al
-,,, K11losl:ot Oil
Entt:JJ l..JJ.,
J;irktt, PoC111<J
v.
1 ht I Vor1nk u
/Jajt11d1agar!ka1 J.
492 SUPREME COURT REPORT3 [1962] SUPP.
C1v1L APPLELLATE JtJRJFllICTJOIS: Civil Ap1ieal
No. 587 of l 9ti0.
Appeal by opccial leave frcm the ~wi;rd dated
Dect'mbcr
Hi, l\J58, of the Jmlustrial Tribunal,
Bombay, iu Refo1<·nce (1. T.) No. 387of1958.
M. C. Sctulvad, Atl-Orney-Ge11cral of India and
I. N. Shroff, fort.he appellant.
K. R. Clwudkuri, for respondent No. I.
Naunit-Lal, fur respondent No. 2.
1961. N oYembcr 17. The Judgment of the
Court "as delivered Ly
GAJmWRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special
leave arises out of the prnoeedings taken at the
instance of the appellant, the Kirloskar Oil Engines
Ltd., Kirkee, Poona under s. 36A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, l 9n (14 of 1947) (hereafter called
the Act).
It appears that certain disputes pending
between the appellant and the respondents, its
workmen, were refened to the industrial tribunal
for its adjudication by the Government of Maharashtra.
The disputes in question related to seven
demands made hy the responclentl:! : two of these
were in regard to privilege leave and allownees.
The tribunal which tried the dispute ma.de its award
in two parts. Part I of the awe.rd which dealt
the demand of privilege leave and different kinds
of allowances was made on Jw1e 30, 1958, and pub·
Jished on July . 7, 1958. On August 2, 1958, the
appellant applied to the State Government for
reference of certain points to the tribunal for its
clarification under 1. 36A. Accordingly an order
of reference was made in reept>ct of the two itrnis
vrivilegc leave and allowa.ncce.
The tribunal has
made the necessary clarification in regard to its
direction as to privilege leave. It has, however,
held that the direction mado by it for the payment
to tho workmen under paragraph 14 of its award
needed no clarification.
It held that in substance
•
-
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
493
the appellant was seeking for a modification of
the said direction and that could not be done in
the clarification proceedings contemplated by s.
36A.
The clarification award was thus made by
the tribunal and submitted to the Government. It
is a.gainst this award that the appellant has come
to this Court by special leave.
It would be convenient at this stage to indicate briefly the nature of the clarification claimed
by the appellant before the tribunal. In regard
the claim for privilege leave the original award
by paragraph 10 had directed as follows :
"All the workmen, both daily and monthly rated, get privilege leave according to
the provisions of the Factories Act. The
leave usually comes to 14 or 15 days in a year
I consider a privilege leave of 15 days a year
to both the sections of the workmen in the Kirloskar Oil Engines as quite adequate. At present this leave is allowed to be accumulated
for two years. Hore I am of the opinion th'l>t
the accumulation should be up to 45 days.
I
therefore direct that all the workmen of the
Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd., Poona, shall be
granted 15 days privilege leave (including privelege le!tve under the Factories Act )which will
be allowed to be accumulated up to 45 days."
The appellant apprehended that the direction of
the award may justify a claim by every worker
whose name is on the muster roll to 15 days privilege leave irrespective of his a.ctual attendance
during the year. In other words, the appellant
argued before the tribunal in the present proceedings that the words used by the original award
were wide enough to justify a claim for 15 days
privilege leave even where the workman was absent
from work, for say 360 days in a year, provided
his name appeared on the muster roll of the appellant. '.rhe tribunal appreciated the force of this
1961
Tiu KiJ/oskar O~
EngiMs Lid.,
Ki1ktt, Poona
••
The Workmen
Gajendragadka' J
1961
'I ht Kir/01k1Jr Oil
Engirus Ltd.,
Kirktf, Pot'Jl/n
••
1 ht H'orkme.1
Gajmdragadfor J,
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
-
argument. It is common ground that under s. 79
of the Factories Act. 1948, it is only where a worker
hRs worked for a period of 240 days or more in a
factory during a calendar year that he becomes
entitled during the subsequent calendar year to
leave with wages for a number of days calculated
at the rate of one day for every twenty days of
work performed by an adult workor in the previous
calendar year, or at the rate of one day for every
fifteen days work performed by a child.
Tho tribunal observed that it was not the intention of the
award to depart from the basic principle prescribed
by s. 79; and so it made the necessary clarification
by adding that in order to entitle him to the privilege as directed by the awi>rd evP.ry workman must
put in 240 days or more of actual working during
the previous calendar year. Thus, in rogard to
the provision made by the award as to privilege
leave the clarification claimed by tlie appellant
was made.
In regard to the second point on which clari-
.fication was sought the relevant direction in the
nward r<'.ads thus :
"At present if a workman
works on
a weekly off or on a holiday, he gets a
substituted holiday undt1r
the Factories
Act but no additional
pa~·mcnt. In my
opinion a workman makes plans well
in
advance about
spending
his
holidays.
H<, spends his time in the company of his
colleagues and refrcsheR himself. If he gets
a substituted holiday, he is deprived of his
enjoyment. He Rhould therefore be compen·
sated in money as well as by a day off.
I
th<>refore direct that if a workman has to
work on a weekly off or on a holiday (paid
or unpaid) ho should be paid
I~ times his
wages and dearness allowanco over and above
1 substituted holiday."
I
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
The appellant urged before the tribunal that this
direction needed to be clarified because as it stood
it was likely to impose on the app'llla'lt very
heavy financial burden. The trihunll held that the
direction itself was very clear and th:i.t under
the guise of clarification the appellant was seeking its modification. So the tribunal rejected tho
appellant's claim for any clarification in that
behalf.
In the present appeal the learned AttorneyGeneral attempted to argue that the aocnmulation
of privilege leave up to 45 days allowed by the
award was not justified.
Tn our opinion, this argument cannot be entertained in the present appeal
for two reasons. First, no such plea appears to have
been made before the tribunal in the present
clarification proceedings and so the appellant cannot be allowed to raise a new plea now.
Be~ides,
it is neoessesary to bear in mind the limitations of
the enquiry permitted under the proceedings contemplated by s. 36A of the Act. The said section
empowers the appropriate Government to refer
any question to the tribunal if the said Government
is s-ttisfied that any diffiiculty or doubt arises as
to the interpretation of any provision of an award
made by the said
tribunal. It further provides
that when such
a question is
referred to it the tribunal shall, after giving the
parties an opportunity of being heard, decide such
question and its decision shall be final and binding
on all such p'Lrties. It is thus clear that the scope of
the enquiry under s. 36A is limited to the decision of
the difficulties or doubts ariRing as to the interpretation of any provision in the award. If the words used
in any provision of an award are ambiguous or obscure and it is not reasonably possible to interpret them the diffieulty
arising
from the use
of such ambiguous or obscure
words
may
be resolved by moving the appropriate Government
to make a roforencc under s. 36A. It is obvious
1961
The Kirlo1kar Oil
Engines Ltd,,
Kirkee, Poona
v.
TJ.e ft'orl.:men
Gajendragat/l:;ar J.
1961
Tiu Kvto.i.., Oil
En_r:ints l.Jd.,
Kirktt, Poona
v.
Tli1 W01ktnttl
Gait11dragaJkar J.
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
that any question about the propriety, oorreotness
or vali<lity of nny provision of tbc award would bo
outside ~he purview of the enquiry contemplated by
the section. If a party to the award is aggrit>ved
by any of its provisions 011 the merits the only
remedy available to it is by making an appeal, say
for instance under .~rt. l:l6 of the Constitution, to
this Court. A grievance felt by a party against any
provision of the award can be ventilated only in
that way and not by adopting the procedure prescribed by s. 36A.
Thus, the enquiry permissible
under s. :lGA is limited to the question of tho interpretation of the provision of the award in question
and no more. That is wby, we think, that even if
the appellant had sought to raise the question about
the propriety of allowing the accumulation of privilege leave up to 45 days before the tribunal, and
even if such a question lia<l been referred by the
Rtatc Gcl\'crnment to the tribunal under s. 36A, the
tribunal would have been justified if in refusing to
considn it I ecause the point raised had nothing to
do with the intcrpretnt.ion of the provision hut is
eoncemed with it.~ merit.~ and its propriety. 'fhcreforc, in our opinion, tho appellant is not <'ntit led to
rai8o this point before us in the present appeal.
The n<'xt contention raisc·cl by the appellant
is against the refusal of the tribunal to entertain its
application for clarification in regard tot.ho provision for the payment to the worker I~ times his
wag~s and dearness allowanco ovt•r and above a.
substituted holiday if he has to work on a weekly
off or on a. holirlay (paid or w1paid ). The grievance
of the a.ppolla.nt in 8ubsta.nce is that in 1956 and
19.57, on account of shortage of electrical energy
for industrial purposes the State Government compelled the factories to change their weekly holidays
from Sunday to some other week day, oaoh factory
or group of factories observing one week day as
weekly off. According to the appellant, if a handful of workmP,n are to work on a weekly off or on a
1
(1)
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
holiday when the whole factory is closed then there
would be some justification for making the payment
to the workm~n required to work on such a day;
b~1t there would be no justification for making such
payment where the whole factory works on a weekly
off or on a holiday. In support of this contention
the appellant reli~s on the observation made in the
original award that the basis for directing the additional payment for working on a weekly off or on a
holiday is that the workman is deprived of an
opportunity to spend his time in the company of
his colleagues and refresh himself. It is urged that
when all his colleagues are working there is no
point in saying that anyone is deprived of an oppor.
tunity to spend his time in the company of his
colleagues. The tribunal was not impressed by this
argument and so it has refused to make any olarifi.
cation-cum-modification in its award. It is significant that the argument based on the orders issued
by the State Government requiring the factories to
change their weekly holidays owing to shortage
of electric energy was not ra.ised before the tribunal
at the time when it originally heard the dispute
between the parties. It has stated in the present
order that it looked at its notes of arguments and
noticed that no such plea was raised before it at
that time. Besides, the tribunal has observed that
having regard to the definition of the word "week"
under s. 2 (f) of the Factories Act as well as the
provisions of s. 52 of the said Act it would have
been open to the appellant to have another day of
the week declared as the first day of the week for
its purposes. If the appellant had adopted such a
course the difficulty on which it relied would not
h we arisen.
The appellant contends that the reasons given
by the tribunal in rejecting its claim for clarificati 1n
are not sound. We are not impressed by this argument. As we have already pointed out, the present
argument ignores the)imitations of the scope of the
19111
Tiu ll"ir/osk<rr Oil
EnzWsLtJ.,
K irkee, P'*1a
v.
Tiu Workmtn
GajtndragaJkar J,
JS6J
111/tirloskar Oil
EngintJ L1J.,
Jrir~t. Poo11a
v.
TJi, W"'kmtn
Goj11dra&adkar J.
J96J
Novtmh" 20.
498 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SPPP.
enquiry nnder s. 36A. It is clear thnt in substance
tho ar~nmeut is that the direction isaued by the
award in regard to the payment in question should
be mo<lific<l, and in support of the claim for modification reliance is placed on the relevant orders
issued !Jy the StatP Government for changing the
weekly holidays. Such n claim
cannot obviously
be entNtained in clarification proceedings under
s. 36A.
A proceeding contemplated bys. 36A is
not a procc<>ding intended to enable the tribunal
to review or modify its own order; it is intended to
enable the tribunal only to clarify the provisions of
its a'mrd where a difficulty or doubt arises about
the interpretation of the provision.~. Quito clearly
the impugned provisions contained in paragraph I 4
of the award in r<'lation to this demand aro clear
and unnmbi~ous. Whatever may be thr appellant's
grievance in respect of the validity or the propriety
of tho said directions there is no <lifficnltv or doubt
about their meaning; and so \rn are satisfied that
tho tribunal was right in refusing to alter the said
direction in the present proeei>dings.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismiRSerl
with costs.
A pperil diamia.~Pd.
M/S. MOTIPUR ZAMINDARY CO. (P) LTD.
v.
THE STATE OF RIHAR
(R. P. RmTIA, c .. T., .T. r •. KAPUR, M. HmAYATUJ.T.AH,
J. C. SHAH and J. R. MunHOLKAR, JJ.)
Salu Ta.y,--Exemplion of green 1JPqe/able.<-S1tqar Can•,
if Jails williin ezemption-Dealtr-Produc.r of •>1qar cant.,
whether a dtalt.r-Bihar Sak• Ta.-r Acl, 1.?47 (Bihar 19 of 1947),
..,, 2(c), 6-Noti{ication No. 9881-F 7 dat&l Auqust 28, lf/47Rihar Annual Finance Act, 1950.
Under s. 6 of the llihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, the Government issued a notification e."(empting cert;lin goocls from the
...