# S. GOPAL REDDY v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1996] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 439
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1996-07-11
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 231 of 1994
- **Bench:** Dr. As. Anand, M.K. Mukherjee
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-gopal-reddy-v-state-of-andhra-pradesh-14677
- **Pages:** 27

## Headnote

B
Criminal Law :
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 :
Sections 2 and 4-Scope of-Held: Covers the demand of dow1y as a C
consideration for a proposed 1naniage--
1'Maniage
11 includes proposed n1ar1iage which has still to take place-Ihe peculiar definition of dow1y in the Act
specifically covers the "demand" made "before" maniage.
Sections 3 and 4-Scope of-Held: 17ie court should deal wilh a case
under the Act in a realistic manner so as to fwther the object of the D
legfrlation-17te Act being a penal statute, cowt should be watchful to see
that suspicion or sunnise or conjectures are not allowed to influence its
ju dg1nent-At the same tin1e it cannot acquit an accused 1nerely on the basis
of technicalities or niinor discrepancies in evidence-Interpretation of
Statutes.
Constitution of India 1950: Article 136.
Climinal appeal-Findings of foci-Recorded by courts below-Interference with-By Supreme Cowt--Held : Supreme Court does not nonnally
inte1fere with such findings of fact unless there is a gross miscaniage of justice.
Evidence Act, 1872:
Section 114 lll. (g}-Non-production of vital lette1-By the Prosecution-Held adverse presunzption is to be drawn fro1n such non-production.
E
F
Section 45-Expert evidence-Nature of-Held: Is a weak type of G
evidence and cannot be relied upon in the absence of independent and
reliable corroboration.
Sections 45, 67 and 73-Document-Execution-Proof of-Modes of
Opinion of witnesses and handw1iting expert in sudz circ1unstances-Relevancy of-Explained.
H
439
440
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
Inte1pretation of Statutes :
Extemal aid;-Dictionade;-He/d: ft'here definition of a w01d is given
in a statute itself it is neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictiona1y
n1eaning.
B
Purposive construction-Held : The carat nutst look to the object,
c
which the statute seeks to achieFe while intc1preting any provision of the Act.
f.Vords and Phrases : ''Dovv1y'~ "En.de!' and "Bn"degroon1
1'-A1eaning
of-In the co/l/exr of Sections 2 and 4 of the Dow1y Prohibition Act, 1961.
The appellant along "ith his brother was convicted for offences
under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In appeal, the Additional Metropolitan
Sessions Judge held that no offence under Section 420 IPC was made out
and set aside their conviction and sentence for the said offence \\'hile
D confirming their conviction and !'ientence for the offence under Section 4
of the Act. Both the convicts unsuccessfully invoked the revisional juris~
diction of the High Court. This Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition
filed by the appellant's brother. The appellant, against the High Court
order pertaining to him, tiled the present appeal.
E
According to the prosecution during the negotiation of the marriage
proposal of the appellant-first accused, an JPS Officer, "1th V, daughter
of PW-1, a lawyer, the appellant's elder brother, the second accused, had
demanded a house, jewels, cash and clothes worth about Rs. 1 lakh and a
sum of Rs. 50,000 in cash for purchase of a car. However, the second
F accused, on being approached by PW-1 for fixing the date of marriage,
demanded Rs. 1 lakh instead for Rs. 50,000 for purchase of the car and
also insisted that the said amount be paid before marriage. While the
dowry talks remained inconclusive; the date of marriage \Vas fixed. In the
meantime it was alleged that the appellant had written a letter to V asking
her to cancel the marriage or to fullil the demands made by his elders.
G PW-1 told the first accused about the additional dernand made by his elder
brother for purchase of the car. The appellant told PW-1 that he would
consult his brother and inform him about it and left for his native village,
it was alleged that on his return from the village, the first accused asked
PW-1 to give Rs. 75,000 instead of Rs. 50,11011 as agreed upon earlier as
H against Rs. 1 lakh as demanded by the second accused. According to the
S.G. REDDY v.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,884 of 66,632. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39884 for what follows._

S. GOPAL REDDY
A
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
JULY 11, 1996
[DR. AS. ANAND AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.]
B
Criminal Law :
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 :
Sections 2 and 4-Scope of-Held: Covers the demand of dow1y as a C
consideration for a proposed 1naniage--
1'Maniage
11 includes proposed n1ar1iage which has still to take place-Ihe peculiar definition of dow1y in the Act
specifically covers the "demand" made "before" maniage.
Sections 3 and 4-Scope of-Held: 17ie court should deal wilh a case
under the Act in a realistic manner so as to fwther the object of the D
legfrlation-17te Act being a penal statute, cowt should be watchful to see
that suspicion or sunnise or conjectures are not allowed to influence its
ju dg1nent-At the same tin1e it cannot acquit an accused 1nerely on the basis
of technicalities or niinor discrepancies in evidence-Interpretation of
Statutes.
Constitution of India 1950: Article 136.
Climinal appeal-Findings of foci-Recorded by courts below-Interference with-By Supreme Cowt--Held : Supreme Court does not nonnally
inte1fere with such findings of fact unless there is a gross miscaniage of justice.
Evidence Act, 1872:
Section 114 lll. (g}-Non-production of vital lette1-By the Prosecution-Held adverse presunzption is to be drawn fro1n such non-production.
E
F
Section 45-Expert evidence-Nature of-Held: Is a weak type of G
evidence and cannot be relied upon in the absence of independent and
reliable corroboration.
Sections 45, 67 and 73-Document-Execution-Proof of-Modes of
Opinion of witnesses and handw1iting expert in sudz circ1unstances-Relevancy of-Explained.
H
439
440
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
Inte1pretation of Statutes :
Extemal aid;-Dictionade;-He/d: ft'here definition of a w01d is given
in a statute itself it is neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictiona1y
n1eaning.
B
Purposive construction-Held : The carat nutst look to the object,
c
which the statute seeks to achieFe while intc1preting any provision of the Act.
f.Vords and Phrases : ''Dovv1y'~ "En.de!' and "Bn"degroon1
1'-A1eaning
of-In the co/l/exr of Sections 2 and 4 of the Dow1y Prohibition Act, 1961.
The appellant along "ith his brother was convicted for offences
under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In appeal, the Additional Metropolitan
Sessions Judge held that no offence under Section 420 IPC was made out
and set aside their conviction and sentence for the said offence \\'hile
D confirming their conviction and !'ientence for the offence under Section 4
of the Act. Both the convicts unsuccessfully invoked the revisional juris~
diction of the High Court. This Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition
filed by the appellant's brother. The appellant, against the High Court
order pertaining to him, tiled the present appeal.
E
According to the prosecution during the negotiation of the marriage
proposal of the appellant-first accused, an JPS Officer, "1th V, daughter
of PW-1, a lawyer, the appellant's elder brother, the second accused, had
demanded a house, jewels, cash and clothes worth about Rs. 1 lakh and a
sum of Rs. 50,000 in cash for purchase of a car. However, the second
F accused, on being approached by PW-1 for fixing the date of marriage,
demanded Rs. 1 lakh instead for Rs. 50,000 for purchase of the car and
also insisted that the said amount be paid before marriage. While the
dowry talks remained inconclusive; the date of marriage \Vas fixed. In the
meantime it was alleged that the appellant had written a letter to V asking
her to cancel the marriage or to fullil the demands made by his elders.
G PW-1 told the first accused about the additional dernand made by his elder
brother for purchase of the car. The appellant told PW-1 that he would
consult his brother and inform him about it and left for his native village,
it was alleged that on his return from the village, the first accused asked
PW-1 to give Rs. 75,000 instead of Rs. 50,11011 as agreed upon earlier as
H against Rs. 1 lakh as demanded by the second accused. According to the
S.G. REDDY v. STA1TI
441
prosecution case this talk took place in presence of one N (\\·ho was not A
examined) the First accused suggested that PW-1 should b>ive Rs. 50,000
immediately towards the purchase of the car and the balance of Rs. 25,000
should be paid with one year aftet· the marriage hut PW-1 did not accept
the suggestion. 'Varapuja' was performed hy PW-1 and his other relatives
at the house of the second accused. At that time PW-1 allegedly handed
over to the first accused, a document purporting to settle a single~stnrcyed
house in the name of his t~aughter V along with a bank pass book sho\.ving
a cash balance of Rs. 50,881 in the name of\'. It was alleged that on this
the appellant flared UJJ sayini; that the settlement was for a douhlestoreyed house and threatened to get the marriage cancelled. The efforts
B
of PW-1 to persuade the first accused not to cancel the marriage did not C
yield any results and ultimately the marriage did not take place. The first
accused then returned all the articles that had been given to him at the
time of 'Varapuja'. Aggrieved by the failure of the marriage negotiations,
PW-1 sent a complaint to the Director of National Police Academy where
the first accused was then undergoing training and later filed a report in D
the police station. During the investigation various letters purported to
have been written by the appellant to V were sent to the handwriting expert
PW~3, who gave his opinion regarding the existence of similarities between
the specimen writing of the first accused and the disputed writings but also
11110 definite opinion can be given on the basis of the present standard"i.
Extensive admitted w1itings are required for offering definite opinion".
E
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that for "demand" of
dowry to become an offence under Section 4 of the Act, it must be made at
the time of marriage and not during the negotiations for marriage, that
the expression "bride" and "bridegroom" in Section 4 of the Act did nr~t F
apply at the stage of pre marriage negotiations since the boy and the girl
were not "bridegroo1n'
1 and "briden and, therefore, the demand made at that
stage could not be construed as a "demand" of dowry; that the appellant
had denied the authorship of various letters purporting to have been
written by him; that the non~examination of V and N was a serious lacuna
in the prosecution case; that the evidence of the handwriting expert was G
"inconclusive" and uncorroborated; that the evidence of PW-1, the complainant had not received any corroboration at all and, therefore, the
conviction of the appellant was unjustified.
Allowing the appeal, this Court
H
442
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
HELD : 1.1. Any "demand" of "dowry" made before, at or after the
B
marriage, where such demand is made as a consideration for nianiage
would attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961. [456-G]
1.2. The Dowry Prohihition Act is a piece of social legislation which
aims to check the grm•ing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes
punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand
of dowry made before or at the time or after the maniage where such demand
is referable to the consideration of 111a111"age. Thus, any
11demand" of money,
property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other
C relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa
would fall within the mischief of 'dowry' under the Act where such demand
is not properly refemble to any legally recognised claim and is re/atable
only to the consideration of maniage. Marriage in this context would include
a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfillment of
D
the "demand of dowry'' leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not
taking place at all. The expression 'dowry' under the Act must be interpreted in the sense, which the statute wishes to attribute to it. It is not
possible to agree with the contention of the appellant that it is only the
property or valuable security given at the time of marriage which would
bring the same within the definition of 'dowry' punishable under the Act,
E and as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object for which
the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the Act, "demand of
dowry" as a consideration for maniage would also come within the expression of 'dowry' under the Act. [452-H, 453-A-C-D, F-G]
F
G
1.3. [tis a well-known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text
and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any
of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object,
which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of
the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. (453-F]
1.4. The definition of the expression 'dowry' contained in Section 2
of the Act cannot be confined merely to the 'demand' of money, property
or valuable security made at or after the performance of marriage on the
basis of the dictionary meaning of the expression 'dowry'. [ 452-F]
L. V. Jadhav v. Shankar Rao Abasaheb Pawar, (1983] 4 SCC 231,
H followed.
S.G. REDDY v. STATE
443
Resc1ve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and lnvest111ent Co.
A
Ltd., [19K7] l SCC 424 andN.K Jain v. C.K Shah, (1991] 2 SCC 495, relied
on.
Seaford Cowl Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 All ER 155 (C.A.),
referred to.
2.1. Dowry as a quid pro quo for marriage is prohibited and not the
giving of traditional presents to the bride or the bridegroom by Friends
B
and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given at or before or after the
1naniage to the bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional
nature, \'t'hich are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love,
C
affection or regard, would not fall within the mischief of the expression
'dowry' made punishable under the Act. [453-D-E]
2.2. The alarming increase in cases relating to harassment, torture,
abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent brides has always sent
shock waves to the civilized society but unfortunately the evil has continued D
unabated. Awakening of the collective consciousness is the need of the day.
For this a wider social movement is necessary. The role of the courts, under
the circumstances, assumes a great importance. The courts are expected to
deal with such cases in a realistic manner so as to further the object of the
legislation. However, the courts must not lose sight of the fact that the Act,
though a piece of social legislation, is a Penal statute. One of the cardinal
rules of interpretation in such cases is that a penal statute must be strictly
construed. The courts have, thus, to be watchful to see that emotions or
sentiments are not allowed to influence their judgment, one way or the other
and that they do not ignore the golden thread passing through criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty
and that the guilt of an accused must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt. They must carefully assess the evidence and not allow either
suspicion or surmise or conjectures to take the place of proof in their zeal
to stamp out the evil from the society while at the same time not adopting
E
F
the easy course of letting technicalities or minor discrepancies in the G
evidence result in acquitting the accused. They must critically analyse the
evidence and decide the case in a realistic manner. [ 456-H, 457-A-D]
3.1. This Court, generally speaking, does not interfere with the
finding recorded on appreciation of eviden~e by the courts below except
where there appears to have occurred gross miscarriage of justice or there H
444
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
exist suflicient reasons which justify the examination of some of the
relevant evidence by the Court itself. [457-F)
B
3.2. In the instant case at the time of initial demand of dowry as a
consideration fo:- 1narriage of the appellant it was only the brother of the
appellant, the second accused, who was present and it was the second
accused alone with whom the negotiations took place in presence of PW-2.
'fhere is no n1ention of the additional demand either in the complaint or
in the FIR. This story, therefore, appears to be an after thought made with
a view to implicate the appellant \Vith the commission of an offence under
Section 4 of the Act. Therefore, this part of the evidence of PW-1 is rather
C difTicult to accept without any independent corroboration. Further, the
holding of 'Varapuja appears to be highly improbable. No corroboration
of any nature to support this part of the evidence of PW-1 is forthcoming
on the record., [459-D, G, 460-B]
D
3.3. There is no satisfactory evidence on the record to show that the
appellant cancelled marriage on account of non- fulfillment of dowry
demand allegedly made by him. The letter, which PW-1 claims to have
himself received from the appellant regarding cancellation of marriage
prior to 'Varapuja' ceremony has not been produced. Reliance instead has
been placed by the prosecution on letter allegedly written by the appellant
E to V cancelling the marriage. The failure of PW-1 to produce the letter
allegedly received by him from the first accused invites an adverse
presumption against him that had he produced the letter, the same would
have belied his evidence. PW-1 does not appear to be a wholly reliable
witness. [461-C-D]
F
4.1. The evidence of an expert is a rather weak type of evidence and
the courts do not generally consider it as offering 'conclusive' proof and
therefore safe to rely upon the same without seeking independent and
reliable corroboration. Moreover, Section 67 of the Evidence Act, 1872
enjoins that before a document can be looked into, it has to be proved.
G Section 67, of course, does not prescribe any particular mode of proof,
Section 47 of the Evidence Act, which occurs in the chapter relating to
'relevancy of facts', provides that the opinion ofa person who is acquainted
with the handwriting of a particular person is a relevant fact. Similarly,
opinion of a handwriting expert is also a relevant fact for indentifying any
H handwriting. The ordinary method of proving a document is by calling as
S.G.REDDY v. STATE OF AP.
445
a witness the person who had executed the document or saw it being A
executed or signed or is otherwise qualified and competent to express his
opinion as to the handwriting. There are some other modes of proof of
documents also as by comparison of the handwriting as envisaged under
Section 73 of the Evidence Act or through the evidence of a handwriting
expert under Section 45 of the Act, besides by the admission of the person
against whom the document is intended to be used. The receiver of the
document, on establishing his acquaintance with the hand"riting of the
person and competence to identify the "riling with which he is familiar,
may also prove a document. These modes are legitimate methods of
proving documents but before they can be accepted they must bear sulTIB
cient strength to carry conviction. [463-B, 464-C-F]
C
4.2. Keeping in view the inconclusive and indefinite nature of the
evidence of the handwriting expert PW-3 and the lack of competence on
the part of PW-1 to be familiar with the handwriting of the appellant, the
approach adopted by the courts below to arrive at the conclusion that the D
disputed letters were written by the appellant to V on the basis of the
evidence of PW- 1 could neither offer any corroboration to the inconclusive
and indefinite opinion of the handwriting expert PW-3 nor could it received
any corroboration from the opinion of PW-3. The court below appear to
have taken a rather superficial view of a matter while relying upon the
evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 to hold the appellant guilty. [464-G-H, 465-A]
E ·
Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) SC 1091, relied on.
Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR (1957) SC 381; Ishwari Prasad· v.
Md. Isa, AIR (1963) SC 1728; Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar, AIR (1964)
SC 529 and Fakhrnddin v. State of M.P., AIR (1967) SC 1326, cited.
F
5. It appears that the demand dowry in connection with and as a·
consideration for the marriage of the appellant with V was made by the
second accused, the elder brother of the appellant and that no such
demand is established to have been directly made by the appellant. The G
High Court rightly found the second accused guilty of an offence under
Section 4 of the Act against which S.L.P. was filed and it was dismissed by
the Court on 15.2.1991. The evidence on the record does not establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that any demand of dowry within the meaning
of Section 2 read with Section 4 of the Act was made by the appellant. May
be the appellant was in agreement with his elder brother regarding H
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A 'demand' of 'dowry' but convictions cannot be based on such assumptions
without the offence being proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The courts
below appear to have allowed emotions and sentiments, rather than iegally
admissible and trustworthy evidence, to influence their judgment. TI1e
evidence on the record does not establish the case against the appellant
B beyond a reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of
doubt. (465-C-E]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
231 of 1994.
C
From the J u<lgment and Order date<l 16.10.90 of the An<lhra Pradesh
High Court in Cr!. R.C. No. 446 of 1990.
P.P. Rao, A. Sudarshan Reddy, B. Rajeshwar Rao, Ramkrishna
Reddy and Vimal Dave for the Appellant.
D
Guntur Prabhakar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :
DR. ANAND, J. The appellant alongwith his brother was tried for
E offences under Section 420 !PC read with section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961. The trial court convicted them both and sentenced them to undergo
9 months R.I. and to a fine of Rs. 500 each and in default to undergo S.I.
for months for the offence under Section 420 !PC and to R.I. for 6 months
and a fine of Rs. 1000 each and in default S.I. for six months for the offence
under Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter the· Act.) In an
F appeal against their sentence and conviction, the Additional Metropolitan
Sessions Judge held that no offence under Section 420 IPC was made out
and set aside their conviction and sentence for the said offence while
confirming their conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 4
of the Act. Both the convicts unsuccessfully invoked the revisional jurisdicG tion of the High Court.
This appeal by special leave filed by the appellant is directed against
the order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 16.10.1990 dismissing the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the convicts. The brother of the
appellant filed SLP (Cr!.) 2336 of 1990 against the revisional order of the
H
High Court but that S.L.P. was dismissed by this Court on 15.2.1991.
•
S.G. REDDY v. STATE OF AP. [DR.ANAND, J.]
447
The prosecution case is as follows :
The appellant (hereinafter the first accused) is the younger brother
of the petitioner (hereinafter the second accused) in S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2336
of 1990, which as already noticed was dismissed on 15.2.1991 by this Court.
A
The first accused had been selected for Indian Police Service and was B
undergoing training in the year 1985 and on completion of the training was
posted as an Assistant Superintendent of Police in Jammu & Kashmir
Police force. His brother, the second accused, was at the relevant time
working with the Osmania University at Hyderabad. P.W. 1, Shri G.
Narayana Reddy, the complaintant, was practising as a lawyer at C
Hyderabad. PWl has four daughters, Ms. Vani is the eldest among the four
daughters. She was working as a cashier with the State Bank of India at
Hyderabad. PW 1 was looking for marriage alliance for his daughcer Ms.
Vani. A proposal to get Ms. Vani married to the first accused was made
by P.W.2, Shri Lakshma Reddy, a common friend of the appellant and
PWl. Later on P.W.2 introduced the second accused to P.W.l, who later D
on also met Ms. Vani and approved of the match. After some time, the
first accused also met Ms. Vani at the Institute of Public Enterprises and
both of them approved each other for marriage. It is alleged that on
6.5.1985, the second accused accompanied by P.W. 2 and some others went
to the house of P.W.1 to pursue the talks regarding marriage. There were E
some talks regarding giving of dowry and the terms were finally agreed
between them on 7.5.1985 at the house of the second accused. The first
accused was not present either on 6.5.1985 or on 7.5.1985. It is alleged that
as per the terms settled between the parties, P.W. 1 agreed to give to his
daughter (1) house at Hyderabad (2) jewels, cash and clothes worth about F
at rupees one lakh and (3) a sum of Rs. 50,000 in cash for purchase of a
car. The date of marriage, however, was to be fixed after consulting the fist
accused. PWl, however, later on insisted on having an engagement
ceremony and contacted the first accused but the first accused persuaded
P.W. 1 not to rush through the same as it was not possible for him to
intimate the date to his friends at a short notice. The first accused came G
to Hyderabad from Dehradun, where he was undergoing training, on
6.8.1985 and stayed at Hyderabad till 15.8.1985. The first accused attended
the birthday party of the youngest sister of Ms. Vani on 15.8.1985 and later
on sent a bank draft of Rs. 100 as the birthday gift for her to Ms. Vani. In
the letter Ex.Pl which accompanied the bank draft, some reference w.s H
448
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A allegedly made regarding the settlement of dowry. It is alleged that the first
accused later on wrote several letters including exhibits P6, P7, P9 and PlO
lo Ms. Vani. It is the prosecution case that the second accused, on being
approached by PWl for fixing the date of marriage, demanded Rs. 1 lakh
instead of Rs. 50,000 for purchase of car. The second accused also insisted
B that the said amount should be paid before marriage. The 'dowry' talks
bet\vcen the second accused and PWl, however) remained inconclusive,
Lateran the date of marriage was fixed as 2.11.1985. On 1.10.1985, the first
accused allegedly wrote letter, exhibit P6, tu Ms. Vani asking her to cancel
the date of marriage or to fulfil the demands made by his elders. The first
accused came to hyderabad on 20.10.1985 when P.W.l told him about the
C demand of additional payment of Rs. 50,000 made by the second accused
for the purchase of car. The first accused told P.W. 1 that he would consult
his brother and inform him about it and left for his native place. It is alleged
that on his return from the village, the first accused asked P.W.l to give
Rs. 75,000 instead of Rs. 50,000 as agreed upon earlier instead of Rs. 1
D lakh as demanded by the second accused. According to the prosecution
case this talk took place in the presence of Shri Narasinga Rao (not
examined). The first accused suggested that P.W.l should give Rs. 50,000
immediately towards the purchase of the car and the balance of Rs. 25,000
should be paid within one year after the marriage but PWl did not accept
E the suggestion. According to the prosecution case 'Varapuja' was performed by PWl and his other relatives at the house of the second accused
on 31.10.1985. At that time P.W.l allegedly handed over to the first
accused, a document Exhibit P-13 dated 12.10.1985, purporting to settle a
house in the name of his daughter Mr. Vani alongwith a bank pass book,
F Exhibit P-12 shO\ving a cash balance of Rs. 50,881 in the name of Ms. Vani.
The first accused is reported to have, after examining the document Exhibit
P-13, flared up saying that the settlement was for a Double Storeyed House
and the document Exhibit P-13 purporting to settle the house in the name
of Ms. Vani was only a single storey building. He threatened to get the
marriage cancelled if P .W. 1 failed to comply with the settlement as arrived
G at on the earlier occasions. The efforts of P.W. 1 to persuade the first
accused not to cancel the marriage did not yield any results and ultimately
the marriage did not take place. The first accused then returned all the
articles that had been given to him at the time of 'Varapuja'. Aggrieved,
by the failure of the marriage negotiations, P.W. 1 on 22.1.1986 sent a
H complaint to the Director of National Police Academy where the first
S.G. REDDY v. STATE OF AP. [DR. ANAND.].]
449
accused was undergoing training. Subsequen:ly, PW! also wenl lo the A
Academy to meet the Director when he learnt from the personal assistant
to the Director of the Academy that Lhe firsl accused was getting married
Lo another girl on 30th of March, 1986 al Bolaram and showed to him the
wedding invitation card. P.W.1, thereupon, gave another complaint to the
director on 26.3.1986, who, however, advised him to approach the concerned police for necessary action. P.W.l filed a report Ex.P20 at Chikkadapalli Police Station on 28.3.1986. The Inspector of Police P.W. 7,
registered the complaint as Crime Case No. 109/1986 and took up the
investigation. During the investigation, various letters purported to have
been written by the first accused to Ms. Vani were sent to the handwriting
expert P.W. 3 who gave his opinion regarding the existence of similarities
between the specimen writings of the first accused and the disputed
writings. Both the first accused and his brother, the second accused, were
thereafter chargesheeted and tried for offences punishable under Scclion
420 I.P.C. read with an offence punishable under Section 4 of the Act and
convicted and sentenced as noticed above.
Mr. P.P. Rao the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant
submitted that the courts below had committed an error in not correctly
interpreting the ambit and scope of section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961 read with the definition of 'dowry' under section 2 of the said Acl.
According to the learned counsel for "demand" of dov>'ry to become an
offence under Section 4 of the Act, it must be made at the time of marriage
and not during the negotiations for marriage. Reliance in this behalf is
placed on the use of the expressions 'bride' and 'bride[,'fOom' in Section 4
to emphasise that at the stage of pre-marriage negotiations; the boy and
the girl are not 'bridegroom' and
1bride' and therefore, the 'demand' 1nade
at that stage cannot be construed as a 'demand' or dowry punishable under
Section 4 of the Act. On merits, counsel argued that reliance placed by the
trial court as well as the appellate and the revisional court on various letters
purporting to have been written by the first accused \Vas erroneous since
B
c
D
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F
the appellant had denied their authorship and there was no satisfactory G
evidence on the record to connect the appellant with those letters except
the
11inconclusive" an<l uncorroborated evidence of the handwriting expert.
Mr. Rao further argued that in the present case there was no unimpeachable evidence available on the record to bring home the guilt of the
appellant and the failure of the prosecution to examine Ms. Vani and Shri H
450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Narasinga Rao was a serious lacuna in the prosecution ~ase. Argued Mr.
Rao that the evidence of PWl, the complaint had not received any corroboration at all and since the evidence of PW 1 was not wholly reliable,
conviction of the appellant without any corroboration of the evidence of
PW 1 was not justified. Mr. Rao urged that the complainant had exagB gerated the case and roped in the appellant, whose cider brother alone had
made the demand for dowry, out of anger and frustration and that let alone
'demanding dowry', the first accused was not even a privy to the demand
of dowry as made by the second accused, his elder brother.
C
Learned counsel for the respondent-State, however, supported the
judgment of the trial court and the High Court and argued that the case
against the appellant had been established beyond a reasonable doubt and
that this court need not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India \vith findings of fact arrived at after
appreciation of evidence by the courts below. According to Mr. Prabhakar,
0
the interpretation sought to be placed by Mr. Rao on Section 4 of the Act
would defeat the very object of the Act, which was enacted to curb the
practice of ndemandTT or acceptance and receipt of dowri
1 and that the
definition of 'dowry' as contained in Section 2 of the Act included the
demand of dowry 'at or before or after the marriage'.
E
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The curse of dowry has been raising its ugly head every now and then
but the evil has been flourishing beyond imaginable proportions. It was to
curb this evil, that led the Parliament to enact the Dowry Prohibition Act
in 1961. The Act is entended to prohibit the giving or taking of dowry and
makes its 'demand' by itself also an offence under Section 4 of the Act.
Even the abetment of giving, taking or demanding dowry has been made
an offence. Further, the Act provides that any agreement for giving or
taking of dowry shall be void and the offences under the Act have also
been made non-compoundable vide Section 8 of the Act. Keeping in view
the object which is sought to be achieved by the Act and the evil it attempts
G to stamp out, a three Judges Bench of this court in L. V. Jadhav v. Shankar
Rao Abasaheb Pawer & Others, [1983] 4 SCC 231 opined that the expression
"Dowry" wherever used in the Act must be liberally construed.
Before proceeding further, we consider it desirable to notice some
H of the relevant provisions of the Dowry prohibition Act, 1961.
S.G. REDDY v. STAIB OF AP. [DR. ANAND, J.]
451
"Section 2-'dowiy' means any property or valuable security given or A
agreed to be given either directly or indirectly -
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage;
or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage
of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in case of
person to whom the Muslim Personal Law (shariat) applies.
B
c
Section 3-Penalty for giving or taking dowry - If any person, after D
the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving
or taking of do\vry, he shall be punishable with i1nprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which
shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the
value of such dowry, whichever is more.
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons
to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years (Substituted for the words
"six months" w.e.f. 19th November, 1986).
Section-4: penalty for demanding dow1y - if any person demands
directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom as the case may be, any dowry, he
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than six months but which may extend to two years and
with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons
to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months."
E
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G
The definition of the terms 'dowry' under Section 2 of the Act shows H
452
SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A that any property or valuable security given or "agreed to be given" either
directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the
marriage
11at or before or after the 111aniage
11 as a
11consideration for the
maniage of the said parties" would become 'dowry' punishable under the
Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute 'dowry' within the
B meaning of the Act must therefore be given or demanded "as consideration
for the marriage
11
:
Section 4 of the Act aims at discouraging the very "demand" of
1\lowry
11 as a 'consideration for the marriage' between the parties thereto
and lays down that if any person after the commencement of the Act,
C "demands", directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a 'bride'
or 'bridegroom', as the case may be, any 'dowry', he shall be punishable
with imprisonment which may, extend to six months or with fine which may
extend to Rs. 5,000 or with both. Thus, it would be seen that section 4
makes punishable the very demand of property or valuable security as a
D consideration for maniage, which demand, if satisfied, would constitute the
graver offence under section 3 of the Act punishable with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than five years and with fine which shall
not be Jess than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such
do\vry whichever is more.
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F
G
The definition of the expression 'dowry' contained in Section 2 of the
Act cannot be confined merely to the 'demand' of money, property or
valuable security 'made at or after the performance of marriage' as is urged
by Mr. Rao. The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the
definition of 'dowry' emphasised that any money, property or valuable
security given, as a consideration for n1an·iage1 'before, at or after' the
marriage would be covered by the expression 'dowry' and this definition as
contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression 'dowry'
occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression 'dowry' as commonly used
and understood is different than the peculiar definition therefore under the
Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand of 'dowry' is sufficient to
bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any
11demandn of money,
property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other
relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa
would fall within the mischief of 'dowry' under the Act where such demand
is not properly referable to any legally recognis~d claim and is re/atable
H only to the consideration of maniage. Marriage in this context would include
•
...
S.G.REDDY v. STATE OF AP. [DR.ANAND,.!.]
453
a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the A
"demand of dowry" leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not
taking place at all. The expression 'dowry' under the Act must be interpreted in the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it. Mr. P.P. Rao,
learned senior counsel referred to various dictionaries for the meaning of
'dowry', 'bride' and 'bridegroom' and on the basis of those meanings
submitted that 'dowry' must be construed only as such property, goods or
valuable security which is given to a husband by and on behalf of the wife
B
at marriage and any demand made p1ior to marriage would not amount to
dowry. We cannot agree. Where definition has been given in a statute itself,
it is neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictionaries etc. to find out
the meaning of the expression. The definition given in the statute is the
determinative factor. The Act is a piece of social legislation which aims to
check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of
dowry made before or at the time or after the ma11iage where such demand
c
is rejemb/e to the consideration of ma11iage. Dowry as quid pro quo for D
marriage is prohibited and not the giving of tradi.tional presents to the bride
or the bridegroon1 by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given
at or before or after the maniage to the bride or the bridegroom, as the
case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration
for marriage but out of love, affection or regard, would not fall within the
mischief of the expression 'dowry' made punishable under the Act.
·
E
It is a well known rule of· interpretation of statutes that the text and
the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of
the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which
the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the
F
Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. We are
unable to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the
property or valuable security given at the time of marriage which would
bring the same within the definition of 'dowry' punishable under the Act,
as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object for which the G
Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the Act, "demand of dowry"
as a consideration for a proposed maniage would also come within the
meaning of the expression dowry under the Act, If we were to agree with
Mr. Rao that it is only the 'demand' made at or after marriage which is
punishable under Section 4 of the Act, some serious con.sequences, which
the legislature wanted to avoid, are bound to follow. Take for example a H
454
SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3S.C.R.
A case where the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a
'demand' of dowry during marriage negotiations and lateron 'after bringing
the bridal party to the bride's house find that the bride or her parents or
relatives have not met the earlier 'demand' and call off the marriage and
leave the brides house should they escape the punishment under the Act.
B The answer has to be an emphatic 'no'. It would be adding insult to injury
if we were to countenance that their action would not attract the provisions
of Section 4 of the Act, Such an interpretation would frustrate the very
object of the Act and would also run contrary to the accepted principles
relating to the interpretation of statutes.
C
Jn Rese1ve Bank of India Etc. Etc. v. Pearless General Finance and
D
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F
G
Investment Co. Ltd. & 010" Etc. Etc., [1987] 1 SCC 424 while dealing with
the question of interpretation of a statute, this court observed :
"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are
the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the
texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored.
Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the
textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge,
the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by
section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If
a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the
glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme,
the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and
appear different than when the statute is looked at without the
glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look
at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause,
each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit
into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word
of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be
construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its
place.
11
Again, in N.K Jain & Others v. C.K Shah & Others, [1991] 2 SCC 495
it was observed that in gathering the meaning of a word used in the statute,
the context in which that word has been used has significance and the
H legislative purpose must be noted by reading the statute as a whole and
-
S.G. REDDY v. STATE OF AP. [DR. ANAND, J.]
455
bearing in mind the context in which the word has been used in the statiite. A
In Seaford Cowt Estates Ltd.