# S•ii•n Singh· v. The State of Punjab. DRS Gupta f

- **Citation:** [1964] 4 S.C.R. 647
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963-08-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 392 of 1963
- **Bench:** S. K. DAs, AcTING C. J, A. K. Sarkar, M. HmAYATULLAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-ii-n-singh-v-the-state-of-punjab-drs-gupta-f-3180
- **Pages:** 26

## Headnote

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958---Section 57, scope and effect
of-Meaning of "shall have regard to the provisions of this Act"
tn s. 57(2) first proviso-Delhi Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952
s. 35-Revisional furisdiction of High Court-Finding by lozve;
appellate court that landlord acquiesced in subletting-Whether
High Court could interfere on the ground of no evidence.
1963
S•ii•n Singh·
v.
The State of
Punjab.
DRS Gupta f.
1963
August 29
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
By s. 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 which
can1c into force on June 9, 1952, courts
were prohibited from
directing eviction of a tenant at the suit of a landlord excepting in
the cases inentioned in the proviso to it.
Clause
( c) of the
proviso permitted ejectment where the "tenant without obtaining
the consent of landlord has before the commencement of this Acr
sub-let . ... the premises''.
Relying on this clause the
respondent
landlord filed a suit against the appellant and respondent no. 2
for their ejectment from a shop room let to the latter alleging that
it had been sub-let to the appellant without his consent.
The
appellant resisted the suit on the ground that the respondent landlord had acquiesced in the sub-letting.
The trial judge decreed
the suit holding that the respondent landlord had not done so. The
appellant alone appealed to the Additional Senior Sub-Judge who
set aside the order of the trial Judge taking the view that the
respondent landlord had acquiesced
in
the sub-letting.
He
also held that the
sub-letting had commenced
not
later than
NoYember 1950. The landlord moved the High Court in revision
under s. 35 of the Act.
While the matter was pending in the High Court, the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958, came into force. Section 57 of the Act of
1958, provided;
"(1) The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act,
1952, in so far as it is applicable to the Union Territory of Delh~
is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and
other proceedings under the said Act pending, at the comn1encement
of this Act, before any court or other authority shall be continued
and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said Act,
as if the said Act had continued in force and this Act had not been
passed: Provided that in any such suit or proceeding for the fixa·
tier: of standard rent or for the eviction of a tenant from any pre·
niiscs to which s. 54 does not apply, the court or other authority shall
ha\'e regard to the provisions of this Act: Provided further that
the provisions for appeal under the said Act shall continue in force
in respect of suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder."
The High Court held that by reason of the provisions of subs. (2) of s. 57 of the Act of 1958 the revision case had to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1952. It
also held that there was no evidence to justify the appellate court's
findings that the respondent had acquiesced in the sub-letting by
respondent no. 2 to the appellant.
In that view of the n1atter the
High Court allowed the petition of revision.
The appellant then
appealed to this Court.
Held: It was competent for the High Court under s. 35 of
the Act of 1952 to interfere with the findings of the court below
on the question of acquiescene on the ground that there was no
evidence to support that finding. If a court had arrived at a find·
ing without any evidence to support it, it can be legitimately said
that it had not decided the case "according to law" within the
n1eaning of that expression in s. 35.
-
..
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
649
Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lall Chowdhury, f 1962 J Supp.
1 S.C.R. 933, /'ooran Chand v. Motilal, [ 1963 [ Supp. 2 S.C.R. 906
and Lda Beni Ram v·. Ku11dan Lal, (1899) L. R. 26 I.A. 58, referred to.
The right of the appellant to challenge the decree of the trial
judge by appeal could not be affected by the failure of the respon·
dent no. ~ to file an

## Text

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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
647
referred to in els. (a), (b) or ( d) of sub-s. ( 1)
in
respect of which there was no charge against the appellant.
We consider that the above argument of learned Counsel for the appellant is corre~t and must be accepted."
The appellant's Counsel is not in a position to submit
that there is evidence on the record which would satisfy
the Court that the accused has "proved the contrary", that
is, that he had not committed the offence with which he
was charged.
We have therefore come
to the conclusion that the
facts proved in this case raise a presumption under s. 5(3)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the appellant's
conviction of the offence with which he was charged must
be maintained on the basis of that presumption. In this
view of the matter we do not propose to consider whether
the High Court was right in basing its conclusion also
on the other evidence adduced in the case to prove the
actual payment of illegal gratification by the partners of
the firm M/s. Ramdas Chhankanda Ram.
Lastly, Mr. Lall prayed that the sentence be reduced.
The sentence imposed on the appellant is one year's rigo·
rous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. Under s. 5(2)
the minimum sentence has to be one year's imprisonment,
subject to the proviso that the Court may for special reasons
to be recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year. We are unable to see anything
that would justify us in taking action under the proviso.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
KARAM SINGH SOBTI & ANR.
v.
SHRI PRATAP CHAND & ANR.
(S. K. DAs, AcTING C. J., A. K. SARKAR AND M. HmAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958---Section 57, scope and effect
of-Meaning of "shall have regard to the provisions of this Act"
tn s. 57(2) first proviso-Delhi Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952
s. 35-Revisional furisdiction of High Court-Finding by lozve;
appellate court that landlord acquiesced in subletting-Whether
High Court could interfere on the ground of no evidence.
1963
S•ii•n Singh·
v.
The State of
Punjab.
DRS Gupta f.
1963
August 29
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
By s. 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 which
can1c into force on June 9, 1952, courts
were prohibited from
directing eviction of a tenant at the suit of a landlord excepting in
the cases inentioned in the proviso to it.
Clause
( c) of the
proviso permitted ejectment where the "tenant without obtaining
the consent of landlord has before the commencement of this Acr
sub-let . ... the premises''.
Relying on this clause the
respondent
landlord filed a suit against the appellant and respondent no. 2
for their ejectment from a shop room let to the latter alleging that
it had been sub-let to the appellant without his consent.
The
appellant resisted the suit on the ground that the respondent landlord had acquiesced in the sub-letting.
The trial judge decreed
the suit holding that the respondent landlord had not done so. The
appellant alone appealed to the Additional Senior Sub-Judge who
set aside the order of the trial Judge taking the view that the
respondent landlord had acquiesced
in
the sub-letting.
He
also held that the
sub-letting had commenced
not
later than
NoYember 1950. The landlord moved the High Court in revision
under s. 35 of the Act.
While the matter was pending in the High Court, the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958, came into force. Section 57 of the Act of
1958, provided;
"(1) The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act,
1952, in so far as it is applicable to the Union Territory of Delh~
is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and
other proceedings under the said Act pending, at the comn1encement
of this Act, before any court or other authority shall be continued
and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said Act,
as if the said Act had continued in force and this Act had not been
passed: Provided that in any such suit or proceeding for the fixa·
tier: of standard rent or for the eviction of a tenant from any pre·
niiscs to which s. 54 does not apply, the court or other authority shall
ha\'e regard to the provisions of this Act: Provided further that
the provisions for appeal under the said Act shall continue in force
in respect of suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder."
The High Court held that by reason of the provisions of subs. (2) of s. 57 of the Act of 1958 the revision case had to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1952. It
also held that there was no evidence to justify the appellate court's
findings that the respondent had acquiesced in the sub-letting by
respondent no. 2 to the appellant.
In that view of the n1atter the
High Court allowed the petition of revision.
The appellant then
appealed to this Court.
Held: It was competent for the High Court under s. 35 of
the Act of 1952 to interfere with the findings of the court below
on the question of acquiescene on the ground that there was no
evidence to support that finding. If a court had arrived at a find·
ing without any evidence to support it, it can be legitimately said
that it had not decided the case "according to law" within the
n1eaning of that expression in s. 35.
-
..
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
649
Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lall Chowdhury, f 1962 J Supp.
1 S.C.R. 933, /'ooran Chand v. Motilal, [ 1963 [ Supp. 2 S.C.R. 906
and Lda Beni Ram v·. Ku11dan Lal, (1899) L. R. 26 I.A. 58, referred to.
The right of the appellant to challenge the decree of the trial
judge by appeal could not be affected by the failure of the respon·
dent no. ~ to file an appeal.
Per Das, Acting C. J., and Hidaytullah, j. (Sarkar, J. dissenting): The first proviso to s. 57(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
l91S does not <lt:inand that a suit for the eviction of a tenant tiled
under the Delhi and 1\jmer Rent Control Act, 1952, must be governed entirely by the provisions of the new Act. The provisions applicable continue to be the provisions of the old Act with this addition
that where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, those modifications and clarifications should be
applied.
\Vhere entirely new rights and new liabilities have been
created, the ne\v provisions 1nust not be allo\ved to override the
provisions of the old Act. If the expression "shall have regard
to the provisions of this Act" in the first proviso to s. 57(2) 1neans
that the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, shall apply
to all such suits or proceedings
as
are referred to in s. 57(2)
except in the n1atter of the jurisdiction of the civil court, then in
reality the substantive provision of s. 57(2) will be denuded of
its full effect for all practical purposes. Moreover, that would be
giving effect to the provisions of the Rent Control Act of 1958
retrospectively though s. 57(2) states in clear terms that all suits
and proceedings pending at the co1n1nencement of the ne\v Act
tvill be dealt \Vith in accordance with provisions of the old
Act.
'fhe correct approach is to read the first proviso harn10niously with the substantive provision contained in s. 57(2).
Per Sarkar, J. The expression "shall have regard to the provi~
sions of this Act" in s. 57(2) of the Act of 1958 gives to all the
provisions of the .\ct of 1958 a retrospective operation and not to
sorne of those provisions.
Those words do not 1nean that the intention was that some of
the provisions of the new Act only were to be applied and they
cannot be given that meaning because otherwise the effect of the
proviso would be to wipe out largely the first part of the subsection.
The words "suits and other proceedings" in sub-s. (2) of s. 57
of the Act of 1958 include appeals and revision cases.
Hari Shankar v. Rao Giridhari Lal Chowdhry, [1962] Supp. I
S.C.R. 933, Pooran Chand v. Motilal, '196>] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 906
Lala Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal, (1899) L.R. 26 I.A. 58, Mukesh
Chand v. famboo Parshad, (1963) LXV P.L.R. 285, Shri Kishore
Aggarwal v. Satya Dev, (1959) LXI P.L.R. 574, /habar Mal
Chokhani v. finendra Parshad, (1963) LXV P.L.R. 469, Ryots of
Garbandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129,
Mysore St~tes Electricity Board v. The Bangalore Woollen Cotton
& Silk Mills Ltd. [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127, Bulaqui Das v. Ram
42-i S. C. lndia/64.
1963
Karani Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand <!f .1nr~
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. /.
650
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ll964J
Saran, (1960) LXIII P.L.R. 231, fiva Bhai Purshottam v. Chhagan
Karson, [1962] I S.C.R. 568, Bimal Parshad fain v. Niadarmal,
(1960) LXII P.L.R. 664 and Man Mohan Lal v. B. D. Gupta,
( 1962) LXIV P .L.R. 51, referred to,
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 392 of
1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated December 13, 1962, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench at Delhi) in Civil Revision No. 427-D of 1957.
Bishan Narain, 0. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain and
/. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. K. fain, for respondent 1.
-
S. N. Andley, for respondent No. 2.
August 29, 1963. The judgment of S. K. Das, Acting
C. J. and M. Hidayatullah, J. was delivered by S. K. Das,
Acting C. J. Sarkar, J. delivered a dissenting opinion.
S. K. DAs, Acting Chief fustice.-With much regret,
we have come to a conclusion different from that of our
learned brother Sarkar, J. as respects the true scope and
effect of s. 57 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the Control Act of 1958. The Control
Act of 1958 repeals the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control
Act, 1952, hereinafter called the Control Act of 1952, in
so far as that Act was applicable to the Union territory
of Delhi, but contains certain savings in respect of "suits
and proceedings" pending at the commencement of the
Control Act of 1958. To these savings we shall advert
later.
The facts giving rise to the appeal have been stated fully
in the judgment of Sarkar, J. and we need not re-state the
facts.
The respondent, Pratap Chand, relied on cl. ( c),
sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to s. 13(1) of the Control Act
of 1952 in support of his claim for eviction of the appellant
from a room, being room no. 6 in Pratap Buildings situate
in Connaught Circus, New Delhi. Sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the
Control Act of 1952 states that notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of
any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of
the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose
tenancy is terminated); the proviso creates certain excep-
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
651
tions and states that nothing in sub-s. ( 1) shall apply to
any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession
if the case comes within the exceptions mentioned in the
proviso. One of the exceptions is mentioned in cl. (c),
sub-cl. ( i), of the proviso. That exception relates to a case
where the tenant without obtaining the consent of the landlord has before the commencement of the Control Act of
1952 sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises. The principal question for decision in the appeal is whether the respondent-landlord is entitled to rely· on the exception provided by cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to sub-s. (1)
of s. 13 of the Control Act of 1952.
The learned trial Judge by his judgment dated June 11,
1956 gave a decree in favour of the respondent-landlord.
One of the questions raised before the learned trial Judge
was whether the respondent-landlord had acquiesced in the
sub-letting in favour of the appellant.
The learned
trial Judge decided against the appellant on the question of
acquiescence. There was then an appeal which was heard
by the learned Additional Senior Subordinate Judge of
Delhi. The learned Subordinate Judge found .... (1) that
the sub-letting had commenced not later than November,
1950, and (2) that thereafter the respondent-landlord continued to receive rent with full knowledge of the subletting. On these findings he held that the respondentlandlord was not entitled to avail himself of the exception
stated in cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of
s. 13 of the Control Act of 1952. The learned Subordinate
Judge gave his judgment on June 11, 1957.
It has
to be noted that these judgments were given prior to
the coming into force of the Control Act
of
1958.
That Act came into force on February 9, 1959.
On
Augnst 26, 1957 the respondent-landlord moved the High
Court of Punjab in revision under s. 35 of the Control Act
of 1952. When the revision was pending in the High
Court, the Control Act of 1958 came into force. The High
Court held that there was no evidence to justify the finding .
of the learned Subordinate Judge that the respondent-land- ·
lord had acquiesced in the sub-letting of tl1e room in favour
of the appellant, and the case being one where there is no
evidence to justify a finding, it was open to the High Court
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pmtap
Chand & Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. /.
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. J.
652
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4]
to interfere in revision. The question of the true scope
and effect of s. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 was agitated
before the High Court and the High Court held that by
reason of the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 57 of the Control Act of 1958, the revision before it had to be disposed
of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act
of 1952. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the petition in revision and restored the decree for possession made
by the trial cuurt. The appellant then moved this court
for special leave and having obtained such leave has preferred the present appeal from the judgment and order of
the High Court dated December 13, 1962.
We are in complete agreement with the conclusions
reached by our learned brother, Sarkar, J. in respect of the
following questions:
(1) whether the High Court was competent on an
application in revision to set aside the finding of
the lower appellate court on the question of acquiescence ;
(2) whether the High Court was right in its view that
there was no evidence in the case to support the
finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on the
question of acquiescence ; and
(3) whether the appeal before the learned Subordinate Judge was maintainable in the absence of an
appeal by the Automobile Association of Upper
India.
On the conclusions reached on the aforesaid three questions,
the respondent-landlord will be entitled to succeed, unless
s. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 stands in his way. If the
provisions of the Control Act of 1958 apply, then sub-s.
( 1) of s. 14 of the Control Act of 1958 will stand in the
way of the respondent-landlord, because the sub-letting in
the present case did not take place on or after June 9,
1952 and will not therefore come within the exception provided in cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. ( 1) of s. 14 of
the Control Act of 1958. Therefore, the narrow question
before us is ...... is the present case governed by cl. (c),
sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to sub-s. (l) of s. 13 of the Control Act of 1952 or is it governed by the provisions of the
Control Act of 1958? The answer to this question depends
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...
•.
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
653
on the true scope and effect of s. 57 of the Control Act
of 1958.
\Ve now proceed to read s. 57 of the Control Act of
1958. That section is in these terms:
"57. (!) The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952,
in so far as it is applicahle to the Union territory of
Delhi, is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other
proceedings under the said Act pending, at the commencement of this Act, before any court or other
authority shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, as if the
said Act had continued in force and this Act had not
been passed :
Provided that in any such suit or proceeding for the
fixation of standard rent or for the eviction of a tenant
from any premises to which section 54 does not apply,
the court or other authority shall have regard to the
provisions of this Act:
Provided further that the provisions for appeal under
the said Act shall continue in force in respect of suits
and proceedings disposed of thereunder."
Two questions arise out of s. 57. It is clear beyond dispute
that had suh-s. (2) of s. 57 stood by itself, then the present
case would be governed by the provisions of the Control
Act of 1952, assuming that an application in revision is a
'proceeding' within the meaning of the sub-section. There
are however two provisos to sub-s.
(2) of s. 57. It is
the interpretation of these two provisos which has caused
much difficulty in the present case. The first question is,
what is the true scope and effect of the first proviso, with
particular reference to the expression "shall have regard
to the provisions of this Act" occurring therein? The
second question is .... does an application in revision come
within the expression "suits and proceedings" occurring in
sub-s. (2) by reason of the second proviso which makes a
special provision for apneals? If, however, we decide against
the appellant on the first question and hold that the application in revision, assuming it to be a proceeding within
the meaning of sub-s. (2), must be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, then
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & A11r.
v.
Shri Pmtap
Cha11d & A11r.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. f.
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. /.
654
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the second question need not be
decided by us in the
present case.
Therefore, we proceed to deal with the first question
the answer to which will be decisive of the appeal.
S. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 has been the subject
of several decisions in the Punjab High Court. We shall
refer to these decisions at a later stage. We prefer first
to consider the question on general principles of construction having regard to the words used in the section.
But before we do so, a brief reference may be made
to the general scheme of the two Control Acts. Chapter II
of the Control Act of 1952 dealt with standard rent and
also contained provisions relating to other charges by the
landlord. The dominant object was to prevent payment
of rent in excess of standard rent and unlawful charges
made by the landlord. Chapter III dealt with control of
eviction of tenants and in this chapter occurred s. 13 to
which we have already made a reference. Chapter IV
dealt with hotels and lodging houses and as we are not
concerned with hotels and lodging houses,
no reference
need be made to the provisions in this chapter. Chapter
V dealt with jurisdiction of Courts, Appeals, Review and
Revision and Chapter VI dealt with miscellaneous provisions. The point to be noticed with regard to the provisions in chapter V is that the Control Act of 1952 conferred power and jurisdiction on ordinary civil courts with
the usual right of appeal from the first court as in other
civil proceedings and a right to move the High Court in
revision from the appellate judgment, in respect of suits
for recovery of possession of all premises as defined in the
Act, which definition excluded rooms in a hotel or lodging
house. With regard to hotels and lodging houses, jurisdiction was conferred on a Controller to be appointed by the
Central Government.
The Control Act of 1958 made a radical change in
respect of many matters. So far as eviction of tenants is
concerned, a matter with which we are concerned in the
present appeal, jurisdiction was conferred on the Controller
to be appointed under s. 35 to order recovery of possession
of the premises on one or more of the grounds mentioned
in the proviso to s.14 of the Control Act of 1958. S. 16 of
the Control Act of 1958 put certain restrictions on sub-
-
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
655
ktting and one of these restrictions was that no premises
which had been sub-let either in whole or in part on or after
June 9, 1952 without obtaining the consent in writing of
the landlord should be deemed to have been lawfully sublet; but where at any time before June 9, 1952 a tenant
had snb-let the whole or any part of the premises and the
sub-tenant was at the commencement of the Act in occupation of such premises, then notwithstanding that the consent of the landlord was not obtained for such sub-letting,
the premises would be deemed to bave been lawfully sublet.
S. 17 required the sub-tenant to give notice to the
landlord and s. 18 provided that in certain circumstances
the sub-tenant was to be treated as the tenant. With the
details of these provisions we are not concerned in the
present case except to point out that the Control Act of
1958 made radical changes in the matter of eviction of
tenants on the ground of sub-letting. In the matter of
sub-letting the relevant date was taken as June 9, 1952 the
date on which the Control Act of 1952 came into force,
and a distinction was made between sub-letting before
that date and sub-letting after that date.
A sub-letting
before June 9, 1952 was treated as lawful sub-letting if the
sub-tenant was in occupation of the premises at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958; but a sub-letting
after June 9, 1952 without the previous consent in writing
of the landlord was treated as unlawful for the purposes
of the Control Act of 1958.
Let us now consider s. 57 of the Control Act of 1958
against the background of the scheme of the two Control
Acts, as stated above. The first sub-section of s. 57 repeals
the Control Act of 1952 in so far as it is applicable to the
Union territory of Delhi. If the repeal stood by itself the
provisions of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) would
have applied with regard to the effect of the repeal and
the repeal would not affect the previous operation of any
enactment repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment
so repealed. The provisions of the General Clauses Act
will not, however, apply where a different intention appears
from the repealing enactment. Such an intention is clear
from sub-s. (2) of s. 57 which contains the saving clause.
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & .1nr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C.].
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. /.
656
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
It states in express terms that notwithstanding the repeal
of the Control Act of 1952, all suits and proceedings under
the Control Act of 1952 pending before any court or other
authority at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958,
shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the Control Act of 1952, as if the Control
Act of 1952 had continued in force and the Control Act
of 1958 had not been passed. Nothing can be more emphatic in the matter of a saving clause than what is contained in sub-s. (2) of s. 57. We had said earlier that had
sub-s. (2) of s. 57 stood by itself without the provisos,
then the incontestable position would have been that the
present case would be governed by the provisions of the
Control Act of 1952. The question before us is, does the
first proviso to sub-s. (2) make a change in the position
and if so, to what extent? The first proviso states inter
alia that in the matter of eviction of a tenant from any
premises to which s. 54 does not apply, the court or other
authority shall have regard to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958. S. 54 need not be considered by us as
it merely saves the operation of certain enactments which
do not apply to premises under our consideration. What
is the meaning of the expression "shall have regard to
the provisions of 1 this Act" (meaning the Control Act
of 1958) ? Does it mean that the proviso takes away
wh3t is given by sub-s. (2), except in the matter of
jurisdiction of the civil court to deal with an eviction
matter which was pending before the Control Act of
1958 came into force?
We are unable to agree that
such is the meaning of the first provisio.
We think
that the first proviso must be read harmoniously with
the substantive provision contained in sub-s. (2) and
the only way of harmonising the two
is
to accept
the view which the Punjab High Court has accepted,
namely, that the words "shall have regard to the provisions of this Act" merely mean that "where the new
Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, these modifications and clarifications should be applied". Vile .see no other way of harmonising sub-s. (2)
with the first proviso thereto.
A similar expression occurring in s. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act (LIV of 1948) was considered by _this
•
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
court in the Mysore State Electricity Board v. The Bangalore Woolen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. and others etc.(').
This Court referred to the decision of the Privy Council in
Ryots of Garbandro v. Z emindar
of
Parlakimedi(')
and expressed agreement with the view of the Privy
Council that the expression "have regard to" or "having
regard to" has no more definite or technical meaning than
that of ordinary usage, and only requires that the provisions to which regard must be had should be taken into
consideration. If the expression "have regard to" in the
first proviso to sub-s. (2) means that the provisions of the
Control Act of 1958 shall apply to all such suits or proceedings as are referred to in sub-s. (2) except in the matter
of jurisdiction of the civil court, then in reality the substantive provision of sub-s. (2) will be denuded of its full
effect for all practical purposes. We do not think that it
would be right to read the first proviso of sub-s. (2) in
that way.
It was argued before us that the first proviso
related only to two matters, (a) fixation of· standard
rent and (b) eviction of a tenant, and the intention
was that in these two matters only the provisions of
the Control Act of 1958 would apply and not in others.
If that was the intention, nothing would have been easier
than to say in suh-s. (2) .. "Notwithstanding such repeal,
all suits and other proceedings under the said Act except
those for fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant
etc." Subs-s. (2) does not, however say so, and if the first
proviso is to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the
appellant, the provisions as to jurisdiction in the new Act
would affect the power of the civil court to pass a decree
for eviction.
We now turn to the decisions of the Punjab High
Court. In Shri Krishna Aggarwal v. Satya Dev(") it was
held that the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 57 was directory
in character and not mandatory; therefore, the courts and
authorities concerned had a discretion conferred on them
to take into consideration the provisions of the new Act
when it was considered necessary in a proper case and in
the interest of justice. We do not wish, however, to base
our decision on these grounds. We think that the proper
way of reading sub-s.(2) and the first proviso thereto is
---(1j [I%3]S~pp:-.z-s:c.R. 127.
(") (1959) LXJ P.L.R. 574.
( 2) (1943] L.R. 70 I.A. 129.
.
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. /.
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & "Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
S. K .. l)•s
Acg. C. ].
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
to harmonise both in the best way possible. In Bulaqt
Das Madan Mohan & others v. Ram Sarup(1) the view
expressed was that the proviso must have some meaning
and force and the proviso intended that where the old provisions had been repeated with modifications, the old Act
should be interpreted in the light of the modifications so
long as they did not involve creating any new rights and
liabilities. A similar view was expressed by the same
Judge in Shri Bimal Parshad Jain v. Shri Niadarmal(").
The question was considered by a Division Bench in Shri
/habar Mal Chokhani v. Shri /inendra Pershad("). At
pages 474 and 475 of the report Dulat, J. who spoke for
the Bench said:
"It would thus appear that apart from Gosain, J.
the other learned Judges of this court have generally
agreed that the proviso to s. 57, sub-section (2), does
not demand that a suit for the eviction of a tenant
filed under the previous Act of 1952 must be governed
entirely by the provisions of the new Act but that,
on the other hand, the provisions applicable continue
to be the provisions of the old Act with this addition
that, where the new Act has slightly modified or
clarified the previous provisions, those modifications
and clarifications should be applied, but, where entirely
new rights and new liabilities have been created, the
new provisions must not be allowed to override the
provisions of the previous Act, and nearly all the cases
have been decided on that basis."
We agree with the view expressed by Dulat, J. We also
agree with the High Court that if the first proviso to subs. (2) of s. 57 is interpreted in the way contended for by
the appellant here, it would really be giving effect to the
provisions of the Control Act of 1958 retrospectively,
though sub-s. (2) of s. 57 states in clear terms that all
suits and proceedings pending at the commencement of the
new Act will be dealt in accordance with the provisions
of the old Act. This is really putting the same argument
that tl1e proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision, in another way.
(') (1960) LXII P.L.R. 231.
( 2 ) (1960) LXII P.L.R. 664.
(') (1963) LXV P.L.R. 469.
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
For the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that in the present case the respondent-landlord is
entitled to the benefit of cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso
to s. 13 ( 1) of the Control Act of 1952 and the first proviso
to sub-s. (2) of s. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 does not
stand in his way. He is, therefore, entitled to succeed, as
the appellant has failed to make out any acquiescence by
the landlord to the sub-letting in question. Therefore, the
High Court rightly allowed the petition in revision and
restored the decree for possession made by the trial court.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
SARKAR J.-The respondent Pratap Chand, hereafter
referred to as the respondent, who was the owner of Pratap Buildings in Connaught Circus, New Delhi had let
a room in it, being room No. 6, to the respondent, the
Automobile Association of Upper India, formerly known
as the Automobile Association of Northern India and hereafter referred to as the Association. The appellant was a
sub-tenant of the room under the Association. These facts
are not in dispute. On October 5, 1959, the respondent
gave the Association a notice to quit and on December 25,
1954 brought a suit against the Association and the appellant for their eviction from the room. It is out of this suit
that the present appeal arises and the question is-Is the
appellant liable to he evicted i
Section 13 of the Delhi and Aimer Rent Act, 1952
which had come into force on June 9, 1952 and governed
the case, prohibited Courts from directing eviction of a
tenant at the suit of a landlord excepting in the cases mentioned in the proviso to it. Clause ( c) of this proviso said
that a decree for recovery of possession might be made
where the Court was satisfied that the "tenant without
obtaining the consent of the landlord has before the commencement of this Act,-sublet, assigned or otherwise
parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the
premises". The respondent relied on this provision in the
Act and contended that the Association ha<l without his
coment sub-let the shop-room to the appellant and that he
had come to konw of this sub-letting about the end of May
1954. The Association does not appear to have seriously
contested the suit but the appellant did. Both the Association and the appellant admitted that the landlord had not
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
"·
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
S. K. Das
Acg. C. f.
Sarkar f.
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
C.hand & Anr.
Sarkar /.
660
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
consented to the . sub-letting before it started but the appellant contended that the respondent had full know ledge
of his occupation of the shop-room as a sub-tenant and had
with such knowledge accepted rent from the Association
and thereby acquiesced in the sub-letting and was, therefore, not entitled to eviction on the ground of sub-letting
without the landlord's consent.
The learned trial Judge by his judgment dated June
11, 1956 held that the respondent landlord had not acquiesced in the sub-letting and in that view of the matter directed ejectment of the Association and the appellant. The
appellant then went up in appeal under s. 34 of the Act to
the Additional Senior Sub-Judge of Delhi who held that
the sub-letting had commenced not later than Novernher
1950 and that the respondent continued to receive rent with
full know ledge of the sub-letting. He, therefore, decided
that the respondent was not entitled to the decree for possession and allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of
the trial Court and dismissed the suit by his judgment
dated June 11, 1957. On August 26, 1957, the respondent
moved the High Court of Punjab in revision under s. 35
of the Act.
While the revision petition was pending in the High
Court the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 came into force.
It repealed the Act of 1952 but made some of the provisions of the repealed Act applicable to certain pending
matters. One of the questions in this appeal will be, which
of the provisions of the new Act are to apply to the pending
cases.
In the revision petition, apart from challenging the
y
'
..
-
-
finding of acquiescence by the learned Senior Sub-Judge,
-
the respondent contended that the appellate judgment was
in any event wrong because the tenant, tlle Association,
/"'
not having appealed from the decree in ejectment made
against it by the learned trial Judge, that decree stood and
as a result of it the tenancy was at an end and, therefore,
the appellant sub-tenant who only derived title through the
tenant, had no right to remain in possession of the demised
room. The appellant on his part in opposing the petition
supported the judgment of the Additional Senior SuhJudge on the merits, disputed that his rights were concluded by the failure of the Association to appeal from the
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
judgment of the trial Judge and further contended that in
view of the provisions of s. 57 (2) of the Act of 1958 to
which I will later refer, the right of the landlord to possession had to be decided by the provisions of that Act and
under s. 16 of this Act the respondent was not on the facts
found entitled to an order for ejcctment on the ground
of sub-letting without his consent.
The various points raised in the case were not all
heard too-ether in the High Court but the result of the
several l~arings was as follows: that the fact that the
tenant had not appealed did not take away the sub-tenant's
right to relief, that there was no evidence to justify the
appellate Court's finding that the respondent had acquiesce<l in the sub-letting by the Association to the appellant,
that the High Court could in revision set aside the judgment of the lower appellate Court on this ground and lastly,
that s. 57(2) of the Act of 1958 did not require the High
Court in exercising its revisional powers to decide the landlord's right to possession by reference to the provisions of
the Act of 1958. ln that view of the matter the High Court
allowed the petition for revision and restored the decree
for possession passed by the trial Court. This judgment of
the High Court is challenged in this appeal.
The first question is whether the High Court was competent in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to set
aside the finding
of
the lower appellate Court that
the landlord had acquiesced in the sub-letting. Section 35
of the Act of 1952 under which the revision petition had
been filed gave jurisdiction to the High Court to satisfy
itself that the decision of the Court below had been "according to law". It has been held by this Court in Hari Shan-
. kar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury(') that a revision petition under s. 35 of the Act of 1952 did not lie to interfere
with a plain finding of fact. Relying on this case learned
counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court
had no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of acquiescence by the lower appellate Court. In that case however
there was evidence which could have supported the finding
arrived at by the Court below the High Court and the High
Court had only re-assessed the value of that evidence. This,
~ it was held, the High Court could not do. Such a case is
~(i) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 933.
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v.
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
Sarkar/.
1963
Karam Singh
Sobti & Anr.
v
Shri Pratap
Chand & Anr.
Sarkar J.
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
very different from a case where, as in the present, the
High Coui;t interferes with the finding on the ground that
there is no evidence to support it. If a Court had arrived
at a finding without any evidence to support it, it can be
legitimately said that it had not decided the case "according
to law": see Pooran Chand v. Motilal('). I may also refer
to Lala Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal(') cited on behalf of the
respondent where it was observed that, acquiescence is not
a question of fact but of legal inference from the facts
found.
The question then arises whether the High Court was
right in its view that there was no evidence in the case
to support the finding of acquiescence. The evidence only
showed that the respondent knew that the appellant was in
occupation of the demised premises.
I think that the
High Court pointed out rightly that the fact that a landlord had knowledge that a person other than a tenant was
in possession did not by itself always lead to an inference
that the landlord had knowledge that the person in possession was a sub-tenant. The facts of the present case made
such an inference more difficult. They were as follows:
The appellant had been in possession of the room from
sometime in 1949 till November 1950 along with the Association. All this time he was publishing a magazine called
the All India Motorist which was the official organ of
the Association. This he was doing under an agreement
with the Association which provided that "office accommodation for the staff of the A.I. Motorist to be provided by
the Association in 6, Pratap Buildings". He was at one
time the General Secretary of the Association and constantly on the premises doing also his own business there.
In November 1950 the Association took another premises
as the demised room was found too small for its expanding
activities. From November 1950, the appellant remained
in sole possession of the premises carrying on his businesses
there as previously, including the business of publishing the
aforesaid official organ of the Association. In may 1954, the.
agreement between the Association and the appellant for the
printing and publication of the magazine was brought to
an end and the Association started its own magazine. Since
(') [ 1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 906.
( 2) [1899] L.R. 26 I.A. 58.
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. ....,
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
then the appellant alone has been using the room for his
1963
own purposes .
I do not think that these facts establish that the respondent had any reason to think that from November
1950, when the sub-tenancy commenced, the appellant had
been in possession as a sub-tenant for he had been using
the room for the work of the Association.