# S.K.KEDAR v. STATE OF WEST BENGAi

- **Citation:** [1973] 1 S.C.R. 488
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-05-02
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 35 of 1972
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-k-kedar-v-state-of-west-bengai-5683
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

488
S.K.KEDAR
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAi,
May 2, 1972
A
lP. ]A(JANMOlli\N REDDY, K. K. MATHEW AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]
B
West Bengal (Prevention of
s. 11-'Puolic order', scope of
detenu in ."'erson-Sco~"e of
Violent Activities) Act (19 of 1970),
Advisory Board's
obligation to
'hear
In exercise of the powers conferred under s. 3(1) and (3) of the
West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activitio;is) Act, 1970 the District
Magistrate passed an order detaining the petitioner with a view to prevent
(
him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order.
The grounds of detention were that he along with his associate
attacked the Railway Police Force with bombs and created disturbance
of public orcb. After his arrest the case was i:eferred to the Advisory
Board and · the Board, after considering the entire material before it.
reported to the State Government that there was sufficient cause for the
o~tention of the petitionc. On the same day hi) sent a representation
that he may be heard in person which the Board received two days later.
D
The Board however heard him, found no reason to revise its opinion, and
sent a supplementary report to that effect.
The petitioner challenged the detention in this C.ourt.
Dismissing the petition,
HI;lLD : (I) The qu,cstion whether a person has only committed a
E·
lireach of Jaw -and ordt.!r or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance of t!JJ, public <Xder is om of degree and the extent r; the reach
of tho act upon society. The act by itself is not determinative of its
own gi-avity.
In its quality it may not di1for from another but in its
potentiality it may be very different.
Similar acts in different contexts
effect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on
the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect
on the community. In the final analysis it depends on the facts of each·
F
cose whether the acts prepetrated are such a nature of po:entiality.
[441D-Gl
Pushkar Mukherjee and others v. The State of West Bengal, (1969)
2 S.C.R. 635, Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta
and another A.l.R .. 1970 S.C. 814 and Ndgendra Nath Monda! v.
The
State of West Bengal, [1972) S.C.R. 498 and Arun Ghosh v.
State W. Bengal. A.l.R. 1970 S.C. 1228, referred to.
G
In the p1esent case, the acts attributed to the petitioner are such as
would bring them within the ambit of s. 3(2) (b) and (d) of the Act.
.Attacking the Railway Police Force party with bombs at the railway
station was bound to cause scare among all the mombers of the public
who would be resorting to the station yard and interfere with their activities in getting the goods loadc<l or unloaded. The acts had the potentiality of affecting the even tempo of the life of the community in the
H
locality hv thdr reverberations.
Therefore, the grounds communicated
to the petitioner .disclosed that he indulged in an activity which was
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order [491 G·H, 492A-B]
s. K. KEDAR v. WES!' BENGAL (Mathew, J.)
4811
A
(2) Section I I of the Act providts that t+ie Advisory Boord may give
personal bearing if it. considers it CSE.ential or if the person _concerned
desires to be beard. In tlm care, the Board did not COllSlder 1t essential
to hear the peti<ionor in person before submitting its. report. But when
petitioner sent a ropresentation that he may k heard m person the Board
heard him bofor.o submitting the supplementary report. Therefore, the
petitioner cannot contend that he was not personally heard before the
ll
Board submitted its opinion. [492E-Gl
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 35 of 1972.
Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the
nature of habeas corpus.
S. K. Gambhir, for the petitioner.
P. K. Chakravarti and G. S. Chatter;ee, for the respondent.

## Text

488
S.K.KEDAR
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAi,
May 2, 1972
A
lP. ]A(JANMOlli\N REDDY, K. K. MATHEW AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]
B
West Bengal (Prevention of
s. 11-'Puolic order', scope of
detenu in ."'erson-Sco~"e of
Violent Activities) Act (19 of 1970),
Advisory Board's
obligation to
'hear
In exercise of the powers conferred under s. 3(1) and (3) of the
West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activitio;is) Act, 1970 the District
Magistrate passed an order detaining the petitioner with a view to prevent
(
him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order.
The grounds of detention were that he along with his associate
attacked the Railway Police Force with bombs and created disturbance
of public orcb. After his arrest the case was i:eferred to the Advisory
Board and · the Board, after considering the entire material before it.
reported to the State Government that there was sufficient cause for the
o~tention of the petitionc. On the same day hi) sent a representation
that he may be heard in person which the Board received two days later.
D
The Board however heard him, found no reason to revise its opinion, and
sent a supplementary report to that effect.
The petitioner challenged the detention in this C.ourt.
Dismissing the petition,
HI;lLD : (I) The qu,cstion whether a person has only committed a
E·
lireach of Jaw -and ordt.!r or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance of t!JJ, public <Xder is om of degree and the extent r; the reach
of tho act upon society. The act by itself is not determinative of its
own gi-avity.
In its quality it may not di1for from another but in its
potentiality it may be very different.
Similar acts in different contexts
effect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on
the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect
on the community. In the final analysis it depends on the facts of each·
F
cose whether the acts prepetrated are such a nature of po:entiality.
[441D-Gl
Pushkar Mukherjee and others v. The State of West Bengal, (1969)
2 S.C.R. 635, Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta
and another A.l.R .. 1970 S.C. 814 and Ndgendra Nath Monda! v.
The
State of West Bengal, [1972) S.C.R. 498 and Arun Ghosh v.
State W. Bengal. A.l.R. 1970 S.C. 1228, referred to.
G
In the p1esent case, the acts attributed to the petitioner are such as
would bring them within the ambit of s. 3(2) (b) and (d) of the Act.
.Attacking the Railway Police Force party with bombs at the railway
station was bound to cause scare among all the mombers of the public
who would be resorting to the station yard and interfere with their activities in getting the goods loadc<l or unloaded. The acts had the potentiality of affecting the even tempo of the life of the community in the
H
locality hv thdr reverberations.
Therefore, the grounds communicated
to the petitioner .disclosed that he indulged in an activity which was
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order [491 G·H, 492A-B]
s. K. KEDAR v. WES!' BENGAL (Mathew, J.)
4811
A
(2) Section I I of the Act providts that t+ie Advisory Boord may give
personal bearing if it. considers it CSE.ential or if the person _concerned
desires to be beard. In tlm care, the Board did not COllSlder 1t essential
to hear the peti<ionor in person before submitting its. report. But when
petitioner sent a ropresentation that he may k heard m person the Board
heard him bofor.o submitting the supplementary report. Therefore, the
petitioner cannot contend that he was not personally heard before the
ll
Board submitted its opinion. [492E-Gl
c
D
E
F
G
H
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 35 of 1972.
Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the
nature of habeas corpus.
S. K. Gambhir, for the petitioner.
P. K. Chakravarti and G. S. Chatter;ee, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mathew, J. This is an application filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus
and to release the petitioner who is alleged to be in illegal custody.
In the exercise of the power conferred under sub-section (1)
read with sub-section (3) of section 3 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's Act 19 of 1970),
hereinafter referred to as the 'Act', the District Magistrate, 24
Parganas, passed an order on July I 0, 1971, detaining the petitioner
with a view to prevent him trom acting in a manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order.
Thereafter the petitioner was
arrested on July 13, 1971, and was served with the order of detention as also with the grounds of detention together with " vernacular translation thereof on the same day. On July 14, 1971, tho
District Magistrate reported to the State Government about the
passjng of the detention order. The report was considered by the
State Government on July 21, 1971, and the Government approved
the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate.
On the
same day, the State Government submitted a report to the Central
Government in accordance with the provisions of sub-section ( 5)
of section 3 of the Act together with the grounds· of detention and
other particulars as required.
On August 11, 1971, the State
Government placed the case of the petitioner before the Advisory
Board under section 10 of the Act. The State Government received
a representation from the petitioner on September 8, 1971. The
representation was considered by the Government and it was rejected by an order·dated September 10, 1971. The representation was,
however, forwarded to the Advisory Board for consideration of the
same by the Board. The Advisory Board, after' consideration of
the materials placed before it, submitted its report to the State
Government on September 6, 1971, incorporating its opinion that
there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. The
' II
490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l S.C.R.
petitioner prayed, to the Advisory Board, by means of a representation dated September 6, 197 l, that he might be given an oppor·
tunity of being heard in person. This representation was received
by the Advisory Board on September 8, 1971, and the Board
heard the petitioner on September 18, 1971. Therefore, the Board
sent a supplementary rel/.Ort to the State Government on the same
day, stating that the Board did not find any reason to revise its
previo.us opinion. The State Government conlirmed the order of
detention on October 7. 1971, and the order of confirmation was
communicated to the detenu on the same day.
The grounds of detention communicated to the petitioner
litated:
"(l) That on 5-7-1971 at about 0530 hrs. you along
with your associates, while removing Brake Blocks,
Vertical Le.vers and other railway materials from wagon
Nos. NRP 1820 and PW 3471 at Chitpur Rly. Yard,
charged bombs and ballasts upon the on-duty R.P.F.
party, when challenged by them.
Your attack grew so
violent that RK 6448 Ram Bacha11 Rai of the R.P.F.
Party had to fire one round in self-defence, when you all
fled away.
You created disturbance of public order
thereby.
(2) That on 5-7-1971 night again at 20.30 hrs., you
along with your associates, while removing iron rods
from BF Wagon No. ER99155 at Chitpur Rly. Yard,
charged bombs and ballasts upon the on-duty R.1'.F.
part; at Chiipur post, when challenged by them. Your
attack grew so violent that RK 6756 Madan Mohan
Prasad of the R.P.F. party had to fire two rounds upon
you in self-defence culminating (in) death of one of.your
associates on the spot, when you all fled away, you created disturbance of public order thereby."
Section 3(2) of the Act defines the expression "acting in any
manner pre.judicial to the security of the State or the maintenance
of public order" for the purpose of sub-section (1) of that section.
Clauses (b) and ( d) of sub section 3(2) read as follows :-
" (b) Committing mischief, within the meaning of
section 425 of the Indian Penal Code, ( 45 of 1860) by
fire or any explosive substance on any property of Government or any local authority or 1my corporation owned
or controlled by Government or any University or other
educational institution or on any public building, where
the commission of such mischief disturbs, or is likely to
disturb, public order;"
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s. K. KEDAR v. WEST BENGAL (Mathew, J.)
491
"(d) committing or instigating any person to commit
any offence punish~ble with death or .imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for a term extendmg to seven years
or more or any offence under the Arms Act, 1959 (S4
of 1959) or the Explosive Substances Act, 1 ?08 (6 of
1908) where the commission of such offence disturbs, or
is likely to disturb, public order;"
The questio:t is,_ whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in the grounds communicated to him
wol!\d amount to commision of offences which would disturb public
order or wi:Jich are likel.y to disturb public order.
The relevant criteria to distinguish in the abstract between acts
prejudicial to maintenance of law and order and those which are
prejudiciar to maintenance of public order are laid down in a
number of rulings of this Court (see Pushkar Mukherjee and others
v. The State of West Benga/(1), Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and another(') and
Nagendra Nath
Monda/ v. The State of West Bengal(').
The question whether
a person has only committed a breach of law and order or has
acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order
is one of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the
society. An act by itself is not determinative of its own gravity.
In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality
it may be very different.
Similar acts in different contexts affect
differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the
other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect
upon the community.
Public order is the even tempo of the life
of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified
locality. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life
of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of the law and order (see A run
Ghosh v. State of Bengal(').
In the final analysis, one must always return to the facts of the
case to i;ee whether·the acts perpetrated are of such a nature or
of such potentiality as to travel beyond the immediate victims and
affect.the gene~al or local public. A case by case alijudication gives
the judicial process the impact of actuality and thereby saves it
from the hazards of generalisation.
We think that the acts attributed to the petitioner are such as
would bring him within the ambit of clauses (b) and ( d). of section
3(2) of. the Act. Attacking the R.P.F. party with bombs at the
Chitpur railway station yard was bound to cause scare among all
th~ m~mbers of the public who wocld be resorting the station yard
and interfere with their activities in getting the goods loaded and
(I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 635
(2) A.l.R.1970 S.C.614
(3) [19721 l s.c.c. 498.
14-LI286SupC!/72
(l) A.T.R. 1970 S.C. 1228.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 s.c.R.
unloaded. The acts attributed to the petitioner had the potentiality
of alfeeting the even tempo of the life of the community in the
locality by their reverberations.
We therefore, overrule the contention of coumel for the petitioner that the grounds communicated
to the petitioner did not disclose that he indulged in any activity
which was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
It was contended that the petitioner was not given an opportunity
of being personally heard by the Advisory Board before it sent the
report. incorporating its opinion t'hat there was sufficient cause for
the detention of the petitioner. We do not think that there is any
substance in this contention either.
Section 11 of the Act, so far
as it is relevant, provides :
"1. Procedure for Advisory Boar(ls (1) The Advisory
Board shall after concidering the materials placed before
it and, after calling for such further information as it
may deem necessary from the State Government or from
any person called for the purpose through the State
Government or from the person concerned, and if in any
particular case it considers it essential so to do or if the
person concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him
in person, submit its report to the State Government
within ten weeks from the date of detention."
In this case, the Board did not consider it essential to hear the
petitioner in person before submitting its report.
So, unless the
petitioner requested for a personal hearing, there was no obligation
on the part of the Board to give a personal hearing to him. The
Board considered all the relevant materials relating to the case of
the petitioner and it came to a conclusion that there was sufficient
cause for the detention of the petitioner in its report dated September 6, 1971. On the same day the petitioner sent a representation
to the Board that he may be heard in person. That representation
reached the Board oajy on September 8, 1971.
Thereafter the
Board heard the petitioner in person on September 18, 1971, but
found no reason to revise its previous opinion.
So it submitted a
supplementary report to the Government on September 18, 1971,
to that effect.
We, therefore, dismiss the petition.
V.P.S.
Petition dismissed.
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