# S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [2022] 11 S.C.R. 42
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2022-08-18
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals No. 5503-04 of 2022
- **Bench:** N. V. Ramana, Krishna Murari, Hima Kohli
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-madhusudhan-reddy-v-v-narayana-reddy-and-others-35673
- **Pages:** 31

## Headnote

Civil procedure Code, 1908 - S.114 r/w Or XLVII - Review
Application - Maintainability of - Held: s.114 r/w Or XLVII makes
it clear that a review application would be maintainable on (i)
discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after
exercise of due diligence, were not within the knowledge of the
applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree was
passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient
reason - The error must be apparent on the face of the record and
not one which has to be searched out - The power of review is not
to be confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior
Court to correct errors committed by a subordinate Court - Under
the review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the
view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking
two views in a matter - There is a clear distinction between an
erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the
record - An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior
Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can
only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction - In the present
case, nothing have prevented the respondents from filing the certified
copies of the revenue records even earlier, but they elected to file
only photocopies of the very same surrender proceedings - At no
stage a plea was taken by the respondents with regard to the
discovery of new documents which could have been produced by
them after due diligence - Several opportunities were available to
the respondents to file authenticated copies of the revenue records,
firstly, when respondents challenged ex-parte order of Appellate
authority , secondly, when Appellate authority reconsidered the
appeals, thirdly, when respondent preferred a second set of revision
petition, fourthly, when respondent filed two review petitions, and
[2022] 11 S.C.R. 42
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lastly, when respondent preferred Special Leave Petition before
Supreme Court - Moreover, no averments were made by the
respondents in the second set of review to the effect that they could
not trace the documents in question earlier - Therefore, nonproduction of the relevant documents on the part of the respondents
at the appropriate stage cannot be a ground for seeking review of
the judgment when five opportunities were available to them for
production of the said documents - Even otherwise, recourse to
successive review petitions against the same order is impermissible
when the respondents have miserably failed to draw the attention
of the Court to any circumstances that would entitle them to invoke
review jurisdiction - Thus, Second set of review petition ought to
be rejected by High Court.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It has been consistently held by this Court in
several judicial pronouncements that the Court's jurisdiction of
review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be
open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the
face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent
on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of
review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising
powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not
substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a
possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also
be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence
has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the
condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of
the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the
order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence.
There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as
against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous
decision can be correcte

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 11 S.C.R.
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY
v.
V. NARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeals No. 5503-04 of 2022)
AUGUST 18, 2022
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI, KRISHNA MURARI AND
HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
Civil procedure Code, 1908 - S.114 r/w Or XLVII - Review
Application - Maintainability of - Held: s.114 r/w Or XLVII makes
it clear that a review application would be maintainable on (i)
discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after
exercise of due diligence, were not within the knowledge of the
applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree was
passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient
reason - The error must be apparent on the face of the record and
not one which has to be searched out - The power of review is not
to be confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior
Court to correct errors committed by a subordinate Court - Under
the review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the
view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking
two views in a matter - There is a clear distinction between an
erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the
record - An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior
Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can
only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction - In the present
case, nothing have prevented the respondents from filing the certified
copies of the revenue records even earlier, but they elected to file
only photocopies of the very same surrender proceedings - At no
stage a plea was taken by the respondents with regard to the
discovery of new documents which could have been produced by
them after due diligence - Several opportunities were available to
the respondents to file authenticated copies of the revenue records,
firstly, when respondents challenged ex-parte order of Appellate
authority , secondly, when Appellate authority reconsidered the
appeals, thirdly, when respondent preferred a second set of revision
petition, fourthly, when respondent filed two review petitions, and
[2022] 11 S.C.R. 42
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lastly, when respondent preferred Special Leave Petition before
Supreme Court - Moreover, no averments were made by the
respondents in the second set of review to the effect that they could
not trace the documents in question earlier - Therefore, nonproduction of the relevant documents on the part of the respondents
at the appropriate stage cannot be a ground for seeking review of
the judgment when five opportunities were available to them for
production of the said documents - Even otherwise, recourse to
successive review petitions against the same order is impermissible
when the respondents have miserably failed to draw the attention
of the Court to any circumstances that would entitle them to invoke
review jurisdiction - Thus, Second set of review petition ought to
be rejected by High Court.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It has been consistently held by this Court in
several judicial pronouncements that the Court's jurisdiction of
review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be
open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the
face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent
on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of
review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising
powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not
substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a
possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also
be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence
has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the
condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of
the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the
order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence.
There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as
against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous
decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an
error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by
exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred
to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been
described as "for any other sufficient reason". The said phrase
has been explained to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at
least analogous to those specified in the rule" [Para 26][65-G-H;
66-A-D]
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
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2. The Single Judge of the High Court has taken great pains
to discuss the three circumstances available under Order XLVII
CPC for maintaining a review application and observed that in
the instant case, the respondents had stated before this Court
that they had in their possession, genuine documents relating to
surrender of the protected tenancy rights in respect of the subject
land and in view of the said submission, the petitions for Special
Leave to Appeal were disposed of with an observation that if the
respondents were able to obtain such documents, it would be
open to them to file a review petition before the High Court.
What is relevant is that this Court had even then declined to
interfere with the findings on merits returned by the High Court
vide Judgment dated 09th July, 2013; nor was the review order
dated 20th February, 2014, interfered with. Under the garb of the
liberty granted to them to approach the High Court again, all that
the respondents have done is to obtain certified copies of the
revenue records in respect of the subject land and enclosed them
with the second set of review petitions. This is so when
photocopies of the said documents had been filed by them earlier.
[Para 27][66-E-H]
3. Nothing prevented the respondents from filing the
certified copies of the revenue records even earlier, but they
elected to file only photocopies of the very same surrender
proceedings along with the revision petitions that were ultimately
dismissed by the High Court vide common judgment dated 9th
July, 2013. The above chronology of events gains significance as
it goes to amply demonstrate that several opportunities were
available to the respondents if they really wished to file
authenticated copies of the revenue records relating to the
purported surrender proceedings before the Tehsildar which they
did not avail of, for reasons best known to them. The first
opportunity arose when the respondents challenged the ex parte
order dated 2nd April, 2005 passed by the Appellate Authority
when they filed two Civil Revision Petitions which were allowed
and the matter was remanded back to the Appellate Authority for
fresh consideration; the second opportunity arose when the
Appellate Authority re-considered the appeals remitted by the
High Court and passed an order dated 23rd March, 2013, in favour
of the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant; the third
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opportunity arose when the respondents preferred a second set
of Civil Revision Petitions assailing the order dated 23rd March,
2013 that culminated in the common judgment and order dated
9th July, 2013 passed by the High Court; the fourth opportunity
arose when the respondents filed two review applications for
seeking review of the common judgment and order dated 9th
July, 2013, that came to be dismissed vide order dated 20th
February, 2014; and the fifth opportunity arose when the
respondents preferred petitions for special leave to appeal before
this Court being aggrieved by the common judgment and orders
dated 9th July, 2013 and the review order dated 20th February,
2014 passed by the High Court. [Paras 28 and 31][67-B; 69-F-H;
70-A-B]
4. Nothing has been stated on affidavit to substantiate the
plea taken by the respondents at such a belated stage that the
documents sought to be filed by them with the second set of
review petitions had come to light after passing of the judgment
and order dated 9th July, 2013. Under the garb of the liberty
granted to them, the respondents have tried to fill in the glaring
loopholes and introduce evidence in the review proceedings that
was all along in their power and possession and ought to have
seen the light of the day much earlier. In fact, it appears that the
Civil Revision Petitions were originally argued to the hilt on
several other grounds, not limited just to the revenue record,
which were all considered and turned down as meritless.
Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that non-production
of the relevant documents on the part of the respondents at the
appropriate stage cannot be a ground for seeking review of the
judgment and order dated 9th July, 2013 particularly, when five
opportunities enumerated in para 31 above, were available to
them for production of the said documents, which were all frittered
away, one by one. [Para 34][71-E-G]
5. Even otherwise, recourse to successive review petitions
against the same order is impermissible more so, when the
respondents have miserably failed to draw the attention of this
Court to any circumstances that would entitle them to invoke
review jurisdiction within the ambit of the Rules. Under the rules,
the respondents were not required to produce "genuine"
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documents but new documents/evidence that was not within their
knowledge and could not have been so even after exercise of
due diligence, which could have turned the tables in their favour.
Nor has any error apparent on the face of the record been brought
out by them. [Para 35][72-A-B]
Babboo Alias Kalyandas and Others v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (1979) 4 SCC 74; Sakuru v. Tanaji (1985) 3
SCC 590 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 109; Dharappa v.
Bijapur Coop. Milk Products Societies Union Limited
(2007) 9 SCC 109 : [2007] 5 SCR 729 - referred to.
Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others
(1980) Supp SCC 562; Parsion Devi and Others v.
Sumitri Devi and Others (1997) 8 SCC 715 : [1997] 4
Suppl. SCR 470; Lilly Thomas and Others v. Union of
India and Others (2000) 6 SCC 224 : [2000] 3 SCR
1081; Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech
Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others (2005)
6 SCC 651 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 517; Jain Studios
Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.(2006) 5 SCC 501
: [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 409; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati
and Others (2013) 8 SCC 320 : [2013] 11 SCR 25;
Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma
(1979) 4 SCC 389; State of West Bengal and Others v.
Kamal Sengupta and Another (2008) 8 SCC 612 :
[2008] 10 SCR 4; S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of
Karnataka and Another (1993) 4 Supp SCC 595 :
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 1; Patel Narshi Thakershi and
Others v. Shri Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji (1971)
3 SCC 844; Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others
v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others (2020) SCC Online
SC 896; Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram and Moran Mar
Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasius and Others - relied on.
Case Law Reference
[2000] 3 SCR 1081
relied on
Para 4
[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 109
relied on
Para 7
[2007] 5 SCR 729
referred to
Para 7
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[1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 470
relied on
Para 15
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 517
relied on
Para 17
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 409
relied on
Para 18
[2013] 11 SCR 25
relied on
Para 19
[2008] 10 SCR 4
relied on
Para 21
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 1
relied on
Para 23
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 55035504 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2022 of the High Court
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in IA No.2 of 2014 (Rev. CRMP
No.6377 of 2014) and CRP No. 2786 of 2013.
With
Civil Appeal No. 5505 of 2022.
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, V. K. Shukla, Sr. Advs., Achut Reddy,
Somanadri Goud Katam, Nidhi Ram Sharma, Ganesh Bhardwaj, Siraj
Malik, Advs. for the Appellant.
Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv., Giridhar Rao, Sridhar Potaraju, Arjun
Singh, Ms. Shiwani Tushir, Rajat Srivastav, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Advs.
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals are directed against a common judgment
and order dated 29th April, 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, allowing the
review petitions filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 herein (IA No.2 of
2014 in Revision CRPMP No. 6377 of 2014 moved in and Civil Revision
Petition No.2786 of 2013 and IA No.1 of 2014 in Revision CRMP No.4997
/2014 moved in and Civil Revision Petition No.2787 /2013). As a result
of allowing the review petitions, the common judgment and order dated
09th July, 2013 passed by the predecessor Bench upholding the common
order dated 23rd March, 2013 in Cases No. F1/3/2005 and F1/4/2005
passed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, has been set aside and as
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a sequel thereto, the orders dated 31st March, 1967 passed by the
Tahsildar, Shadnagar, accepting the surrender of protected tenancy rights
by the ancestors of the appellant have been confirmed.
3. The appeals have a chequered history that dates back to the
year 1967. The facts relevant for deciding the present appeals are as
follows:-
3.1 Late Shri Chandra Reddy and late Shri Chenna Reddy, both
sons of Buchi Reddy, were protected tenants in respect of separate
parcels of land situated in different survey numbers of Kammadanam
Village, Shadnagar Mandal, Mahabubnagar District1. The recorded
landlord of the protected tenants was late Venkat Anantha Reddy, who
was the Karta of a joint family comprising of himself and his brother,
late Laxma Reddy. On the basis of an oral partition of the land that took
place between the two brothers, the subject land fell to the share of late
L. Harshavardhan Reddy (respondent No.6), son of late Laxma Reddy.
Pertinently, L. Harshavardhan Reddy expired during the pendency of
the review petitions and L. Sameera Reddy was brought on record as
his legal heir. As per the respondents, late Shri Chandra Reddy, who
was a protected tenant in respect of the subject land measuring 57 acres
and 16 guntas, had surrendered his protected tenancy rights on submitting
a written application dated 6th August, 1966 to the Tehsildar. A similar
application was submitted by the three legal heirs of Late Chenna Reddy
(Ram Reddy, Chandra Reddy and Laxma Reddy) in respect of land
measuring 98 acres 18 guntas. The respondents claim that on receiving
the said applications, the Tehsildar, Shadnagar, recorded the statements
of the applicants and after confirming the identity of the parties, issued a
public notice and thereafter, accepted the surrender on satisfying the
requirements prescribed in the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 19502. After accepting the surrender applications,
the names of the protected tenants were struck off from the final records
of tenancy, vide order dated 31st March, 1967.
3.2 It is also the version of the respondents that the protected
tenants had surrendered their tenancy rights in favour of late Venkat
Anantha Reddy pursuant to an understanding that the latter would not
oppose the 38-B Certificate issued by the Tenancy Tribunal in favour of
Chandra Reddy and the sons of late Chenna Reddy in respect of the
1 Hereinafter referred to as 'subject land'
2 For short 'Act'
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parcel of land measuring 85 acres 23 guntas situated in Kammadanam
Village. In other words, there was a reciprocity between the protected
tenants and the landlord based on which, the landlord relinquished his
rights in respect of land measuring 85 acrs 23 guntas in exchange of the
surrender of the subject land by Chandra Reddy and the legal heirs of
late Chenna Reddy.
3.3 On the other hand, the appellant, who is the legal heir of the
original tenants, claims that his ancestors were dispossessed from the
subject land in the year 1975 when they were trying to obtain 38-E
Certificate from the authorities. Only in the year 2001 when the legal
heirs of the protected tenants had applied for the final record of tenancy,
did they discover that the names of the protected tenants had been struck
off on the basis of the purported surrender proceedings conducted by
the Tehsildar in the year 1967. Challenging the said surrender proceedings,
the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant being the protected tenants,
preferred appeals before the Joint Collector in February, 2002 along
with an application seeking condonation of delay. The said appeals were
allowed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, being the Appellate
Authority, vide order dated 2nd April, 2005. Aggrieved by the said order,
the respondents approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh3 raising
a plea that it was an ex-parte order and filed two Civil Revision Petitions
(CRP No. 4620/2005 and CRP No. 4988/2005), which were allowed,
vide order dated 19th September, 2006 and the matters were remanded
back for fresh disposal. On a re-hearing, the Appellate Authority passed
an order on 23rd March, 2013 whereby, the order dated 31st March, 1967
passed by the Tehsildar, Shadnagar accepting the surrender of the
protected tenancy rights by the ancestors of the appellant, was set aside
and the original entries in respect of the land in the final record of tenancy
as existing prior to 1967, were restored.
3.4 Dissatisfied by the order dated 23rd March, 2013, the
respondents once again approached the High Court by filing two Civil
Revision Petitions (CRP No.2786/2013 and CRP No.2787/2013), which
came to be dismissed by a common judgment and order dated 09th July,
2013. The review petitions subsequently filed by the respondents for
seeking review of the aforesaid judgment (Rev. CRMP No.5443/2013
in Civil Revision Petition No. 2786/2013 and Rev. CRMP No. 5432/
2013 in Civil Revision Petition No. 2787/2013) were also dismissed, vide
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
3 For short 'High Court'
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[2022] 11 S.C.R.
order dated 20th February, 2014. The common judgment and order dated
9th July, 2013 and the order dated 20th February, 2014 were assailed by
the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 through Special Leave Petitions (C) CC No.
8209- 8210/ 2014 that were disposed of with the following order passed
on 4th July, 2014:
"Delay condoned.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that he would be
in a position to file genuine documents to show that there was
surrender of tenancy. If he will be able to obtain such documents,
it is open to him to file a review before the High Court. The special
leave petitions are disposed of accordingly."
3.5 Armed with the above order, the respondents No. 1 to 6 again
approached the High Court and filed a second round of review applications
seeking review of the common order and judgment dated 9th July, 2013
which have been allowed by the impugned order. The learned Single
Judge has upheld the surrender order dated 31st March, 1967 passed by
the Tehsildar, Shadnagar whereby the names of the protected tenants
(predecessors-in-interest of the appellants) were deleted from the final
records of tenancy.
4. Arguing for the appellant, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned
Senior Advocate has contended that the review petitions filed by the
respondents No. 1 to 6 are not maintainable as they do not satisfy any of
the conditions for review provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 19084. He submitted that the grounds taken in the second
set of review petitions were akin to those taken in the first set of review
petitions and once the first set of review petitions were dismissed by the
High Court, vide order dated 20th February, 2014 and no new grounds
were taken by the respondents No.1 to 6 subsequently, there was no
occasion to allow the second set of review petitions; that the respondents
No. 1 to 6 did not take a plea that the documents subsequently filed by
them, were not in their knowledge when they had filed the civil revision
petitions and the first set of review petitions before the High Court for
attracting the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Stating that the
scope of review is very limited and a review application can only be
entertained if there is any error apparent on the face of the record,
which the respondents No. 1 to 6 have failed to point out in the instant
4 For short 'CPC'
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case, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the High Court ought to
have dismissed the same outright. It was argued that by virtue of the
impugned order, the High Court has virtually treated the review petitions
filed by the respondents No. 1 to 6 as independent appeals, which is
impermissible. To buttress the aforesaid submissions made on the limited
ambit and scope of a review petition and the bar on filing successive
review petitions, the decisions of this Court in Babboo Alias Kalyandas
and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh5 and Lilly Thomas and Others
v. Union of India and Others6 have been cited.
5. Another plea sought to be taken on behalf of the appellant is
that the name of the father of the protected tenants, Chandra Reddy and
Chenna Reddy has been stated to be Papi Reddy in the surrender
proceedings whereas, his correct name is Buchi Reddy which goes to
show that the surrender proceedings conducted by the Tehsildar were
fabricated and the fact of the matter is that neither the appellant, nor his
ancestors had ever surrendered the tenancy rights in favour of the
respondents/their ancestors/ predecessors- in-interest. It was contended
that this fact is borne out from the declaration made by the landlord in
the ceiling proceedings where he had admitted that 38-E Certificate
was granted in respect of the subject land and the tenants were in
possession thereof. It was canvassed that the High Court has failed to
appreciate that had surrender of lands by the protected tenants in favour
of the landlord actually taken place in the year 1967, as alleged, there
was no occasion for the landlord to have later on claimed exemption of
these lands for being computed as part of his holdings under the Andhra
Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 19737.
6. The aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the appellant
have been vehemently contested by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the respondents. It was submitted that the
surrender proceedings had attained finality in the year 1967 and after
maintaining silence for almost 35 years, the legal heirs of the protected
tenants, had filed a misconceived appeal under Section 90(1) of the Land
Ceiling Act. Pertinently, the respondents being the purchasers of the
subject land, were not made parties in the said proceedings and the
Appellate Authority had proceeded to pass an order dated 2nd April,
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
5 (1979) 4 SCC 74
6 (2000) 6 SCC 224
7 For short 'the Land Ceiling Act'
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2005 allowing the said appeals behind their back. Aggrieved by the said
ex parte order, when the respondents approached the High Court, the
matters were remanded back to the Appellate Authority for fresh
adjudication. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeals, once again
compelling the respondents to approach the High Court by filing fresh
appeals which were knocked off vide order dated 09th July, 2013 and
their review petitions were also dismissed on 20th February, 2014. Against
the said dismissal orders, the respondents had to approach this Court.
The petitions for special leave to appeal preferred by them were disposed
of vide order dated 4th July, 2014 that has been extracted in para 5
hereinabove.
7. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that in the light of the
permission granted by this Court, the respondents had filed review petitions
in the Civil Revision Petitions before the High Court after obtaining
certified copies of the relevant documents forming a part of the revenue
records. Only after considering the said documents did the learned Single
Judge allow the review petitions for cogent and valid reasons that do not
deserve any interference. It has been canvassed on behalf of the
respondents that the legal heirs of the protected tenant had knowledge
about the surrender of the subject land right from the year 1967 to 2001
and they were also aware of the fact that the names of their ancestors
were not reflected in the protected tenants register. The real position is
that the ancestors of the appellant were never in possession of the subject
land after 1967. Despite that, they had approached the Appellate Authority
challenging the surrender proceedings after a passage of 35 years.
Contending that said appeals were highly belated and deserved to be
thrown out on the ground of limitation alone without going into the merits,
the decisions in Sakuru v. Tanaji8 and Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop.
Milk Products Societies Union Limited9 have been cited. It has been
urged that the appeals preferred by the ancestors of the appellant were
not maintainable, being patently barred by limitation which aspect has
been gone into by the High Court while passing the impugned judgment
allowing the review petitions filed by the respondents.
8. As for the mis-description of the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellant, it was submitted that Buchi Reddy was also known Papi Reddy
in the village which fact is reflected from the revenue records, namely,
8 (1985) 3 SCC 590
9 (2007) 9 SCC 109
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Faisal Patti record of the village, as recorded by the Patwari. Counsel
for the respondents also sought to negate the ground taken by the other
side with reference to the landlord claiming exemption under the land
ceiling proceedings on the ground that Land Reforms Tribunal did not
accept such a plea of exemption. It was thus submitted that surrender of
the tenancy rights had attained finality in the year 1967 itself and the
appellant and his ancestors have reopened settled issues after passage
of 35 years reckoned from the date of surrender only for the reason that
the price of the subject land, which is situated close to the International
Airport at Shamshabad, have escalated and he wants to encash the
same.
9. This Court has carefully perused the impugned judgment and
the orders preceding the impugned judgment, gone through the records
and given its thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by
learned counsel for the parties. The only point that arises for consideration
in these appeals is whether the respondents/review petitioners had made
out a case for reviewing the judgment and order dated 23rd March, 2013
by satisfying the criteria for entertaining a second set of review petitions,
having failed to succeed in the first set of review petitions.
10. The core argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that
the High Court ought not to have entertained successive review petitions
filed by the respondents when they could not demonstrate emergence of
any new facts or point out any error apparent on the face of the record,
for allowing the review applications, must be put to test by examining
the relevant provisions of law that governs review jurisdiction.
11. Section 114 of the CPC which is the substantive provision,
deals with the scope of review and states as follows:
"Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself
aggrieved:-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this
Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred;
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this
Code; or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the
decree or made the order, and the court may make such order
thereon as it thinks fit."
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
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12. The grounds available for filing a review application against a
judgment have been set out in Order XLVII of the CPC in the following
words:
"1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but
from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or
order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a
reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after
the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or
could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was
passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient
reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order
made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the
Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order may
apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of
an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such
appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when,
being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case
on which he applies for the review.
1[Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on
which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any
other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.]''
13. A glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a
review application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and
important matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence,
were not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced
by him when the decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account
of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for
any other sufficient reason.
14. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others10,
this Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done
10 1980 Supp SCC 562
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unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on
the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine
its soundness. The observations made are as under:
"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to
hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has
been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier
order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of
the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of
justice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib11
this Court observed :
'A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant
resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or
patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier
by judicial fallibility. ... The present stage is not a virgin
ground but review of an earlier order which has the
normal feature of finality.' ''
(emphasis added)
15. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others12,
stating that an error that is not self- evident and the one thathas to be
detected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error
apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the powers
of review, this Court held as under:
"7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly
confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.13 this Court
opined:
'11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether
the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case
did not involve any substantial question of law is an 'error
apparent on the face of the record'. The fact that on the
earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts
that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be
conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous.
Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
11 (1975) 1 SCC 674
12 (1997) 8 SCC 715
13 1964 SCR (5) 174
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follow that it was an 'error apparent on the face of the
record', for there is a distinction which is real, though it
might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere
erroneous decision and a decision which could be
characterized as vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is
by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies
only for patent error.'
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury14
while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar
Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma15 this Court once again held
that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to
be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1
CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent
on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident
and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly
be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record
justifying the court to exercise its power of review under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction under
Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous
decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition,
it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot
be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'".
[emphasis added]
16. The error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the
face of the record and not one which has to be searched out. While
discussing the scope and ambit of Article 137 that empowers theSupreme
Court to review its judgments and in the course of discussing the contours
of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC in Lily
Thomas (supra), this Court held as under :
"54. Article 137 empowers this court to review its judgments
subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any
rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme
14 (1995) 1 SCC 170
15 (1979) 4 SCC 389
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Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of
the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of
the grounds specified in Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides:
"1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but
from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not
within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the
time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account
of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record,
or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of
the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or
made the order.'
Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review
lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the
record in criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court
Rules provides that after an application for review has been
disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same
matter.
XXX XXX XXX
56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be
exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute
a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of
the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review
cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere
possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for
review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further
petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of
following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches
and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated
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jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.
However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article
136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that
the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental
rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can
take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.
XXX XXX XXX
58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL of
the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed
before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the
judgment in Sarla Mudgal case16. It is not the case of the
petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter
which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their
knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at
the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us
were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before
the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the
judgment in Sarla Mudgal16 case. We have also not found any
mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a
review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such
which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error
which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error
of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the
judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment
interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the
fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for
reviewing the judgment. The words "any-other sufficient
reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC" must mean "a
reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those
specified in the rule" as was held in Chajju Ram v. Neki
Ram17 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius18. Error
apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is
16 (1995) 3 SCC 635, Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and Others v. Union of India and
Others
17 AIR 1922 PC 112
18 1955 SCR 520
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based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of
law. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa19 this Court held that
such error is an error which is a patent error and not a
mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad20, it
was held:
"It is essential that it should be something more than a
mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on
the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to
this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the
principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case.
When does an error, cease to be mere error and become an
error apparent on the face of the record? Learned Counsel on
either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which
the boundary between the two classes of errors could be
demarcated.
Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the
strength of certain observations of Chagla, CJ in - 'Batuk K
Vyas v.