# S. MOHAN LAL v. R. KONDIAH

- **Citation:** [1979] 3 S.C.R. 12
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1979-02-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2047 of 1969
- **Bench:** R. S. Sarkaria, 0. Chinnappa Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-mohan-lal-v-r-kondiah-7769
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Andhra Pradesh Building (Lea.e, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960,
6. 10(3) (a) (iii), "business," interpretation, whether includes practice of legal
profession-Construction of expressions, principles.
' •
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The respondent, an advocate, sought to evict his tenant, the appellant, under
·
s. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) .,j-.-..
Control Act, 1960, on the ground that he required the disputed premises for
"---
carrying on his profession. The court of small causes, Hyderabad, finding
,.__
that the requirement was bon.a fide, passed an eviction
order
against the
appellant. In revision, the High Court negatived the contention
that
the
expression "business" used in s. 10(3) (a) (iii), - did not include the 'profession'
of an advocate.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court,
HELD : 1. "Business" is a word of large and wide import, capable of a
variety of meanings. In a broad sense it is taken to mean 'everything that
occupies the time, attention and labour of men, for the purpose of livlihood
. or profit'. The practice of law is 'business' within the
meaning
of
that
expression in s.10(3)(a)(iii). The Act is of general application,
and its
protection is not confined to any classes of tenants, nor is the right to evict
under the Act, limited to any class of landlords. There is no reuon why a
landlord who is a member of the legal or medical professions and who requires
the premises for carrying
on the practice of his profession, ihould be
wholly debarred from obtaining possession of the premises. It
1NOuld be
anamolous to bold that all the provisions of the Act apply to non-midential
buildings owned by an Advocate, excepting s. 10(3)(a)(iii).
[14D, E, l6A-B, C.D]
Williams' Will Trusts, Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China arul
A11r. v. Williams and Ors., [1953] 1 All. ELR 536; Taramal v. Laxman Sewak
Surcy & Ors. 1971 MPU 888, approved.
M. P. Sethurama Menon v. Thaiparambath Kunhukutty A.mma's daught•r, .
Meenakshi Amma &: Ors., AIR 1967 Kerala
88;
Bangalore
Water~Supply
S.werage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa & Ors .• [1978] 3 SCR 207;
Stuchbery
& Ors. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Carp. Ltd., (194'] 2 KBD
256; distinguished.
2. It is a sound principle of construction that, meaning of
words
and
expressions used in an Act, muat take their colour from tho context in whieb.
they appear. Neither the meaning, nor tho definition of a term in one statute,
affords a guide to tho construction of tho same term in another statute, more
so, if the two Acts in Which the same word is used, a.re not cognate Acta
and the sense in which a term has been understood in ieveral statute&:, deos
not necessarily throw any light on the manner in which it •hould be understood aenerally. [14G·H &: 15AJ
.
/
}"
MOHAN LAL v. R· KONDIA!l: (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
13
C!vn. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2047 of 1969.
A
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
25-6-1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 346/67.
Y. S. Chitaley; S. K. 'Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul Anam for
the Appellant.
B
A. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for the Respondent.
•
. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
·'+"--
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The short question for consideration in this
<'
appeal is whether the practice of the legal profession is 'business' within
the meaning of Section 10(3) (a) (jii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings
(Lease,, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.
The question arises
this way.
The respondent, an Advocate filed an application before the
Rent Controller seeking eviction of the appellant, his tenant, from the
premises in question on the ground that he required the premises for
the purpose of carrying on his profession as an Advocate.
The appli·
cation was contested by the appellant who was carrying on the business
of manufacturing art jewellery in the premises.
We are not coucemed
in this appea!l with the several defences which were raised by th~ app

## Text

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S. MOHAN LAL
v.
R. KONDIAH
February 5, 1979
[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.j
Andhra Pradesh Building (Lea.e, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960,
6. 10(3) (a) (iii), "business," interpretation, whether includes practice of legal
profession-Construction of expressions, principles.
' •
•
The respondent, an advocate, sought to evict his tenant, the appellant, under
·
s. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) .,j-.-..
Control Act, 1960, on the ground that he required the disputed premises for
"---
carrying on his profession. The court of small causes, Hyderabad, finding
,.__
that the requirement was bon.a fide, passed an eviction
order
against the
appellant. In revision, the High Court negatived the contention
that
the
expression "business" used in s. 10(3) (a) (iii), - did not include the 'profession'
of an advocate.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court,
HELD : 1. "Business" is a word of large and wide import, capable of a
variety of meanings. In a broad sense it is taken to mean 'everything that
occupies the time, attention and labour of men, for the purpose of livlihood
. or profit'. The practice of law is 'business' within the
meaning
of
that
expression in s.10(3)(a)(iii). The Act is of general application,
and its
protection is not confined to any classes of tenants, nor is the right to evict
under the Act, limited to any class of landlords. There is no reuon why a
landlord who is a member of the legal or medical professions and who requires
the premises for carrying
on the practice of his profession, ihould be
wholly debarred from obtaining possession of the premises. It
1NOuld be
anamolous to bold that all the provisions of the Act apply to non-midential
buildings owned by an Advocate, excepting s. 10(3)(a)(iii).
[14D, E, l6A-B, C.D]
Williams' Will Trusts, Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China arul
A11r. v. Williams and Ors., [1953] 1 All. ELR 536; Taramal v. Laxman Sewak
Surcy & Ors. 1971 MPU 888, approved.
M. P. Sethurama Menon v. Thaiparambath Kunhukutty A.mma's daught•r, .
Meenakshi Amma &: Ors., AIR 1967 Kerala
88;
Bangalore
Water~Supply
S.werage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa & Ors .• [1978] 3 SCR 207;
Stuchbery
& Ors. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Carp. Ltd., (194'] 2 KBD
256; distinguished.
2. It is a sound principle of construction that, meaning of
words
and
expressions used in an Act, muat take their colour from tho context in whieb.
they appear. Neither the meaning, nor tho definition of a term in one statute,
affords a guide to tho construction of tho same term in another statute, more
so, if the two Acts in Which the same word is used, a.re not cognate Acta
and the sense in which a term has been understood in ieveral statute&:, deos
not necessarily throw any light on the manner in which it •hould be understood aenerally. [14G·H &: 15AJ
.
/
}"
MOHAN LAL v. R· KONDIA!l: (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
13
C!vn. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2047 of 1969.
A
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
25-6-1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 346/67.
Y. S. Chitaley; S. K. 'Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul Anam for
the Appellant.
B
A. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for the Respondent.
•
. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
·'+"--
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The short question for consideration in this
<'
appeal is whether the practice of the legal profession is 'business' within
the meaning of Section 10(3) (a) (jii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings
(Lease,, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.
The question arises
this way.
The respondent, an Advocate filed an application before the
Rent Controller seeking eviction of the appellant, his tenant, from the
premises in question on the ground that he required the premises for
the purpose of carrying on his profession as an Advocate.
The appli·
cation was contested by the appellant who was carrying on the business
of manufacturing art jewellery in the premises.
We are not coucemed
in this appea!l with the several defences which were raised by th~ appellant. Nor are we concerned with the vicissitudes which the case underwent.
For the purposes of this appeal it is sufficient to say that the
final Court of fact, namely the Chief Judge of the Court of Small
causes, Hyderabad, found that the respondent bona fide required the
premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an Advocate
and that the tenancy was not such as could be split up.
The Appellate authorities passed an order of eviction against the appellant.
_Before the High Court, in revision, it was contended by the appellant
that
the practice
of
the
profession
of an
Advocate
was
not
business
within the
meaning
of
Section 10(3) (a) (iii)
and, therefore,
the respondent could not seek the eviction of the
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appellant on the ground that he required the premises for the purpose
of carrying on his profession as an Advocate.
it was contended that
Section 10(3) (a) (iii) used the expression 'business' only and not the
expression 'profession.'
The contention was negatived by a Division
Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh consisting of Gopalrao
Ekbote and Ramachandra Rao, JJ.
The tenant has appealed by spe·
dal leave to this Court.
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Dr. Chitaley learned counsel for the appellant argued that there was
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a clear distinction between 'business' and 'profession' and that the practice of a liberal profession like that of an Advocate or a Doctor which
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979) 3 s.c.R.
had nothing commercial abont it was not business within the meaning of
Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh :Buildings (Lease, Rent
and Eviction) Control Act 1960. He argued that though the Andhra
Pradesh Act broadly classified buildings into residential and non·residential buildings, the landlord of a non.residential building could not
seek to evict hii tenant on the ground of his requirement unless it wa&
for the purpose of carrying on a business. · According to the learned
Counsel this indicated that the expression business was to be given
a
narrow meaning and was to be confined to activities of a commercial
nature.
The learned Counsel also urged that the Court should favour
a constru~tion which would be beneficient to the tenant.
Dr. Chitaley
relied on M. P. Sethut/Jma Menbh v.
Thaiparambath
kunhukutty
Amma'.1" daughter, Meenakshi Amma and Ors.(') Btmgalore WoterSupply &
Sewerage Board, etc.
v.
R. Rajappa & Ors. (2)
and
Stuchbery & Ors. v. General Accident Fire and Life lllsurance Cotpotation Ltd.(')
The e:tpression business has not been defined in the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. It is a
common p:pression which is sometimeii used by itself and sometimes in
a collocaflon of words as in "business, trade or profession".
It is a
word of large and wide import,, capable of a variety of meanings.
It is
needless to refer to the meanings given to that term in the various Dictionaries except to say that everyone of thetn notices a large number of
meanings of the Wotd.
In a broad sense it is taken to mean everything
that occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the irurpose of
livlihood or profit'.
In a narrow sense it is confined to commercial activity.
It is obvious that the meaning of the word must be gleaned from
ihe context in which it is used.
Reference to tile provlsians df
the
Constitution or othet statutes where' the expression is used cannot be
of any assistance in determining its meaning in Secti.on 10 ( 3 )(a) (iii) of
the Andhra Pradesh• Building '(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,
1960.
ft is not a spund princip!e of construction to interpret exprc·ssions used in one Act with reference to their Use in another Act; more
so, if the two Acts in which the same word is used ate not cognate Acts.
Neither the meaning, rtor the definition of the term in one statute
affotds a guide to the construction of the sanie term in another statute
and the sense in which the term has been understood in the several
statutes does not necessarily throw any light on the matiher in which
the term should be understood generally.
On the other hand it is a
(I) A.I.R. 196'7 i<erala 88.
(2) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 207.
(3) [1949] 2 K. B. l:J. 256.
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Mb'!iAN LAL v. R. Kol'1iJrA!l' (Chinnappa F.eiidy, J.)
15
sound; and, irideed, a well known priritip1e bf construction that meaning of words anti expressions used in an Act must take their colour
from the context iri which they ap·peat. Dr. Chitaky very frankly arid
fairly conceded as much .
Now tlie Ai:idhta Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and
Eviction)
Control Act; 196o, i• aii 'Act to consolidate, and amend the law relating to the regu~aiion of leasing of buildings, the control of rent thereof
and the prevehticin of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the
Slate of Aridhra Pradesh.
it applies to the cities of Hyderabad
and
Secundefabatl and to all fuunieipalities in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
'flie provisions ol ihe Ad, however, do not apply to buildings owned by
the Governriierit and to liuiJdirigs cilrisiiuded Oil or after 26th August,
1957.
Briiiding is broadly defined as meaning any hou·se or hut or a
part of a house or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or nonresidential purposes.
Landlord is defined as the owner of a building,
including a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of
a building, on his own account or on behalf of another person etc. Tenant
_ is defined as a person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for
a building.
Section 4 prdvides for the de!erniiii<itioh of a fair rent of a
building on the applicaiinn of the tenant or landlord.
Section 10(1)
provides that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution ot
a
decree or othef\vise except in accordance with the pr~visioris ol Sections
10, 12 and 13.
Section io(i) rileritioris several gtouiids on which a
landlord may seek to evict a tenant.
The grounds are default of payment of rent, sub-Jetting of premises, used for a purpose other than that
tor which it was leased, commission at ads of waste, conduct amounting
to nuisance to the occupiers cif the other portions in the same building,
securing of alternative accommodation by the teriant and denial of the
title of the lap.dfoid.
The grounds mentioned in SeCiioil iO(i) iipp1y
hnth to tesideritial aiid iion-fesidential buildings. Section 10(3)(a)(i)
provides for the evidibri of a ietiant where the landford of a resideiitial
building require~ it for his own occupation. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) provid-
. CS for the eviction of a teiiiint ffom a hOn'reSidentiaJ building where
"the landlord is not occupying a ri6n-residential building iii a city, fown
or vi1fage concerned whicb is his own br to the possesSioiI bf wliieli he is
ehtitled whether under the Act or othetwise-( a) for the purpose df a
business which he iS carrying on on !he date of the app1icaliori, cir (b)
for the purpose bf a business which: in !he opinion of the Con troll et, tlie
landlo'rd boria'flde proposes to coinmence".
Section 12 alld 13 cdntaill
special provisions relating fo recovery of buildings liy landlord fo'r the
purpose of e:lfectihg repairs, aiteratidns or additions or for reconstiilCtion.
The scbefue at the Act is to prevent unreasonab1e eviction
of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
tenants b! landlords and to provide for eviction on specified grounds.
The Act is of general application and its protection not confined to any
classes of tenants nor is the right to evict under the Act limited to any
c'lass of landlords.
There is no reason why a landlord who is a member
of the legal or medical professions and who requires the premises for
carrying on the practice of his profession should be wholly debarred
from obtaining _possession of the premises. It is impossible to discover
any reason for so making a discrimination against the liberal professions,
But, that would be the result if the expression 'business' is given a narrow
meaning which the appellant wants us to give to that expression.
It
would indeed be anamolous to hold that all the provisions of the Act
includinlJ Section 4 which provides for the determination of fair
rent
and Section 10(1) which bars the eviction of tenants apply to nonresidential buildings owned by an Advocate but not Section 10(3)
(a) (iii) only, In onr view the expression business occurring iii
Section 10(3)(a) (iii) is used in a wide sense so as to include the
practice of the profession of an Advocate.
The Kerala IEgh Court in M.P. Sethurama Menon v. Meenakshi
Am ma & Ors., (supra) construed the expression 'trade or business' as
connoting commercial activity and as not including the practice of the
legal profession.
The learned Judges referred to Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution, Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961, the Madras
Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 and drew a distinction between
the words 'business' and 'profession.' As mentiojled by us earlier, we do
not think that it is right to ascribe to the word 'business' occurring in
the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,
1960, the.same meaning that the word may have when it occnrs in other
statutory provisions. The word must be interpreted in the context of
the, statute in which it occurs and not in the context of other statutes or
in a manner alien to the context of the statute concerned.
In Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Bo,qrd etc. v. R. Rajappa
& Ors., (supra) Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) observed" ...... I
find myself unable to accept the broad formulation that a Solicitor's
establishment cannot be an industry. A Solicitor, undoubtedly, does
not carry on trade or business when he acts for his client or advises him
or pleads for him, if and when pleading is permissible to him.
He
pursues a profession which is variously and justifiably described as
learned, liberal or noble."
The observations of the Learned Judge
were made in the context of the question whether a
Solicitor's
establishment would fall within the definition of 'industry' under the
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MOHAN LAL v. R· KONDIAH (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
17
Indu.strial Disputes Act.
It. would be most unwise to apply this
observation to determine whether the practice of the liberal professions is within the meaning of the expression 'business' in Rent
Control legislation .
In Stuchbery & Ors. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance
Corporation Ltd., (supra) it was observed that the carrying on of a
Solicitor's business was the carrying on of a profession and was not the
carrying on of a trade or business within the meaning of that phrase
in the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927. The observation was made in
the context of that Act which made a distinction between 'trade or business' and 'profession'. In fact sub-~ection 3(a) of Section 17 of the
Act expressly said : "for the purposes of this Section premises shall
not be deemed to he premises used for carrying on there at a trade
or business by reason of their being used for the purpose of carrying
on there at any profession". The question in that case was about the
right to compensation for the goodwill attached to the premises where
the "business" or "profession" was being carried on. We do not think
that the case is of any help to the appellant.
We may refer here to the decision of Danckwerts, J., in Re Williams'
Will Trusts, Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and Another
v. Williams and Others.(') where the question was whether the bequO.t
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to a son for the purpose of starting him in 'business.' was affective
to
start the son in medical practice. The learned Judge held that it did,
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observing that the word 'business' was capable of including the practice
of a profession and that it plainly included the profession of a Doctor.
We may refer to just one more case i.e. Taramal v. Laxman Sewak
Surey & Ors(') where this very question whether the practice of law
was a 'business' within the meaning of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act came for consideration before A. P. Sen, J.
The
learned Judge held that in the context of the Madhya Pradesh Act, the
word 'business' h~d to be given a wide meaning so as to include
any
profession.
We, therefore, agree with the High Court that the practice of law is
'business' within the meaning of that expression in Section 10{;3) (a)
(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)
Control Act, 1960. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
M. R.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) [1953] All E.R. 536.
(2) [1971] M.P.L.J. 888.
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