# s. NARA YANASWAMI v. G. PANNERSEL V AM & ORS

- **Citation:** [1973] 1 S.C.R. 172
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-04-12
- **Bench:** S. M. Sikri, C.J .• A. N. Grover, A. N. Ray, D. G. PALF.XAil, M. H. Beg
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-nara-yanaswami-v-g-pannersel-v-am-ors-5775
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

B
ConstitutioJJ o/Imlia 1950, A.rt.t. 171 to 173 and ReprtsenJction of tht
People 4ct (43 of 1951) s. 6-Candidate from Grodualer constit11mcy
1o ulis)ative Council-lj should bt a KTDduaJe,
The respondent cbalknged the appellant'!
cl~ to the Madras
Legi.slalivt Council from the Madras District Gr:uluates' Coostitueocy en
the grounds, (l) that, the pw-po&e of.Art. 171 of the Constitution waa
C
lo C0!1fa a right of ftmclional {!!presentation upon petsoll$ po:ssessina
certain educational or other qualifications !0 that the appellant who was
not • graduate could not be elected to ·the Legi:slative Council from tbe
GroduaJCS' Cooltltueucy; (2} that, it would be absurd and destructive
of the ~
of representation that an individual, who did not poee5S
the ~
a.- buic qualification of .the electon. Uould be tbeir repreaentatm, aAd
(3~ . that. the Con~tiaJtion, beioc an organic inslzwnent.
D
must be imapi'eted in 11 broad and liberal ma.aner !0 ae to gM: etrect
to the ande~ principi.!S and purpoee& of the system of repte9entation
sought to be embodied in it.
The ..High Court &el aside the cll:ctiDA.
Anowinr the appeal to flm Court,
HELD: (l)(a) Gradu:rtes are not an occupational or vocati~al I
If'~· but ~ly a body of. person& with particular ~ducatioool qualifi·
~
It would, therefor.e, n()t be cotTect to describe the additional
~
sought to be given to them in the Legislative Council as an
1l%1cmpt ao tntrodu~ functiooal or vocational representation. [181Bl
(b) The qualillcati0118 of the elector oomtituting the clectoi'Qt.e, and
of .thoec who can repreaent .each ekctorate, contemplated by the ~
tution and supplemented by Parliament, are separately set out fot tach
f
~~
Aa ~pds tbe Legislative Council too qualificationi for the four
e-...,..t.es are indi~tcd In Art. 171(3)(a): (b),(.:) and (d). The plain
and ordinary mearung of ~ term "electorate is that it is tilt body of
~m
who e~t. It does not take in the extended notion of a body
P_ei"!!IOl51 el(:(;llnl! representatives from among1r th~m.s~trel. It does
not Impose • reqUirement that the person to be chosen must also be a
member of the electorate. (177D-FJ
G
•
(c) 'Ille qualillcatioos of cflll<lidtltes for seats in the Council are given ·
~~ 1· 6 of ~be .Repre~entation of the People Act, 19Si: While a mwber
tro::C ~~hlhtive ~embly should also be un ·elector in the constituencY
tequlrcd to bee stan s, the member of the Legislative Council ia not sO
tht penon to ~ :mber of the e~IOrate. All Chat is. required is .tbfJ
be ao ~tutor for a~t~ aab~ ~of
the Legislative Council ~gislative Counc;il he Is ch~: [l~J*•IIt7 in tho State to whoso
}I
(d) Whatever may have been the_....._
. tioo .;,aket
or their advisors it is not P<*ibAc Co .....-- ot the Co!Mbtu 171 tbat
tho Sec.ood Cbambet- f OUDd ..._
aay • «a a perusal. of Art. • -!,~.I
~e woere lOIIIQt to provide for fu~
A
B
c
D
E
c
··- ...:...::.:..:._ .. -- ..
NARAYANASWAMI v. PAN.NEitSELVAM (Beg, /.)
173
or vocational representation. t\f1 that can be . f
.
repres~tation or wcigbtage was given to
rso~n e~ed ~~ that a~dit.ionaJ
of knowledge and experience by enabling ~m s posscssmg _spec1al types
presentativcs. 1bo concept of such ~epresentation ~
0 elect the~e s~i~ refurther notion that the rep!"esentative must aso oes not cany w1th 1t the
1ications of tbose he represents.
The Hi h C
possess the very quaJi.
outside the fo1..r c&tters of the statutory gprov·~ err~eously traveUed
. .
all .
.he I
JSJOns Wu.;n there wu DO
~b1~1ty at .
m
an&\! age,. and by rescting to a presumed 1e ·
Jative mtent, 1t added a qualificatJon to those expressly iaid d
· ~
Constitution and otber statutory provisions.
(lBOF]
own 10
e
Davies Jankins & Co. v. Davies, 1967 (2) W.LR. p. 1139 @ 1156,
rc!ef"!'d to.
2(a) Article 171 is designed only to give a right to choos.e their representatives to those_ who have certain types of presumably valuablo
mowledge ~d educalton.
I~ ~
pi"c3umptioo of their better competence
to elect a SWtable (Cpresentahvc IS there, It would be for th

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172
s. NARA YANASWAMI
A
v.
G. PANNERSEL V AM & ORS.
April 12, 1972
[S. M. SIKRI, C.J .• A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALF.XAil
AND M. H. BEG, IJ.J
B
ConstitutioJJ o/Imlia 1950, A.rt.t. 171 to 173 and ReprtsenJction of tht
People 4ct (43 of 1951) s. 6-Candidate from Grodualer constit11mcy
1o ulis)ative Council-lj should bt a KTDduaJe,
The respondent cbalknged the appellant'!
cl~ to the Madras
Legi.slalivt Council from the Madras District Gr:uluates' Coostitueocy en
the grounds, (l) that, the pw-po&e of.Art. 171 of the Constitution waa
C
lo C0!1fa a right of ftmclional {!!presentation upon petsoll$ po:ssessina
certain educational or other qualifications !0 that the appellant who was
not • graduate could not be elected to ·the Legi:slative Council from tbe
GroduaJCS' Cooltltueucy; (2} that, it would be absurd and destructive
of the ~
of representation that an individual, who did not poee5S
the ~
a.- buic qualification of .the electon. Uould be tbeir repreaentatm, aAd
(3~ . that. the Con~tiaJtion, beioc an organic inslzwnent.
D
must be imapi'eted in 11 broad and liberal ma.aner !0 ae to gM: etrect
to the ande~ principi.!S and purpoee& of the system of repte9entation
sought to be embodied in it.
The ..High Court &el aside the cll:ctiDA.
Anowinr the appeal to flm Court,
HELD: (l)(a) Gradu:rtes are not an occupational or vocati~al I
If'~· but ~ly a body of. person& with particular ~ducatioool qualifi·
~
It would, therefor.e, n()t be cotTect to describe the additional
~
sought to be given to them in the Legislative Council as an
1l%1cmpt ao tntrodu~ functiooal or vocational representation. [181Bl
(b) The qualillcati0118 of the elector oomtituting the clectoi'Qt.e, and
of .thoec who can repreaent .each ekctorate, contemplated by the ~
tution and supplemented by Parliament, are separately set out fot tach
f
~~
Aa ~pds tbe Legislative Council too qualificationi for the four
e-...,..t.es are indi~tcd In Art. 171(3)(a): (b),(.:) and (d). The plain
and ordinary mearung of ~ term "electorate is that it is tilt body of
~m
who e~t. It does not take in the extended notion of a body
P_ei"!!IOl51 el(:(;llnl! representatives from among1r th~m.s~trel. It does
not Impose • reqUirement that the person to be chosen must also be a
member of the electorate. (177D-FJ
G
•
(c) 'Ille qualillcatioos of cflll<lidtltes for seats in the Council are given ·
~~ 1· 6 of ~be .Repre~entation of the People Act, 19Si: While a mwber
tro::C ~~hlhtive ~embly should also be un ·elector in the constituencY
tequlrcd to bee stan s, the member of the Legislative Council ia not sO
tht penon to ~ :mber of the e~IOrate. All Chat is. required is .tbfJ
be ao ~tutor for a~t~ aab~ ~of
the Legislative Council ~gislative Counc;il he Is ch~: [l~J*•IIt7 in tho State to whoso
}I
(d) Whatever may have been the_....._
. tioo .;,aket
or their advisors it is not P<*ibAc Co .....-- ot the Co!Mbtu 171 tbat
tho Sec.ood Cbambet- f OUDd ..._
aay • «a a perusal. of Art. • -!,~.I
~e woere lOIIIQt to provide for fu~
A
B
c
D
E
c
··- ...:...::.:..:._ .. -- ..
NARAYANASWAMI v. PAN.NEitSELVAM (Beg, /.)
173
or vocational representation. t\f1 that can be . f
.
repres~tation or wcigbtage was given to
rso~n e~ed ~~ that a~dit.ionaJ
of knowledge and experience by enabling ~m s posscssmg _spec1al types
presentativcs. 1bo concept of such ~epresentation ~
0 elect the~e s~i~ refurther notion that the rep!"esentative must aso oes not cany w1th 1t the
1ications of tbose he represents.
The Hi h C
possess the very quaJi.
outside the fo1..r c&tters of the statutory gprov·~ err~eously traveUed
. .
all .
.he I
JSJOns Wu.;n there wu DO
~b1~1ty at .
m
an&\! age,. and by rescting to a presumed 1e ·
Jative mtent, 1t added a qualificatJon to those expressly iaid d
· ~
Constitution and otber statutory provisions.
(lBOF]
own 10
e
Davies Jankins & Co. v. Davies, 1967 (2) W.LR. p. 1139 @ 1156,
rc!ef"!'d to.
2(a) Article 171 is designed only to give a right to choos.e their representatives to those_ who have certain types of presumably valuablo
mowledge ~d educalton.
I~ ~
pi"c3umptioo of their better competence
to elect a SWtable (Cpresentahvc IS there, It would be for the members of
such a constituency themselves to decide whether a person who stands
for election from their constituency possesses the right type of knowledge, experience and wisdom. The Constitution makers. acting on such
a presumption, may have intentionally left the educationa.l quo.Jilications
of candid'ltc for election from the Graduates Constituency unspecified.
[l81C)
(b) It couJJ not pos~bly be said that the question to be dealt with
was DOt known to the legislators. The p!ovisiOO$ of law show that the
qualifications ot the ek:ctors as well as of tha>e ~o be elec~d. v.e.re matters
to which the attention of the law makers, both 1n the Constltuent ~m
bly and in Parliament, was specifically directed. Hence. the omJSIIOO
must ha\'C been deliberate. [ I81G1
R . v. Cleworrh, (1864) 4 B&S 927 and. Craies on Statute JAw6th ~
1963 72, referred to.
.
(c) Tb~ legislative bistDry of tbe Articl~ also show!. tha!bethe ~=
sioo by t.be Constitution m.;~ken or by Parliament. to ..... ~n nstituen<:Y
tion u a qualification of tbc candidate from the Grod~~::Sdia co(Provinciai
was deliberate. Tbt: provisions of the Gove~ent 0
u:ilificatioos of
Legisla.tive Assemblies) Order, 1936, J{rescri;biDg t ~~ f~ representlltion
persoo.s to be chosen from special constttuenC'Ies sc
f India Act. 1935.
!.11 the Legislative Councils und..-1" the Gov~he
0
re it was 90 intend·
indicate that it was lnva,ri~bly _expressly prov_Jdi!te tor a seat W11S that ho
ted, that a occessary quahficauon of h a . cand/d! m~mbtr to fill it. Such
lbould bo entitled to vot~ fur tfte ~ 01rfe ~Oft:-[181 H·182.E)
• qualification was not left to mere unp cau ·
.
_ _, and
.
.
hould be inkrpreted ID a b,.__. .
(3) lt is tru~ that a ~omtltulloo . s
. .• r "litc:ra1" in~rpretaliO!l
itllefOt.ls ipilit, but the rule or "pl:un ~an:~ec~ oi in~rpretation -~-~
0
COuld not altDgc:ther be abandoned.
c:
d this object can obviuu-xY
dacover th.t: intention of the law make~. Ill\ ., used in the re~eva~ pro-
~ .best aclticvcd by tint look.lni at tho: ~~t"llteral interpl:etatiOf?, 11 '::!
VlS&Ons.
A logical corolla.cy of ~~ ru a case /or ~bi~ provJsiOG rule
• ltatute m11y not be extended to m~et· aod an applu:auon pf ~
in
clea~ly ~nd undoubrtd/y nor -~en mado; modili~tion of, wor~t 6-0ID
~ly involves that ac.hhllon 10• ~ible. Courb may
~lory provi!.ions is not ge!Y.!r.illY per·
[17501
fbu tulc only to avoid a pa~nt absurdtty.
·' Domfxrl, A .l.~·
Th~ Stale o,
Ltd v..CoptaJtt
Srl Ritnt Naral11 Mtdill & Ors. v. 1 [nJUranu
Co.
•
19S9 S.C. 459; British Jr~di11 GeMra
174
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19'73] 1 S.C.R.
Jtbar Singh & Ors., [1960] 1 S.C.R. 168; R. C. Jacob v. Union of lndic,
[1963] 3 S.C.R. 800; State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Azqd Bhar.:zt
Finance Co. & Anr. A.l.R. 1967 S.C.
276; Hira
Devi "'·
Diatrict
Board, Shabiahanpur, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 362 & 365, ~fe~~ to.
From the language as well as the legislative history of Arts. 171 and
173 of the Constitution and s. 6 of the Representation of tbe People
Act, 1951, it cq_uld be presumed that the
omissiott ~ of tbe
qualifica~on
that the representative of graduate should also be a graduate was delibe~
ra~. By presumin~ such an intention of the law makors, no absurdity
results. By adding 'deemed to be ~airy' or 'implied' qualification of
a rupresentative of the graduates, which the Constitution mak.~rs or
Parliament could easily have imposed, t,lle Court would be invading the
legislative sp~re. [18~F1
CIVIL APPEI..,LATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 189 of 1971.
·
Appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 from the judgment a!lld order dated January 8, 1971 of
the Madras aigh Court in Election Petition No. 1 of 1970.
.
.
V. P. Raman and Vineet Kumar, for the appellant.
A
B
c
I agdish Swurup, Socilitor -General of India, B. D. Sharma and · n
S. P. Nayar, for the Election Commission of India.
J!. Sen and Sobhag Mal lain, for the Supreme Court Bar Association.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Beg, J.
This is an appeal under Section 116~A of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The appellant's election, held on
11-4-1970, to the· Madras Legislative Council from the Madras
District Graduates' Constituency was set aside by a learned Judg~
of the Madras High Co.!lrt who decided aU the issues except one
in favour of the appellant.
The only issue decided against the
appellant, which is now before us, was framed as follows :
. "Whether the first Respondent was not qualified to
stand for election_ to the Graduates Constituency on all
or any of the grounds set out by the petitioner in paragraph 7 to. 9 of the election Petition" ?
Paragraphs 7 to 9 of the election petition against ~
apwJlant
are lengthy, prolix, and argumentative.
The case and the contentions of the Respondent G. Panneerselvam, the petitioner before
the High Court, .which were accepted by the High Court, may be
summarised as follows :
Firstly, the whole purpose of Artfcle 171 of the Constitution
was to confer a right of "functional representation" upon persons
possessing certain educational or otb~r qualifications so that the
Appellant Narayanaswami, who had only passed the High School
Leaving Examination and wa~ not a Graduate, could not be elected
E.
F
G
H
A
B
c
NARAYANASWAMI V. PANNERsBLVAM (Beg, J.)
175
at all to the Legislative Council from the Graduates' Constituency;
'secondly, it would be abiurd and destructive of the very concept
of representation of e~pecially qualified persons that an individual
who does not possess the essential or basic qualification of the
electors should be a representative of those who are to be represented because of this _§pecial qualification of theirs; and, thirdly,
the Constitution~ being an organic instrument for ,fue governance
of the land, must be interpreted in a partict;larly broad and liberal
manner so as to give effect to the underlying principles and purposes of the system of representation sought to be set up by it and
not in such a way as to defeat them. Hence, the educationnl qualification of the electors should be read into the system of representation se( up by the Constitution for Legislative Councils as a
necessary qualification _vf candidates in such constituencies.
Authorities are certainly not wanting which indicate that Courts
should interpret in a broad and. generous spirit the document which
contains the fundamental law of the land or the basic principles
of its Government. Nevertheless, the rule of "plain meaning" or
o. "literal" interpretation, described in Maxwell'~ Interpretation. of
Statutes as "the primary rule", could not be altogether abandoned
today in interpreting any document. Indeed, we find Lord Ever;.
shed, M.R., saying: "The length and detail of mooern legislation,
has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction ~ the
on1y safe rule".
(See : Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statutes"
E
.,
G
H
12th Edition p. 28). It may be that the great maSs of modern
legiSlation, a large part of which consists of statutory rules, makes·
some departute from the literal rule of 'interpretation more easily
justifiable today than.it was in the pas1, But, the object of interpretation and of "const:rl!ction" (which may be broader than "interpretation'') is to.disCover the.intention of the law makers in every
case (See: Crawford on "Statutory Construction, 1940 Ed. para
157, 1>· 240-242). T@ object can, obviously, be best achieved
by first looking at the language used in the relevant provisions.
Other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to· only
if the language used is contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really
to absurd results. This is an el~mentary and basic rule of interpretation as well as of construction-processes which, from the
point of view ~f prin~iples applied, coalesce and converge towards
the common purpose 9f both which is to get at the real sense and
meaning, so far as it may be reasonably possible to do this, of what
is found laid down. The provisions whose meaning is under con·
sideration have, therefore, to be eXamined before. applying any
method of construction at .all. To these provisions we may now ·
tum.
Article 168 of our Constitution shows that the State LegiSlatures in nine Sfa~ in India, including Madras, were to consist ·
·of two Houses = the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative CoWl-
176
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19'73] 1 S.C.R.
cil. Article 170 lays do'Wn that the Legislative Assembly .-of each
State "shall consist of members chosen by direct election ffom territorial constituen~ies in the State, in such a manner as the Parliament may by law determine". After that, comes Article 171
which may be reproduced in toto here :
"171(1) The total number of members in.the Legislative Council of a State having such a Council shall not
exceed one third of the total number of members in the
Legislative Assembly of that State :
Provided that the total number of members in the
·Legislative Council of a State shall in no case be less than
forty.
(2) Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the
composition of the Legislative CQUncil of a State shall be
as provided in clause (3).
(3) Of the total number of members of the Legislative Council of a State-
(a) as nearly a~ may be, one-third shall be elected
by .electorates consisting of membe~ of municipalities,
district boards and such other local. authorities. jn the
State as Parliament may by 1aw specify;
(b) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected
by electorates consisting of persons residing in tht;; State
who have been· for at least three years graduates of any
university in the tyrritory of India or have been for at
.least three years in.possession of qualifications ptescribed
by or under any law made by Parliament· as equivalent
to that of a gradu~te of any such university;
(c) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected
by electorates con_sisting of persons who have .been for
at least three years engaged in teaching in such educa-.
tional institutions within the State, not lower jn stan-
. dard than that of a secondary school, as may be presenDed by or under any law made by Parliament;
(d) as nearly as may ·be. one-third shall be elected
by the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State
from am.ongst persons who are not members of the
Assembly. -
(e) the remainder shall be nominated 1?y the Gover-
.nor in accordance with the provisions of clause ( 5).
(4) The members to be elected under sub-clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of clause (3) shall be chosen in such territorial CODSiituenc(ies as may be prescribed by or under
any law made by Padiament, and the elections under
A
B
c
D
\
E
F
G
H
NARAYANASWAMI v. PANNER.SELVAM (Beg, ].)
177
A
tbe said sub-clauses and under sub-clause (d} of the said
clause shall be held in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.
B
c
D
E
(5) The mem~rs to be nominated by the Governor
under sub--clause (2) of clause (3) shall con$ist of
persons havin~ special knowledge or practical experience
in respect of such matters as the following namely :-
Literature, Science, Art. cooperative movement and
social service."
The term "electorate", used in Article 171(3) (a)(b) & (c)
has neither been defined by the Constitution nor in any enactment
by Parliament. Sec. 2(1)(e) of the Representation of People Act
43 of 1951, however, says:
" 'elector,' in relation to a co.nstituency means a person whose name is entered in the electoral roll of that
constituency for th~ time being· in force and who is not
subject to any of the disqualificatiOilS mentioned in Sec.
16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950".
The plain and ordinary meaning of the term "electorate" is
confined to the body of persons who elect. · It does not contain,
within its ambit, the extended notion of a body of persons electing
representatives "from amongst themselves". Thus, the use of the·
term "electorate", in Article 171 (3) of our Constitution, could n~
by itself, impose a limi~ upon the field of cboice of members of
the electorate by requiring that the person to be chosen must also
be a member of the electorate. 1b-e· qualifications of the electors
constituting the "electorate" and of those who can represent each
"electorate", contemplated by the constitution and then supplemented by Pa':'liament, are separately set out for each house. We
F
may glance at the p~ions relating to ~gislative Assemblies first.
G
R
Section 16 of the Representation of People Act 43 of 1950 lays
down the qualifications of an elector negatively by prescribing wbo
shall be disqualified for registration in an electoral roll. ·A disquatifi.ed -person is one who :
(a) · is not a ci~en of India; or
(b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a
competent court; or
_ (c) is for the--time being disqualified from voting
un~ the provisions of any law relating to corrupt prac.
tices and other offences in connection with eleotions".
Section 19 lays down f!he two conditions for registration on the
e1ectoral roll of a constituency. The person to be registered must
not be less than 21 years of age on· the qualifying date and must
178
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19'73) 1 ~;C.R.
be ordinarily resident in the constituency. The persons so register-
., ed, whose names appear on the electoral roll, constitute the electora~ for the legislative Assembly of each State.. Section 5 of
the Representation of People Act, 43 of 1951 enacts:
''5. Qualifications for membership of a Legislative
Assembly:-
A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a
seat_in the Legislative ~bly of a State unless-
(a) m the c~ of a seat reserved for the Scheduled
Castes or for the Scheduled Tribes of that State, he is a
. member of any of those castes or of those tribes, as the
case may be, and is an elector for any Assembly constituency in that State;
(b) in the case of a seat reserved for an autonomous
di$trict of Assam, pther than a seat the constituency for
which comprises the cantonment and municipalit;y of.
Shillong, he is a member of a Scheduled Tribe of any
autonomous distriqt and is an elector for the Assembly
constituency in whicJ:t such seat or any other seat is reserved for that district; and
. (c) in· the case of any other pt, he is an elector for
any Assembly constituency in that State";
Conrlqg tO the Legislative Council, we find that the qualificationsforth~four "electorates" are indicated by Art. 171(3)(a)(b)(c)
It (d). Arid, the qualificati!Jns of candidates for seats in a Legislative Coun~il are given _in Section 6, of the Representation of People Act 43 OJ; 1951 which lays down:
''6. Qualifications for mem ~rship o! a Legislative
Council.-
(!) A person sllall .not be qualified to be chosen to
fill a seat in the .LegiSlative Council of a State to be filled
by election unless he is an elector for any Assembly constituency in that State.
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to
fill a seat in the Legislative Council of a &tate to be fille4
by nomination by the Governor unless he is ordinarily
resident in the State'• .
.
A look at Article 171(2), set out above, indicates that the com--
position of the Legislative Council of a State was a matter to be
a)SQ -provided for by law made by Parliament. It is evident that
the . constitution makers had directed their attention specificaJly
towards the methods of election and composition of the legislature
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
.,
G
H
NA!tAYANASWAMl v. PANNERSELVAM (Beg, ] .)
179
of each State.
They themselves prescribed some qual~cations
to be possessed by members of each House of the Legislature~
Article 173 lays down :-
"173. A ·person shall not be qualified to be ch~en
to.fill a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he-
( a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes
before some persop authorised in that behalf by the
Election Commission an oath or affirmation according to
the
1form set out for the purpose in the Thlrd Schedule;
(b) is, in the case of a seat in ·the Legislative ~em
bly, not less ~
~enty-five years of .age and, m the
case of a seat in the Legislative Council, not less than
thirty years of age; and .
(c) possesses such other qualifications as may be
·. prescribed in that behalf by or under any law made by
Parliament".
An important and yery noticeable difference between qualifications prescribed by P~liament for the membership of a Legislative Assembly by Secti9n 5 of the Representa~on. of People. Act
of 1951 and those for the membership of a LegiSlative Council by
Section 6 of that Act is that, so far as a member .. of the .Legislative
Assembly is concerned, he or she has to be an Elector in the Constituency from which he or she stands, but a member of a Legislative Council in a State is n'ot, similarly, required to be a member
of the elec.torate. All that Parliament says, in Section 6 of the
Representation of People Act, 1951, is that the person to be
chosen as a member of the Legislative Council has to Qe "an elector for any Assembly constituency" in the State. to whose legislative
Council he was to be chosen. He has to be "ordinarily resident".
in the State to qua.lify Jor nomination. No other qualifications,
apart from those found in Article 173 of the Constitution and
Section 6 of the Repre:S.entation of People .Act of 1951, are to be
found laid down anywh~re .
But, an additional quali6.cation was
found, by tbe iudgmellit under appeal before us, Ito exist by resorting to a presumed legislative ihtent and •then practically adding it
to those expressly laid down.
It may be ~sible to Jook ·for legislative intention in materials
outs~de the four·co~e~s of a statute where its language is really
ambiguous or conflicting. But, where no such difficulty arises
the mere fact that the intentions of the law . .malers, sought to ~
d~~onstrated by what was s~id .bY some of them or by those adVJsmg them when the ConstitutJOn was on the anvil were really
differ~nt from ~
r~ult whi.c~ clearly follow~ from the langua~
used m the Legtslatlve proviStons under cons1deration, could not
authorise the use of such an exceptional mode of construction.
"It is well acc~pted", said Lord Morris (See: Davies Jankins &
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S.C.R.
Co. v. Davies)\ "that the beliefs and assumptions of those who
frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law".
A
The judgment· under appeal, after discussing the manner in
which Article 171 of the Constitution was
framed and the:
different views expresseq about the nature of the Second Chambers ,
to be set UJ> by it in our States, says : "The system of funcB
ltional, whic}J is also ·called occupational representation, as distinguished from territorial representation, was borrowed from the
Irish C~nstitution and that is the underlying principle in Article
1 71. The opinion of political thinkers and ·statement on the wisdom of such representation may not be unariimous. Whatever be
the divergent views; the accomplished fact in the Constitution is
that such a representation has been given recognition and it has to · C
be implemented.
In ma 1dng the Legislative Council as a repr~
sentative body, the framers of the Constitution have not made .it
exclusively one of elected representatives according to their occupations. It is intended to be a hetergenous and more broad
based body consisting of perwns of different walks of life, some
elected and some nominated, each with ·the experience in his own
D
field of activity". The learned Judge conCluded; "It is with these
objects that clauses (a), {b), and (c) of Article 171(3) have been ·
conceived so that persons in those walks of life could make their
contribution to the Legislative functions of the State. Article 171
in fixing the composition of the Legislative Council as a functional
chamber, has also indirectly laid down certain qualifications and
E
also disqualifications of members to be elected thereunder".
Whatever may haw been the opinions of Constitution makers
cr of their advisers, wh9se views are cited in the judgment under
appeal, it is not possib]_e to say, on a perusal of Article 171 of the
Constitution, that the Second Chambers set up in nine States jn
India were meant to incorporate the principle of what is known as
"functional" or "vocatjonal" representation. which has been advocated by Guild-Socialist and Syndicalist Schools of political
thought. . Some of the observations quoted above, in the judgment
under appeal itself, militate with the conclusions reached there.
All that we can infer from our Constitutional provisions is that
additional representation or weightage was given to persons possessing special type of knowledge and experience by enabling
them to elect their
sp~ial representatives also for Legislative
Councils. The concept of such representation does not carry with
it, as a necessary consequence, the further notion that the representative must also possess the very qualifications of those he
represents.
In the case of the Graduates' constituency, it is provided in
Article 171 (3)(b) that the electors must have held their degr~
(1) 1967 2 W.L.R. p. 1139@ 1156.
F
G
H .
A
B
c
D
E
·-
F
G
H
NARAYANASWAMI V. PANNERSELVAM (Beg, /.)
i'fH
for at least three years before they become qualified-an electors.
Thus, in laying down tJ?.e test of competence of voters of such a
con!itituency, more possession of degrees by them was not considered sufficient. Moreover, graduates are not an occupational or
vocational group but mesely a body -of persons with an educational
qualification. It would, therefore, not be correct to describe the
addition~ representation sought to be given to them as an attempt
to introduce the "functional" or "vocational'' principle.
On the
face of it, Article 171 appears to be designed only to give a right
to choose their representatives to those who have certain types of.
presumably valuable ~owledge and education. If the presumptioa of their better competence to elect a suitable tepresentative
in there, as we think tha.t there must be, it would be ~
the mem-
. hers of such a constituency themselves to decide whether a person
·who stands for election from their constituency possesses the right
type of knowledge,. experience, and wisdom which satisfy certain
stan4ards. It may well be that the constitution makers, acting
upon . such a presuri:tption, had intentionally left the educational
qualifications qf a candidate for election from the graduates constituency unspecified.
A test laid down by Blackburn J. in R. v. Cleworth(l), to
determine what the correct presumption, arising from an omission
in a statute should be~ was whether what was omitted but sought
to be brought within the legislative intention was .. "known" to the
law makers, and could, therefore, be ''supposed to have been omitted intentionally". "It makes no
difference",
says Craies in
"Statute Law''(2) "that the omission on the part of the legislature
was a mere oversight, and that without doubt the Act would have
been drawn otherwise had the attention of the legislature been
directed to the oversjght at the time the Act was under discussion",
In the case before us, it could not possibly be said that the que:s·
tion to be dealt with ~as .. not "known" to the legislators. It could
n:>t even be said that qualifications of the electors as well as of
those to be elected were not matters to which the attention of the
law makers, both in the Constituent Assembly and in Parliament
was not specially directed at· all or that the omission must . be by
mere oversight The provisions discussed above demonstrate
amply how legislative. attention was paid to the qualifications of
the electors as ":ell a~ of the elected in every case. Hence, the
correct presumption, 10 such a case, would be that the omission
was deliberate.
A glance at the legislative history lying behind Article 171
also enables us to reach the conclusion that the omission by the
Constitution makers or by Parliament to prescribe graduation as
(l) [1864] 4 B&S 927, 9·34
(2) Crains on Statute Law-5th En. 1963 p. 72.
182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19'73] 1 ft.C.R.
must be deliberate.
Sections 60 and 61 of the Government of
India ,Act, 1935, deal with composition of Provincial legislatures
and of the two Chambers of such legislatures. The Upper Chambers in the Provincial Legislatures were to be composed of members retiring every third year in accordance with provisions of the
Fifth Schedule to the Act. R1.1le 10 of ·this Schedule lays down:
"In a Province in which any seats are to bd filled
by representatives of backward areas or backward tribes, representatives of commerce,, industry, mining and
planting, repr~entatives of landholders, rep~ta~ves
of universities or representatives of labour, persons to
fill those seats .•.............. shall be chosen in such
manner. as may be prescrib,ed". .
A
B
c
On 30th April, 1936, the Government af India (Provincial' Legislative Assemblies) Order of 1936 was issued· by His Majesty in
Council. It prescribed the qualifications of persons to be chosen
from the ''special cqnstituencies" set up for representatiofl in the
Legislative Councils. ·_A glance at the provisions relating to these
qualifications, including those for the University seats, indicates
D
that it was invariably e~pressly provided, where it was so intended,
that a necessary qt~alification of a candidate for a seat was that
he or she should be "entitled to vote for the choice of a member
to fill it". Hence, legislative history on the subject would also
indicate that, whenever any qualification of the candidate was
intended to be impose<L this was expressly done and not left to
mere implications.
E
We think that the view contained in the Judgment under
appeal, necessarily results in writing some words into or adding
them to the relevant statutory provisions to the effect that the
candidates from graduates' constituencies of Legislative Councils
must also possess the qualification' of. having graduated.
This
J
-contravenes the rule of "plain meariing'' or "litera.ll" construction
which must ordinarjly prevail. A lOgical coroU,ary of that rule is
that "a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which
provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made" (See : Craies
on Statute Law-6th J;dn. p. 70).
An application of the rule
· . - necessarily involves that addition to or modification of w.ords· used
G
in statutory provisions is not generally permissible (see e.g. Sri
Ram Narain Medhi & Ors. v. · The State of Bombaye), British
India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Captain ltbar Singh & Ors.(1 ),
R. G .. Jacob v. Union of India( 8 ). Courts may depart from this
ruleonly,to avoid a patent absurdity (see e.g. State of Madhya.
Pradesh v. Mjs. Azad Bharat Finance Co. &Anr.(')._ -In Hira
Devi v. District Board, Shahiahanpur(5 ), this Court observed :
(1) AIR 1959 S.C. 459.
(4) A.f.R. 1967 S.C. 276,
(2) [t960j t SCR 1611. (3) [1969] 9 SCR 800.
(S) A.J.R. 1952 SC 962@ 36.5.
H
NARAYANASWAMI V. PANNERSELVAM. (Beg, J.)
183
A
"No doubt it is the duty of the Court to try and har~
monise the various provisions of an Act ·passed by the
Legislature. ·But it is certainly not the duty of the Court
to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps
or omissions in the provisions of an Act".
8
Cases ih which defects in statutory provisions may or may
not be supplied by Co~s have been indicated in well known works
such as Sutherland's "Statutory Construction" (3rd Edn.(Vol. 2)
(Paragraph 4924 at pages 455~558) and in Crawford'~ "tonstrUC-
· tion ot Statutes" (1940 Edn.).
Only one passage from the last
mentioned work need be cited_ here : (p. 269) :
c
"Where the statute's IQ~ing is clear and explicit,
words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such
a case, they are nC)t~needed. If they should be interpolated,
the statute would more than likely fair to express the
legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed
might be altered by the addition of new words. They
.
D
should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the
·:~
statute would thereby be advanced, or a more desirable
or just result would occur. Even where the meaning of
•
the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without
the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the
primary source of the legislative intent is in the languagft
of the statute".
E
We think that the language a~ well as the legislative history
of Articles 171 and 173 of the Constitution and Section 6 of tho
Represent.ation of People Act, 1951, enable us to pres111DC a· de--
liberate omisskm of the qualifi~tion that the representative of the
Graduates should also be a graduate.
In our opinion, no
I' absurdity l'Cfiults if we presume such an intention.
We cannot
~cr, as the learned lJJdge of the .Madras High Court had done,
from the mere ·fact of such an omission and opinions about a
supposed scheme of "functional representation" underlying Article
171 of our Constitution, that the omission was either unintentional
or tltat it leid to. absqrd results. We think that, by adding a deemed
G
to be necessary or impli~ qualification of a representative of the
Graduates which the Constitution makers, or, in. any event, the
Puliament, could have easily imposed, the learned Judge had really
invaded the I.egislatiye sphere. The defect, if any, in the law
could be removed only by law made by Parlianlent.
We conclude, after considering all the relev-ant constitutional
H
and statutory provisions relating to the qualifications of ~ candi·
date for election from the Graduates' constituency of the Legisla·
tive Council of the MadraS State, that the appellant possesses all
the qualifiGa.tiom laid down for such a candidate.
•
;
I
< -
184
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S.C.R.
Therefore, we allow this ~ppeal, set aside the Judgment and
A
order of the Madras !figh Court, and dismiss the Respondent's
election petition .. The appellant is entitled to his costs throughout.
V;P.S.
Appeal allowed.
B
< •