# S. P. E. MADRAS v. K. V. SUNDARAVELU

- **Citation:** [1978] 3 S.C.R. 460
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-03-08
- **Case number:** criminal cases. The judgment in S.C. No. 34 of 1968
- **Bench:** S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P. N. SmNGHAL
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-p-e-madras-v-k-v-sundaravelu-7347
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Criminal Procedure Code (Act V), 1898, Section 215--Committa[ orders can
be quashed by the High Court only on a point of law-Li1nitation for taking
cognizance of offence-Evidence Act (Act I), 1872, Sections 40 to 44, relevancy
of previous judgment.
The respondent who was charged of offences under sections 420, 471 read with
o;ection 466 Indian Penal Code and Section 132 of Customs Act was committed to the Court of Sessions. The offence related to alleged tan:ipering with
seals affixed by the Textile Inspector on the bales containing hand.loom fabric
known as "Bleeding Madras".
The Court split the case into
two so that
&ssions Case No. 34/68 was registered for the trial of the offence relating to
93 bales v1h_ich were covered by a particular invoice and' Sessions Case No. 2 /
1~70 was registered for the goods relating to 19 bales which were covered by
a different invoice. Sessions Case 34 of 1968 ended in conviction of the respon-
. dent, but on an appeal the High Court acquitted him giving him the benefit
D
of doubt. When the secilnd C2tie was taken uo for trial, the respondent moved
the Ifigh Court under section 215 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, for
quashing the "proceedings". The· High Court allO\\'Cd the application holding
( 1) that the evidence in both the cases being similar and one case having ended
in acquittal, further prosecution in the present case would amount to abuse of
the process of the Court; (ii) even otherwise the alleged offiences were committed somewhere in 1965 and it would be unfair, if not unjust, to put the
petitioner on trial after about ten years and (iii) the charges were "not likely
to stand''.
·
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G
H
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court
HELD : The trial of the case had not started and there \Vas no justification
for taking the view that evidence in both the cases was similar. Moreover it is
not the requirement of law that if one caee has ended in acquittal prosecution
in another case would be illegaJ..
So also it could not be said that the lligh
Court's opinion that the charge was not likely to stand the trial was on a point
of law within the meaning of sectioo 215. The High Court therefore lost sight
of its limitation under section 215 and quashed the "Proceedings" for reasons
"Y!:ich were extraneous to that section. [463 A-Bl
The Iligh Cou1t took its earlier judgment in Sessions Case No. 34 of 1968
into consideration in reaching its conclusion.
Here again it lost sight of the
provfaions of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act which. State the circumstances of which previous judgments are relevant in evil and criminal cases. The
judgment in S.C. No. 34 of 1968 was clearly "irrelevamt'' under those provisicms.
[463 C, D. Fl
In fact it was not in controversy that Sessions Case No. 2 of 1970 concerned
the trial of the respondent in respect of 19 bales which formed the subject
ma1ter of separate· invoices and of which the goods were inspected on different
dates. It was also not controverted that a different officer inspected three of
those bales and found them to be substandard goods and they were not the subject matter of the trial in case No. 34 of 1968.
[464 A-BJ

## Text

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B
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460
S. P. E. MADRAS
v.
K. V. SUNDARAVELU
March 8, 1978
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. N. SmNGHAL, JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Code (Act V), 1898, Section 215--Committa[ orders can
be quashed by the High Court only on a point of law-Li1nitation for taking
cognizance of offence-Evidence Act (Act I), 1872, Sections 40 to 44, relevancy
of previous judgment.
The respondent who was charged of offences under sections 420, 471 read with
o;ection 466 Indian Penal Code and Section 132 of Customs Act was committed to the Court of Sessions. The offence related to alleged tan:ipering with
seals affixed by the Textile Inspector on the bales containing hand.loom fabric
known as "Bleeding Madras".
The Court split the case into
two so that
&ssions Case No. 34/68 was registered for the trial of the offence relating to
93 bales v1h_ich were covered by a particular invoice and' Sessions Case No. 2 /
1~70 was registered for the goods relating to 19 bales which were covered by
a different invoice. Sessions Case 34 of 1968 ended in conviction of the respon-
. dent, but on an appeal the High Court acquitted him giving him the benefit
D
of doubt. When the secilnd C2tie was taken uo for trial, the respondent moved
the Ifigh Court under section 215 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, for
quashing the "proceedings". The· High Court allO\\'Cd the application holding
( 1) that the evidence in both the cases being similar and one case having ended
in acquittal, further prosecution in the present case would amount to abuse of
the process of the Court; (ii) even otherwise the alleged offiences were committed somewhere in 1965 and it would be unfair, if not unjust, to put the
petitioner on trial after about ten years and (iii) the charges were "not likely
to stand''.
·
E
,
G
H
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court
HELD : The trial of the case had not started and there \Vas no justification
for taking the view that evidence in both the cases was similar. Moreover it is
not the requirement of law that if one caee has ended in acquittal prosecution
in another case would be illegaJ..
So also it could not be said that the lligh
Court's opinion that the charge was not likely to stand the trial was on a point
of law within the meaning of sectioo 215. The High Court therefore lost sight
of its limitation under section 215 and quashed the "Proceedings" for reasons
"Y!:ich were extraneous to that section. [463 A-Bl
The Iligh Cou1t took its earlier judgment in Sessions Case No. 34 of 1968
into consideration in reaching its conclusion.
Here again it lost sight of the
provfaions of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act which. State the circumstances of which previous judgments are relevant in evil and criminal cases. The
judgment in S.C. No. 34 of 1968 was clearly "irrelevamt'' under those provisicms.
[463 C, D. Fl
In fact it was not in controversy that Sessions Case No. 2 of 1970 concerned
the trial of the respondent in respect of 19 bales which formed the subject
ma1ter of separate· invoices and of which the goods were inspected on different
dates. It was also not controverted that a different officer inspected three of
those bales and found them to be substandard goods and they were not the subject matter of the trial in case No. 34 of 1968.
[464 A-BJ
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal .Appeal No. 375
of 1976.
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S.P.E. MADRAS v. K. v. SUNDARAVEL!J (Shinghal, /.)
461
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dt.
A
4-12-75 of the Madras High Court in Cr!. Misc. Petition No. 1029/
75).
H. S. Marwah & R. N. Sachthey for the Appellant.
S. Goindswaminadhan, I. Subramanium, Veena
Devi
Khanna
and K. Rajindra Chowdhary for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SmNGHAL J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against
the judgment of the Madras High Court dated December 4, 1975,
quashing the "proceedings pending in S. C. No. 2 of 1970 on the
file of the First Assistant Sessions Judge, Madras." The facts giving
B
rise to the appeal have been stated in the petition for special leave
c
and have not been disputed.
Respondent K. V. Sundaravelu carried on business as an exporter
in Madras.
He had a quota for the export of the handloom fabric
known as "Bleeding Madras" for the period April 1, .1965 to March
31, 1966. It was one of the conditions of ,his export licence that
he should produce the goods for pre-shipment inspection by officers
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of the Textile Committee who had the authority to affix the
date
seals, monogram seals and the quality marking seals containing the
trade mark of the All India Hand!oom Board.
The seals were affixed by the concerned Textile Inspector after random inspection
of
the quality of the fabric.
Such an inspection was made in July 1965,
the fabric was put in bales, and the bales were sealed with lead seal.
It was found, on a fresh inspection of one of the bales before actual
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loading, that the inside seals had been tampered with and there were
forged date seals.
The shipment was therefore stopped and all the
goods were examined between July 27, l 965 and July 30, 1965.
As the respondent ·was found to have committed offences under
sections 420, 4 71 read with section 466 of the Indian Penal Code
and section 132 of the Customs Act, he was charge-sheeted and was
committed to the Court of Session after the necessary inquiry. The
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Court split the case into two, so that Sessions Case No. 34 of 1968
was registered for the trial of the offence relating to 93 bales which
were covered by a particular invoice, and Sessions Case No. 2 of
1970 was registered for the goods relating to 19 bales which were
covered by a different invoice. The first case (S.C. No. 34 of 1968)
proceeded to trial and ended in the conviction of the respondent.
He was however ~ven the benefit of doubt on appeal and was acG
quitted by the jud=ent of the High Court dated March 9, 1974.
The second case (S.C. No. 2 of 1970), which is the subiect matter
of the present appeal, was then taken up for trial by. the First As~istant Sessions Judge, Madras.
The respondent applted to t?e High
Court for quashin~ the "proceedings". As has been stated'. his application was allowed by the High Court and the
proceedmgs have
been quashed by the impugned judgment.
H
It was urged before the High Court that Sessions Case No. 2 of
1970 was different from the earlier case (S.C. No. 34 of 1968) and
12-L277SCI/78
462
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
A should be allowed to proceed to trial, but the High Court thought it
proper to go through the record which was received from the court
of the committing magistrate and took the view that the present case
was "substantially the same as the other case which ended in acquittal." In doing so it made a reference to its finding in the
earlier
case and held as follows,-
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"! have found in the other case that the substitution
could not have been subsequent to the baling of the cloth
pieces as contended by the prosecution, and acquitted the
petitioner therein.·
The same point arises in thls case
as it is found in this case also that the prosecution has
come
forward
with
the
case
that
the
substitution was subsequent to the baling.
Sc, on these
broad aspects, the evidence in both these cases being similar and one case having ended in acquittal, further prosecution of the petitioner in this case will amount to abuse
of process.
Even otherwise, the alleged offences were said
to have been committed somewhere in 1_965, namely, about
ten years ago and it would be unfair, if not unjust to put the
petitioners on trial ou the charge which, in my opinion, is
not likely to stand."
It is not disputed that the case was committed to the Court of Session
before April 1, 1974, when the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
came into force. It is also not in dispute that by virtue of section
484 (2) of that Code, the pending trial of the respondent in the
Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge had to be disposed of
in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Crimin.l!l Procedure,
1898 and that the respondent's application to the High Court for
quashing the commitment had also to be disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of section 215 of that Code.
That section provided as follows.-
"215. A commitment once made under section 213 IJy
a competent Magistrate or by a Civil or Revenue Court
under section 478, can be quashed by the High Court only,
and only on a point of law."
So, as the case had already been committed by the competent Magistrate, the commitment could be quashed only on a point of law.
A reading of the impugned judgrnent shows that the High Court
has quashed the proceedings in the Court of the Assistant Sessions
Judge for three reasons,-
(i) the evidence in both the cases being similar and one
case having ended in acquittal, further prosecution
in the present case would amount to abuse of the
(ii)
process of the Court,
even otherwise, the alleged
offences
were committed somewhere in 1965 and it would be unfair,
if not unjust to put the petitioner on trial after
about 10 years, and
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S.P.E. MADRAS v. K. v. SUNDARAVELU (Shinglw!, .f.)
463
(iii) the charge was not "likely to stand".
It will be recalled that the trial in the case had not started. There
was therefore no justification for taking the view that evidence in
both the cases was similar.
Moreover, it is not the requirement of
law that if one case has ended in acquittal, prosecution in another
case would be illeg:\i. It cannot also be said that it would be illegal
A
to commence the trial in a case after a period of 10 years or so.
B
So also it cannot be said that the High Court's opinion that the
charge ~vas not "likely to stand" the trial, was o~ <~ point of la~
within the meaning of section 215 of the Code of Cnmmal Procedure.
The High Court therefore lost sight of it? limitation under section
215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and quashed the "proceedings" for reasons 'which were extraneous to that section.
Its order
docs not conform to the requirement of the law and cannot be susC
tained.
The High Court has in fact taken its earlier judgment in Sessions
Case No. 34 of 1968, which ended in acquittal, into consideralion
in the present case, and has reached the conclusion that the present
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appeal is "not likely to stand".
Here again, the High Court lost
sight of the provisions of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act which
state the circumstances in which previous judgments are relevant in
civil and criminal cases.
Thus section 40 states the circumstances
in which a previous judgment may be relevant to bar a second suit
or trial, and has no application to the present case for the obvious
reason that no judgment, order or decree is ~aid to be in existence
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in this case which could in law be said to prevent the Sessions Court
from holding the trial.
Section 41 deals with the relevancy of certain
judgments in probate, matrimonal, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction and is equally inapplicable.
Section 42 deals with the relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees other than those
mentioned !n section 41 in so far _as they relate to matters of a
public nature,
and is again inapplicable- lo the present case.
Then
F
comes section 43 which clearly states that judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41
1nd 42,
are
irrelevant. unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree
is a fact in issue,' or is relevant under some other provisions of the
Act.
As it has not been shown that the judgment in Sessions Case
No. 34 of 1968 could be said to be relevant under the otl1er provisions of the Evidence Act, it was clearly "irrelevant" and could not
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have been taken into consideration by the High Court for the purpose
of making the impugned order. The remaining section 44 deals with
fraud or collusion in obtaining a judgment, or incompetency of
a
court which delivered it, and can possibly have no application in the
prese~t case. It would thus appear that the High Court not only
lost sight of the above facts, but also ignored the provisions of section
215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thus committed an error
H
of law i.IJ basing the impugned judgment on a judgment which was
clearly melevant.
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464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 3 S.C.R.
It has been pointed out to us, and has not been controverted,
that Sessions Case No. 2 of 1970 concerned the trial of the respondent in respect of 19 bales which formed the subject matter of separate invoices and of which the goods were inspected on different dates.
It has also not been controverted that one Chakravarty inspected three
m thuse bales, and found them to be sub-standard goods.
They
were not the subject matter of the respondent's criminal trial in
Sessions Case No. 34 of 1968. Moreover the trial court has
not
recorded any evidence in the case, and it was premature for
the
High Court to reach the conclusion that the charge was "not likel.)'
to stand" against the respondent.
In these circumstances we have no hesitation in allowing the
appeal and in setting aside the impugned judgment of
the High
Court.
We order accordingly, and in doing so we make it quite
clear that the High Court's judgment in Sessions Case No. 34
of
1968. or any observation therein, should not be taken into consideration in deciding Sessions Case No. 2 of 1970 which must stand
or fall on its own merits.
s. R.
Appeal allowed.
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