# S. P. JINADATHAPPA v. R. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 22
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAh, J. R. Mudiiolkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-p-jinadathappa-v-r-p-sharma-and-others-2248
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Rent Control-Allotment of accommodation-Statute a11thorising
controller to select tenant-Constitutionality of-If violates fundamental right of landlord-Discrimination-Guidance for choosing
tenant-Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, r95r
(Mys. XXX of r95r}, s. 3(3)(a)-Constitutio1' of India, Arts. r4
and r9(r)(j).
Section 30(3}(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, r95r, authorised the Controller to select any
Government, local authority, public institution, officer of a
government, local authority or public institution or any other person as a tenant of a vacant house. Under the Act the owner was
bound to let the house to the tenant so selected. The petitioner
was the owner of a house for whom the controller selected a
tenant under these provisions. He challenged the constitutionality of s. 3(3)(a) in so far as the selection of "other persons"
was authorised on the grounds that: (i) it put an unreasonable
restriction on his fundamental right to property and (ii) it
offended Art. I4 of the Constitution as it provided no guidance
for choosing the tenant and enabled the controller to makt an
arbitrary choice.
Held, thats. 3(3)(a) of the Act was valid and did not violate
Art. r4 or rg(r)(f) of the Constitution.
An individual was a member of the public and the restriction caused by his selection was in the interest of the general
public. The restriction was not unreasonable. It was enforced
only when the owner did not want the house for his own use.
It could make no reasonable difference to him whether an individual was selected or government, local authority, public institution or any officer of any of these was selected. The Act made
provision for selection of a suitable tenant. This was further
securer! by providing for an appeal to the District Judge and
thereafter a revision petition to the High Court.
There was ample guidance given in the Act to the Controller to choose a suitable tenant. Every one had been given a
right to apply for being selected as a tenant; and the owner had
been given the right to have his views also considered. The
ultimate decision was a judicial decision, and if required, of the
highest tribunal in the State.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Writ Petition No. 71 of
..ol
1958.
r
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23
Writ Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
S. K. Venkataranga Ayengar and S. J. S. Fernandez,
for the petitioner.
B. R. L. Iyengar, for respondent No. 1.
R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen, for the respondent No. 2.
1961.
April 17. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
S. P.
J inadathappa
v.
R. P. Sharma
SARKAR, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the ConSa.kar J.
stitution raises a question of the constitutional validity
of s. 3(3)(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (Mysore XXX of 1951).
Shortly put, that provision enables an authority set
up by the Act to select any Government, local authority, public institution, officer of a government, local
authority or public institution or any other person as
the te11-ant of a vacant house. Under the Act the
owner is bound to let the premises to the tenant so
selected. The petitioner, for whom a tenant had been
selected under this provision, challenges its validity
on the ground that it puts an unreasonable restriction
on his fundamental right to property under Art.
19(l)(f) of the Constitution and is outside the protection of cl. (5) of that article.
The petitioner had a building in respect of which he
had made some sort of arrangement with one Misri
Lal for the making of certain alterations in it and for
letting it thereafter to him for the purpose of a boarding house.
He later gave a notice as required by
s. 3(2)(a) of the Act to respondent No. 2, the Controller, who had the authority under s. 3(3)(a) to select
a tenant, that the house had become vacant. Thereupon respondent No. 2 considered applications for the
tenancy of the house of which

## Text

April z7.
22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
S. P. JINADATHAPPA
v.
R. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAh
and J. R. MUDIIOLKAR, JJ.)
Rent Control-Allotment of accommodation-Statute a11thorising
controller to select tenant-Constitutionality of-If violates fundamental right of landlord-Discrimination-Guidance for choosing
tenant-Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, r95r
(Mys. XXX of r95r}, s. 3(3)(a)-Constitutio1' of India, Arts. r4
and r9(r)(j).
Section 30(3}(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, r95r, authorised the Controller to select any
Government, local authority, public institution, officer of a
government, local authority or public institution or any other person as a tenant of a vacant house. Under the Act the owner was
bound to let the house to the tenant so selected. The petitioner
was the owner of a house for whom the controller selected a
tenant under these provisions. He challenged the constitutionality of s. 3(3)(a) in so far as the selection of "other persons"
was authorised on the grounds that: (i) it put an unreasonable
restriction on his fundamental right to property and (ii) it
offended Art. I4 of the Constitution as it provided no guidance
for choosing the tenant and enabled the controller to makt an
arbitrary choice.
Held, thats. 3(3)(a) of the Act was valid and did not violate
Art. r4 or rg(r)(f) of the Constitution.
An individual was a member of the public and the restriction caused by his selection was in the interest of the general
public. The restriction was not unreasonable. It was enforced
only when the owner did not want the house for his own use.
It could make no reasonable difference to him whether an individual was selected or government, local authority, public institution or any officer of any of these was selected. The Act made
provision for selection of a suitable tenant. This was further
securer! by providing for an appeal to the District Judge and
thereafter a revision petition to the High Court.
There was ample guidance given in the Act to the Controller to choose a suitable tenant. Every one had been given a
right to apply for being selected as a tenant; and the owner had
been given the right to have his views also considered. The
ultimate decision was a judicial decision, and if required, of the
highest tribunal in the State.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Writ Petition No. 71 of
..ol
1958.
r
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23
Writ Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
S. K. Venkataranga Ayengar and S. J. S. Fernandez,
for the petitioner.
B. R. L. Iyengar, for respondent No. 1.
R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen, for the respondent No. 2.
1961.
April 17. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
S. P.
J inadathappa
v.
R. P. Sharma
SARKAR, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the ConSa.kar J.
stitution raises a question of the constitutional validity
of s. 3(3)(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (Mysore XXX of 1951).
Shortly put, that provision enables an authority set
up by the Act to select any Government, local authority, public institution, officer of a government, local
authority or public institution or any other person as
the te11-ant of a vacant house. Under the Act the
owner is bound to let the premises to the tenant so
selected. The petitioner, for whom a tenant had been
selected under this provision, challenges its validity
on the ground that it puts an unreasonable restriction
on his fundamental right to property under Art.
19(l)(f) of the Constitution and is outside the protection of cl. (5) of that article.
The petitioner had a building in respect of which he
had made some sort of arrangement with one Misri
Lal for the making of certain alterations in it and for
letting it thereafter to him for the purpose of a boarding house.
He later gave a notice as required by
s. 3(2)(a) of the Act to respondent No. 2, the Controller, who had the authority under s. 3(3)(a) to select
a tenant, that the house had become vacant. Thereupon respondent No. 2 considered applications for the
tenancy of the house of which there were two. One
was from Misri Lal mentioned above and the other
was from respondent No. 1, who was a private individual carrying on business of a boarding house keeper.
Respondent No. 2 selected respondent No. 1 as the
z96z
S. P.
]in2dathappa
v.
R. P. Sharma
Sarkar ].
24
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
person to whom the house should be let by the petitioner. He fixed the rent at Rs. 350 per month which
was the rent demanded by the petitioner. There does
not appear to have been any specification of the terms
of the tenancy and no question as to such terms arises
in this caHe.
The petitioner was dissatisfied with this decision as
he wanted that the premises should be let to Misri
Lal, and appealed to the District Judge under s. 15 of
the Act.
The District Judge affirmed the decision of
respondent No. 2.
The petitioner then went up in
revision to the High Court under s. 17 of the Act but
the High Court refused to interfere.
Before the District Judge and the High Court the petitioner had
contended that Misri Lal was a more suitable tenant
than respondent No. 1.
But such contention was
rejected. Having failed in the High Court he has now
challenged the Act itself by the present petition.
The only question is whether s. 3(3)(a) imposes an
unreasonable restriction on the petitioner's right to
property. The validity of no other part of the Act
has been challenged in this petition. The provision
challenged is in these words:-
S. 3(3)(a).
On receipt of the intimation under
sub-section (2), the Controller shall, taking into consideration any representation illade by the landlord
and after making such inquiry as he considers necessary, select the State Government or the Central
Govern.ment or the Government of any other State
in India, or any local authority or any educational
or other publin institution or any officer of any
Government, authority or institution, aforesaid, or
any other person (hereinafter referred to as the
allottee), to be inducted as a tenant in the house and
direct the landlord by a written order (hereinafter
referred to as the 'allotment order') to let the house
to such allottee at such rent as shall be specified in
the allotment order and to deliver possession of the
house to the allot tee on such date as shall be specified in the said order:
Provided that before making an allotment order
in favour of any authority or person, other than
'
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
the State Government, the Central Government or
the Government of any State in Inrlia or a local
authority, the Controller shrtll considrr any repre.
sentrttion of the lrtncl!orcl about the suitability of
the propoRed tenant and shrtll not allot the house to
any person who, in the opinion of the Cont.roller, is
rtn unsuitable tenant:
The petitioner does not contend that the provision in so far as it allows the Controller to select as a
tenant a Government, local authority, public institution or any of the officers mentioned, imposes any
unreasonable restriction on the right to property. As
we understood learned counsel for the petitioner, it
was conceded that selection of such tenant would constitute a public purpose and the restriction thereby
imposed, would be reasonable. It would therefore
appear that it is not contended that the selection of a
tenant by the Controller would by itself amount to
imposing rtn unreas01mble restriction on the right to
property. We do not think that such a contention,
if made, would have been well founded. It io cka.r
tlrnt the Act deals wit.h houses which are vacant. It
does not deprive an owner of his right to live in his
own house. It provides for vacant houses not needed
for the use of the owner being made available for the
use of others who <tre without accommodation. The
Act was necessary because of the scarcity of housing.
ft was, therefore, passed to regulate the letting of
houses and to control rent and also to prevent unreasonable eviction: see the preamble to the Act ..
Docs the Act then by leaving it to the Controller to
select t1ny person other than a Government, local
rtuthorit,y, public institution or an officer of any of
these as the tenant, impose an unreasonable restriction on the right to property?
W'e do not think it
does so. If the Controller could validly choose a
Government, a local authority or any institutionwhich as we have said is not disputed-it can make
no difference that instead of such a tenant the Contl'llller chooses a private individual as a tenant. The
idea of this provision is that people in need should be
4
S. P.
j i nadat hap pa
v.
R, P. Sharma
Sar!iar ].
S. P.
Jinadathappa
v.
R. P. Shanna
Sa1kar ].
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
found accommodation. Persons in need of accommodation arc the public and therefore serving their need,
would be serving a public purpose.
An individual
would be a member of the public and as the accommodation available can be let out to one, a restriction
caused by selection of a member of the public would
be one in the interest of the general public. Such a
restriction is furthermore not unreasonable.
It is
enforced only when the owner does not want the
house for his own use. It can then make no reasonable difference to the owner if a private individual is
chosen as the tenant. The Act further makes ample
provision to see that the tenant chosen is suitable. By
providing the appeal to the District Judge and a right
to move the High Court in revision, full safeguard
has been given to secure that an unsuitable person is
not foisted on an owner as his tenant.
It is true that the Act does not define who would
be a suitable person but we do not think that a definition was required.
Any man of experience would
know who is a suitable ·tenant. Further, the owner
has been given the right to have the suitability of the
tenant chosen examined by the highest court. In the
explanation to s. 3(3)(a) certain persons have been
declared to be unsuitable tenants.
vVe are unable to
accept the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the result of this explanation is that
all others are suitable. The explanation only shows
that the persons coming within the description are
unsuitable.
As to whether others would be suitable or not would have to be decided on the merits
of each. The decision as to the suitability of a tenant
is not to be controlled by the explanation at all
except to the extent of making certain persons unsuitable as tenants and taking it out of the discretion of
the authority concerned to go into the question of
their suitability
If the Act had left it to the house-owner to choose
a tenant, then there was every likelihood of its purpose being defeated. It .vould be easy for the owner
to make secret arrangements for hi; own gain in
creating a tenancy. The tenant would obviously be
..
'
;
I
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
in a disadvantageous situation in view of the scarcity
of housing, in the matter of bargaining for the house.
He could easily be made to yield to the terms imposed
by the owner who has a much superior bargaining
situation. If scope was left for this kind of thing to
happen, then the entire object of the Act would have
been defeated.
The Act intends to avoid this situation and hence the provision for a power iu the Controller to select a tenant for the ow11er.
Neither do we think that any objection to this provision can be based on Art. 14 of the Constitution on
the grnund that it provided no guida.nce as to how
a tenant is to be chosen and so enabled the authority
concerned to make an arbitrary choice. This contention is not in any event open to the petitioner, an
owner, for the provision does not enable any discrimination being made between one owner and another.
If a tenant had challenged the validity of the provision relying on Art. 14, which is uot the case here, we
do not think that challenge would have been of substance. There is, in our view, >1mple guidance given
to the authority as to how to choose a tenant. The
tenant has first to be suitable.
All persons are
entitled to apply for being selected as tenants and so
all have equal chance to get the house.
The choice
will have to be made from amongst the applicants
and that choice will depend on an examination of the
comparative merits of their claims.
Further, the
owner has a right to have his views in the matter being
given due consideration by the authority selecting the
tenant.
Again, the ultimate decision would be a judicial decision, and if required, of the highest tribunal
in the State.
We, therefore, think that the challenge to the Act
is ill founded. In the resnlt we dismiss this petition.
The petitioner will pay the costs of the appearing respondent.
Petition dismissed.
S. P.
jinadathappa
v.
a. P. Sh1nna
Sarkar ].