# )- S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR ETC v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS - **Citation:** [1987] 1 S.C.R. 435 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1986-12-09 - **Bench:** P.N. Bhagwati, Cj!, Ranganath Misra, V Khalid, B G.L. Oza, M.M. Dutt - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-p-sampath-kumar-etc-v-union-of-india-ors-9420 - **Pages:** 23 ## Headnote Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: ss. 4, 5, 6 & 28-Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 in service mattersC~nstllutional ·validity of-Chairman, Vice-Chairman and MembersQua/ifications and mode of appointment to make the TribunaJ equally efficacious and effective alternative to the High Court-Benches pnd Circuits of C Tribunal-Setting up of. . Constitution of India, Arts. 226, 227, 32, 136, 323A and 368-Judicia/ review-Exclusion of-When permissible. • Clause (1) of Art. 323-A, brought in by Constitution ( 42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, authorised Parliament to provide by law for the adjudication or trial D by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints; with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services. Clause (2)( d) of that Article envisaged exclusi1,1n of the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 with respect to the E disputes or complaints referred to in cl. (1 ). Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 originally enacted within the ambit of Art. 323-A, provided for exclusion of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 32. The Act as amended by the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, replaced by Act No.19of1987 now F saves the jurisdiction of Supreme Court both under Art. 32 in respect of original proceedings as also ·under Art. 136 for entertaining appeals. Section 6(1) of the Act which lays down qualifications of Chairman, states tha.t he should be or have been (a) a Judge of a High Court, or (b) has for at least two years held office of Vice-Chairman, or (c) has for at least two years held the post of · Secretary to the Government of India. Sub-section (2) provides that a ViceG Chairynan should be or have been (a) a Judge ofa High Court, or(b)for at least two years held the post of a Secretary to the Government oflndia, or (bb) for at least five years held the post of Additional Secretary to the Government of India, or (c) for a. period of not less than three years held office as a Judicial Member·of an Administrative Tribunal. Sub-section (3) states that the Judicial Member (a) should or should have been qualified to be a Judge of a High H 435 ' 436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] 1 S.C. R. A Court, or (b) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service, Grade 1; for at least three years. Sub-section (3A) provides that a person to he appointed as Administrative Member (a) should ~ave for at least two years held the post of Additional Secretary to ,the Government of India, or (b) has for at least three years held the post of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India. B The petitioners in these writ petitions and transfer petitions challenged the vires of the 1985 Act. It was contended that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Cou_rt under Arts. 226 anil 227 in service matters specified in s.28 of the Act was unconstitutional and void, and that the composition of the Tribunal and mode of appointmmt of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and . -\ - Members was outside the scope of the power conferred on Parliament under C Art. 323-A. D Allowing the petitions in part, the Court, By the Court HELD: It is the High Court which is being supplanted by Administrative Tribunal. The office of Chairman of the Tribunal, therefore, for all practical purposes should be equated with the o llice of the Chief Justice of a High Court. Judicial discipline generated by experimce and training in an adequate dose is a necessary qualification for that post. It is thus essential that he should have been E a Judge of the High Court or he should have for at le~sttwoyears held office as Vice-Chairman. A person who has merely held the post of Secretary to the Government of India and who has no le\:"l and judicial experience if appointed Chairman would not only fail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrath e Tribunal a much less effective and effic ## Text _Characters 0–39,517 of 63,506. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39517 for what follows._ )- S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR ETC. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DECEMBER 9, 1986 [P.N. BHAGWATI, CJ!, RANGANATH MISRA, V KHALID, B G.L. OZA AND M.M. DUTT, JJ.] Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: ss. 4, 5, 6 & 28-Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 in service mattersC~nstllutional ·validity of-Chairman, Vice-Chairman and MembersQua/ifications and mode of appointment to make the TribunaJ equally efficacious and effective alternative to the High Court-Benches pnd Circuits of C Tribunal-Setting up of. . Constitution of India, Arts. 226, 227, 32, 136, 323A and 368-Judicia/ review-Exclusion of-When permissible. • Clause (1) of Art. 323-A, brought in by Constitution ( 42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, authorised Parliament to provide by law for the adjudication or trial D by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints; with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services. Clause (2)( d) of that Article envisaged exclusi1,1n of the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 with respect to the E disputes or complaints referred to in cl. (1 ). Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 originally enacted within the ambit of Art. 323-A, provided for exclusion of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 32. The Act as amended by the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, replaced by Act No.19of1987 now F saves the jurisdiction of Supreme Court both under Art. 32 in respect of original proceedings as also ·under Art. 136 for entertaining appeals. Section 6(1) of the Act which lays down qualifications of Chairman, states tha.t he should be or have been (a) a Judge of a High Court, or (b) has for at least two years held office of Vice-Chairman, or (c) has for at least two years held the post of · Secretary to the Government of India. Sub-section (2) provides that a ViceG Chairynan should be or have been (a) a Judge ofa High Court, or(b)for at least two years held the post of a Secretary to the Government oflndia, or (bb) for at least five years held the post of Additional Secretary to the Government of India, or (c) for a. period of not less than three years held office as a Judicial Member·of an Administrative Tribunal. Sub-section (3) states that the Judicial Member (a) should or should have been qualified to be a Judge of a High H 435 ' 436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] 1 S.C. R. A Court, or (b) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service, Grade 1; for at least three years. Sub-section (3A) provides that a person to he appointed as Administrative Member (a) should ~ave for at least two years held the post of Additional Secretary to ,the Government of India, or (b) has for at least three years held the post of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India. B The petitioners in these writ petitions and transfer petitions challenged the vires of the 1985 Act. It was contended that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Cou_rt under Arts. 226 anil 227 in service matters specified in s.28 of the Act was unconstitutional and void, and that the composition of the Tribunal and mode of appointmmt of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and . -\ - Members was outside the scope of the power conferred on Parliament under C Art. 323-A. D Allowing the petitions in part, the Court, By the Court HELD: It is the High Court which is being supplanted by Administrative Tribunal. The office of Chairman of the Tribunal, therefore, for all practical purposes should be equated with the o llice of the Chief Justice of a High Court. Judicial discipline generated by experimce and training in an adequate dose is a necessary qualification for that post. It is thus essential that he should have been E a Judge of the High Court or he should have for at le~sttwoyears held office as Vice-Chairman. A person who has merely held the post of Secretary to the Government of India and who has no le\:"l and judicial experience if appointed Chairman would not only fail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrath e Tribunal a much less effective and efficacious mechanism than the High Court. Clause (c) of s.6(1) of the Act, F therefore, must be struck down as imalid. [445 C, 455 DE, 445 ABE] j. Per Bhagwati, C.J. 1.1 Judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and no law passed by Parliament in exercis" of its constituent power can abrogate it G or take it away. It is, however, within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to substitute in place of the High Court another alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review without in any way violating the basic strudure doctrine, provided it is no less efficacious than the High Court. Theu it would be another authority which would be exercising the power of judidal review with a view to enforcing the H . constitutional limitations and maintaining the rule of law. [441 B, 443 BC] ,.\ S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF JNDIA 437 Minerva Mills Ltd. &·Ors. v. Union oflndia & Ors. [1981]1 SCR206, A referred to. 1.2 Clause (2X d) of Art. 323-A specifically authorises the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 by any :aw made by Parliament under cl.(l). If this constitutional amendment were to permit a law to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 and 227 without setting up an effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review it would,be violative of the basic structure doctrine and hence outside the ·constitutent power of Parliament. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in the amendment that such a law to be constitutionally valid must not leave a void but it must set up another equally effective olternative outhority and' vest the power of judicial review in it. [ 443 F, H, 44 A _BJ 2.1 Whot is needed in a judicial tribunal which is intended to supplant the High Court is legal training and experience. Service matters which are removed from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 and entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal invariably involve questions of interpretation B c and applicability of Arts .. 14, 15, 16 and 311 which require for their D determination not only judiciol approach but also knowledge and expertise in this particulor branch of constitutional law: [445 D, 444 D] 2.2 The Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or shouJd have been a Judge of a High Court or he should have for at least two years held office as Vice-Chairman. It is the High Court which is being supplanted by the . E Administrative Tribunol. Substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a Chairmon of the Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post of a Secretary to the Gcivemment of India and who has no legol or judicial experience would not only fail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrative Tn'bunal a much less effective and efficacious mechanism than the High Court. Clause (c) of s.6(1) of the Act, F therefore, must be struck down as invalid. [ 445 A, C, B, E] 3. Since the Administrative Tribunal has been created in substitution of the High Court, its Vice-Chairman would be-in the position of a High Court Judge. Therefore, a District Judge or an advocate who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court should be regarded as eligible for being Vice-Chairman of the G Administrative Tribunal. The provisions of the Act in regard to the composition of the Administrative Tribunal are weighted in favour of members of the Services. This value discounting of the judicial members does have the effect of making the Administrative Tribunal less effective and efficacious than the High Court. Unless an amendm_ent to that effect is carried out on or before 31st March, 1987 the Act would have to be declared to be invalid because the H 438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] I S.C.R. provision in regard to the composition of the Administrative Tribunal cannot A be severed from the other provisions contained in the Aci. [445 F, 446 A, 445 G, 446 BJ 4.1 Under the Act the sole an~ exclusive power to make appointment of · Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Administrative Members is conferred on the B Government. No obligation is cast on the Government to consult the Chief Justice of India or to follow any p•rticular selection procfdure in this behalf. Total insulation of the judiciary from all forms of interference from the coordinate branches of Government is a basic essential feature of the Constitution. In case of High Com1 Judges the President cannot make any appointment without consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the ChiefJustice oflndia. This check or safeguard is totally absent in the case of C appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Administrative Members • of the Administrative Tribunal. If tti e Tribunal is created in substitution of the High Court and the jurisdiction of tlile High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 is taken away and vested in it, it is but ..Senti al that .the same iJ:!dependence from possibility of executive pressure m· influence must also be ensured to the o Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Tribunal.[4460,4470,B,EJ 4.2 The appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Administrative Members, therefore, should be made by the concerned Government only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and such consultation must be meaningful and effective. Alternqtively, a High Powered Selection Committee headed by the Chief Justice of India or a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court or E concerned High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of India may be set up for making these appointments. If ei11her of these two modes of appointment is adopted, it would save the impungecl Act from invalidation. Otherwise, it'will be outside the scope of the power conferred on Parliament under Art. 323-A. [447 F, G, 448 B] F 5. The Government should se1 up a permanent bench and if that is not feasible having regard to the volume of work, then at least a circuit bench of the Administrative TribuJ:!al wherever th('re is a seat of the High Court on or before 31st March 1987 so that the provisions of the Act could be SI/stained. [448 DJ 6. Judgment to operate only prospectively and not to invalidate G appointments already made. [448 BJ Per Ranganath Misra, J. I. The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, as amended by Act No. 19 of 1986 saves jurisdiction of the Suprem1' Court both under Article 32 in respect of original proceedings as also under Article 136 for entertaining appeals. There is H thus a forum where matters of importance and grave injustice can be brought )( _)-- S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. ·UNION OF INDIA 439 for determination or rectification. The exch1sion of the jurisdiction of the High A Court, therefore, does not totally bar judicial review. [451 C, 453 A) 2.1 It is open to Parliament to make effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements in place of the High Court for providing judicial review. But such an authority or tribunal must be a worthy successor and real substitute of the High Court-not only in form and de jure but in content and B de facto so as to be effective and efficient as also capable of upholding the constitutional limitations enshrined in Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. [453 B, 454 C, 453 E) 2.2 The Tribunal under the scheme of the Act has been contemplated as a substitute and not as supplemental to the High Court. It is not designed as an C additional froum from where parties could go to the High Court. Under ·.s. 14 and 15 of the Act all the powers of the Courts, except those 'of the Supreme Court, in regard to matters specified therein vest in the Tribunal-either Central or State. Barring of the jurisdiction ·or the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 cannot, therefore, be said to be ultra vires the Constitution. [443 CD, FG, 449 A) Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981} 1 SCR 206, 287 and K.K Dutta v. Union of India, [1980) 3 SCR 811, referred to. D 3.1 The Office of Chairman of the Tribunal should for all practical purposes be equated with the office of Chief Justice of a High Court. Judicial discipline generated by experience and training in an adequate dose being a E necessary qualification for that post, ordinarily a. retiring or retired Chief Justice of a High Court or when such a person is not available, a senior Judge of proved ability, either in office or retired should be appointed. In order that the Tribunal ,may be acceptable to the litigants, who .. are themselves members of the various Services, therefore, s.6(1 )( c) of the Act, which makes a Secretary to the Government of India also eligible for the post of Chairrnan, should be omitted. F [455 D-F) 3.2 The selection of Vice-Chairrnan and Members, when it is not of a sitting Judge or retired Judge of a High Court, should be done by a high powered committee . with a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court, to be nominated by the Chief Justice of lndia, as its Chairrnan. This will ensure G selection of proper and competent people to man these high offices of trust and help to build up reputation and acceptability. The Central Government to bring the provisions of the Act in .accord within a reasonable time not beyond March 31, 1987. Or else, the constitution of Tribunal as a su!Jstitute of the High Court would be open to challenge. [ 455 G, 456 A, HJ 3.3 The judgment to operate prospectively and not to affect the H 440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] I S.C.R. A appointments already inade to the office of Vice-Chairman and Members. ";I' [456 B] 4. The term of five years prescribed under s.8 of the Act for Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Tribunal requiring them to retire at the end of it is too short, which is neith~ r convenient to the person selected for the B job nor expedient to the scheme. When amendments to the Act are undertaken this aspect of the matter deserves to be considered. [ 456 C, F, G] ORIGINAL,JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 12437 of 1985 etc. (Under Article 32 of the Con:;titution of India) C Raju Ramachandra, Mukul Mudgal, Mrs. R. Ramachandran, N.J. Mehta, P.H. Parekh, D. Krishnamurthy, K.N. Rai, K.R. Nagaraja, Ms. Malinio Poduval, N.N. Verma, S.K. Bhardwaj and P.O. Sharma for the Petitioners. D K.'Parasaran, Attorney General, V.P. Sarthy and Ms. A. Subhashini for E the Respondents. S.K. Sinha and S.K. Verma for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGW ATI, CJ. I am in entire agreement with the judgment prepared by my learned brother Ranganath Misra, but since the questions involved in these writ petitions are of seminal importance affecting as they do, the structure of the judicial system and the principle of independence of the F Judiciary, I think I would be failing in my duty if! did not add a few words of my own, There are two questions which arise for consideration in these writ petitions and they have been succinctly set out in the judgment of Ranganath Misra, J. The first question is wheth<:r the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the G High Court under Articles 226 and 2:17 of the Constitution in service matters specified in section 218ofthe Admini,;trative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) and the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in i, such service matters in the AdministrativeTribuool to be constituted under the impugend Act, subject .to an exception in favour of the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 32 and 136, is unconstitutional and void and in any event, H even if the first question be answered against the petitioners and in favour of S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [BHAGWATI, C.J.] 441 ~ the Government, the second question required to be considered is, whether the A composition of the Administrative Tribunal and the mode of appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and members have the effect of introducing a constitutional infirmity invalidating the provisions of the impugned Act. I agreed with the answers given to th~'5e questions in the judgment of Ranganath Misra, J. I would articulate my reasons as follows:- .. It is now well-settled as a result of the decision of this Court in Minerva B Mills Ltd. & Others v. Union of India and Ors. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206 that judicial review is a basic and essential featl)re of the Constitution and no law }- . passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent powe1 can abrogate it or - take it away. If the power of judicial review is abrogated or taken away the Constitution will cease to be what it is. It is a fundamental principle of our c constitutional schem_e that every organ of the State, every authority under the ~ Constitution, derives its power from the Constitution and has to act within the limits of such power. It is a limited Government which we have under the Constitution and both the executive and the legislature have to act within the \ limits of the power conferred upon them under the Constitution. Now a question may arise as to what are the powers of the executive and whether the D executive has acted within the scope of its power. Such a question obviously cannot bC left to the executive to decide and for two very good reasons. First, the decision of the question would depend upon the interpretation of the Constitution and the laws and this would pre-eminently be a matter fit to be .. decided by the judiciary, because it is the judiciary which alone would be I possessed of expertise in this field and secondly, the constitutional and legal E protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality ·of its own action. So also if the legislature ~ makes a law and a dispute arises whether in makingthe law, the legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative competence or the la\\.: is violative of the ' fundamental rights or of any other provisions ,of the~ Ccracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unriuestionably, to my mind, part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that however effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. But what I wish . to emphasise is that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. If by a Constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is provided that the validity of any law made by the legislature shall not be liable to be called in question on any ground; even if it is outside the legislative competence of the legislature 'or is violative of any fundamental rights, it would be nothing short of subversion of the Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative powers between the IJ nion and the States and r~nder the fundamental rights meaningless and futile. So also if a constitutional amendment is made which has the effect of taking it way the power of judicial review and providing that no amendment made in the Constitution shall be liable to be.questioned on any ground, even if such amendrr_ent is violative of the basic structure and, therefore, outside the amendatory power of Parliament, it would be making P:o.rliament sole judge of the constitutional validity of what it has done and that would, in effect and substance, nullify the limitation on the amending power of Parliament and affect the basic structure of the Constitution. The conclusion must therefore inevitably follow that clause (4) of the Article 368 is unconstitutional and void as damaging the basic structure of the Constitution." ! -)- i S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [BHAGWATI, C.J.] 443 It is undoubtedly true that my judgment in Minerva Mills Ltd. case (supra) was A a minority judgment but so far as this aspect is concerned, the majority Judges also took the same view and held that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution and. it is equally clear from the same decision that though judicial review cannot be altogether abrogated by Parliament by amending the Constitution in exercise of its constituent power, Parliament can B certainly, without in any way violating the basic structure doctrine, set up effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicl.al review. The basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to substitute in place of the High Court, another alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is no C less efficacious than the High Court. Then, instead of the High Court, it would be another institutional mechanism or authority which would be exercising the power of judicial review with a view to enforcing the constitutional limitations and maintaining the rule of law. Therefore, if any constitutional amendment made by Parliament takes away from the High Court the power of judicial review in any particular area and vests it in any other institutional mechanism D or authority, it would not be violative of the basic structure doctrine, so long as the essential condition is fulfilled, namely that the alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by the parliamentary amendment is no less effective than the High Court. Here, in the present case, the impugned Act has been enacted by Parliament in exercise of the power conferred by clause (I) of Article 323A which was introduced in the Constitution by Constitution (42nd Amendemnt) Act, 1976. Gause (2) (d) of this Article provides that a law made by Parliament under clause (1) may exclude the jurisdiction of courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136,.with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (!). The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 by any l~w made by Parliament under clause ( 1) of Article 323A is, therefore, specifically authorised by the constitutional amendment enacted in clause (2) (d) of that Article. lt is clear from the discussion in the preceding paragraph that this constitutional amendment authorising exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 postulates for its validity that the law made under clause (1) of Article 323A excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 must provide for an effective alternative institutional mechanism or authority for judicial review. If this constitutional amendment were to permit a law made under clause (I) of Article 323A to exclude the jurisdiction of tile High Court under Articles 226 and 227 without setting up an effective alternative E F G H A B c D E F G H 444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] I S.C.R. institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, it would be violative of the basic structure doctdne and hence outside the constituent power of Parliament. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in this constitutional amendment that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 permissible under it must not leave a void but it must set up another effective institutional mechanism or authority and vest the power of judicial review in it. Consequently, the impugned Act excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 2:26 and 227 in respect of service matters and vesting such jurisdiction in the Administrative Tribunal can pass the test of constitutionality as being within the ambit and coverage of clause (2) (d) of Article 323A, only if it can be shown that the Administrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act is equally ,efficacious as the High Court, so far as the power of judicial review over service matter is concerned. We must, therefore, address ourselves to the question whether the Administrative Tribunal established under the impugned Art can be regarded as equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power or judicial review as the High Court acting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is necessary to bear in mind that service matters which are removed from the jurisdiction uf. the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and entrusted to the ,'\d1ninistrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act for adjudication involve questions of interpretation and applicability of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases. These questions require for their determination not only judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of constitutional law. It is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these questions should have same modicum of legal training and judicial experience because we find that some of these questions are so difficult and complex that they baffle the minds of even trained Judges in the High Courts and the Supreme Court. That is the reason why at the time of the preliminary hearing of these writ petitions we insisted that every bench of the Administrative Tribunal sh.ould consist of one judicial member and one administrative member 'and there should be no preponderance of administrative n1embers on any bench. Of course, the presence of the administrative menber would provide input of practical experience in the functioning of the services and add to the efficiency of the Administrative Tribunal but the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input or not giving it sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal as compared to the High Court. Now section 6 provides that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or should have been a Judge of the High Court or he should have for at least two years held office of Vice-Chairman or he should have for at least two years held the post of - . ~ r • I S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [BHAGWATI, C.J.] 445 Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or A State Government carrying a scale of pay which_ is not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India. I entirely agree with Ranganath Misra, J. tr.at the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or should have beon" Judge of a High Court or he should have forat least two years held office . as Vice-Chairman. If he has held office as Vice-Chairman for a period of at least two years he would have gathered sufficient experience and also within such B period of two years, acquired reasonable familiarity with the constitutional and legal questions involved in service matters, But substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post ofa Secretary to the Government and who has no legal or judicial experience would not only fail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrative Tribunal a much less effective and . C efficacious mechanism than the,High Court. We eannot afford to forget that it . i~ the High Court which is being supplanted by the Administrative Tribunal and it must be so manned as tp inspire confidence in the public mind that it is a highly competent and expert mechanism with judicial approach and objectivity. Of course, I must make it clear that when I say this, I do not wish to D cast any reflection on the members of the "Civil Services because fortunately we have, in our country, brilliant civil servants who possess treme~dous sincerity, drive and initiative and who have remarkable capacity to resolve and overcome administrative problems of great complexity. But what is needed in a judicial tribunal which is intended to suppbnt the High Court is legal training and experience. I am, therefore, of the view, in agreement with Ranganath Misra, J. E that clause (c) of section 6 (1) must be struck down as invalid. • I also fail to see why a District Judge or an advocate who is qualified to ./ be a Judge of a High Court should not be eligible to be considered for appointment as Vi=Chairrnan of the .Administrative Tribunal. It may be . noted that since the Administrative Tribunal has been created in substitution F of the High Court, the Vice-Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal would be in the position of a High Court Judge and if a District Judge oran advocate · qualified to be a Judge of the High Court, is eligible to bea IJighCotirtJudge; · there is no reason why he should not equally be eligible to be a Vice-Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal. Can the position of a Vi=Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal be considered higher than that ofa Hig.'1 Court Judge G so that a person who is eligible to be a High Court Judge may yet be regarded as ineligible for becoming a Vi=Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal? It does appear that the provisions of the ;mpugned Act in regard to the composition of the Adnlinistrative Tribunal · · ; a little weighted in favour of members of the Services. This weightage in favour of the members of the ·Services and value-discounting of the judicial members does have the effect of H 446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987] I S.C.R. A making the Administrative Tribunal less effective and efficacious than the High Court. I would therefore suggest that a District Judge or an Advocate who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court s11ould be regarded as eligible for being Vice-Chairman of the AdministratiYe Tribunal and unless an amendment to that effect is carried out on or b·,fore 31st March, 1987, the B impugned Act would have to be declared to be invalid, because the provision ·in regard to composition of the Administrative Tribunal cannot be severed from the other provisions contained in the impugned Act. c That takes me to another serious infirmity in the provisions of the impugned Act in regard to the mode of appoin:ment of the Chairman, ViceChairman and members of the Administrat 1ve Tribunal. So far as the appointment of judicial members of the Admini >trative Tribunal is concerned, there is a provision introduced in the impugned Act by way of amendment that the judicial members shall be appointed by the Government concerned in consultatio.n with the Chief Justice of India. Obviously no exception can be taken to this provision, because even so far as Judges of the High Court are D concerned, their appointment is required to be made by the President inter alia in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. But so far as the appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and administrative members is concerned, the sole and exclusive power to make such appointment is conferred on the Government under the impugned Act. The·:e is no obligation cast on the Government to consult the Chief Justice of India or to follow any particular E selection procedure in this behalf. The result is that it is left to the absolute unfettered discretion of the Government to appoint such person or persons as it likes as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and administrative members of the Administrative Tribun~l. Now it may be noted that almost all cases in regard to service matters which come before the Administrative Tribunal would be against the Government or any of its officers and it would not at all be F conducive to judicial independence to leave unfettered and unrestricted discretion in the executive to appoint the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and administrative members; if a judicial member or an administrative member is looking forward to promotion as Vice-Chairman or Chairman, he would h_ave to depend on the goodwill and favourabk stance of the executive and that would be likely to affect tile independence and impartiality of the members of G the Tribunal. The same would be the position vis-a-vis promotion to the office of Chairman of the Administrative Tribi..nal. The administrative members would also be likely to carry a sense of obligation to the executive for having been appointed members of the Administrative Tribunal and that would have a tendency to impair the independence and objectivity of the members of the Tribunal. There can be no doubt that the power of appointment and H · promotion vested in the executive cim have prejudicial effect on the -~- - S.P. SAMPATH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA [BHAGWATJ, C.J.] 447 independence of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and members of the A Administrative Tribunal, if such power is absolute and unfettered. If the members have to look to the executive for advancement, it may tend, directly or indirectly, to influence their decision-making proCess particularly since the Government would be a litigant in most of the cases coming before the Administrative Tribunal and it is the action of the Government which would be challenged in such cases. That is the reason why in case of appointment of B High Court Judges, the power of appointment vested in the executive is not an absolute unfettered power but it is hedged in by a wholesome check and safeguard and the President cannot make an appointment of a High Court Judge without consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India and a healthy convention has grown up that no appointment would be made by the Government which is not approved by the C Chief Justice of India. This check or safeg1:1ard is totally absent in the case of appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and administrative members of the Administrative Tribunal and the possibility cannot be ruled outindeed the litigating public would certainly carry a feeling-that the decisionmaking process of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and ·members of the Administrative Tribunal might be likely to be affected by reason of D dependence on the executive for appointment and promotion. It can no longer be disputed that total insulation of the judiciary from all forms of interference from the coordinate branches of Government is a basic essential feature of the Constitution. The Constitution makers have made anxious provision to secure tOtal independence of the judiciary from executive pressure or influence. Obviously, therefore if the Administrative Tribunal is created in E substitution of the High Court and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 is taken away and vested in the Administrative Tribunal, tlie same independence from possibility of executive pressure or influence must also be ensured to the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and members of the Administrative Tribunal. Or else the Administrative Tribunal would cease to be an equally effective and efficacious substitute for the High Court. and the F provisions of the impugned Act would be rendered invalid. I am, therefore, of the view that the appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and administrative members should be made by the concerned Government only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and such consultation must be meaningful' and effective and ordinarily the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India must be accepted unless there are cogent reasons, in which event G the reasons must be disclosed to the Chief Justice oflndia and his response must be invited to such reasons. There is also another alternative which may be adopted by the Government for making appointments of Chairman, ViceChairmen and members and that may be by setting up a High Powered Selection Committee headed by the Chief Justice oflndia or a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court or concerned High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of H A B c 448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] I S.C.R. India. Both these modes of appointment will ensure selection of proper and competent persons to man the Administrative Tribunal and give it prestige and reputation which would inspire confidence in the public mind in regard to the competence, objectivity and impartiality of those manning the Administrative Tribunal. If either of these two modes of appointment is adopted, it would save the impugned Act from invalidation. Otherwise, it will be outside the scope of the power conferred on Parliament under A!.ticle 323-A. I would, however hasten to add that this judgment will operate only prospectively and will not invalidate appointments already made to the Administrative Tribunal. But if any appointments of Vice-Chairmen or administrative members are to be made hereafter, the same shall be made by the Government in accordance with either of the aforesaid two modes of appointment. I may also add that if the Administrative Tribunal is to be an equally effective and efficacious substitution for the High Court on the basis of which alone the impugned Act .:an be sustained, there must be a permanent or if there is not sufficient work, then a Circuit Bench ~f the Administrative Tribunal at o every place where there is a seat of the High Court. I would, therefore, direct the Government to set up a permanent bench and if that is not feasible having regard to the volume of work, then at least a Circuit Bench of the Administrative Tribunal wherever there is a seat of the High Court, on or before 31st March, 1987. That would be necessary if the provisions of the impugned Act are to be sustained. So far a< rest of the points dealt with in the E judgment of Ranganath Misra, J.