# S. PARTHASARATHI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1974] 1 S.C.R. 697
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-09-20
- **Bench:** K. K. Mathew, A. K. Mukherjea
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-parthasarathi-v-state-of-andhra-pradesh-6021
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

697
Hyderabad Civil Services (Classificatio11, Control and Appeal, Ru/as 1955 .
Appellant was under direct control of the Enquiring Offie<r-He_ was ref!'seJ
access to certain relevant files and documents-Whether the enqu1r,, 1v4' vl11ated
and whether the enquiry ofjicer had jurisdiction under the Rules.
The appellant, a clerk-cum·typist was under the direct control of one M, th".
Deputy Director of Information aad Public Relations Department in the State of
Andhra Pradesh. The appellant's case. is that M was irumical towards him llDd
harassed him in various ways. As Director.in-charge, M caused the appellant to
be suspended from service. and thereafter he framed certain charges against thl'
appellant. The appellant protested against M conducting the enquiry. In spite of
. protest M. conducted the enquiry. The appellant wanted to inspect several fileA
and documents, but was refused. ·The appellant, therefore, did not participate in
the enquiry. The enquiry was conducted ex-parte and the appellant was found
guilty of some of the charges.
On the basis of the Inquiry Report, the Directqr issued a show cause notic:tto the appellant. The appeUant. submitted a written explanation stating that thl.:
inquiry was vitiated on account of the bias of the-Inquiry Officer, that he wainot given reasonable opportunity of defending himself as he was not supplied with
the copies of the relevant documents and that the Inquirv Officer had no jurisdiction to conduct the enquiry. The Director however, foultd the appellant guilty
and passed an order removing him from service. l'hereafter, on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission, the Government modified the order cf
removal and ordered the compulsory retirement of the appellant from service.
Thereafter, the appellant filed a suit for declaration that the order of tlu:-
Director was· null and void and asked for consequential reliefs etc. The triaJ
court decreed the suit, but the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the
suit.
Before this Court the following points were raised by the appellant: (i) the>
enquiring officer was biased against th~ aooellant; (ii) the Enquiring Officer had
no authority to .conduct the enquiry (iii) that the d.ppeUant was not given a rca~
sonable opportunity to defend himself as he was denied access to several file.n
which had a material bearing upan his defence. Dismissing, the judgment 111J<l
decree of the High Court, but restoring the decree passed by the trial court,
HELD: (i) The Inquiring Officer was biased aad he adopted a procedw"
which is contrary to the rules of natural justice. Therefore, the order of his compulsol1' retirement is bad. The cumulative effect of the circumstances, with ·the
exhibits [e.g. Medical Officer's reply (Ex. 8) stating that the appellaat was not
insane, as sug~ested by M etc.,] and other evidence showed that the Inquiring
Officer was inimical towards the appellant.
(ii) The test of likelihood of bia. which has been applied in a number o{
cases is based on a "reasonable apprehension" of a reasonable man fully cognizant
of the facts. The courts have quashed decisions on the strength of the reasonable
suspicion of the party aggrieved )Vithout having made any finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed.
·
R. v. Huggins, [1895f ( Q.B. S63, R v. Sussex II., Ex. P. McCarthy, [1924\
I K. B. 2S6, Cottle v. Cottle, [1939) 2 All E.R. S3S and R. v. Abingdon II., Ex.
P. Cousins, [1964) 108 SJ. 840. referred to.
I~ R. v. Camborne, II. Ex. P. Pearce, [19SSJ I Q.B. 41 and 51, the court, after·
a review of the relevant cases. held that real likelihood of bias was the proper ta;:
and ~at '! real likelihCJ'?'1 of bias had to be made to appear not only from the
maten~ tn fsct !""Ort••~ by the party complaining, but from such further facl.<
as h~ .mtght readily have ascertained and easily verified in the course Of hi,
1nqu1nes.
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(iii) Th~ question, as to whether a real likelihood of bias existed in a part

## Text

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S. PARTHASARATHI
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
September 20, 1973
[K. K. MATHEW AND A. K. MUKHERJEA, ]J.j
697
Hyderabad Civil Services (Classificatio11, Control and Appeal, Ru/as 1955 .
Appellant was under direct control of the Enquiring Offie<r-He_ was ref!'seJ
access to certain relevant files and documents-Whether the enqu1r,, 1v4' vl11ated
and whether the enquiry ofjicer had jurisdiction under the Rules.
The appellant, a clerk-cum·typist was under the direct control of one M, th".
Deputy Director of Information aad Public Relations Department in the State of
Andhra Pradesh. The appellant's case. is that M was irumical towards him llDd
harassed him in various ways. As Director.in-charge, M caused the appellant to
be suspended from service. and thereafter he framed certain charges against thl'
appellant. The appellant protested against M conducting the enquiry. In spite of
. protest M. conducted the enquiry. The appellant wanted to inspect several fileA
and documents, but was refused. ·The appellant, therefore, did not participate in
the enquiry. The enquiry was conducted ex-parte and the appellant was found
guilty of some of the charges.
On the basis of the Inquiry Report, the Directqr issued a show cause notic:tto the appellant. The appeUant. submitted a written explanation stating that thl.:
inquiry was vitiated on account of the bias of the-Inquiry Officer, that he wainot given reasonable opportunity of defending himself as he was not supplied with
the copies of the relevant documents and that the Inquirv Officer had no jurisdiction to conduct the enquiry. The Director however, foultd the appellant guilty
and passed an order removing him from service. l'hereafter, on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission, the Government modified the order cf
removal and ordered the compulsory retirement of the appellant from service.
Thereafter, the appellant filed a suit for declaration that the order of tlu:-
Director was· null and void and asked for consequential reliefs etc. The triaJ
court decreed the suit, but the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the
suit.
Before this Court the following points were raised by the appellant: (i) the>
enquiring officer was biased against th~ aooellant; (ii) the Enquiring Officer had
no authority to .conduct the enquiry (iii) that the d.ppeUant was not given a rca~
sonable opportunity to defend himself as he was denied access to several file.n
which had a material bearing upan his defence. Dismissing, the judgment 111J<l
decree of the High Court, but restoring the decree passed by the trial court,
HELD: (i) The Inquiring Officer was biased aad he adopted a procedw"
which is contrary to the rules of natural justice. Therefore, the order of his compulsol1' retirement is bad. The cumulative effect of the circumstances, with ·the
exhibits [e.g. Medical Officer's reply (Ex. 8) stating that the appellaat was not
insane, as sug~ested by M etc.,] and other evidence showed that the Inquiring
Officer was inimical towards the appellant.
(ii) The test of likelihood of bia. which has been applied in a number o{
cases is based on a "reasonable apprehension" of a reasonable man fully cognizant
of the facts. The courts have quashed decisions on the strength of the reasonable
suspicion of the party aggrieved )Vithout having made any finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed.
·
R. v. Huggins, [1895f ( Q.B. S63, R v. Sussex II., Ex. P. McCarthy, [1924\
I K. B. 2S6, Cottle v. Cottle, [1939) 2 All E.R. S3S and R. v. Abingdon II., Ex.
P. Cousins, [1964) 108 SJ. 840. referred to.
I~ R. v. Camborne, II. Ex. P. Pearce, [19SSJ I Q.B. 41 and 51, the court, after·
a review of the relevant cases. held that real likelihood of bias was the proper ta;:
and ~at '! real likelihCJ'?'1 of bias had to be made to appear not only from the
maten~ tn fsct !""Ort••~ by the party complaining, but from such further facl.<
as h~ .mtght readily have ascertained and easily verified in the course Of hi,
1nqu1nes.
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(iii) Th~ question, as to whether a real likelihood of bias existed in a particular case, 1s to be determin~d ~n the probabilities to be inferred from the
cir~
c~mstances by the court ob1ect1~ely, or, upon the b8;-"iS, of the impression that
might reason~?Iy be.lef~ on ~e mind.~ of the party aggrieved or jhe public at large.
~e tests of real ltkehhO?d ! and re3;sonable suspicion" are really inconsistent
\Vitb each ~ther. The rev1ew;rng authonty, therefore, must make a determination
~n the ~asts of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would
IJ?. the c1rcumstances, in.fer that there is real likelihood of bias. There must exisi
~1rcll;~tances fro~ which r_eas.onable ~en think it probable or likely that the
!nqUtrQJg officer wdl be preiud1ced agamst the delinquent. The court will not
mqU1re.whether he."'."' rc~lly prejudiced, If a reasonable man would think on
the b~1s of the existing c.1~cumstances tliat h~ is lik.;ly to b? prejudicied, that is
sufficient to quash the decIS1on Per Lord Denrnng M.R. in Metropolitan Properties
(F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lanon and Ors. etc., (1968) 3 W.L.R. 694, referred to. In the
prese.nt case, as there was real likelihood of bias in the sense explained above the
enquiry and the order~ based on the inquiry were bad.
(702D·703D]
'
(iv) M was not authorised to conduct ihe inquiry ordered by the Government
after he ceased to be thb Director in·charge and became a Deputy Director. The
Government wanted the Director to conduct the inquiry. Even assuming that as
Director-in-charge, M was authorised to conduct th~ inquiry, that authority came
to an end when he ceased to be the Director-and became the Deputy Director.
Beyond framing the charges, M had taken no steps in the inquiry before he ceased
£0 be the Director.in-charge'.
All the witnesses were examined tiy M after he
ceased to be the Director-in-charge and after. his reversion as Deputy Director.
(70~0-E]
,
Further rule 22 of the Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and
«\ppeal) Rules, 1955 provides that in every case, where it is proposed to impose
on a Government servant any of the penalties mentioned in items ( v), {vi J etc.
the authority competent to order an inquiry ani aopoint an inquiry officer, shall
be, in the case of subordinate services, the head. of the office, the appointing
1.1uthority or the higher authority. When the Government made it clear that the
Director should conduct the inquiry, the Director, as Head of the Department,
cannot delegate his power to another person to conduct the inquiry.
Therefore,
the delegation by the Director to another person. the power to inquire into the
allegations was contrary to th? intention of the Government and trerefore was
beyond his competence. (705C]
(v) There is no justification for the refusal of the inquiring officer to give
access of the files to the appellant and not granting the prayer of the appellant to
inspect the files containing the proceedings on the ground thafthe appellant was
appraised of the earlier proceeding<; esneciallv wh ~n it is seen that these-proceedings haye been relied upon by the inquiry officer in his report to substantiate one
of the charges against the appellant. It was too much to assume that the appellant would be remembering the details of th~ proceeding• of 1951 at th~ time of
the inquiry. 'Therefore, the trial on this score was also vitiated. [706C]
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CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Qvil Appeal No. 656 of 1971.
Api>eal by certificate from the judgment and tic ;ree dated April
l.7. 1970 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in
G
CC.C. Appeal No· 56 of 1966.
B.R.L. Aiyanagar and H.K.Puri, for the appellant.
P. Ram Reddy and P. Parmeswararao, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MATHEW, J. The appellant filed a suit for quashing the order
passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh on November 10. 1961
retiring him compulsorily on the basis of the finding in a disciplinary
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s. PARTHASARATHI I'. ANDHRA PRADE~H (Mathew, J.)
699
proceeding against him. The trial court decreed the suit. The Govern
ment of Andhra Prad~sh appealed against the decree to the High
Court.· The High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit
This appeal, by certificate, is against that decree.
The appellant was appointed in the service of Andhra Pradesh
Government in 1940 as Clerk-cum-Typist in the Public Works
Department. It is not necessary to tr~ the subsequent career of the.
appellant in the service. Suffice it to say that on June 7, 1952, he
was posted as Office Superintender.t in the Information and Public
Relations Department and was confirmed in the post in 1956. The
Deputy Director of lnfirmation and Public Relations
Department,
dunng the period from 1956 to 1957 was one Narsing Rao Manvi.
hereinafter referred to as Manvi. The appellant" was under his imme·
diate administrative control.
The appellant's case in the pla.int was as follows : The Deputy
Director was inimical towards him and harassed him in various ways.
Manvi was appointed as Direcror·in-charge, on August 1, 1957. As
Director-in-charge, Manvi caused the appellant to be suspended from
service and tltereafter he framed certain charges against the appellant
on May 13, 1959 and they were communicated to the appellant. The
appellant protested saying that Manvi should not conduct the enquiry
on the basis of the charges for the reason that Manvi had bias against
him and that he was not duly authorised to conduct the enquiry. In
spite of the protest Manvi conducted the enquiry. The
appellant
wanted to inspect several files and do:uments in the enquiry for the
purpose of his defence, but his requests in that behalf were not granted. The appellant, therefore, refused to participate in the enquiry.
The enquiry was conducted and the appellant was found guility of
some of the charges. On the basis of the enquiry report, the Director
issued a show cause notice to the appellant why he should not be
dismissed from service. The appellant submitted a written explana·
tion sta!ing that the enquiry was vitiated on account of the bias of
the inquiring officer, that he was not given reasonable opportunity of
defending himself in the enquiry as he was not supplied with copies
of the relevant do:uments nor given an opportullity to inspect the
concerned files and that the enquiring officer had no jmisdiction to
'conduct !he enquiry.
·
The Director, however, found the appellant guilty and passed an
order removing him from service with effect from April 11, 1960.
Thereafter, the Government, on the recommendation of the Public
Service Commission, modified the order of removal and ordered the
compulsory retirement of the appellant from service.
The prayer of the appellant in the suit was for a declaration that
the order of the Director of Information and Public Relation~ dated
AorU 11. 1960 as modified by the order of the Government compul·
sorily retiring him from service was null and void and that he was
entitled to arrears of salary and damages to the tune of Rs. 65,000/-.
700
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS
( 1974 J 1 s.c.R.
The trial court held that Manvi as Director-in-;:harge had no jurisdiction to conduct the cnq:iiry and that, at any rate, he had no authonty to continue tne ~nqmry alter he ceased to be tne Director-in-charge,
that the enquiry was vitiated as the appellant was not given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself and as the inquinng officer was
l>iased against him. The court therefore passed a decree setting aside
the impugned orders arul declaring that the appellant must be deemed
to have continued in service and that he would be entitled to the
arrears of salary claimed in the plaint.
It was against this decree that the State of Andhra Pradesh filed
the appeal before the High Court.
·
The High Court found that there wc1s no material to show that
the inquiring officer was biased against the appellant, that the Government had authorised the Director-in-<:harge to conduct the enquiry, that
at any rate, lhe Director authorized the Deputy Director to conduct
the enquiry and that the Government subsequently accepted the suggestion of the Director that the Deputy Director may continue
the -
criquiry and therefore, the inquiring officer had jurisdiction to conduct
1he enquiry. The court further found that there were no
materials
from which it could be infer·red that the inquiring officer was biased
_against the appellant and that the appellant was not d~nied reason·
able opportunity of defending himself as he was not denied access to
any file which had a material bearing 11pon his defence. The High
Court, therefore, reversed the judgment and decree of the. trial court
and dismissed the suit.
In- this appeal, counsel for the appellant submitted that the inquiring officer was biased against
the
aopellant,
that ·the
inquiring officer had no authority to conduct the enqUiry and that the appellant was not given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself as
he was denied access to several files which had a material bearing upon his defence.
The trial court had relied upon the following circumstances for its
conclusiop that the inquiring officer was biased against the appellant.
Uy Ex. A-10 dated 15-10-1955. Manvi who was the Assistant Director
at the time, -called for the explanation of the Appellant regarding
theft of 164 files in the Weeding Section in which the appellant wa'
the Superintendent. The appellant replied by Ex. A-97 dated October
18. 1955 statin2 that he had no idea of the missing files till his return
from privilege leav~ in the first week of July, 195\ Ex. A-18 dated
January 10, 1958 is a Memorandum served on the
appe]},int bv
.'vfanvi to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for giving false statement relating to. his residence. By
Ex. A-19 the appellant denied that he had given any false statement
in tj:le particulars furnished by him. Ex. A-21 dated March 12, 1958
is a Memorandum served on the appellant by Manvi threatening disciplinary action for being negligent in his duties. In his reply - (Ex.
1\-22) the appellant said that no files were pending with him and that
he was not negligent. Ex. A-23 dated March 13, 1958 is a MemoA
n
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randum served upon the appellant by manvi, again threaten~
ing him with disciplinary action for negligence of duties. By Ex. A-24
the appellant denied the charge of negligence.
Manvi
as
Deputy
Director overlooked the claim of the appellant for promotion. The
appellant complained about it to higher authorities. Ex. A·33
is a
letter addressed to the inquiring officer on 3-11-1958 informing him
that he was never absent w1ihout leave and without prior application
and requesting the Director-in-charge that deductions made bv him
from the salary may be paid to him. Ex. A-34 shows that his exp;anation was accepted by the Director-in-charge. Ex. A· 36 is a Memorandum served on the appellant on November 20, 1958 to show cause
. why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for aCC1Umulation of arrears of work .. Ex. A-37 is the reply of the appellant
wherein he has protested against the attitude of the Director-in-charge
towards him. By Ex. A-41 order dated December 1, 1958 and signed
by the Assistant Director, the appellant was asked to take charge ·or
the Weeding Section. The appellant complained against that posting
by Ex. A-42 and in that he said that if the Record Keeper of the
Weeding Section Sri Kazim Ali is required to hand over charge of the
several thousand files, and registers, all of them being very old and
mainly in Urdu, two Clerks, knowing English and Urdu should be
posted to the Weeding Section to check each file in a manner prescribed by Govermnent. By Ex. A-13 the Assistant Director ordered
that the appellant should take charge immediately and comply with
the earlier order in Ex. A-41. By Ex. A-4 7 the appellant was
threatened with disciplinary action unless he took charge in compliance with the order. Bv Ex. A-49 the Director-in-charge said that the
appellant should take charge of the entire files in the Weeding Section
and that no further arrangement is possible, vpparently referring to the
requirement "Jf two clerks for taking charge.
Besides the circumstances relied on by the trial comt, the appellan;
urged the following circumstances to support his case that the inquiring
officer was biased. Manvi had written on April 29, !959, a letter
enclosing certain documents requesting for an opinion from Dr. R.
Natarajan, Superintendent, Hospital for Mental Diseases, Hyderabad.
about the meutal condition of the· appellant. This Jetter was not produced in court. We are left to gather the contents of the letter from
the reply of Dr. Natarajan (Ex. B-8). It would seem from the reply
that Ml\Dvi 'Yanted to get i;id of the services of the appellant without
taking any disciplinary action against him and without holdin~ an
enquiry, for the reason that he was mentally unsound. In his reply.
Dr. Natarajan said :
·
"Unforturtately, I cannot. on medical grounds, advice his
retrenchment or removal and, therefore, I would suggest you
to deal }Vith him departtnentally and take appropriate action
according to the seriousness of the offence~ he has committed in the office. This is a case that would be dealt with
departmentally and disciplinarily and I am sorry I will not be
able to help you furtl1er as he cannot be termed insane in
the spirit of which it is understood".
702
SUPREME 'cOURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 1 S.C.R.
It was after this letter was received by Manvi, the Director-in·crharge,
that he started the disciplinary procecdi~. against the appellant.
According to the High Court, nQ11C of the circumstances relied on
by the appellant was sufficient to establish bias on the part of the
inquiring officer. The High Court said that it was because various
officers had complained to Manvi while he was the Director-in-charge
about the conduct and behaviour of the appellant that he wanted a
medical opinion as to his mental condition and that as the letter
written by Manvi to the Medical Officer was not produced liefore the
court nor the Medical Officer examined, no inference of bias could be
made.
The Jetter written by the Medical Officer (Ex. B-8) would indicate
that Manvi wanted to get rid of the services of the appellant on the
ground of his mental imbalance and it was for that purpose that he
tried to get a certificate to the effect that the appellant was mentally
unsound. We are of the opinion that the cumulative effect of the
circumstances stated above was sufficient to create in the mind of a
reasonable man the impression that there was a real likelihood of bias
in the inquiring officer. There must be a "real likelihood" of bias and
that means there must be a substantial possibility of bias. The court
will have to judge of the matter as a reasonable man would judge of
any matter in the conduct of hi.s own business (see R. v. Sunderland
JJ.)(').
The test of likelihood of bias which has been applied in a n\lmber of
cases iS based on the "reasonable apprehension" of a reasonable man
fully cognizant of the facts.
The courts have quashed decisions on the
strength of the reasonable suspicion of the party aggrieved without having made any finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed [see
R. v. Huggins(')]; R. v. Sussex JJ., ex. p. McCarthy(•); Cottle v.
Cottle('); R. v. Abingdon JJ. ex. p. Cousins("). But in R. v. Camborne JJ., ex. p. Pearce(•), the Court, after a review of the relevant
cases held that real likelihood of bias was the proper test and that a
real likelihood of bias had to be made to appear not only from the materials in fact ascertained by the party complaining, but from such further
facts as he might readily have ascertained and easily verified in the
course of his inquiries.
The question then is : whether a real likelihood "of bias existed is
to be determined on the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances by court objectively, or, upon the basis of the impressiolli that
might reasonably be left on the minds of the party aggrieved or the
public at large.
.
The tests of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" ar_t\jreally
inconsistent with each other.
We think that the reviewing authority
must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before
(I) (1901) 2 K. B. 357 at 373.
(3) (1924) 1 K. B. 256.
(5) [1964) 108 S.1. 840.
(2) [IS95) I Q. B. 56,;.
(4) [1939) 2 Ail E. R 535.
(6) [1955] 1 Q. B. 41 at 51.
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it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there
is real likelihood of bias.
The c0urt must look at the impression which
other people have.
This follows from the principle. that justice must
not only be done but seen to be done. 'If right miaded persons would
think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring
ofticer, be must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there must be a
real likelihood of bias.
Surmise or conjecture would not be enough.
There must exist circumstances from which
rea~onable men would
think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced
against the delinquent.
The court will not inquire whether he
was
really prejudiced.
If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the
existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision [see per Lord Denning, M.R. in M etropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon and Others, etc.(')]. We
should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with
greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in
proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings.
·
As there was real likelihood of bias in the sense explained above,
think that the inquiry and the orders based on the inquiry were bad.
The decision of this Court in the Stdte of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad
Nooh(2) makes it ·c1ear that if an inquiring officer adopts a procedure
which is contrary to the rules of natural justice, the ultim1te decision
based on his report of inquiry is liable to be quashed.
We see no rea-
~OA for not applying the same principle here as we find that the inquiring officer was biased.
The next point for consideration is whether the inquiring officer was
authorised to conduct the enquiry.
On April 13, 1959, Manvi, as
Director-fo-charge, appointed Siddiqui, the Assistant Director as
inquiring officer.
Siddiqui, Assistant Director passed an order suspending the appellant on April 13, 1959 and served a Memorandum of
charges onhim on May 12, 1959.
The appellant objected to the framing of charges by Siddiqui on May 26, 1959, by Ex. B-16.
On July
1, 1959, by Ex. B-1 order, the Government directed that the enquiry
must te conducted by the Director himself.
On July 6, 1959 Manvi as
Director-in-charge issued a Memorandum of charges containing practically the same charges as framed as Siddiqui.
On July 15, 1959 the
appellant protested against Manvi conducting the enquiry.
0,1 July
16, !959 Manvi ~ommunicaled to the appellant that he was conducting
the enquiry in pursuance to the Government order, and that the written
statement should be filed by the appellant before July 27, 1959.
On
July 27; 1959 Manvi went on leave; Luther was appointed as Director
on August 1, 1959.
On October 10, 1959, by Ex A-65, the appellant
again protested that Manvi was biased against him and a person unconnected with the Department should be appointed as inquiring officer.
On October 20, 1959, Luther, as Director, authorised Manvi,
Deputy Director to continue the enquiry (see Ex. A-114-B).
But on
October 27. 1959,by Ex-B-4, the Government enquired of Luther
whether it. was the Deputy Director who was conducting the enquiry
and said that the Director himself should conduct the enquiry.
Ex-B-4
(!) (1968) 3 W. LR. 694 at 707.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 5''·
5-L392Sup.CT174
704
SUPl<tlME COURT REPORTS .
[ 1974] 1 S.C.R.
was not communicated to the appellant or shown to Manvi.
On November 6, 1959, Luther. wrote to Government explaining the practical
difficulties in his conducting the enquiry and stating that it would be
expedient if the Deputy Director was allowed to continue the enquiry.
On November 24, 195_9 the enquiry was completed.
On December 3,
1959 the Government agreed to the suggestion of Luther that Manvi
might continue the enquiry.
It is not clear from Ex. B-1 that although Manvi was the Directorin-c11arge at the time, he was the person intended by the Government to
conduct the enquiry, for by that document the Government only authorized' the Director to conduct the enquiry.
But Ex. B-4 is clear that
the Government wanted the Director to conduct the enquiry.
In that
communication the Government said that it.was the intention of the
Government that the Director himself should conduct the enquiry and
that if Manvi, the Deputy Director was conducting the enquiry, the
Director should take up the matter and proceed with the enquiry. Even
assuming for a moment that by Ex. B-1, the Director-in-charge at the
time, namely Manvi, was aut)lorised to conduct the enquiry, it wuuld
not follow that Manvi, when he ceased to be the Director-in-charge and
became the Deputy Director, was authorised to continue the enquiry.
In other words, even assuming that as Director-in-charge Manvi was
authorised to conduct the enquiry, that authority came to an end when
he ceased to be the Director-in-charge and became the Deputy Director.
Beyond framing the charges, Manvi had taken no steps in the enquiry
before he ceased to be the Director-in-charge.
All the witnesses were
examined by Manvi after he ceased to .be the Dirctor-in-charge and
after his reversion as Deputy Director. The order of the Government
accepting the suggestion of Luther, the Director, that Manvi might continue the enquiry was passed only on December 3, 1959 and at that.titne
Manvi had already completed the enquiry and drawn up his report Of
the inquiry.
As we said, assuming that the Director-in-charge was
authorised to conduct the enquiry by Ex. B-1, Manvi was not authorised
to conduct the enquiry after he ceased to be the Director-in-charge and
Ex. B-4 makes that position clear.
The order of Government dated
December 3, 1959, accepting the suggestion of Lu.ther that Manvi might
continue the enquiry, as it did not in terms clothe Man vi with authority
to conduct the inquiry after he became the Deputy Director, is of no
avail because it did not either expressly or by implication have retrospective operation, ev~n if it be assumed that the Gs>vemment could give
that order retrospective effect.
Rule 22 of the Hyderabad Civil Service (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1955, so far as it is material, provides:
"22 (1) in every cas~ where it is proposed to impose on
a Government servant any of the penalties mentioned in
items (v), !vi). (vii) and (viii) of rule 12, or in any other
case where disciplinary action into the conduct of a Government servant is considered necessary, the authority competent
A
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F
G
H
A
B
S. PARTHASARATHI V. ANDHRA PRADESH (Mathew, /.)
7\15
to order an enquiry and appoint an Inquiry ·Officer shall
be as follows :-
.
·
. ·
· · · .·
.
.
. .
Class of membc" of the State·
Subordinate Service
(a) Subordinate Se1'1iices (Cass
Ill Service)
.
.
Auth~rity competent to OrdCr an
· enquiry and/ or to appoint an
Inquiry Officer
·
-
The Head of the Office, the
appointing authority
or~ any
higher authority". . ·
·
We think that when the Government made it clear that the Director '..
should conduct the enquiry; the Director as Head of the , Department
cannot exercise his power under the rule by designating another person
to conduct the enquiry "and therefore the order passed by Luther (Ex.
C
A-11 +.B) authorising Manvi as Deputy Director to conduct the enquiry could not invest him with the power to do so. .We think that the
Director, as Head of the office had no power to designate or appoint an
inquiry officer, as Government, the appointing authority, had already
directed that the Director should himself conduct the· enquiry. It
would be anamaloui to hold that both the appointing authority, namely,
the (iovernment and the Head a! the Office, namely, the Director, could,
D
in the same case, appoint two persons to conduct . the ·enquiry. We.
cannot, therefore, agree with the reasoning of the · High Court that
Manvi, :is Deputy Director, was invested with authority to conduct the
enquiry by the Director by Ex. A·ll4·B. The High Court said that
since Ex. B-4 order was not communicated to the appellant, he cannot
found an argument upon it and say that the Director alone was authoE . rized to conduct the enquiry. We see little substance in the reasoning.
The question is whether the Government, as appointing authority, had
manifested its intention that the Director alone. shpuld conduct the
enquiry. Whether Ex. B-4 was communicated to the appellant or not,
it manifested the intention of Government to invest only the Director
with power to conduct the enquiry. That is all what is relevant. · No
doubt,. the Government could have changed that order.
But in this
F
case when it changed the order and authorized Manvi to continue the
enquiry by its order dated December 3, 1959, Manvi bad already completed the enquiry and drawn up the report. · As we said, the order
dated December 3,' 1959 was not ratrospective in character and, there.-
fore, it did not invest Manvi with authority to conduct the inquiry from
an anterior date.
Nor do we think that when the Director alone was
invested with power to conduct the inquiry by Ex. B-1 read in the light
of E"C.B-4, he could have delegated that power ·to·Manvi, as we think
G
itl>at. the Government had manifested its intention in Ex-B-4 that the
D'..!'!ctor a.lone shonM conduct ~
enquiry and so any delegation by the
H
· Director of that power would have been contrary to the intention of
the Government.
The trial court was.of the viewithat the appellant was not given a
reasonable Opportunity of defending himself as the inquiring officer md
net give him facility for inspecting the relevant files/ · The High Court
. fo~ ·that although the ~t
was not allowed io inspect the confi-
. <lential record of some.!tf the wil!lesses for the purpose of enabling the
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7,0&
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974) 1 S.C.R.
appellant to cross-examine them, that would not be a denial of reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the enquiry.
The High Court
also found that Exhibits 3 and 4 (R.D. File No. Estt/89 of 1951 Pt. II
p.17 and H.D. File No. Est/89 of 1951 Pt.II paras 253 to 258 pp.55
also found that Exhibits 3 and 4 (R.D. File No. Estt/89 of 1951 Pt. II
were not material for the purpose of defew.:e, that the appellant was
made aware of the contents of those proceedings and therefore, the
inquiring officer was justified in not giving copies of these proceedings
or in not acquainting the delinquent of them. Ex. 3 relates to a file
regarding the transfer of the appellant in 1951 from the Secretariat
to the Information Department. Ex.4 relates to a proceeding against
the appellant whlch reselted in a censure on the basis of a complaiJJ.t
in 1!151.
Whatever night be said in justification of the refusal.of the
inquring officer to give access to the appellant of the confidential records
relating to the witnesses we see no justification.Jar not granting the
prayer of the appellant to inspect the files containing the proceedings
on the ground that the appellant was appraised of the proceedings in
1951, especially when it is seen that these proceedings have
been
relied
upon by the inquiring
officer . in his
report
to suhstantiate one of the charges against the appellant. It was too rituch to
assume that the appellant would be remembering the details of the pro"
ceedings of 1951 at the time of the inquiry.
We set aside the judgment and decree of..the High Court and restore the decree passed by the trial court, but in the circumstances, we
make no order to costs.
s.c.
Appeal al/(}wed.
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