# S. RANGARAJAN ETC v. P. JAGJIVAN RAM & ORS

- **Citation:** [1989] 2 S.C.R. 204
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1989-03-30
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 1668 and 1669 of 1988
- **Bench:** K.N. Singh, K. Jagannatha Shetty, Kuldip Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-rangarajan-etc-v-p-jagjivan-ram-ors-10359
- **Pages:** 28

## Headnote

Cinematograph Act, 1952 (Cinematograph (Certificate) Rules,
1983.
Sections 4, 5, 5A, B, C and 8/Guidelines ( 1)-(3) and notification
dated January 21, 1987.
High Court revoking 'U' certificate granted by Censor BoardValidity of High Court order-Duty of Censor Board-Obligatory duty
of state to protect freedom of expression.
Constitution of India-Articles 19( 1)(a) and 19(2)-Freedom of
speech and expression-Reasonable restrictions must be justified on
anvil of necessity and not quicks-Sand of convenience and
expediency-Obligatory duty of State to protect freedom of expression.
'r·
E
The appellant, S. Rangarajan is a film producer. He produced a
Tamil film "Ore Oru Gramathile" and applied for certificate for exhibition of the film. The examination committee upon seeing the film
refused to grant the Certificate but on a reference being made to the
2nd Revising Committee for review and recommendation, the Committee hy a majority of 5:4 recommended the grant of a 'U' certificate
F
subject to deletion of certain scenes.
On 7 .12.87 'U' certificate was granted which was challenged in
the High Court by means of writ petitions. It was contended before the
High Court that the film is treated in an irresponsible manner, the
reservation policy of the Govt. has been projected in a biased manner
G and the so-called appeal in the film that "India is one" is a hollow
appeal which touches caste sensitivity of the Brahmin forward caste. It
was also asserted that the film would create law and order problem in
Tamil Nadu. The Writ Petitions were dismissed by the Single Judge but
upon appeal they were allowed and the 'U' certificate issued to the
appellant-producer was revoked. These two appeals, one by the proH ducer of the film and the other by the Union of India have been filed by
204
. ' ..
-
-
-+-
S. RANGARAJAN v. P.J. RAM
205
special leave of challenging the decision of the High Court.
The principal contentions raised on behalf of the appellants were:
(i) that the fnndamental right of freedom of free expression guaranteed
under the Constitntion covers even the medinm of movies; that the
opinion on the film ought not to be rested on the isolated passages
disregarding the main theme and its message; (ii) That the Court should
not concern itself with the correctness or legality of the views expressed
in the film and the Court cannot limit the expression on any general
issue even if it is controversial and that the writings of the film must be
considered in a free and liberal manner in the light of the freedom of
expression gnaranteed nnder the Constitution. It was asserted that the
theme of the fllm is that reservation could be on the basis of economic
backwardness instead of caste.
A
B
c
Counsel for the Respondents was critical about the manner in
which the reservation policy of the Govt. has been condemned and the
events and the characters protrayed in the film, as they are depicted in a
biased manner and reaction to the film in Tamil Nadu is bound to be
D
volatile and likely to create law and order problem. Allowing the
appeals, this Court,
-I
HELD: The motion pictures were originally considered as a
form of amusement to be allowed to titillate but not to arouse. They
were treated as mere entertainment and not an art or a means of
E
expression. Movie motivates thought and action and assnres a high
degree of attention and retention. It makes its impact simultaneously
arousing the visual and aural senses. The movie had unique capacity
to disturb and arouse feelings. It has as mnch potential for evil as
it was for good. It has an equal potential to instil or cultivate violent
or good behaviour. [2110-E; 212G; 2130]
Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable but
also necessary. [213E]
F
The Censors Board should exercise considerable circumspection on
movies affecting the morality or decency of our people and cultnral
G
heritage of the country. The moral values in particular, should not be
allowed to be sacrificed in the guis

## Text

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A
B
c
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S. RANGARAJAN ETC.
v.
P. JAGJIVAN RAM & ORS.
MARCH 30, 1989
[K.N. SINGH, K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND
KULDIP SINGH, JJ.]
Cinematograph Act, 1952 (Cinematograph (Certificate) Rules,
1983.
Sections 4, 5, 5A, B, C and 8/Guidelines ( 1)-(3) and notification
dated January 21, 1987.
High Court revoking 'U' certificate granted by Censor BoardValidity of High Court order-Duty of Censor Board-Obligatory duty
of state to protect freedom of expression.
Constitution of India-Articles 19( 1)(a) and 19(2)-Freedom of
speech and expression-Reasonable restrictions must be justified on
anvil of necessity and not quicks-Sand of convenience and
expediency-Obligatory duty of State to protect freedom of expression.
'r·
E
The appellant, S. Rangarajan is a film producer. He produced a
Tamil film "Ore Oru Gramathile" and applied for certificate for exhibition of the film. The examination committee upon seeing the film
refused to grant the Certificate but on a reference being made to the
2nd Revising Committee for review and recommendation, the Committee hy a majority of 5:4 recommended the grant of a 'U' certificate
F
subject to deletion of certain scenes.
On 7 .12.87 'U' certificate was granted which was challenged in
the High Court by means of writ petitions. It was contended before the
High Court that the film is treated in an irresponsible manner, the
reservation policy of the Govt. has been projected in a biased manner
G and the so-called appeal in the film that "India is one" is a hollow
appeal which touches caste sensitivity of the Brahmin forward caste. It
was also asserted that the film would create law and order problem in
Tamil Nadu. The Writ Petitions were dismissed by the Single Judge but
upon appeal they were allowed and the 'U' certificate issued to the
appellant-producer was revoked. These two appeals, one by the proH ducer of the film and the other by the Union of India have been filed by
204
. ' ..
-
-
-+-
S. RANGARAJAN v. P.J. RAM
205
special leave of challenging the decision of the High Court.
The principal contentions raised on behalf of the appellants were:
(i) that the fnndamental right of freedom of free expression guaranteed
under the Constitntion covers even the medinm of movies; that the
opinion on the film ought not to be rested on the isolated passages
disregarding the main theme and its message; (ii) That the Court should
not concern itself with the correctness or legality of the views expressed
in the film and the Court cannot limit the expression on any general
issue even if it is controversial and that the writings of the film must be
considered in a free and liberal manner in the light of the freedom of
expression gnaranteed nnder the Constitution. It was asserted that the
theme of the fllm is that reservation could be on the basis of economic
backwardness instead of caste.
A
B
c
Counsel for the Respondents was critical about the manner in
which the reservation policy of the Govt. has been condemned and the
events and the characters protrayed in the film, as they are depicted in a
biased manner and reaction to the film in Tamil Nadu is bound to be
D
volatile and likely to create law and order problem. Allowing the
appeals, this Court,
-I
HELD: The motion pictures were originally considered as a
form of amusement to be allowed to titillate but not to arouse. They
were treated as mere entertainment and not an art or a means of
E
expression. Movie motivates thought and action and assnres a high
degree of attention and retention. It makes its impact simultaneously
arousing the visual and aural senses. The movie had unique capacity
to disturb and arouse feelings. It has as mnch potential for evil as
it was for good. It has an equal potential to instil or cultivate violent
or good behaviour. [2110-E; 212G; 2130]
Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable but
also necessary. [213E]
F
The Censors Board should exercise considerable circumspection on
movies affecting the morality or decency of our people and cultnral
G
heritage of the country. The moral values in particular, should not be
allowed to be sacrificed in the guise of social change or cnltural
assimilation. [216G-H]
The Censors should be responsive to social change and they must
go with the current climate. The Censors may display more sensitivity
H
/
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
A to movies which will have a markedly deleterious effect to lower the
-+--
moral standards of those who see it. [217C-D]
If the film is unobjectionable and cam1ot constitutionally he
restricted under Article 19(2), freedom of expression cannot he supB pressed on account of threat of demonstration and processions or
threats of violence. That would tantamount to negation of the rule of
~
law and a surrender to black mail and intimidation. It is the duty of the
~
State to protect the freedom of expression since it is a liberty guaranteed
against the State. The State cannot plead its inability to handle the
hostile audience problem. It is its obligatory duty to prevant it and
-
protect the freedom of expression. [230C-D I
c
The Revising Committees have approved the film. The members ~
thereof come from different walks of life with variegated experiences.
They represent the cross section of the community. They have judged
the film in the light of the objectives of the Act and the guidelines
D
provided for the purpose. There is nothing wrong or contrary to the
Constitution in approving the film for public exhibition. [230E-F]
The framework of the Indian Constitution differs from the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. "Article 19(l)(a) guarantees to all
citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of
}---
E the expression means the right to express one's opinion hy words of
mouth, writing, printing, picture or in any other manner, it would thus
include the freedom of communication and the right to propagate or
publish opinion. The communication of ideas could be made through -
any medium, newspaper, magazine or movie. But this right is sub,ject to
reasonable restrictions on grounds set out unde.r Article 19(2). ReasonF
able limitations can be put in the interest of sovereighty and integrity of
)-
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, ..
public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence. [212B-D]
In matters of certification of films, it is necessary to take prompt
G
action by the respective authorities. The producer who has invested a
large capital should not be made to wait needlessly. He has a statutory
f
right to have the validity of the film determined in accordance with law.
It would be, therefore, proper and indeed appreciative if the film is
reviewed as soon as it is submitted. It is not proper to form an opinion
hy dwelling upon stray sentences or isolated passages disregarding the
H
main theme. [219E; 220B-C]
\
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S. RANGARAJAN v. P.J. RAM
207
Freedom of expression is the rule and it is generally taken for A
granted. Every one has a fundamental right to form his own opinion on
any issue of general concern. He can form and inform by any legitimate
means. [223C]
Democracy is Government by the people via open discussion.
The democratic form of government itself demands its citizens an B
active and intelligent participation is a basic features and a rational
~ process of democracy which distinguishes it from all other forms
of govt. Public discussion on issues relating to administration had
positive value. l223D-E]
Our commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot
be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are C
pressing and the community interest is endangered. The anticipated
danger should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched. It should have
proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of
thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interests. In
other words, the expression should be inseparably locked up with D
the action contemplated like the equivalent of a "spark in a power
keg". [226G-H]
It is difficult to understand how the expression in the tilm with
criticism of reservation policy or praising the colonial rule will affect
the security of the State or sovereignty and integrity of India. There is
E
no utterance in the tilm threatening to overthrow the Govt. by unlawful
or unconstitutional means. There is no talk of secession either nor is
there any suggestion for impairing the integration of the country. The
film seems to suggest that the existing method of reservation on the
basis of caste is bad and reservation on the basis of economic backwardness is better. The tilm also deprecates exploitation of people on caste p
considerations. [222G-H; 223A]
The fundamental freedom under Art. 19(l)(a) can be reasonably
restricted only for the purposes mentioned in Art. 19(2) and the restriction must be justified on the anvil of necessity and not the quicks and of
convenience and expediency. Open criticism of Government policies G
-~. and operations is not a ground for restricting expression. We must
practice tolerance to the views of others. Intolerance is as much dangerous to democracy as to the person himself. l230H; 231A-B]
The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High
Court and dismissed the writ petitions. [23IB-C]
H
208
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
A
Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 235 U.S. 230
(1915) referred to, Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 referred to,
Schenek v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) referred to, Santosh Singh
v. Delhi Administration, [1973] 3 SCR 533 followed, K.A. Abbas v.
Union of India, [1971] 2 SCR 446 referred to, Ramesh v. Union of
India, [1988] 1 SCC 668; Bhagwat Charan Shukla v. Provincial
B Government, AIR 1947 Nag 1 at 676, Rajkappoor v. Laxman, [1980] 2
SCR 512, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621;
Naraindas v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 3 SCR 624; Sakal v.
--4
Union of India, [1962] 3 SCR 842; Whitney v. California, )274] U.S.
c
357, 375-378, 1927; Manohar v. Govt. of Bombay, AIR 1950 Bombay
210; Niharender Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 22 and
Handyside v. United Kingdom, [1975] EHRR/737 at p. 754 referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1668
and 1669 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.4.1988 of the Madras
D High Court in W.R. Nos. 469 and 488 of 1988.
E
Soli J. Sorabjee, V.C. Mahajan, C.A. Sundaram, U.A. Rana,
M. Mudgal, Ms. Indu Malhotra, C.V. Subba Rao, A. Mariar Autham,
Aruna Mathur, N.N. Sharma, Jose Varghese, Bhagwan Das, R.
~
Mohan, R.A. Perumal and A.V. Rangam for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. These appeals by leave are
from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court
revoking the 'U-Certificate' issued to a Tamil film called 'Ore Oru
F
Gramathile" (In one Village) for public exhibition. Civil Appeal Nos.
1668 and 1669 of 1988 are by the producer of the film and the Civil
Appeal nos. 13667 and 133668 of 1988 are by the Union of India.
G
The story of 'Ore Oru Gramathile" can be summarised as
follows:
"A Brahmin widower, Shankara Sastry, has a talented daughter
Gayathri. He apprehends that she would not be able to get admission
to college because she belongs to a Brahm in community. He seeks
advice from his close friend Devashayam, a Tehsildar. The Tehsildar
who otherwise belongs to a very poor family and whose father was
H working in a local Church responds with gratitude. He divises a
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S. RANGARAJAN v. P.J. RAM {SHETfY, J.]
209
-{·
method to help Gayathri because it was through Sastry's father that he
A
got proper education and rose to become a Tahsildar. He prepares a
false certificate showing Gayathri as Karuppayee belonging to an Adi
Dravida Community and as an orphan. He issues the certificate under
the reservation policy of the Government for the benefit of 'backward
communities' indentified on caste consideration. On the basis of the
\
false certificate, Karuppayee gets admitted to college and enters
B
1
I.A.S. witness to this arrangement is the brother-in-law of Tahsildar
;..
called Anthony who later turns out to be a villian of the piece.:-
"Years later, Karuppayee, who was working in Delhi is sent to a
-
rural village called Annavayil as a Special Officer for flood relief
operations. Her father, Shankara Sastry happens to work in the same c
village as Block Development Officer. However, both of them pretend
f,-
not to recognise each other. Karuppayee takes her work seriously and
improves the living conditions of people to such· an extent that she is
held by them in high esteem. By a coincidence, after the death of the
Tahsildar, Anthony comes to live in the same village and recognises
Karuppayee. He starts blackmailing her and threatens to reveal the D
fraudulent means by which she got the caste certificate. His attempt is
to extract money from her frequently. One evening when he visits
Karuppayee's house, he is confronted by Shankara Sastry who puts a
-J.
halt to his blackmailing. Later Anthony dies of sudden heart attack but
not before he informs the Government about the facts relating to
Karuppayee. Upon preliminary enquiry, the Government suspends
E
both Karuppayee and her father and eventually they are put on trial in
the Court. The people of the village resentful of the action taken
against Karuppayee rise as one man and demonstrate before the Court
in a peaceful manner for her release. They also send petitions to the
--'
Government."
. .,
F
"Karuppayee and her father admit in the Court the fact of their
having obtained the false caste certificate but they attribute it to
circumstances resulting by Government reservation policy on caste
basis. They say that they are prepared to undergo any punishment.
They contend hat some politicians are exploiting the caste considera-
~
tion and that would be detrimental to national integration. They also G
argue that the reservation policy should not be based on caste, but
could be on economic backwardness. Just about the time when the
judgment is to be pronounced the Court receives intimation from
Government that in the light of petitions received from the public, the
case against Karuppayee and her father stands withdrawn. Karuppayee goes back to her Government job with jubilent people all H
round."
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
210
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
This is the theme of the picture presented. As usual, it contains
some songs, dance and side attractions to make the film more
delectable.
On August 7, 1987, the producer applied for certificate for
exhibition of the film. The examining committee upon seeing the film
unanimously refused to grant certificate. The appellant then sought for
review by a Revising Committee which consisted of nine members.
)
This Committee reviewed the film. Eight members were in favour of ~
grant of certificate and one was opposed to it. The Chairman of the
Censor Board however, referred the film to Second Revising Committee for review and recommendation. This again consisted of nine
members and by majority of 5:4 they recommended for issue of 'U'
certificate subject to deletion of certain scenes. The 'U' certificate
means for unrestricted public exhibition as against 'A' certificate
~
restricted to adults only. The minority expressed the view that the film
is treated in an irresponsible manner. The reservation policy of the
Government is projected in a highly biased and distorted fashion.
They have also stated that the so called appeal in the film "India is
One" is a hollow-appeal, which in effect touches caste sensitivity of the
Brahmin forward caste. One of the members felt that the impact of the
film will create law and order problem. Another member said that the
film will hurt the feelings and sentiments of certain sections of the
->--
public. But the majority opined that the theme of the film is on the
reservation policy of the Government suggesting that the reservation
could be made on the basis of economic backwardness. Such a view
could be expressed in a free country like India, and it did not violate
any guideline.
On December 7, 1987, 'U' certificate was granted for the exhibition of the film which was challenged before the High Court by way of
writ petitions. The writ petitions were dismissed by the Single judge,
but the Division Bench upon appeal allowed the writ petitions and
revoked the certificate. The Division Bench largely depended upon
the minority view of the Second Revising Committee and also the
opinion of the Examining Committee. The producer of the film and the
Government of India by obtaining leave have appealed to this Court.
The film has since been given National Award by the Directorate of
Film Festival of the Government of India.
f-
~-
In these appeals, the fundamental point made by Mr. Soli Sorabjee, learned counsel for the producer is about the freedom of free
H
expression guaranteed under our Constitution even for the medium of
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S. RANGARAJAN v. P.J. RAM [SHETI'Y, J.J
211
movies. The counsel argued that the opinion on the effect of the film
should not be rested on isolated passages disregarding the main theme
and its message. The Film should be judged in its entirety from the
point of its overall impact on the public. The writings of tile film must
be considered in a free, fair and liberal spirit in the light of the freedom
of expression guaranteed under our Constitution. The counsel said
that the Court is not concerned with the correctness or legality of the
views expressed in the film and the Court cannot limit the expression
A
B
·-
on any general issue even if it is controversial. Mr. Mahajan for the
Union of India supported these submissions. Mr. Varghese learned
counsel for the contesting respondents did not dispute most of the
proposition advanced for the appellants. He was, however, critical
about the manner in which the reservation policy of the Government
has been condemned and the events and characters shown in the film.
C
He contended that they are depicted in a biased manner and reaction
to the film in Tamil Nadu is bound to be volatile.
Before examining these rival contentions, a few general observations may be made as to the utility of movies and the object of the film
D
Censors Board. The motion pictures were originally considered as a
form of amusement to be allowed to titillate but not to arouse. They
were treated as mere entertainment and not an art or a means of
expression. This theory was based on the concept that motion picture
.-1,.
wa~ a business "pure and simpe originated and conducted for profit,
like other spectacles." It was considered strictly as an "amusement E
industry". It was so held in 1915 by the unanimous decision of the
American Supreme Court in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial
Commission, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). It was not without significance since
there were no talking pictures then. The talking pictures were first
produced in 1926, eleven years after the Mutual decision (Encyclo-
·-', pedia Britinnica) (1965 Vol. 15 p. 902). The later decisions of the F
t" American Supreme Court have therefore declared that expression by
means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free
press guaranty of the First Amendment. (See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495). The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press." This Amendment is absolute in terms and it contains no G
....I.
exception for the exercise of the right. Heavy burden lies on the State
to justify the interference. The judicial decisions, however, limited the
scope of restriction which the State could impose in any given
circumstances. The danger rule was born in Schenek v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919). Justice Holmes for a unanimous court, evolved the
test of "clear and present danger". He used the danger test to
H
212
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989] 2 S.C.R.
A determine where discussion ends and incitement or attempt begins.
-+-
The core of his position was that the First Amendment protects only
utterances that seeks acceptance via the democratic process of discussion and agreement. But "Words that may have all the effect of
force" calculated to achieve its goal by circumventing the democratic
process are however, not so protected.
B
c
The framework of our Constitution differs from the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) of our _..
Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech
and expression. The freedom of expression means the right to express
one's opinion by words of mouth, writing, printing, picture or in any
other manner. It would thus include the freedom of communication
and the right to propagate or publish opinion. The communication of
ideas could be made through any medium, newspaper, magazine or
movie. But this right is subject to reasonable restrictions on grounds
set out under Article 13(2) of the Constitution. The reasonable limitations can be put in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India,
D the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, deceny or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. The Framers deemed it essential to
permit imposition of reasonable restrictions on the larger interests of
the community and country. They intended to strike a proper balance
between the liberty guaranteed and the social interest specified under }-
E Article 19(2). (See Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration, [1973] 3
SCR 533).
This is the difference between the First Amendment to the U.S,
Constitution and Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitution. The decisions
bearing on the First Amendment are, therefore, not useful to us except
F
the broad principles and the purpose of the guaranty.
(
Movie doubtless enjoys the guaranty under Article 19( l)(a) but
there is one significant difference between the movie and other modes
of co~munication. The movie cannot function in a free market place
like the newspaper, magazine or advertisement. Movie motivates
,.
G
thought and action and assures a high degree of attention and retention. It makes its impact simultaneously arousing the visual and aural }-
senses. The focusing of an intense light on a screen with the dramatizing of facts and opinion makes the ideas more effective. The combination of act and speech, sight and sound in semi-darkness of the theatre
with elimination of all distracting ideas will have an impact in the
H minds of spectators. In some cases, it will have a complete and im-
l
\
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S. RANGARAJAN v. P.J. RAM [SHETI'Y, J.]
213
mediate influence on, and appeal for every one who sees it. In view of
the scientific improvements in photography and production the preA
sent movie is a powerful means of communication. It is said: "as an
instrument of education it has unusual power to impart information, to
influence specific attitudes towards objects of social value, to affect
emotions either in gross or in microscopic proportions, to affect health
in a minor degree through sleep disturbance, and to affect profoundly
the patterns of conduct of children." (See Reader in Public Opinion
and Communication Second Edition by Bernard Berelson and Morris
Janowitz p. 390). The authors of this Book have demonstrated (at 391
B
c
to 401) by scientific tests the potential of the motion pictures in formation of opinion by spectators and also on their attitudes. These tests
have also shown that the effect of motion pictures is cumulative. It is
proved that even though one movie relating to a social issue may not
/"' · significantly affect the attitude of an individual or group, continual
exposure to films of a similar character will produce a change. It can,
therefore, be said that the movie has unique capacity to disturb and
arouse feelings. It has as much potential for evil as it has for good. It has
an equal potential to instil or cultivate violent or good behaviour. With
these qualities and since it caters for mass audience who are generally
not selective about what they watch, the movie cannot be equated with
other modes of communication. It cannot be allowed to function in a
free market place just as does the newspapers or magazines. Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable but also
D
necessary.
Here again we find the difference between the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution and Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitution. The
First Amendment does not permit any prior restraint, since the
E
___...
guaranty of free speech is in unqualified terms. This essential dif-
.
ference was recognised by Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., conp
..,
curred in Kingsley Corporation v. Regents of the University of New
York, 3 L.Ed. 1512 at 1522. In holding that censorship by "prior
restraint" on movies was unconstitutional, the learned Judge said:
"If we had a provision in our Constitution for
"reasonable" regulation of the press such India has G
included in hers, there would be room for argument that
censorship in the interests of morality would be permissible. Judges sometimes try to read the word "reasonable"
into the First Amendment or make the rights it grants
subject to reasonable regulation ..... But its language, in
terms that are absolute is utterly at war with censorship.
H
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989) 2 S.C.R.
Different questions may arise as to censorship of some
i
A
news when the nation is actually at war. But any possible
exceptions are extremely limited."
The Cinematograph Act 1952 ("The Act") which permits censorship on movies is a comprehensive enactment. Secttion 3 of the Act
B
provides for constitution of Board of Film Censors. Section 4 speaks of
f
examination of films. A film is examined in the first instance by an
-~
Examining Committee. If it is not approved, it is further reviewed by a
Revising Committee under Section 5. Section 5A states that if after
examining a film or having it examined in the prescribed manner, the
-
Board considers that the film is suitable for unrestricted public exhibic tion, such a certificate is given which is called 'U' certificate.
Section 5(a) provides principles for guidance in certifying films.
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It is significant to note that Article 19(2) has been practically read into
Section 5(B)(l). Section 5(C) confers right of appeal to Tribunal
against refusal of certificate. Under Section 6, the Central GovernD
ment has revisional power to call for the record of any proceeding in
relation to any film at any stage, where it is not made the subject
matter of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.
Under Section 8 of the Act, the Rules called the Cinematograph
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(Certification) Rules 1983 have been framed. Under Section 5(B)(2)
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the Central Government has prescribed certain guidelines for the
Censors Board. Guideline (1) relates to the objectives of film censorship. The Board shall ensure that: (a) the medium of film remains
responsible and sensitive to the values and standards of society; (b)
artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed and ( c)
censorship is responsive to social change.
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Guideline (2) requires the Board to ensure that: (i) anti-social
activities such as violence not glorified or justified; (ii) the modus
operandi of criminal or other visuals or words likely to incite the
commission of any offence are not depicted; (iii) pointless or avoidable
scenes of violence, cruelty and horror are not shown; (iv) human
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sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity and depravity;
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(vi) the sovereignty and integrity of India is not called in question; (vii)
the security of the State is not jeopardised or endangered; (viii)
friendly relations with foreign states are not strained; and (ix) Public
Order is not endangered.
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Guideline (3) also requires the Board to ensure that the film: (i)
S. RANGARAJAN v. P.J. RAM ISHElTY, J.]
215
is judged in its entirety from the-point of view of its overall impact and;
(ii) is examined in the light of contemporary standards of the country
and the people to whom the film relates.
It will be thus seen that censorship is permitted mainly on social
interest specified under Article 19(2) of the Constitution with
emphasis on maintenance of' values and standands of society. Therefore, the censorship by prior restraint must necessarily be reasonable
that could be saved by the well accepted principles of judicial review.
In K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, [1971] 2 SCR 446 a Constitution Bench of this court considered important questions relating to
pre-censorship of cinematograph films in relation to the fundamental
right of freedom of speech and expression. K.A. Abbas, a noted
Indian journalist and film producer produced a short documentary
film called "A tale of Four Cities". In that film he sought to contrast
the self indulgent life of the rich in Metropolitan cities with the squalor
and destitution of labouring masses who helped to construct the
imposing buildings and complexes utilised by the rich. The film also
goes on to explore the theme of exploitation of women by men, dealing in particular prostitution. Abbas applied to the Board of Film
Censors for a 'U' certificate, permitting unrestricted exhibition of the
film. He was informed by the regional officer that the Examining
Committee had provisionally concluded that the film should be
restricted to adults. The Revising Committee concurred in this result,
whereupon Abbas, after exchanging correspondence with the Board,
appealed to the Central Goverrunent. The Goverrunent decided to grant
'U' certificate provided that the scenes in the red light district were
deleted from the film. Abbas challenged the action of the Board mainly
on four issues out of which two did not survive when the Solicitor
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·.,.. General stated before the C~urt that the Goverrunent would set on
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· foot legislation to effectuate the policies at the earliest possible date.
The two issues which survived thereupon were: (a) that pre-censorship
itself cannot be tolerated under the freedom of speech and expression;
(b) that even if it were a legitimate restraint on the freedom, it must be
exercised on very definite principles which leave no room for arbitrary
.\ action.
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With regard to the power of pre-censorship, Hidayatullah, C.J.,
observed (at473-74):
"The task of the censor is extremely delicate
The standards that we set out for our censors must make a
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1989) 2 S.C.R.
substantial allowance in favour of freedom thus leaving a
vast area for creative art to interpret life and society with
some of its foibles along with what is good. We must not
look upon such human relationships as banned in toto and
for ever from human thought and must give scope for talent
to put them before society. The requirements of art and
literature include within themselves a comrehensive, view
of social life and not only in its ideal form and the line is to
be drawn where the average man moral man begins to feel
embarassed or disgusted at a naked portrayal of life without the redeeming touch of art or genius of social value. If
the depraved begins to see in these things more than what
an average person would, in much the same way as it is
wrongly said, a Frenchman sees a woman's legs in everything, it cannot be helped. In our scheme of things ideas
having redeeming social or artistic value must also have
importance and protection for their growth."
Recently, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., in Ramesh v. Union of India,
[1988) 1SCC868 which is popularly called "TAMAS" case laid down
the standard of judging the effect of the words or expression used in
the movie. The learned Judge quoting with approval of the observation of Vivian Bose, J., as he then was, in the Nagpur High Court in
the case of Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government, AIR
1947 Nag 1(at676):
"That the effect of the words must be judged from
the standards of reasonable, strong minded, firm and
courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating.
l
This in our opinion is the correct approach in judging the
/
effect of exhibition of a film or of reading a Book. It is the ~
standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in
English law, "the man on the top of a Cl&mpham
omnibus."
We affirm and reiterate this principle. The standard to be
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applied by the Board or courts for judging the film should be that of an
j
ordinary man of common sense and prudence and not that of an out of
the ordinary or hypersensitive man. We, however, wish to add a word
more. The Censors Board should exercise considerable circumspection
on movies affecting the morality or decency of our people and cultural
heritage of the country. The moral values in particular, should ncit be
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allowed to be sacrificed in the guise of social change or cultural assimi-
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S. RANGARAJAN v. P.J. RAM [SHETIY, J.]
217
lation. Our country has had the distinction of giving birth to a galaxy of A
great sages and thinkers. The great thinkers and sages through their
life and conduct provided principles for people to follow the path of
right conduct. There have been continuous efforts at rediscovery and
reiteration of those principles. Adi-guru Shankaracharya, Ramanujacharya, Madhwacharya, Chaitanya Maha Prabhu, Swami Ram
Krishan Paramhansa, Guru Nanak Sant Kabir and Mahatma Gandhi,
B
have all enlightened our path. If one prefers to go yet further back, he
will find "TIRUKKURAL" the ethical code from Tiruvalluvar teaching which is "a general human morality and wisdom." Besides, we
have the concept of "Dharam" (righteousness in every respect) a
unique contribution of Indian civilization to humanity of the world.
These are the bedrock of our civilization and should not be allowed to C
be shaken by unethical standards. We do not, however, mean that the
Censors should have an orthodox or conservative outlook. Far from it,
they must be responsive to social change and they must go with the
current climate. All we wish to state is that the Censors may display
more sensitivity to movies which will have a markedly deleterious 1
effect to lower the moral standards of those who see it. Krishna Iyer, D
J., in Rajkapoor v. Laxman, I 1980 I 2 SCR 512 in words meaningful
expressed similar thought. The learned Judge said (at 517):
"The ultimate censorious power over the Censors belongs to the people and by indifference, laxity or abetment,
pictures which pollute public morals are liberally certified, E
the legislation, meant by Parliament to protect people's
good morals, may be sabotaged by statutory enemies
within."
With these prefactory remarks, let us now turn to the reasons
which weighed with the High Court to revoke the 'U' certificate and F
rule out the film altogether. The High Court has found fault with the
Constitution of the First Revising Committee. It has held that the
Revising Committee was constituted hurriedly and its constitution by
"delegate Board Member" was illegal and without authority of law.
The Committee also showed unusual favour to the producer by reviewing the film with hot haste. In the absence of a First Revising CommitG
tee having come into existence as known to law; the High Court said
that the constitution of the Second Revising Committee was invalid and
inoperative.
We do not think that the High Court was justified in reaching
this conclusion. Under the rules, the Regional Officer shall appoint an H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11989] 2 S.C.R.
Examining Committee to examine the film. The reports and records
relating thereto shall be treated as confidential. The Rule 22 inter alia,
states that after screening the film, the Examining Officer shall within
three working days send the recommendations of all the members of
the Examining Committee to the Chairman. Rule 24(1) provides for
constitution of a Revising Committee. It states that on receipt of the
record referred to in rule 22, the Chairman may, of his own motion or
on the request of the applicant, refer the movie to a Revising Committee. In the instant case, the Chairman did not constitute the first Revising Committee but a member of the Board did. The question is
whether the member of the Board was competent to constitute the
Revising Committee. Our attention was drawn to the Government
order dated January 21, 1987 made under sec. 7(B) of the Cinematograph Act. The order reads;
"No. 803/1/86-F(C)
Government of India
Ministry of Human Resource Development
Department of Culture.
New Delhi, the 21st January, 1987
ORDER
In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 7B of the
Cinamatograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the Central Goverment hereby
directs that any power, authority or jurisdiction exercisable
by the Board of film, Certification (hereinafter referred to
as the Board) in relation to matters specified in sec. 4,
sub-secs. (3) and (4) of sec. 5, sec. 5-A and sec. 7C of the
said Act shall also be exercisable subject to the condition
given below by the following members of the Board at the
Regional Office indicated against each, with immediate
effect and until further orders:
1. Shri Samik Banerjee
2. Ms. Maithreyi Ramadhurai
3. Dr. B.K. Chandrashekar
xxx xxx xxx xxx''
Calcutta
Madras
Bangalore
This order clearly states that the power of the Board shall also be
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exercisable by the specified members within their regional office. For
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S. RANGARAJAN v. P.J. RAM ISHETIT, J.]
219
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Madras region Ms. Maithrayi Ramadhurai has been constituted to
·exercise such powers.
It cannot be contended that the Central Government has no
power to delegate the powers or to issue the said order. Sec. 7(B)
empowers the Central Government to issue general or special order
I
directing that any power, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by the
Board under the Act shall be exercisable also by the Chairman or any
..
other member of the Board. The section further provides that anything
done or action taken by the Chairman or other member specified in
the order shall be deemed to be a thing done or action taken by the
Board. From the provisions of sec. 7B read with the Government
order dated January 21, 1987, it becomes clear that the constitution of
the First Revising Committee by the member at the Madras Regional
,._, Office is not vulnerable to any attack. It is legally justified and
'
unassailable. The conclusion to the contrary reached by the High
Court is apparently unwarranted.
We also do not find any justification for the observation of the
High Court that there was unusual favour shown to the producer by
the First Revising Committee in reviewing the film. It is true that the
film was reviewed within 2-3 hours of the presentation of the application. But there is no reason to attribute motives either to members of
~
the Committee or to the producer. In matters of certification of films,
it is necessary to take prompt ac\ion by the respective authorities. The
producer who has invested a large capital should not be made to wait
needlessly. He has a statutory right to have the validity of the film
determined in accordance with law. It would be, therefore, proper and
indeed appreciative if the film is reviewed as soon as it is submitted.
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There are two other side issues which may be disposed of at this
~ stage. The scene with song No. 2 in reel No. 3 and the comments by
the heroine of looking at the photo of Dr. Ambedkar, have come
under·serious criticism. It is said that the song has the effect of spread·
ing 'Kulachar' which is 'Poisonous message' to the depressed classes not
to educate their children. The complaint, if true, is serious. We, there·
.l
fore, gave our anxious consideration to the grievance. We, as did the
High Court, viewed the movie. The cobbler sings the song in question
with his grandson who is eager to go to school.