# S. RM. AR. S. SP. SATHAPPA CHETTIAR v. S. RM. AR. RM. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1024
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955-01-25
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 203 of 1956
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, J. L. Kapur, Gajendragadkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-rm-ar-s-sp-sathappa-chettiar-v-s-rm-ar-rm-ramanathan-chettiar-1391
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Court fee, Computation of-Suit for enforcement of
share in joint family property-Plaintiff's valuation of the
claim-Value for purposes of jurisdiction, if must he tite
same-Court-Fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1370), s. 7(IV) (b)-
Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (VII of 1887), s. 8.
The computation of Court fees in suits falling under
s. 7 (IV) of the Court-Fees Act depends upon the valuation
which the plaintiff in his option puts on his claim and once
he exercises his option and values his claim, such value
must also be the value for purposes of jurisdiction under
s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The value for purposes
of Court fee, therefore, determines the value for purposes
of jurisdiction in such a suit and not vice versa.
Where, therefore, the Court finds that the case falls
under s. 7 (IV) (b) of the Court-Fees Act, and the pla\ntiff
has omitted to specifically value his claim, liberty should
ordinarily be given to him to amend his plaii!lt and set out
the amount at which he wants to value his claim. The value
put for purposes of jurisdiction which cannot be binding
for purposes of Court fee, and must be altered accordingly.
Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir, A.LR. (1949) Lah.
116, referred to.
Consequently, in the present case where the Division
Bench of the Madras High Court was of the opinion that s.
7 (IV) (b) of the Court-Fees Act appJ;ed but nevertheless
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1025
held that the valuation given in the plaint for purposes of
1957
jurisdiction should be taken to be the valuation for purposes 8 R A 8 s
of court fee and directed the appellant to pay court feessaiha~pa rCh;ttf'a~
both on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal on that
v.
basis, its order was set aside and the appellant allowed
A R
d l .
S. Rm. r. m.
to. pay court fees on the amount at which he value
ns
Ramanathan
relief.
Chmiar
Held further, that 0. II, r. 1 of the High Court Fees
Rules, 1933, framed by the Madras High Court clearly
indicates, that s. 12 of the Court Fees Act applies to the
Original Side of the Madras High Court and it was, therefore, open to the Division Bench in a reference to assume
jurisdiction and pass appropriate orders thereunder.
In the absence of any evidence on the record to show
that he had either generally or specially been empowered
by the Chief Justice in this behalf, the Chamber Judge
sitting on the Original Side of the Madras High Court has
no jurisdiction under s. 5 of the Court Fees Act to pass a
final order thereunder.

## Text

1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
1957
appointment after the integration, or the one of April
Raji•i Amar Singh 23, 1951, no question of reduction in rank can arise
v.
and so Art. 311 is not attracted.
All his previous
The ~rahre of postings in the new State were purely transitional and
RaJOS/an
f
I
f h c
temporary; and so ar as Art. XVI( ) o t e ovenant
Bose J.
is concerned, its guarantee has been fulfilled.
1957
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
S. RM. AR. S. SP. SATHAPPA CHETTIAR
v.
S. RM. AR. RM. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR
(BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR
and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Court fee, Computation of-Suit for enforcement of
share in joint family property-Plaintiff's valuation of the
claim-Value for purposes of jurisdiction, if must he tite
same-Court-Fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1370), s. 7(IV) (b)-
Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (VII of 1887), s. 8.
The computation of Court fees in suits falling under
s. 7 (IV) of the Court-Fees Act depends upon the valuation
which the plaintiff in his option puts on his claim and once
he exercises his option and values his claim, such value
must also be the value for purposes of jurisdiction under
s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The value for purposes
of Court fee, therefore, determines the value for purposes
of jurisdiction in such a suit and not vice versa.
Where, therefore, the Court finds that the case falls
under s. 7 (IV) (b) of the Court-Fees Act, and the pla\ntiff
has omitted to specifically value his claim, liberty should
ordinarily be given to him to amend his plaii!lt and set out
the amount at which he wants to value his claim. The value
put for purposes of jurisdiction which cannot be binding
for purposes of Court fee, and must be altered accordingly.
Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir, A.LR. (1949) Lah.
116, referred to.
Consequently, in the present case where the Division
Bench of the Madras High Court was of the opinion that s.
7 (IV) (b) of the Court-Fees Act appJ;ed but nevertheless
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1025
held that the valuation given in the plaint for purposes of
1957
jurisdiction should be taken to be the valuation for purposes 8 R A 8 s
of court fee and directed the appellant to pay court feessaiha~pa rCh;ttf'a~
both on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal on that
v.
basis, its order was set aside and the appellant allowed
A R
d l .
S. Rm. r. m.
to. pay court fees on the amount at which he value
ns
Ramanathan
relief.
Chmiar
Held further, that 0. II, r. 1 of the High Court Fees
Rules, 1933, framed by the Madras High Court clearly
indicates, that s. 12 of the Court Fees Act applies to the
Original Side of the Madras High Court and it was, therefore, open to the Division Bench in a reference to assume
jurisdiction and pass appropriate orders thereunder.
In the absence of any evidence on the record to show
that he had either generally or specially been empowered
by the Chief Justice in this behalf, the Chamber Judge
sitting on the Original Side of the Madras High Court has
no jurisdiction under s. 5 of the Court Fees Act to pass a
final order thereunder.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
203 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the orders dated
January 25, 1955, of the Madras High Court in C.M.P.
No. 9335 of 1954 and S. R. No. 55247 of 1953.
K. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar, R. Ganapathy Iyer
and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and
M. S. K. Sastri, for the respondent.
Venkata.krishnan and T. M. Sen, for the intervener.
1957. November 28.
The following Judgment of
the Court was·delivered by
G
. .
. .
Gaj .. 11dragadkarJ.
AJENDRAGADKAR J.-Th1s IS a plaintiff's appeal by
special leave against the order passed by a Division
Bench of the Madras High Court on January 25, 1955,
calling upon him to pay court fees on the valuation
of Rs. 15,00,000 both on his plaint and on his memorandum of appeal and it raises some interesting questions of law under the provisions of the Court Fees
Act (which will be described hereafter as the Act).
The appellant had filed Civil Suit No. 311 of 1951
on the Original Side of the Madras High Court. In
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
this suit he had claimed partition of the joint family
s. Rm. Ar. s. Sp. properties and an account in respect of the joint
Sathappa Chettiar family assets managed by the respondent. The appels Rm •A R
lant is the son of Subbiah Chettiar. His case was that
R..,,,;.,,.~iumm. Subbiah had been adopted by Lakshmi Achi in 1922.
Chettiar
Lakshmi Achi was the widow of the undivided paterGajendragadkar J. nal uncle of the respondent. As a result of his adoption Subbiah became a coparcener in his adoptive
family and, as Subbiah's son, the appellant claimed to
have a share in the joint family properties and in the
assets of the joint family and that was the basis on
which a claim for partition and accounts was made by
the appellant in his suit. In the plaint it had been alleged that Subbiah had filed a suit for partition of his
share and had obtained a decree in the trial court.
The respondent had taken an appeal against the said
decree in the High Court. Pending the appeal the
dispute was settled amicably between the parties and
in consideration of payment of a specified sum and
delivery of possession of certain sites Subbiah agreed
to release all his claims and those of his son, the present appellant, in respect of the properties then in
suit.
According to the appellant, this compromise
transaction did not bind the appellant and so he claimed to recover his share ignoring the said transaction
between his father and the respondent. The plaint
filed by the appellant valued the claim for accounts at
Rs. 1,000 under s. 7(iv) (f) of the Act and a court fee
of Rs. 112-7-0 was paid on the said amount on an ad
valorem basis. In regard to the relief for partition
the fixed court fee of Rs. 100 was paid by the appellant
under Art. 17-B (Madras) of Schedule II of the Act.
For the purposes of jurisdiction, however, the appellant gave Rs. 15,00,000 as the value of his share.
It appears that the Registry, on examining the
plaint, was inclined to take the view that the plaint
should have borne court fee under s. 7 ( v) in respect of
the claim for partition. Since the appellant did not
accept this view the matter was referred to the Master
of the Court who was the taxing officer under the
Madras High Court Fees Rules, 1933. The Master felt
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1027
that the issue raised by the Registry was of some
1957
importance and so, in his turn, he referred the dispute ·S. Rm. Ar. s. Sp.
to the Judge sitting on the Original Side under s. 5 of Sathappa Chettiar
the Act. This reference was decided by the Chamber s Rm ",4 R
· Judge Krishnaswamy Naidu J. on October .18, 1951. · R~hanm.
The learned judge held that the appellant was not
Chett/QI'
bound to set aside the prior compromise decree bet- Gajendragadkar J.
ween his father and the respondent and that the
plaint was governed by Art.
17-B of Schedule II.
Accordingly the court fee paid by the appellant in respect of his claim for partition was held to be in order.
In due course the respondent wAs served and he
filed a written statement raisingAveral contentions
against the appellant's claim for partition and
accounts. One of the points raised by the respondent
was that the compromise and the release deed executed by the appellant's father and the decree that
was subsequently passed between the parties were
fair and bona fide transactions and, since they amounted to a settlement of the disputed cl~i!n by the appellant's father, the plaintiff was bouna by them.
Ramaswamy Gounder J. who heard the suit tried
the respondent's contention about the binding character of the compromise decree as a preliminary issue.
The learned judge held that there was a fair and bona
fide settlement of the dispute by the appellant's father
acting as the manager of his branch and so the appellant was bound by the compromise decree. In the
result, the appellant's suit was dismissed on September 22, 1953.
Against this decree the appellant presented his
memorandum of appeal on December 1, 1953. This
memorandum bore the same court fees as the plaint.
On examining the memorandum of appeal the Registry again raised the question about the sufficiency of
fees paid by the appellant. The Registry took the
view that the appellant should .have paid court fees
under s. 7 ( v) of the Act in respect of his claim for
partition as the appellant's claim in substance was a
claim for recovery of possession based ·on title within
the meaning of s. 7(v). The matter was then referred
1028
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
~
to the Master; but, in his turn, .the Master again made
s. Rm. Ar. s. Sp. a reference to the Taxation Judge under s. 12(2) of
Sathappa Chettiar the Act. Thereupon the learned Chief Justice constis. Rm.vAr. Rm. tuted a Bench of ~wo judges to deal with this reference.
Ramanathan
The learned Judges who heard the reference did
Ch<ttiar
not think it necessary to consider whether s. 12 of the
Gajendragadkar J. Act was applicable to the present appeal. They dealt
with the reference as matie under s. 5 of the Act. The
appellant urged before the Division Bench that the
order passed by Krishnaswami Naidu J. was final since
it was an order passed under s. 5 of the Act. The
learned judges did not accept this contention. They
held that the record did not show that Krishnaswamy
Naidu J. had been nominated by the Chief Justice to
hear the reference under s. 5 either by a general or
a special order and so no finality could be claimed for
the said order under s. 5 of the Act. On the merits
the learned judges agreed with the view taken by
Krishnaswamy Naidu J., and held thats. 7(v) of the
Act was not applicable to the appellant's claim for
partition. According to the learned judges, neither
was Art. 17-B of Schedule II applicable. They held
that the provisions of s. 7(iv) (b) of the Act applied.
That is why the appellant was directed to mention his
value for the relief of partition under the said section. It may be mentioned at this stage that this order
became necessary because in the plaint the plaintiff
had not specifically mentioned the value for the relief
of partition claimed by him. He had merely stated
that for the relief of partition claimed by him he was
paying a court fee of Rs. 100 in accordance with Schedule II, Art. 17-B. All that he had done in the plaint
was to value his total claim for jurisdiction at
Rs. 15,00,000.
In compliance with this order the appellant valued
his relief tci enforce his right to share in the joint
family properties in suit at Rs. 50,000, paid the deficit.
court fee Rs. 1,662-7-0 and represented his memorandum of appeal in court on May 7, 1954.
That, however, was not the end of the present
dispute in respect of court fees. The Registry raised
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1029
another objection this time. According to the Regis1957
try, since the appellant had valued his relief in the s. Rm. Ar. s. Sp.
suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 15,00,000, it ·sathappa Chettiar
was not open to him to valu~ his reli~f on the memo"" s. Rm.vAr. Rm.
randum of appeal under s. 7(1v) (b) without an amendR.amanathan
ment of the valuation made in the plaint. Since the
Chettiar
appellant did not accept this view of the Registry, theGa.tendragadkarJ.
matter was again placed before the court for orders.
The appellant then offered to file an application for
formal amendment of his plaint by substituting
Rs. 50,000, in place of Rs. 15,00,000, for the jurisdictional value of his relief. Accollidingly the appellant
made an application on October 18, 1954. This application was opposed both by the respondent and the
Assistant Government Pleader on behalf of the State.
The learned judges who heard this application took
the view that if the appellant had given the value in
the first instance for purposes of jurisdiction he was
precluded from giving a different value at a later
stage. Accordingly it was held that Rs. 15,00,000,
which had been mentioned in the plaint as the va.lue
of the· appellant's claim for jurisdictional purposes
should be treated as the value given by the appellant
also for .the purposes of court fees under s. 7 (iv) (b) of
the Act. The result was that the application made by
the appellant for a formal amendmertt of ·the valuation made in the plaint was rejected. The learned
judges also purported· to exercise their jurisdiction
under s. 12(2) of the Act and directed that the appel~
lant should pay deficit court fees on the. basis of Rs.
15,00,000 riot only on his memorandum of appeal but
also on his plaint. It is this oraer which ha.s given
rise to the present appeal:
The
first point which Shri
Krishnaswamy
Ayyangar has raised before us on behalf of the appellant is that the order passed by the learned Charrtber
Judge on October 18, 1951, is final under s. 5 of the
Act. By this order the learned Chamber Judge ha.d
held that the plaint filed in the present suit did not
attract the ·provisions of s. 7 ( v) of the Act and that
the proper court fee to be paid was determined by
1030
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
1957
Att. 17-B of Schedule II of the Act. Since the appels. Rm. Ar. s. Sp. lant had paid the fixed court fee of Rs. 100, under this
Sathoppa Chettilfr latter provision, no objection could be taken on the
s Rm vA R
ground that sufficient court fee had not been paid. If
R..,,;,,,,;hanm. this order had really been passed under s. 5 of the
Chettiar
Act it would undoubtedly be final. Section 5 of the
Gajendragadkar J. Act provides for procedure in case of difference as
io necessity of court fee. In cases where a difference
arises between an officer whose duty it is to see that
any fee is paid under Chapter III and a suitor as to
the necessity of paying the fee or the amount thereof,
it has to be referred to the taxing officer whose decision thereon shall be final. This section further provides that if the taxing officer, to whom such difference is referred by the office, is of opinion that the
point raised is one of general importance, he can refer
the said point to the final decision of the Chief Justice
of the High Court or such judge of the High Court as
the Chief Justice shall appoint either generally or
specially in this behalf; and it is clear that if the Chief
Justice or any other judge appointed in that behalf
by the Chief Justice decides the matter in question,
his decision shall be final. Unfortunately, however, in
the present case it has been found by the Division
Bench that dealt with this matter subsequently that
a search of the record did not show any general or
special order which would have justified the exercise
of jurisdiction under s. 5 by Krishnaswamy Naidu J.
No doubt Shri Krishnaswamy Ayyangar stated before
us that the practice in the Madras High Court always
was to refer disputes as to proper court fees arising
between suitors on the Original Side and the Registry
to the Chamber Judge and it was always assumed,
says Shri Ayyangar, that the Chamber Judge on the
Original Side was appointed generally to deal with
such disputes. It is difficult for us to make any such
assumption in dealing with the present suit. Unless
we are satfsfied from the record that Krishnaswamy
Naidu J., had, at the material time, been appointed
either generally or specially to act under s. 5 it would
be difficult to accede to the argument that the order
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1031
passed by him in the present proceeding~ is-final. · 1t
1957
. is frankly conceded that the record does not show any s. Rm7r-s. Sp.
general or special or-der as contemplated by s. 5. That Sathappa Chettiar
is why we must hold that the learned judges of the
v.
R
Division Bench were right in refusing to attach finaS-/:::,~!,;,anm.
lity to the order passed by Krishnaswamy Naidu J.
Chettiar
It is then urged by Shri Krishnaswamy Ayyangar Gafendragadkar J.
that the learned judges were in error in purporting to
exercise their jurisdiction under s. 12(2) of the Act
when they directed the appellant to pay additional
court fees on the plaint on the basis of the valuation
of Rs. 15,00,000. His contention is that s. 12 does not
apply to the appeals arising from judgments and
decrees passed in suits ori the Original Side of the
Madras High Court. It is perfectly true that the
question about the levy of fees in High Courts on their
Original Sides is governed by s. 3 of the Act and, if
the matter had to be decided solely by reference to
the Act, it would not be possible to apply any of the
provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act either
to the suits filed on the Original Side of the Madras
High Court or to the appeals arising from judgments
and decrees in such suits. But it is 1common ground
that, on the plaints filed on the Original Side of the
Madras High Court, court fees are leviable under the
relevant provisions contained in Chapter III of the
Act and the levy of these fees is authorised by 0. II,
r. 1 of the High Court Fees Rules, 1933. It is, therefore, necessary to inquire what provisions of the Act
have been extended to the suits filed on the Original
Side. The authority and jurisdiction of the Madras
High Court in enactin·g r. 1 of 0. II are not in dispute.
What is in dispute before us is the effect of the said
rule. The appellant's case is that the said rule merely
contemplates the levy of certain specified court fees
as indicated in the provisions of the Act which are
expressly made applicable to the Original Side. No
other provision of the Act, according to the appellant,
can be said to have been extended and so the learned
judges were in error in purporting to exercise their
jurisdiction under s. 12(2). We are not satisfied that
1032
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1957
this argument is well-founded. Order II, r. 1 reads
s. Rm. Ar. s. Sp. thus :
SathapJJO...Chettiar
"O. II, r. 1 of Madras High Court Fees Rules.
S. Rm; Ar. Rm. 1933 :-
R/mlallllJhan
Chtttiar
Order II.
Ga}emfragaJkar J.
1. The fees and commissions set out in Appendix
II hereto shall be charged by the Registrar, Sheriff,
The Reserve Bank of India and the Imperial Bank of
India, as the case may be, upon the several documents, matters and transactions therein specified as
chargeable. The commission chargeable to Government shall be charged by the Reserve Bank of India
and credited to Government. *(To other documents
including Memoranda of appeals the Registrar shall
apply so far as may be the law for the time being in
force relating to court-fees, as regards the scale of such
fees, the manner of levy of such fees, the refund of
such fees and in every other respect, in the manner
and to the extent that it is applicable to similar documents filed in original proceedings in a District Court
and in appeals from decrees and orders of a District
Court).
*Added by R. 0. C. No. 2219 of 1949."
It cannot be disputed that as a result of this rule,
s. 7(iv) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Act along
with the proviso as well as Art. 17-B of Schedule II
of the Act applied to suits filed on the Original Side
of the High Court. The latter portion of the order
which has been added in 1949 obviously makes applicable to the suits and appeals on the Original Side of
the High Court provisions of the Act as regards the
scale of fees, the manner of their levy and the refund
of fees. It also makes the relevant provisions of the
Act applicable in "every other respect". The words
"in every other respect" in the context clearly indicate that s. 12 which confers upon the appellate court
authority or jurisdiction to examine the question
about the sufficiency or otherwise of the court fees
paid not only on the memorandum of appeal but also
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1033
on the plaint in the suit which comes before the court
1957
of appeal is obviously intended to apply. It would s. Rm. Ar. s. Sp.
indeed be illogical to apply the relevant provisions of Sathappa Chettiar
the Act for the levy of court fees on plaints and memo- s R v.
R
randa of appeal and not to confer jurisdiction on the
R.01":,~~:,iuvrm.
· appropriate court to examine the sufficiency or otherChettiar
wise of the court fees paid in that behalf. The power Gajendragadkar J.
to entertain claims for refund of court fees has been
specifically mentioned. A claim. for refund can be
validly made, for instance in a case where excess
court fee has been paid. That is why the provisions
of ss. 13, 14 and 15 had to applied in terms. If a litigant is entitled to make a claim for refund of court
fees in cases governed by the relevarit provisinos of
the Act, there appears to be no reason why it should
not be open to the court to entertain the question about
inadequate payment of court fees. Logically, if excess court fees paid should and can be refunded in
these proceedings, inadequate or insufficient court
fees paid can and should be dealt with on that footing
and orders passed to pay the deficit court fees in such
cases. It is matters of this kind that are clearly covered by the expression "in every other respect" to
which we have just referred. We, therefore, hold that ·
the learned judges below were justified in assuming
jurisdiction under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 12. Section
12 consists of two parts. Sub-section ( 1) provides that
the question about the proper payment of court fees
on the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be decided by the court in ·which such plaint or memorandum of appeal is filed. It also lays down that such
decision is final between the parties to the suit. Subsection ( 2) confers upon the court of appeal, reference,
or revision, jurisdiction to deal with the question of
adequacy of court fee paid on the plaint whenever the
suit in which such plaint has been filed comes before
it and if the court is satisfied that proper court fees
have not been paid then it can pass an order requiring the party to pay so much additional fee as would
have been payable if the question had been rightly
decided in the first instance. Since the decision of
LISup. Court/61-10
1034
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
Krishnaswamy Naidu J. cannot attract the finality
·s. Rm.-Ar~ s. Sp. mentioned in s. 5 of the Act, it was open to the DiviSathappa Chettiar sion Bench to consider the correctness of the view
s R vA
R
taken by the learned Chamber Judge; and as they were
Ra':,;, :,hanm. satisfied that the plaint did not fall under Art. 17-B
lhertiar
of Schedule II, they were entitled to pass appropriate
Gaje.,dragatkar J. orders under s. 12 ( 1) and ( 2).
·
The appellant, however, contends that the learned
judges were in error in directing him to pay court
fees on the basis of the value of Rs. 15,00,000 both on
his plaint and on his memorandum of appeal because
he argues that this dicision is inconsistent with the
earlier order that the proper court fees to be paid on
the memorandum of appeal had to be determined
under s. 7(iv) (b) of the Act.
This order has been
passed by the Division Bench under s. 5 of the Act and
it is final between the parties. This order gives the
appellant leave to value his claim for the relief of
partit10n and he exercised his option by valuing it at
Rs. 50,000. The valuation thus made by the appellant
in respect of the value of his relief of partition for lhe
payment of court fees should and must be taken to be
the valuation even for the purposes of jurisdiction and
., it is on this ,valuation alone that the appellant can
bejustly called upon to pay court fees both on the
plaint and on the memorandum of appeal. The learned judges were, therefore, in error in not allowing
the appellant leave to make amendment in the plaint
so as to bring the plaint in conformity with the provisions of s. 7, sub-s. (iv) of the Act. That in brief is
the appellant's case.
On the other hand, on behalf of the IntervenerAdvocate-General of Madras as well as on behalf of
the respondent, it was sought to be urged before us
that both the plaint and the memorandum of appeal
m•ght to be valued for the purposes of payment of
court fees under s. 7 ( v) of the Act. It is conceded that
the question of court fees must be considered in the
light of the allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the
written statement or by the final decision of the suit
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1035
on the merits. The argument, however, is that if all
1957
the material allegations contained in the plaint are s. Rm. Ar. s. Sp.
fairly construed and taken as a whole it would Sathappa Chettiar.
appear that the plaintiff has been ousted from the en-
·
v.
joyment of the properties in suit and his clflim· for st:a:;;h1;::'
partition in substance is a claim for possession of
Chettiar
the suit properties and as such falls within the pro- Gajendr0gadkarJ.
visions of s. 7, sub-s.. ( v) of the Act. The question · ~:'·
about proper court fees leviable on plaints in which
Hindu plaintiffs make claims for partition under varying circumstances has given rise to several conflicting
decisions in the High Courts of India. We are, however, not called upon to consider the point as to whether s. 7(v) would apply to the present suit or whether the present suit would fall under s. 7(iv)(b). In
our opinion, the decision of the Division Bench of the
Madras High Court that the memorandum of appeal
shoulcl be taxed for the purposes of court fee under
s. 7(iv)(b) of the Act is final under the provisions of
s. 5 of the Act and it cannot be reopened at this stage.
It may be that when the Division Bench of the Madras
High Court considered this matter under reference
made by the Master under s. 5, the respondent was
not heard. Normally the dispute between the litigant
and the Registry in respect of court fees arises at the
initial stage of the presentation of the plaint or the
appeal and the defendant or the respondent is usually
not interested in such a dispute unless the question of
payment of court fees involves also the question of
jurisdiction of the court either to try the suit or to
entertain the appeal. There is no doubt that the
question about the adequacy of the court fees leviable
on the appellant's memorandum of appeal '\Vas properly referred by the Master to the learned Chief
Justice of the Madras High Court and has been decided by the Division Bench of the said High Court in
pursuance of the requisite order made by the Chief
Justice in that behalf. In such a case, the decision
reached by the Division Bench must be held to be
final under s. 5 of the Act. That is why we have not
allowed the merits of this order to be questioned in
LISup. Court/61-11
1036
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
the present appeal. We must, therefore, deal with the
s. Rm::;;: s. Sp. appellant's contention on the basis that the court fees
Sathappa Chettlar on his memorandum of appeal must be levied under
s. Rm.vAr. Rm. s. 7(iv) (b) of the Act.
Ramanathan
Ch'1tiar
The question which still remains to be considered is
GaJendragadkar J. whether the Division Bench was justified in directing
the appellant to pay court fees both on the plaint and
on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of the
valuation for Rs. 15,00,000. In our opinion, the appellant is justified in contending that this order is erroneous in law. Section 7, sub-s. (iv) (b) deals with suits
to enforce the right to share in any property on the
ground that it is joint family property and the amount
of fees payable on plaints in such suits is "according
to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in
the plaint or memorandum of appeal." Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under s. 7 (iv)
the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value
of the relief is sought. If the scheme laid down for
the computation of fees payable in suits covered by
the several sub-sections of s. 7 is considered, it would
be clear that, in respect of suits falling under sub-s.
(iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been
given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff
is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness. Take for instance the claim for partition where
the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to share in any
property on the ground that it is joint family property.
The basis of the claim is that the property in respect
of which a share is claimed is joint family property.
In other words, it is property in which the plaintiff
has an undivided shars. What the plaintiff purports
to do by making a claim for partition is to ask the
court to give him certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account for his share in
lieu of his undivided share in the whole property.
Now it would be clear that the conversion of the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1037
plaintiff's alleged ~divided share in the joint family
1957
property into his separate share cannot be easily s. Rm. Ar. s. Sp.
valued in terms of rupees with any precision or de- Sathappa Chettiar
finiteness. That is why legislature has left it to the s Rn ~ R
option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the pay-
°Rm/:01u:i1tanm.
ment of court fees. It really means that in suits fallChetti"'
ing under s. 7(iv) (b) the amount stated by the plain- GaJendraglldkarJ.
tiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the court in computing the court
fees payable in respect of the said relief. In the circumstances of this case it is unnecessary to consider
whether, under the provisions of this section, the
plaintiff has been given an absolute right or option to
place any valuation whatever on his relief.
What would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction in such suits is another question which often
arises for decision. This question has to be decided
by reading s. 7(iv) of the Act along with s. 8 of the
Suits Valuation Act.
This latter section provides
that, where in any suits other than those referred to
in Court Fees Act. s. 7, para. 5, 6 and 9 and para.
10 cl. ( d), court fees are payable ad valorem under the
Act, the value determinable for the computation of
court fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. In other words, so far as suits
falling under s. 7, sub-s. (iv) of the Act are concerned,
s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value
as determinable for the computation of court fees and
the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the
same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the
provisions of s. 8 is to make the value for the purpose
of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of court fees and that is natural
enough. The computation of court fees in suits falling
under s. 7(iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation
that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once
the plaintiff exercises his opt.ion and values his claim
for the purpose of court fees, that determines the
value for jurisdiction. The value for court fees and
the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same
in such cases; but it is the value for court fees stated
1038
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
'
1957
by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is
s. lltn.A-; s. Sp. from this value that the value for jurisdiction must
Sathappa Chettiar be determined. The result is
that it is
the
v.
amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief
s.l:::,;;;,.,;:,,m. sought for the purposes of court fees that determines
Chettiar
the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa.
Gajendragadkar 1. Incidentally we may point out that according to the
appellant it was really not necessary in the present
case to mention Rs. 15,00,000 as the valuation for the
purposes of jurisdiction since on plaints filed on the
Original Side of the Madras High Court prior to 1953
there was no need to make any jurisdictional valuation.
The plaintiff's failure to state the amount at which
he values the relief sought is often due to the fact that
in suits for partition the plaintiff attempts to obtain
the benefit of Art. 17-B of Schedule II in the matter
of payment of court fees. 'II/here the plaintiff seeks
to pay the fixed court fee as required by the said article, he and his advisers are apt to take the view that
it is unnecessary to state the amount for which relief
is sought to be claimed for the purposes of court fees
and the valuation for jurisdiction purposes alone is,
therefore, mentioned. Often enough, it turns out that
the plaint does not strictly attract the provisions of
Art. 17-B of Schedule II and that the court fee has to
be paid either under s. 7(iv)(b) or under s. 7(v) of
the Act. If the court comes to the conclusion that
the case falls under s. 7(iv) (b) ors. 7(iv) (c) ordinarily liberty should be given to the plaintiff to amend
his plaint and set out specifically the amount at which
he seeks to value his claim for the payment of court
fees. It would not be reasonable or proper in such a
case to hold the plaintiff bound by the valuation made
by him for the purposes of jurisdiction and to infer
that the said valuation should be also taken as the
valuation for the payment of court fees. In this connection we may point out that this is the view taken
by the Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court
in Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir( 1 ). As we have
(I) A.I.R. (1949) Lah. 116.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1039
already indicated s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act postu1957
lates that the plaintiff should first value his claim for s. Rm. Ar. s. Sp.
the purpose of court fee and it provides for the de- Sathappa Chettiar
termination of the value for jurisdiction on the basis s R vA
Rm
of such claim. In our opinion, therefore, the learned
p_:::,~,,:,ium ·
judges of the Madras High Court were in error in
Chettiar
holding that the valuation for jurisdiction showed in Gajendragadkar J.
the plaint should be taken to be the valuation for the
payment of court fees on the plaint as well as the
memorandum of appeal. In view of their prior decision that the present case fell under s. 7(iv)(b), they
should have allowed the appellant to amend his valuation for the payment of court fees not only on the
memorandum of appeal but also on the plaint.
We must accordingly set aside the order under
appeal and direct that the plaintiff should be allowed
to state the amount of Rs. 50,000 at which he values
the relief sought by him for the purpose of s. 7(iv)(b)
of the Act. Shri Krishnaswamy Ayyangar has orally
requested us to give him liberty to make the appropriate amendment in his plaint and we have granted
his request.
In the result. the appeal would be allowed and the
appellant directed to pay additional court fees on his
plaint on the basis of the valuation of Rs. 50,000 within two months from today. Since the appellant has
already paid adequate court fees on his memorandum
of appeal, no further order need be passed in that
behalf .. There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.